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CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D. W. H. D. ROUSE, utt.d. 












rhst printed 1913 
Rtprinted 1921, 1928 

PrxMtdin Oreat Brttain by Woods and Soni, Lld., LonJon, M. I 



Fage ix 





Book 11 


Book III 





In the de Officiis we have, save for the latter 
PhiUppicSj the great orator's last contribution to 
literature. The last, sad, troubled years of his busj"^ 
life could not be given to his profession; and he 
turned his never-resting thoughts to the second love 
of his student days and made Greek philosophy a 
possibihty for Roman readers. The senate had been 
abohshed; the courts had been closed. His occupa- 
tion was gone ; but Cicero could not surrender himself 
to idleness. In those days of distraction (46-43 b.c.) 
he produced for pubhcation almost as much as in all 
his years of active life. 

The liberators had been able to remove the tyrant, 
but they could not restore the republic. Cicero's 
own hfe was in danger from the fury of mad Antony 
and he left Rome about the end of March^ 44 b.c. 
He dared not even stop permanently in any one of 
his various country estates, but, wretched^ wandered 
from one of his villas to another nearly all the sum- 
mer and autumn through. He would not suffer 
himself to become a prey to his overwhelming sorrow 
at the death of the repubhc and the final crushing 
of the hopes that had risen with Caesar's downfall, 
but worked at the highest tension on his philosophi- 
cal studies. 

The Romans were not philosophical. In l6l b.c. 
the senate passed a decree excluding all philosophers 
and teachers of rhetoric from the city. They had no 
taste for philosophical speculation, in which the 
Greeks were the world's masters. Thej' were in- 
tenselyjnarrowlypractical. And Cicerowas thorough- 


ly lloman. As a studeiit in a Greek university he 
had had to study philosophy. His mind was broad 
enough and his soul great enough to give him a joy 
iii foUowing after the mighty masters, Socrates, Plato, 
Zeno, Cleanthes, Aristotle,Theophrastus,andtherest. 
But he pursued his study of it, hke a Roman, from a 
practical" motive — to promote thereby his poAver 
^ an orator and to augment his success and happi- 
ness in lifc. To him Ihe goal of pliilosoph^' was not 
primarily to know but to do. Its end was to point 
out the course of conduct that would lead to succcss 
and happiness. The only side of philosophy, there- 
fore, that could make much appeal to the Roman 
mind was ethics; pure science could have httle 
meaning for the practical Roman ; metaphysics might 
supplement ethics and rehgion, without which true 
happiness was felt to be impossible. 

Philosophical study had its place, therefore, and 
the most important department of philosophy was 
ethics. The treatise on Moral Duties has the very 
practical purpose of giving a practical discussion of 
the basic principles of Moral Duty and practical 
rules for personal conduct. 

As a philosopher, if we may so stretch the term as 
to include him, Cicero avows himself an adherent of 
the New Academy and a disciple of Carneades. He 
had tried Epicureanism under Phaedrus and Zeno, 
Stoicism under Diodotus and Posidonius ; but Philo 
of Larissa converted him to the New Academy. 

Scepticism declared the attainment of absolute 
knowledge impossible. But there is the easily obtain- 
able golden mean of the probable ; and that appealed 
to the practical Roman. It appealed especially to 
Ciccro; and the same indccision that had been hvs 



bane in political life naturally led him first to scep- 
ticism, then to eclecticism, where his choice is 
dictated by his bias for the practical and his scepti- 
cismitself disappears from view. Andwhile Antiochus, 
the eclectic Academician of Athens, and Posidonius, 
the eclectic Stoic of Rhodes, seem to have had the 
strongest influcnce upon him, he draws at his own 
discretion from the founts of Stoics, Peripatetics, and 
Academicians aHke; he has only contempt for tlie 
Epicureans, Cynics, and Cyrenaics. But the more he 
studied and hved, the more of a Stoic in ethics he 

The cap-sheaf of Cicero's ethical studies is the 
treatise on the Moral Duties. It takes the form of a 
lctter addressed to his son Marcus (see Index), at this 
time a youth of twenty-one, pursuing his university 
studies in the Peripatetic school of Cratippus in 
Athens, and sowing for what promised to be an 
abundant crop of wild oats. This situation gives 
force and definiteness to the practical tendencies of 
the father's ethical teachings. And yet, be it ob- 
served, that same father is not without censure for 
contributing to his son's extravagant and riotous 
living by giving him an allowance of nearly £870 a 

Our Roman makes no pretensions to originahty 
in philosophic thinking. He is a follower — an ex- 
positor — of the Greeks. As the basis of his discussion 
of the Moral Duties he takes the Stoic Panaetius of 
Rhodes (see Index), Uepl Kad-qKovTo<s, drawing also 
from many other sources, but following liim more or 
less closely in Books I and II ; Book III is more in- 
dependent and much inferior. He is usually super- 
ficial and not always clear. He translates and 



paraphrases Greek philosophy, weaving in illustra- 
tions from Roman history and suggestioiis of Roman 
mould in a form intended to make it, if not popular, 
at least comprehensible, to the Roman mind. How 
well he succeeded is evidenced by the comparative 
receptivity of Roman soil prepared by Stoic doctrine 
for the teachings of Christianity. Indeed, Antliony 
Trollope labels our author the Pagan Christian." 
"You would fancy sometimes/' says Petrarch, it 
is not a Pagan philosopher but a Christian apostle 
who is speaking." No less an authority than 
Frederick the Great has called our book the best 
work on morals that has been or can be written." 
Cicero himself looked upon it as his masterpiece. 

It has its strength and its weakness — its sane 
common sense and noble patriotism, its self-conceit 
and partisan poHtics; it has the master's brilhant 
style, but it is full of repetitions and rhetorical 
flourishes, and it fails often in logical order and 
power ; it rings true in its moral tone, but it shows 
in what haste and distraction it was composed; for 
it was not written as a contribution to close scientific 
thinking; it was written as a means of occupation 
and diversion. 



The following works ai*e quoted in the critical 
notes : — 

MSS. A = codex Ambrosianm. Milan. lOth century, 
B = codex Bambergensis. Hamburg. 1 Oth cen- 

H = codex Herbipolitafius. Wiirzburg. 1 Oth cen- 

Ij = codex Harleianus. London. 9th century. 
a b = codices Bernenses. Bern. 1 Oth century. 
c = codex Bemensis, Bern. 1 3tli century. 
p = codex Palatinus, Rome. 12th century. 

Editio Princeps : The first edition of the de OJJIciis 
was from the press of Sweynheim and Pannartz 
at the Monastery of Subiaco ; possibly the edi- 
tion published by Fust and Schoffer at Mainz is 
a little older. Both appeared in 1465. The 
latter was the first to print the Greek words in 
Greek type. The de Officiis is, therefore, the 
fii*st classical book to be issued from a printing 
press, witli the possible exception of Lactantius 
and Cicero's de Oratore which bear the more 
exact date of October 30, 14-65, and were like- 
wise issued from the Monastery press at Subiaco. 

Baiter Sf Kayser: M. TulHi Ciceronis opera quae su- 
persunt omnia. Lipsiae, I86O-69. 

Beier: M. TulUi Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres . . . 
cum commentariis editi a Carolo Beiero. Lipsiae, 

Erasmus: ]M. Tullii Ciceronis Officia, dihgenter 

Melanchthon : f restituta. Ejusdem de Amicitia et 



Senectute dialogi . . , : cum annotationibun 

Erasmi et P. Melanchthonis. Parisiis, ] 5SS. 
Ed. : M. TulUi Ciceronis Scripta quae manserunt 

omnia recognovit C. F. W. Miiller. Teubncr: 

Lipsiae, 1 879. This edition is the basis of the 

text of the present volume. 
Emesti: M. TulHi Ciceronis opera ex recensione 

novissima. J. A. Ernesti ; cum eiusdem notis, 

et clave Ciceroniana. Editio prima Americana, 

Bostoniae, 1815-16. 
Facciolati: M. TulUi Ciceronis de Officiis Ubri tres, de 

Senectutc, de Amicitia, de Somnio Scipionis, 

et Paradoxa. Accedit Q. fratins commentariolum 

petitionis. Ex recensione J. Facciolati. Venc- 

tiis, 1747. 
Fleckeisen, Alf. : Kritische Miscellen. Dresden, 1864, 
Gernhard: M. TuUii Ciceronis de Officiis Ubri tres. 

Rec. et schoUis lac. Facciolati suisque animad- 

versionibus instruxit Aug. G. Gernhard. Lipsiae, 

Graevius : M. TulUi Ciceronis de Officiis Ubri tres ; , . . 

de Senectute ; . . . de Amicitia; Paradoxa; 

Somnium Scipionis ; ex recen^ione J. G. Graevii. 

Amstelodami, 1680. 
Gtdiehnus :\M. Tullii Ciceronis opera omnia quae 
Gruler: j extant . . , emendata studio . . . 

J, GuUelmi et J. Gruteri. Hamburgi, 1618-19. 
Ileine, Otto: M. TuUii Ciceronis de Officiis ad Mar- 

cum FiUum Libri tres. 6te Aufl. Berlin, 188.5. 
Heusinger: M. TuUii Ciceronis de Officiis Ubri tres 

, , , recensuit adjectisque J. M. Heusingeri et 

suis annotationibus , . . editurus erat J. F, 

Heusinger. (Edited by C. Heusinger.) Bruns- 

vigae, 1783, 



Hotden : M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres, with 
Introduction, Analysis and Commentary by 
Herbert Ashton Holden. 7th Edition. Cam- 
bridge, 1891. To his full notes the translator 
is indebted for many a word and phrase. 

Klotz: M. Tulhi Ciceronis Scripta quae manserunt 
omnia. Recognovit Reinholdus Klotz. Lipsiae^ 
1850-57, 1869-74. 

Lamhinus : M. Tullii Ciceronis opera omnia quae ex- 
tant, a D. Lambino . . . ex codicibus manu- 
scriptis emendata et aucta . . . Lutetiao, 

Lange: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis Hb. III. Cato 
Major vel de Senectute . . . Laelius vel de Ami- 
citia . . . Paradoxa Stoicorum sex, Somnium 
Scipionis . . . opera C. Langii recogniti . . . 
ejusdem in hosce . . . libros annobvtiones. Cum 
annotationibus P. Manutii, etc. Antverpiae, 1 568. 

Lund: De emendandis Cicei'onis libris de Officiis 
observationes criticae. Scripsit G. F. G. Lund. 
Kopenhagen, 1848. 

Manutius: M. Tullii Ciceronis Officiorum Hbri tres: 

Cato Maior, vel de Senectute: Laehus, vel de 

Amicitia: Paradoxa Stoicorum sex . . . additae 

sunt . . . variae lectiones, (Edited by P. Manu- 

zio.) P. Manutius: Venetiis, 1541. 

Muller, C. F. W.: M. Tulhi Ciceronis de Officiis 

libri III. Fiir den Schulgebrauch erklart. 

Leipzig, 1882. 

Muretus: M. Antoni Mureti SchoHa in Cic. officia. 

Mureti opera ed. Ruhnken. Lugd. Bat., 1879- 

Orelli: | M. Tulhi Ciceronis opera quae supersunt 

Baiier: \ omnia, ac deperditorum fragmenta . . . 

Halm : ) Edidit J. C. Orellius (M. Tulhi Ciceronis 



Scholiastae. C. M. Victorinus, Rufinus^ C. Julius 
Victor, Boethius, Favonius Eulogius, Asconius 
PedianuSj Scholia Bobiensia, Scholiasta Grono- 
vianus, Ediderunt J. C. OrelHus et J. G. Baiter. 
Turici, 1826-38). Ed. 2. Opus morte Orellii 
interruptum contin. J. G. Baiterus et C. Halmius, 

Pearce: M. Ciceronis de Officiis ad Marcum filium 
libri tres. Notis illustravit et . . . emendavit 
Z. Pearce. Londini, 1745. 

Stuerenburg : M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis hbri III. 
Recensuit R. Stuerenburg. Accedit Commenta- 
rius. Lipsiae, 1843. 

Unger: M. TulHi Ciceronis de Officiis hbri III. 
Erklart v. G. F. Unger. Leipzig, 1852. 

Victorius, P. : M. Tulhi Ciceronis opera, omnium 
quae hactenus excusa sunt castigatissima, nunc 
primum in lucem edita. 4 tom. Venetiis, 

Zumpt : M. Tulhi Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres cum 
selectis J. M. et J. F. Heusingerorum suisque 
notis. Scholarum in usum iterum edidit Car. 
Tim. Zumptius. Brunsvigae, 1849. 






I. Quamquam te^ Marce filij annum iam audientem 
Cratippum, idque AtheniSj abundare oportet prae- 
ceptis institutisque philosophiae propter summam et 
doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, quorum alter te scien- 
tia augere potest, altera exemphs, tamen, ut ipse ad 
meam utihtatem semper cum Graecis Latina coniunxi 
neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam in dicendi 
exercitatione feci, idem tibi censeo faciendum, ut par 
sis in utriusque orationis facultate. Quam quidem 
ad rem nos, ut videmur, magnum attuhmus adiumen- 
tum hominibus nostris, ut non modo Graecarum 
htterarum rudes, sed etiam docti ahquantum se 
arbitrentur adeptos et ad dicendum^ et ad iudican- 

Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius 
aetatis philosophorum, et disces, quam diu voles ; tam 
diu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, 
non paenitebit ; sed tamen nostra legens non multum 
a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici 
et Platonici volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo 
iudicio (nihil enim impedio), orationem autem Lati- 

^dicendum Edd.j discendum MSS. (i.e. acquisition of 



1. My dear son Marcus, you have now been study- introducHon: 
iug a full year under Cratippus, and that too in o^tomWning*^* 
Athens, and you should be fuUy equipped with the Greek and Latin 
practical precepts and the principles of philosoi^hy ; so 
much at least one might expect from the pre-emi- 
nence not only of your teacher but also of the city ; 
the former is able to enrich you with learning, the 
latter to supply you with models. Nevertheless, just 
as I for my own improvement have always combined 
Greek and Latin studies — and I have done this not 
only in the study of philosophy but also in the prac- 
bice of oratory — so I recommend that you should do 
the same, so that you may have equal command of 
both languages. And it is in this very direction that 
I have, if I mistake not, rendered a great service 
to our countrymen, so that not only those who are 
unacquainted with Greek Hterature but even the 
cultured consider that they have gained much both 
in oratorical power and in mental training. 

You will, therefore, learn from the foremost of Greek PhiT». 
present-day philosophers, and you will go on learning cicero-s^own. 
as long as you wish ; and your wish ought to continue 
as long as you are not dissatisfied with the progress 
you are making. For all that, if you will read my 
philosophical books, you will be helped ; my philosophy 
is not very difFerent from that of the Peripatetics (for 
both they and I claim to be foUowers of Socrates and 
Plato). As to the conclusions you may reach, I leave 
that to your own judgment (for I would put no hind- 
rance in your way), but by reading my philosophical 
b2 ^ 


nam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec 
vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam 
philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est 
oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, 
quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi 
assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare. 

Quam ob rem magnopere te hortor, mi Cicero, ut 
non solum orationes meas, sed hos etiam de philo- 
sophia libros, qui iam iUis fere se ^ aequarunt, studi- 
ose legas ; vis enim maior in illis dicendi, sed hoc 
quoque colendum est aequabile et temperatum ora- 
tionis genus. Et id quidem nemini video Graecorum 
adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere elabo- 
raret ^ sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc 
quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Pha- 
lereus in hoc numero haberi potest, disputator sub- 
tilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut 
Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere. Nos autem 
quantum in utroque profecerimus, aliorum sit iu- 
dicium, utrumque certe secuti sumus 

Equidem et Platonem existimo, si genus forense 
dicendi tractare voluisset, gravissime et copiosissime 
potuisse dicere, et Demosthenem, si illa, quae a 
Platone didicerat, tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset, 
ornate splendideque facere potuisse; eodemque 
modo de Aristotele et Isocrate iudico, quorum uter- 
que suo studio delectatus contempsit alterum. 

^se A c, Edd. ; not in B H a b p. 

^ elaboraret Lambin., Edd. ; laboraret MSS. 

«Cicero is alluding to his Republic, Tusculan Disputations, 

Theories of the Supreme Good and Evil, The Nature of the 

Gods, Academics, Hortensius, his essays on Friendship 

(Laelius), Old Agre (Cato), Fate, Divination, etc. (15 in all). 


BOOK I. i 

writings you will be sure to render your mastery of 
the Latin language more complete. But I would by 
no means have you think that this is said boastfuUy. 
For there are many to whom I yield precedence in 
knowledge of philosophy ; but if I lay claim to tlie 
orator's pecuhar abihty to speak with propriety, 
clearness, elegance, I think my claim is in a measure 
justified, for I have spent my life in that profession, 

And therefore, my dear Cicero, I cordially re- PWiosophy 

, , n Ti 1 i-ii andoratory, 

commend you to read careiully not oniy my orations but 
also these* books of mine on philosophy, which are 
now about as extensive. For while the orations ex- 
hibit a more vigorous style, yet the unimpassioned, 
restrained style of my philosophical productions is 
also worth cultivating. Moreover, for the same man 
to succeed in both departments, both in the forensic 
style and in that of calm philosophic discussion has 
not, I observe, been the good fortune of any one of the 
Greeks so far, unless, perhaps, Demetrius of Phalerum 
can be reckoned in that number — a clever reasoner, 
indeed, and, though rather a spiritless orator, he is 
yet charming, so that you can recognize in him the 
disciple of Theophrastus. But let others judge how 
much I have accomphshed in each pursuit; I have 
at least attempted both. 

I believe, of course, that if Plato had been willing 
to devote himself to forensic oratory, he could have 
spoken with the greatest eloquence and power; and 
that if Demosthenes had continued the studies he 
pursued with Plato and had wished to expound his 
views, he could have done so with elegance and 
brilHancy. I feel the same way about Aristotle and 
Isocrates, each of whom, engrossed in his own pro- 
fession, undervalued that of the other. 


II. Sed cum statuissem scribere ad te aliquid hoc 
tempore, multa posthac, ab eo ordiri maxime volui, 
quod et aetati tuae esset aptissimum et auctoritati 
meae. Nam cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia 
et utilia accurate copioseque a philosophis disputata, 
latissime patere videntur ea, quae de officiis tradita 
ab iUis et praecepta sunt. Nulla enim vitae pars 
neque publicis neque privatis neque forensibus neque 
domesticis in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid, neque 
si cum altero contrahas, vacare officio potest, in eo- 
que et colendo sita vitae est honestas omnis et negle- 
gendo^ turpitudo. 

5 Atque haec quidem quaestio communis est omnium 
philosophorum ; quis est enim, qui nulUs officii prae- 
ceptis tradendis philosophum" se audeat dicere ? Sed 
sunt non nuUae disciplinae, quae propositis bonorum 
et malorum finibus officium omne pervertant. Nam 
qui summum bonum sic instituit, ut nihil habeat cum 
virtute coniunctum, idque suis commodis, non hone- 
state metitur, hic, si sibi ipse consentiat et non in- 
terdum naturae bonitate vincatur neque amicitiam 
colere possit nec iustitiam nec Uberalitatem ; fortis 
vero dolorem summum malum iudicans aut temperans 
voluptatem summum bonum statuens esse certe nuUo 
modo potest. 

6 Quae quamquam ita sunt in promptu, ut res dis- 
i2ff.'"Tusc. putatione non egeat, tamen sunt a nobis alio loco 
de off' nT' disputata. Hae discipUnae igitur si sibi consentaneae 


^et neglegendo A H a b, Edd.; et in neglegendo B c. 


BOOK I. i\ 

IT. But sii.v-c I liave decided to write you a little statementof 
now (and a great deal by and by), I wish, if possible, ^" ^^"^ ' 
to begin with a matter most suited at once to your 
years and to my position. Although philosophy 
ofFers many problems, both important and useful, 
that have beer fully and carefully discussed by 
philosophers, those teachings which have been 
handed down on the subject of moral duties seem 
to have the widest practical application. For no 
phase of life, whether public or private, whether in 
business or in the home, whether one is working on 
what concerns oneself alone or dealing with 
another, can be without its moral duty; on the 
discharge of such duties depends all that is morally 
right, and on their neglect all that is morally wrong 
in life. 

Moreover, the subject of this inquiry is the com- The phiiosopWi 
mon property of all philosophers ; for who would ethicai teachim 
presume to call himself a philosopher, if he did not 
inculcate any lessons of duty ? But there are some 
schools that distort all notions of duty by the theories 
they propose touching the supreme good and the 
supreme evil. For he who posits the supreme good 
as having no connection with virtue and measures it 
not by a moral standard but by his own interests — 
if he should be consistent and not rather at times 
over-ruled by his better nature, he could value 
neither friendship nor justice nor generosity; and 
brave he surely cannot possibly be that counts pain 
the supreme evil, nor temperate he that holds 
pleasure to be the supreme good. 

Although these truths are so self-evident that the Reasons for 
subject does not call for discussion, still I have dis- subject°and 
cussed it in another connection. If, therefore, these authonties. 



velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere, neque ulla 
officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae 
tradi possunt nisi aut ab iis, qui solam, aut ab iis, qui 
maxime honestatem propter se dicant expetendam. 
Ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum, Academico- 
rum, Peripateticorum, quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, 
Erilli iam pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen 
haberent ius suum disputandi de officio, si rerum ali- 
quem dilectum^ reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem 
aditus esset. Sequemur ^ igitur hoc quidem tempore et 
hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpre- 
tes, sed,ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque 
nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus. 
Placet igitur, quoniam omnis disputatio de officio 
futura est, ante definire, quid sit officium; quod a 
Panaetio praetermissum esse miror. Omnis enim, 
quae [a] ratione^ suscipitur de aUqua re institutio, 
debet a definitione proficisci, ut intellegatur, quid sit 
id, de quo disputetur. . . .^ 

III. Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio: unum 
genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum, alterum, 
quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnis partis 
usus vitae conformari ^ possit. Superioris generis huius 
modi sunt exempla: omniane officia perfecta sint, 
num quod officium aliud aho maius sit, et quae sunt 
generis eiusdem. Quorum autem officiorum praecepta 
traduntur,ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum, 
tamen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem 
vitae communis spectare videntur; de quibus est 

' dilectutn B H a b, Edd.; delectum A c. 

* sequemur Graevius, Edd. ; sequimur MSS. 

*[a] ratione Ed. ; a ratione MSS. ; ratione Miiller. 

*Cicero's definifion must have followed here, something' 
like Omne igitur, quod ratione actum est officium appellamus 
Unger. ^ conformari Edd. ; confirmari MSS. (i.e. fortified). 


BOOK I. ii-iii 

schools should claim to be consistent, they could not 
say anything about duty ; and no fixed, invariable, 
natural rules of duty can be posited except by those 
who say that moral goodness is worth seeking solely 
or chiefly for its own sake. Accordingly, the teach- 
ing of ethics is the pecuhar right of the Stoics, the 
Academicians, and the Peripatetics ; for the theories 
of Aristo, Pyrrho, and Erillus have been long since 
rejected; and yet they would have the right to dis- 
cuss duty if they had left us any power of choosing 
between things, so that there might be a way of 
fmding out what duty is. I shall, therefore, at this 
time and in this investigation follow chiefly the 
Stoics, not as a translator, but, as is my custom, I 
shall at my own option and discretion draw from 
those sources in such measure and in such manner 
as shall suit my purpose. 

Since, therefore, the whole discussion is to be on 
the subject of duty, I should hke at the outset to 
define what duty is, as, to my surprise, Panaetius has 
failed to do. For every systematic development of any 
subject ought to begin with a definition, so that every 
one may understand what the discussion is about. 

III. Every treatise on duty has two parts : one,deal- ciassification 
ing with the doctrine of the supreme good ; the other, °* ^^^'^^- 
with tlie practical rules by which daily hfe in all its 
bearings may be regulated. The following questions 
are illustrative of the first part: whether all duties 
are absolute ; whether one duty is more important 
than another; and so on. But as regards special 
duties for which positive rules are laid down, though 
they are affected by the doctrine of the supreme 
good, still the fact is not so obvious, because they 
seem rather to look to the regulation of every-day 



nobis his libris explicandum. Atque etiam alia divisio 
est officii. 

8 Nam et medium quoddam officium dicitur et per- 
fectum. Perfectum officium rectum, opinor, vocemus, 
quoniam Graeci Karopdoifia, hoc autem commune 
officium Ka^TjKovvocant.^ Atque ea sic definiunt, ut, 
rectum quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant ; 
medium autem officium id esse dicunt, quod cur fa- 
ctum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit. 

9 Triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii 
capiendi dehberatio. Nam aut honestumne factu sit 
an turpe dubitant id, quod in deliberationem cadit; 
in quo considerando saepe animi in contrarias senten- 
tias distrahuntur. Tum autem aut anquirunt^ aut con- 
sultant, ad vitae commoditatem iucunditatemque, ad 
facultates rerum atque copias, ad opes, ad potentiam, 
quibus et se possint iuvare et suos, conducat id necne, 
de quo dehberant ; quae dehberatio omnis in rationem 
utihtatis cadit. Tertium dubitandi genus est, cum 
pugnare videtur cum honesto id, quod videtur esse 
utile ; cum enim utihtas ad se rapere, honestas contra 
revocare ad se videtur, fit ut distrahatur in deHbe- 
rando animus afferatque ancipitem curam cogitandi. 

10 Hac divisione, cum praeterire ahquid maximum 
vitium in dividendo sit, duo praetermissa sunt ; nec 

^ officium Ko.Qr\Kov vocani Pearce, Ed., Heine ; officium 
vocant MSS., Bt. ^anquirunt A B H b ; inquirunt a c. 

* Cicero's technical terms are difficult because he has to 
invent them to translate Greek that is perfectly simple: 

rectum is 'right,' i.e. perfect, absolute. Its opposite is 
medium, 'mean,'i.e. intermediate, fallingshortof the 'abso- 
lute ' and occupying a middle ground ; common ; ordinary. 

hon stum is ' morally right '; as a noun, ' moral goodness' 
( = honestas) ; its opposite is turfie, 'morally wrong.' 

honestas is ' moral rectitude,' — ' moral goodness'; 'mo- 
rality '; its opposite turpitudo, ' moral wrong,' ' immorality.* 

^ JOK I. iii 

life; and it is thcse special duties that I propose to 
treat at length in the following books. 

And yet there is still another classification of 
duties: we distinguish between mean"* duty, so- 
calledj and ' absolute" duty. Absolute duty we 
may, I presume. call right/' for the Greeks call it 
KaTopdw/J-a, whilc the ordinary duty they call KaQyjKov. 
And the meaning of those terms they fix thus : what- 
ever is right they define as absolute duty, but 
' mean" duty, they say, is duty for the performance 
of which an adequate reason may be rendered. 

The consideration necessary to determine conduct The threefold 
is, therefore, as Panaetius thinks, a threefold one : Setius"'" °' 
first, people que tion wliether the contemplated act 
is morally right or morally wrong; and in such 
dehberation their minds are often led to widely 
divergent conclusions. And then they examine and 
consider the question whether the action contem- 
plated is or is not conducive to comfort and happiness 
in Ufe, to the command of means and wealth, to 
influence, and to power, by which they may be able 
to help themselves and their friends; this whole 
matter turns upon a question of expediency. The 
third type of question arises when that which seems 
to be expedient seems to conflict with that which is 
morally right ; for when expediency seems to be pull- 
ing one way, while moral right seems to be calling 
back in the opposite direction, the result is that the 
mind is distracted in its inquiry and brings to it the 
irresolution that is born of deliberation. 

Although omission is a most serious defect in The question is 
classification, two points have been overlooked in 

honestus, on the other hand, is always ' honourable '; and 
honores are always ' offices of honour.' 


enim solum utrum honestum an turpe sit, deliberari 
solet, sed etiam duobus propositis honestis utrum 
honestius, itemque duobus propositis utilibus utrum 
utilius. Ita, quam ille triplicem putavit esse rationem, 
in quinque partes distribui debere reperitur. Primum 
igitur est de honesto, sed dupliciter, tum pari ratione 
de utili, post de comparatione eorum disserendum. 

11 IV. Principio generi animantium omni est a natura 
tributum, ut se, vitam corpusque tueatur, declinet ea, 
quae nocitura videantur, omniaque, quae sint ad vi- 
vendum necessaria, anquirat et paret, ut pastum, ut 
latibula, ut alia generis eiusdem. Commune item^ 
animantium omnium est coniunctionis adpetitus pro- 
creandi causa et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata 
sint^; sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime in- 
terest, quod haec tantum, quantum sensu movetur, 
ad id solum, quod adest quodque praesens est, se accom- 
modat paulum admodum sentiens praeteritum aut fu- 
turum ; homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per 
quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt earum- 
que praegressus' et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, 
atque annectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt 
ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias. 

12 Eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat 
homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem inge- 

^item Manutius, Edd. ; autem MSS. 

^procreata sint B H a b; procreata sunt A. (?), Bt.; pro- 
creantur c. ^ praegressus A H a b, lS.Ad,; progressus B c 

aFor Panaetius was a Stoic, and the Stoics did notadmit 
that there were any degrees of right or wrong. 

BOOK I. iii-iv 

the foregoing:* for we usually consider not only 
whether an action is morally right or morally wrong', 
but also, when a choice of two morally right courses 
is offered, which one is morally better ; and hkewise, 
when a choice of two expedients is offeredj which onf 
is more expedient. Thus the question which Panaetiui 
thought threefold ought, we find, to be divided into 
five parts. First, therefore, we must discuss the moral 
— and that, under two sub-heads ; secondly, in the 
same manner, the expedient; and finally, the cases 
where they must be weighed against each other. 

IV. First of all, Nature has endowed every species The essentlai 
of hving creature with the instinct of self-preserva- betwe^en man 
tion, of avoiding what seems hkely to cause injury andthelower 
to hfe or Hmb, and of procuring and providing every- 
thing needful for hfe — food, shelter, and the Hke. 
A common property of all creatures is also the 
reproductive instinct (the purpose of which is the 
propagation of the species) and also a certain amount instinct and 
of concern for their offspring. But the most marked ^^^°"- 
difference between man and beast is this : the beast, 
just as far as it is moved by the senses and with 
very httle perception of past or future, adapts itself 
to that alone which is present at the moment ; while 
man — because he is endowed with reason, by which 
he comprehends the chain of consequences, perceives 
the causes of things, understands the relation of 
cause to effect and of effect to cause, draws analogies, 
and connects and associates the present and the 
future — easily surveys the course of his whole hfe 
and makes the necessary preparations for its conduct. 

Nature hkewise by the power of reason associates 
man with man in the common bonds of speech and FakJiy ties. 
hfe; she implants in him above all, I may say, a 


neratque in primis praecipuum quendam amorem in 
eos^ qui procreati sunt, impellitque, ut hominum 
coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit ob 
easque causas studeat parare ea, quae suppeditent ad 
cultum et ad victumj nec sibi solij sed coniugi^ liberis 
eeterisque, quos caros habeat tuerique debeat; quae 
cura exsuscitat etiam animos et maiores ad rem ge- 
rendam facit. 

13 In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio 
atque/ investigatio. Itaque cum sumus necessariis 
negotiis curisque vacui, tum avemus aliquid videre, 
audire, addiscere cognitionemque rerum aut occul- 
tarum aut admirabihum ad beate vivendum neces- 
sariam ducimus. Ex quo intellegitur, quod verum, 
simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae hominis 
aptissimum. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta 
est appetitio quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere 
animus bene informatus a natura velit nisi praeci- 
pienti aut docenti aut utiUtatis causa iuste et legi- 
time imperanti; ex quo magnitudo animi existit 
humanarumque rerum contemptio. 

14 Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque, 
quod unum hoc animal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid 
sit, quod deceat, in factis dictisque qui modus. 
Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae aspectu sentiuntur, nul- 
lum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, con- 
venientiam partium sentit ; quam similitudinem natura 
ratioque ab ocuhs ad animum transferens multo etiam 


BOOK I. iv 

strangely tender love for his offspring. She also 
prompts men to meet in companies, to form pubhc 
assemblies and to take part in them themselves ; and 
she further dictates, as a consequence of this, the 
effort on man's part to provide a store of things that 
minister to his comforts and vv^ants — and not for 
himself alone, but for his wife and children and the 
others whom he holds dear and for whom he ought 
to provide; and this responsibihty also stimulates 
his (courage) and makes it stronger for the active 
duties ^^i^T~~~--/UjSr / j4^/(^**^ 

Above all, the search after truth and its eager Search after 
pursuit are pecuhar to man. And so, when we have *^'^"'"* 
leisure from the demands of business cares, we are 
eager to see, to hear, to learn something new, and 
we esteem a desire to know the secrets or wonders 
of creation as indispensable to a happy hfe. Thus 
we come to understand that what is true, simple, 
and genuine appeals most strongly to a man's 
nature. To this passion for discovering truth there 
is added a hungering, as it were, for independence, 
so that a mind well-moulded by Nature is unwilling 
to be subject to anybody save one who gives rules of 
conduct or is a teacher of truth or who, for the 
general good, rules according to justice and law, 
From this attitude come greatness of soul and a sense 
of superiority to worldly conditions. 

And it is no mean ihanifestation of Nature and Moral 
Reason that man is the only animal that has a feel- sensibiUty. 
ing for order,forpropriety,for moderation in word and 
deed. And so no other animal has a sense of beauty, 
lovehness, harmony in the visible world ; and Nature 
and Reason, extending the analogy of this from the 
world of sense to the world of spirit, find that beauty, 



magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in con- 
siliis factisque conservandam ^ putat cavetque, ne 
quid indecore efFeminateve faciat, tum in omnibus et 
opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat 
aut cogitet. 

Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod 
quaerimus, honestum, quod etiamsi nobihtatum non 
sit, tamen honestum sit, quodque vere dicimus, 
etiamsi a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile. 

15 V. Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fih, et tamquam 
faciem honesti vides, quae si ocuhs cerneretur, 

Phaedr., mirabiles amores," ut ait Plato, excitaretsapientiae." 
Sed omne, quod est honestum, id quattuor partium 
oritur ex ahqua : aut enim in perspicientia veri soller- 
tiaque versatur aut in hominum societate tuenda 
tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum 
fide aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine 
ac robore aut in omniura, quae fiunt quaeque dicun- 
tur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et 
(15) Quae quattuor quamquam inter se colhgata atque 
imphcata sunt, tamen ex singuhs certa officiorum 
genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte, quae prima 
discripta ^ est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam 
ponimus, inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque 

16 virtutis hoc munus est proprium. Ut enim quisque 
maxime perspicit, quid in re quaque verissimum sit, 

^ conservandam MSS. ; conservanda codd. aliquot recen- 
tiores, Bt. 

* discripta Heinc ; descripia MSS., Bt. 

*Cicero plays on the double meaning- of honestum: (i) 
'moral goodness,' and (2) 'honourable, ' distinguished, 


;nOK I. iv-v 

consistency, order 'rp. far more to be maintained in 
thought and deed^ and the same Nature and Reason 
are careful to do nothing in an improper or unmanly 
fashion^ and in every thought and deed to do or 
think nothing capriciously. 

It is from these elements that is forged and 
fashioned that moral goodness which is the subject 
of this inquiry — something that, even though it be 
not generally ennobled, is still worthy of all honour*; 
and by its own nature, we correctly maintain, it 
merits praise, even though it be praised by none. 

V. You see here, Marcus, my son^ the very form and 
as it were the face of Moral Goodness ; and if," as 
Plato says, it could be seen with the physical eye^ it 
would awaken a marvellous love of wisdom." But 
all that is morally right rises from some one of 
four sources, : it is concerned either (l) with the The four Car- 
full perception and intelHgent development of the 
true; or (2) with the conservation of organized 
society, with rendering to every man his due, and 
with the faithful discharge of obligations assumed ; 
or (3) with the greatness and strength of a noble 
and invincible spirit; or (4) with the orderliness 
and moderation of everything that is said and done, 
wherein consist temperance and self-control. 

Although these four are connected and inter- Theirseverai 
woven, still it is in each one considered singly that P''°^'°'^®^" 
certain definite kinds of moral duties have their 
origin: in that category^ for instance^ which was 
designated first in our division and in which we 
place wisdom and prudence, belong the search after 
truth and its discovery; and this is the pecuHar 
province of that virtue. For the more clearly any- 
one observes the most essential truth in any given 
c 17 


quique acutissime et celerrime potest et videre et 
explieare rationem, is prudentissimus et sapientissi- 
mus rite haberi solet. Quocirca huic quasi materia, 
quam tractet et in qua versetur^ subiecta est veritas. 

17 ReHquis autem tribus virtutibus necessitates pro- 
positae sunt ad eas res parandas tuendasque, quibus 
actio vitae contineturj ut et societas hominum con- 
iunctioque servetur et animi excellentia magnitudoque 
cum in augendis opibus utiHtatibusque et sibi et 
suis comparandis, tum multo magis in his ipsis 
despiciendis eluceat. Ordo autem^ et constantia 
et moderatio et ea, quae sunt his simiHa, versantur 
in eo genere, ad quod est adhibenda actio quaedam, 
non solum mentis agitatio. lis enim rebus, quae 
tractantur in vita^ modum quendam et ordinem 
adhibentes honestatem et decus conservabimus. 

18 VI. Ex quattuor autem locis^ in quos honesti na- 
turam vimque divisimus, primus ille, qui in veri 
cognitione consistit, maxime naturam attingit huma- 
nam. Omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cogni- 
tionis et scientiae cupiditatem, in qua excellere 
pulchrum putamus, labi autem, errare, nescire, decipi 
et malum et turpe ducimus.^ In hoc genere et 
naturaH et honesto duo vitia vitanda sunt, unum, ne 
incognita procognitis habeamus iisque temere assenti- 
amur; quod vitium efFugere qui volet (omnes autem 

1 autem MSS., Muller, Heine ; item Pearce, Ed., Bt. 

2 ducimus c, Edd. ; dicimtis A B H a b. 


BOOK I. v-vi 

case and the more quickly and accurately he can 
see and explain the reasons for itj the more under- 
standing and wise he is generally esteemed, and 
justly so. Soj then^ it is truth that is, as it were, 
the stufF with which this virtue has to deal and on 
which it employs itself. 

Before the three remaining virtues^ on the other 
handj is set the task of providing and maintaining 
those things on which the practical business of Hfe 
depends, so that the relations of man to man in 
human society may be conserved, and that largeness 
and nobility of soul may be revealed not only in 
increasing one's resources and acquiring advantages 
6or one's self and one's family but far more in rising 
superior to these very things. But orderly behaviour 
and consistency of demeanour and self-control and 
the like have their sphere in that department of 
things in which a certain amount of physical exer- 
tionj and not mental activity merely, is required. 
For if we bring a certain amount of propriety and 
order into the transactions of daily life, we shall be 
conserving moral rectitude and moral dignity. 

VI. Now, of the four divisions which we have a. Wisdom 
made of the essential idea of moral goodness, the 
first, consisting in the knowledge of truth, touches 
human nature most closely. For we are all attracted 
and drawn to a zeal for learning and knowing ; and 
we think it glorious to excel therein, while we count 
it base and immoral to fall into error, to wander 
from the truth, to be ignorant, to be led astray. In 
this pursuit, which is both natural and morally 
right, two errors are to be avoided : first, we must 
not treat the unknown as known and too readily 
accept it ; and he who wishes to avoid this error (as 
c2 19 

velle debent), adhibebit ad considerandas res et 

19 tempus et diligentiam. Alterum est vitium, quod 
quidam nimis magnum studium multamque operam 
in res obscuras atque difficiles conferunt easdemque 
non necessarias. 

Quibus vitiis declinatis quod in rebus honestis et 
cognitione dignis operae curaeque ponetur, id iure 
laudabitur, ut in astrologia C. Sulpicium audivimus, 
in geometria Sex. Pompeium ipsi cognovimus, multos 
in dialecticis, plures in iure civili, quae omnes artes 
in veri investigatione versantur ; cuius studio a rebus 
gerendis abduci contra officium est. Virtutis enim 
laus omnis in actione consistit ; a qua tamen fit in- 
termissio saepe multique dantur ad studia reditus; 
tum agitatio mentis, quae numquam acquiescit, po- 
test nos in studiis cognitionis etiam sine opera 
nostra continere. Omnis autem cogitatio motusque 
animi aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis et 
pertinentibus ad bene beateque vivendum aut in 
studiis scientiae cognitionisque versabitur. 

Ac de primo quidem officii fonte diximus. 

20 VII. De tribus autem reliquis latissime patet ea 
ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi 
communitas continetur; cuius partes duae,^ iustitia, 
in qua virtutis est splendor maximus, ex qua viri 
bonl nominantur, et huic coniuncta beneficentia, 

* cognttionis A, Bt., Miiller, Heine ; cogitationis BH a b c 
(error caused by cogitatio in next line). 
^partes duae BH b ; partes duae sunt c, Bt., Heine 

BOOK I. vi-vii 

all should do) will devote both time and attention 
to the weighing of evidence. The other error is 
that some people devote too much industry and too 
deep study to matters that are obscure and difficult 
and useless as well. 

If these errors are successfully avoided^ all the 
labour and pains expended upon problems that are 
morally right and worth the solving will be fully 
rewarded. Such a worker in the field of astronomy, 
for example, was Gaius Sulpicius, of whom we have 
heard; in mathematics, Sextus Pompey, whom I 
have known personally; in dialectics, many; in civil 
law, still more. All these professions are occupied 
with the search after truth; but to be drawn by 
study away from active life is contrary to moral 
duty. For the whole glory of virtue is in activity ; 
activity, however, may often be interrupted, and 
many opportunities for returning to study are opened. 
Besides, the working of the mind, which is never at 
rest, can keep us busy in the pursuit of knowledge 
even without conscious effort on our part. More- 
over, all our thought and mental activity will be 
devoted either to planning for things that are mor- 
ally right and that conduce to a good and happy Ufe, 
or to the pursuits of science and learning. 

With this we close the discussion of the first 
source of duty. 

VII. Of the three remainlng divisions, the most B. justice 
extensive in its application is the principle by which 
society and what we may call its common bonds" 
are maintained. Of this again there are two 
divisions — ^justice, in which is the crowning glory 
of tlie virtues and on the basis of which men are 
called good men"; and, close akin to justice, 


quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem 
appellari licet. 

Sed iustitiae primum munus estj ut ne cui quis 

noceat nisi lacessitus iniuria, deinde ut communibus 

pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis. 

21 Sunt autem privata nulla natura, sed aut vetere 

occupationCj ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt, aut 

victoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt, aut lcge, pactione, 

condicionCj sorte ; ex quo fitj ut ager Arpinas Arpi- 

natium dicatur, Tusculanus Tusculanorum ; similisque 

est privatarum possessionum discriptio.'' Ex quo, 

quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae natura fuerant 

communia, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat; 

e quo ^ si quis sibi appetet, violabit ius humanae socie- 


22 Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, 

Ep IX, ad non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem 


368 A patria vindicat, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, 

quae in terris gignantur, ad usum hominum omnia 
creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, 
ut ipsi inter se aHis alii prodesse possent, in hoc 
naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utihtates 
in medium afFerre mutatione officiorum, dando acci- 

^discriptio B, Edd. ; descriptio A II a b c. 
^e quo A' H a b c, Miiller ; eo B, de quo Bt. (suppl.), Heine. 


BOOK I. vii 

charity, which may also be called kindness orj^ene- 

T-he first office of justice is to keep one man from 
doing harm to another, unless provoked by vprong ; 
anJ the next is to lead men to use common posses- 
sions fcr the common interests, private property 
for their omil 

There is, ho"wa\er no such thing as private PubUc 
ownership estabhshed bj nature, but property be- prrvate 
comes private either through long occupancy (as in interests. 
the case of those who long ago settled in unoccupied 
territory) or through conquest (as in the case of 
those who took it in war) or by due process of law, 
bargain, or purchase, or by allotment. On this prin- 
ciple the lands of Arpinum are said to belong to the 
Arpinates, the Tusculan lands to the Tusculans ; and 
similar is the assignment of private property. There- 
fore, inasmuch as in each case some of those things 
which by nature had been common property be- 
eame the property of individuals, each one should 
retain possession of that which has fallen to his lot ; 
and if anyone appropriates to himself anything 
beyond that, he will be violating the laws of human 

But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we 
are not born for ourselves alone, but our country 
claims a share of our being, and our friends a share; 
and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the 
earth produces is created for man's use ; and as men, 
too, are born for the sake of men, that they may be 
able mutually to help one another ; in this direction 
we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contri- 
bute to the general good by an interchange of acts 
of kindness, by giving and reeeiving, and thus by 


piendo, tum artibus, tum operaj tum facultatibus 
devincire hominum inter homines societatem. 
23 Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est 
dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas. 
Ex quo^ quamquam hoc videbitur fortasse cuipiam 
durius, tamen audeamus imitari Stoicos, qui studiose 
exquirunt, unde verba sint ducta, credamusque, quia 
fiatj quod dictum est, appellatam fidem. 

Sed iniustitiae genera duo sunt^ unum eoi-um, qui 
inferunt, alterum eorum_, qui ab iis, quibus infertur, 
si possunt, non propulsant iniuriam. Nam qui iniuste 
impetum in quempiam facit aut ira aut aliqua pertur- 
batione incitatus, is quasi manus afferre videtur socio ; 
qui autem non defendit nec obsistit, si potest, iniuriae, 
tam est in vitio, quam si parentes aut amicos aut 

24 patriam deserat. Atque illae quidem iniuriae, quae 
nocendi causa de industria inferuntur, saepe a metu 
proficiscuntur, cum is, qui nocere alteri cogitat, timet 
ne, nisi id fecerit, ipse aliquo afficiatur incommodo. 
Maximam autem partem ad iniuriam faciendam ag- 
grediuntur, ut adipiscantur ea, quae concupiverunt ; 
in quo vitio latissime patet avaritia. 

25 VIII. Expetuntur autem divitiae cum ad usus 
vitae necessarios, tum ad perfruendas voluptates. 
In quibus autem maior est animus, in iis pecuniae 
cupiditas spectat ad opes et ad gratificandi facul- 
tatem, ut nuper M. Crassus negabat ullam satis 

^Of course, ' g-ood faith' and ' made gfood' have just as 
little etymological connedl;ion a.sjiat a.ndjidem. 


300K I. vii-viii 

our skill, c _..austry, and our talents to cement 
human society more closely together, man to man. 

The foundation of justice^ moreover, is good faith — Cood faith. 
that is, truth and fidehty to promises and agree- 
ments. And therefore \ve may follow the Stoics, 
who diligently investigate the etymology of words ; 
and we may accept their statement that good faith " 
is so called because what is promised is made good/' 
although some may find tliis derivation^ rather far- 

There ar^ ■-■. the other hand, two kinds of injus- injustice: 
tice — tht. -^ the part of those who inflict wrong, passive. 

the other o> ;art of those who, when they can, do 

not shield from wrong those upon whom it is being 
inflicted. For he who, under the influence of anger 
or some other passion, wrongfully assaults another 
seems, as it were, to be laying violent hands upon a 
comrade; b ,". ''.c who does not prevent or oppose 
wrong, if he can, is just as guilty of wrong as if he 
desei-ted his parents or his friends or his country. 
Then, too, those very wrongs which people try to in- 
flict on purpose to injure are often the result of fear: 
that is, he who premeditates injuring another is 
afraid that, if he does not do so, he may himself be 
made to sufler some hurt. But for the most part, 
people are led to wrong-doing in order to secure 
some personal end ; in this vice, avarice is generally 
the controlling motive. 

VIII. Again, men seek riches partly to supply 
the needs of hfe, partly to secure the enjoyment of 
pleasure. With those who cherish higher ambitions, The dangers of 
the desire for wealth is entertained with a view to *"^ * ""^* 
power and influence and the means of bestowing 
favours ; Marcus Crassus, for example, not long since 



magnam pecumam esse ei, qui in re publica princeps 
vellet esse, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non pos- 
set. Delectant etiam magnifici apparatus vitaeque 
cultus cum elegantia et copia ; quibus rebus efFectum 
estj ut infinita pecuniae cupiditas esset. Nec vero 
rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda 
estj sed fugienda semper iniuria est. 

26 Maxime autem adducuntur plerique, ut eos iusti- 
tiae capiat oblivio, cum in imperiorum, honorum, 
gloriae cupiditatem inciderunt. ^ Quod enim est 
apud Ennium: 

Niilla sancta societas 
Nec fides regni est, 
id latius patet. Nam quicquid eius modi est, in quo 
non possint plures excellerej in eo fit plerumque 
tanta contentio, ut difficillimum sit servare san- 
ctam societatem." Declaravit id modo temeritas C. 
Caesaris, qui omnia iura divina et humana pervertit 
propter eum, quem sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat, 
principatum. Est autem in hoc genere molestum, 
quod in maximis animis splendidissimisque ingeniis 
plerumque exsistunt honoris, imperii, potentiae, 
gloriae cupiditates. Quo magis cavendum est, ne 
quid in eo genere peccetur. 

27 Sed in omni iniustitia permultum interest, utrum 

' tnciderunt A B H L a b ; inciderint c. 

BOOK I. viii 

declared that no amount of wealth was enough for 
the man who aspired to be the foremost citizen of 
the state, unless with the income from it he could 
maintain an army. Fine establishments and the 
comforts of life ia elegance and abundance also 
afFord pleasure, and the desire to secure it gives rise 
to the insatiable thirst for wealth. Still, I do not 
mean to find fault with the accumulation of property, 
provided it hurts nobody, but unjust acquisition of 
it is always to be avoided. 

The great majority of people, however, when 
they fall a prey to ambition for either mihtary or 
civil authority, are carried away by it so completely 
that they quite lose sight of the claims of justice. 
For Ennius says : 

There is no fellowship inviolate, 

No faith is keptj when kingship is concerned;" 

and the truth of his words has an uncommonly wide 
appHcation. For whenever a situation is of such 
a nature that not more than one can hold pre- 
eminence in it, competition for it usually becomes 
so keen that it is an extremely difficult matter to 
maintain a fellowship inviolate." We saw this caesar. 
proved but now in the efFrontery of Gaius Caesar, 
who, to gain that sovereign power which by a 
depraved imagination he had conceived in his fancy, 
trod underfoot all laws of gods and men. But the 
trouble about this matter is that it is in the greatest 
souls and in the most brilliant geniuses that we usually 
find ambitions for civil and mihtary authority,for power, 
and for glory, springing up ; and therefore we must be 
the more heedful not to go wrong in that direction. 

But in any case of injustice it makes a vast deal Themotivesto 

gn. wrong. 


perturbatione aliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis 
est et ad tempus^ an consulto et cogitata ^ fiat iniuria. 
Leviora enim sunt ea, quae repentino aliquo motu 
accidunt, quam ea, quae meditata et praeparata in- 

Ac de inferenda quidem iniuria satis dictum est. 

28 IX. Praetermittendae autem defensionis deseren- 
dique officii plures solent esse causae ; nam aut ini- 
micitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt 
aut etiam neglegentiaj pigritia, inertia aut suis studiis 
quibusdam occupationibusve sic impediuntur, ut eos, 
quos tutari debeant, desertos esse patiantur. Itaque 

fsiff. ; ' videndum est^ ne non satis sit id^ quod apud Plato- 
VII, 520 D nem est in philosophos dictum, quod in veri investi- 
gatione versentur quodque ea, quae plerique vehe- 
menter expetant/ de quibus inter se digladiari 
soleant^ contemnant et pro nihilo putent, propterea 
iustos esse. Nam alterum [iustitiae genus] asse- 
quuntur^^ ut* inferenda ne cui noceant iniuria^ in 
alterum incidunt^; discendi enim studio impediti, 
Rop. I, quos tueri debent, deserunt. Itaque eos ne ad rem 
pubHcam quidem accessuros putat nisi coactos. 
Aequius autem erat id voluntate fieri; nam hoc ipsum 
ita iustum est, quod recte fit^ si est voluntarium. 

29 Sunt etiam, qui aut studio rei famiharis tuendae 
aut odio quodam hominum suum se negotium agere 

' cogitata A B H a b p, Edd.; cogitatu c, cogitato alii, 
Madvig- (ad De Fin. p. 696). 

^e.vpetant A B a b; expectant H ; exspcctant c. 

^alterum iustitiae genus assequuntur MSS. ; alterum asse- 
quuntur Pearce, J. M. Heusiiiger, et al.; alterum genus 
assequuntur Beier. 

*ut Halm ; in MSS.; om. Bt. 

"m alterum incidunt A B H a b ; «n altero dcllnqunt c, 
Bt. {delinquunt, i.e. they offend in tlie other dircction). 


347 C 

BOOK I. viii-ix 

of diiference whether the wrong is done as a result 
of some impulse of passion^ which is usually brief 
and transientj or whether it is committed wilfully and 
with premeditation ; for ofFences that come through 
some sudden impulse are less culpable than those 
committed designedly and with malice aforethought. 

But enough has been said on the subject of 
inflicting injury. 

IX. The motives for failure to prevent injury and Motiyes to pas- 
so for slighting duty are likely to be various: people ^'^'''"J"' "^®- 
either are reluctant to incur enmity or trouble or 
expense; or through indifference, indolence, or in- 
competence, or through some preoccupation or self- 
interest they are so absorbed that they suffer those to a. Preoccupa- 
be neglected whom it is their duty to protect. And *'°°' 
so there is reason to fear that what Plato declares 
of the philosophers may be inadequate, when he 
says that they are just because they are busied with 
the pursuit of truth and because they despise and 
count as naught that which most men eagerly seek 
and for which they are prone to do battle against 
each other to the death. For they secure one sort 
of iustice, to be sure^ in that they do no positive 
wrong to anyone^ but they fall into the opposite 
injustice ; for hampered by their pursuit of learning 
they leave to their fate those whom they ought to 
defend. And so, Plato thinks, they will not even 
assume their civic duties except under compulsion. 
But in fact it were better that they should assume 
them of their own accord; for an action intrin- 
sically right is just only on condition that it is 

There are some also who^ either from zeal in b. Seif-interest. 
attending to their own business or through some 


dicant nec facere cuiquam videantur iniuriam. Qui 
altero genere iniustitiae vacant, in alterum incurrunt ; 
deserunt enim vitae societatem, quia nihil conferunt 
in eam studii, nihil operae, nihil facultatum. 

Quando igitur duobus generibus iniustitiae propo- 
sitis adiunximus causas utriusque generis easque res 
ante constituimus, quibus iustitia contineretur, facile, 
quod cuiusque temporis officium sit, poterimus^ nisi 

30 nosmet ipsos valde amabimus, iudicare; est enim 
Heaut. difficilis cura rerum alienarum. Quamquam Teren- 

Tim. 77. jf 

tianus ille Chremes humani nihil a se alienura 
putat"; sed tamen, quia magis ea percipimus atque 
sentimus, quae nobis ipsis aut prospera aut adversa 
eveniunt, quam illa, quae ceteris, quae quasi longo 
intervallo interiecto videmus, aliter de ilHs ac de 
nobis iudicamus. Quocirca bene praecipiunt, qui 
vetant quicquam agere, quod dubites aequum sit an 
iniquum. Aequitas enim lucet ipsa per se, dubitatio 
cogitationem significat iniuriae. 

31 X. Sed incidunt saepe tempora, cum ea, quae 
maxime videntur digna esse iusto homine eoque, 
quem virum bonum dicimus, commutantur fiuntque 
contraria, ut reddere depositum, facere promissum- 
quaeque pertinent ad veritatem et ad fidem, ea mi- 


BOOK I. ix-x 

sort of aversion to their fellow-men, claim that they 
are occupied solely with their own affairs, without 
seeming to themselves to be doing anyone any injury. 
But while they steer clear of the one kind of injustice, 
they fall into the other : they are traitors to social 
Hfe, for they contribute to it none of their interest, 
none of their efFort, none of their means. 

Now since we have set forth the two kinds of Ruies of duty 
injustice and assigned the motives that lead to each, j^^g^JJgg'^ ^^ 
and since we have previously established the prin- 
ciples by which justice is constituted, we shall be in 
a position easily to decide what our duty on each 
occasion iSj unless we are extremely self-centred ; for 
indeed it is not an easy matter to be really concerned 
with other people's afFairs ; and yet in Terence's play, 
we know, Chremes thinks that nothing that concerns 
man is foreign to him." Nevertheless, when things 
tum out for our own good or ill, we realize it more 
fully and feel it more deeply than when the same 
things happen to others and we see them only, as it 
wer3, in the far distanee; and for this reason we 
judge their case differently from our own. It is, 
therefore, an excellent rule that they give who bid us 
not to do a thing, when there is a doubt whether it 
be right or wrong ; for righteousness shines with a 
briljiance of its own, but doubt is a sign that we are 
thinking of a possible wrong. 

X. But occasions often arise, when those duties change of duty 
which seem most becoming to the just man and to '° change of cir- 
the good man," as we call him, undergo a change 
and take on a contrary aspect. It may, for example, 
not be a duty to restore a trust or to fulfil a promise, 
and it may become right and proper sometimes to 
evade and not to observe what truth and honour 


grare interdum et non servare fit iustum. Referri 

Ch. vii enim decet ad ea, quae posui principio^ fundamenta 
iustitiae^ primum ut ne cui noceatur, deinde ut com- 
muni utilitati serviatur. Ea cum tempore commu- 
tantur, commutatur officium et non semper est 
32 idem. Potest enim accidere promissum aliquod et 
conventum, ut id effici sit inutile vel ei, cui pro- 
missum sitj vel ei, qui promiserit Nam si, ut in 

e.g. Eur. fabulis est, Neptunus, quod Theseo promiserat, 


1315-1319 non fecisset, Theseus Hippolyto filio non esset 
orbatus ; ex tribus enim optatis^ ut scribitur, hoc erat 
tertium^ quod de Hippolyti interitu iratus optavit; 
quo impetrato in maximos luctus incidit. Nec pro- 
missa igitur servanda sunt ea^ quae sint iis, quibus 
promiseriSj inutilia^ nec, si plus tibi ea noceant quam 
ilH prosint, cui promiseris, contra officium est maius 
anteponi minori ; ut, si constitueris cuipiam te advo- 
catum in rem praesentem esse venturum atque 
interim graviter aegrotare filius coeperit, non sit 
contra officium non facere, quod dixeris, magisque 
ille, cui promissum sit, ab officio discedat, si se 
destitutum queratur. lam illis promissis standum 
non esse quis non videt, quae coactus quis metu, 
^cut B a, Edd, ; cui quod H b ; cui quid A c. 

*The three wishes were: (i) safe return from Hades; 
(2) escape frora the Labyrinth; (3) the death of Hippolytus. 



would usually demand. For we may well be guided 
by those fundamental principles of justice which I 
laid down at the outset : first, that no harm be done 
to anyone; second, that the common interests be 
conserved. When these are modified under changed 
circumstances, moral duty also undergoes a change, 
;ind it does not always remain the same. For a given 
promise or agreement may turn out in such a way Non-fulfilment 
that its performance will prove detrimental either to ° P"^"™'*^*- 
the one to whom the promise has been made or to 
the one who has made it. If, for example, Neptune, 
in the drama, had not carried out his promise to 
Theseus, Theseus would not have lost his son 
Hippolytus; for, as the story runs, of the three 
wishes^ that Neptune had promised to grant him the 
third was this : in a fit of anger he prayed for the 
death of Hippolytus, and the granting of this prayer 
plunged him into unspeakable grief. Promises are, 
therefore, not to be kept, if the keeping of them Is 
to prove harmful to those to whom you have made 
them ; and, if the fulfilment of a promise should do 
more harm to you than good to him to whom you 
have made it, it is no violation of moral duty to give 
the greater good precedence over the lesser good. 
For example, if you have made an appointment with 
anyone to appear as his advocate in court, and if in 
the meantime your son should fall dangerously ill, it 
would be no breach of your moral duty to fail in what 
you agreed to do; nay, rather, he to whom your 
promise was given would have a false conception of 
duty, if he should complain that he had been deserted 
in his time of need. Further than this, who fails to 
see that those promises are not binding which are 
extorted by intimidation or which we make when 
D 3.a 


quae deceptus dolo promiserit? quae quidem pleraque 
iure praetorio liberantur, non nulla legibus. 
S3 Exsistunt etiam saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et 
nimis callida^ sed malitiosa iuris interpretatione. Ex 
quo illud Summum ius summa iniui*ia" factum est 
iam tritum sermone proverbium. Quo in genere 
etiam in re publica multa peccantur, ut ille, qui, cum 
triginta dierum essent cum hoste indutiae factae, 
noctu populabatur agros, quod dierum essent pactae, 
non noctium indutiae. Ne noster quidem probandus, 
si verum est Q. Fabium Labeonem seu quem alium 
(nihil enim habeo praeter auditum) arbitrum Nolanis 
et Neapolitanis de finibus a senatu datum, cum ad 
locum venisset, cum utrisque separatim locutum, ne 
cupidequid agerent, ne appetenter, atque ut regredi 
quam progredi mallent. Id cum utrique fecissent, 
aliquantum agri in medio relictum est. Itaque 
illorum finis sic, ut ipsi dixerant, terminavit ; in medio 
relictum quod erat, populo Romano adiudicavit. 
Decipere hoc quidem est, non iudicare. Quocirca in 
omni est re fugienda taHs sollertia. 

XI. Sunt autem quaedam officia etiam adversus 
eos servanda, a quibus iniuriam acceperis. Est enim 
ulciscendi et puniendi modus; atque haud scio an 
satis sit eu m, qui lacessierit, iniuriae suae paenitere , 

*Each praetor, at his inauguration, announced publicly 
the principles and policies that should gulde him in the 
administration of his office. These were the source of the 
his Praetorium, which explained and supplemented the 
common law (/«s Civile) and even modified its ancient 
rigour so as to conform with a more advanced public senti- 
ment, and form a most valuable part of the body of Roman 

hThis story is told of Cleomenes, King' of Sparta (520- 
491 B.C.), in the war with Argos. (Plutarch, Apophth. 
Lacon. 223 A.) 

BOOK I. x-xi 

misled by false pretences? Such obligations ai*e 
annulled in most cases by the praetor's edict in 
equity/ in some cases by the laws. 

Injustice often arises also through chicanery^ that Chicanery. 
is, through an over-subtle and even fraudulent con- 
struction of the law. This it is that gave rise to the 
now famihar saw, More law^ less justice." Through 
such interpretation also a great deal of wrong is 
committed in transactions between state and state ; 
thus, when a truce had been made with the enemy 
for thirty days, a famous general'' went to ravaging 
their fields by night^ because, he said, the truce 
stipulated 'days," not nights. Not even our own 
countryman's action is to be commended, if what is 
told of Quintus Fabius Labeo is true — or whoever it 
was (for I have no authority but hearsay) : appointed 
by the Senate to arbitrate a boundary dispute be- 
tween Nola and Naples, he took up the case and 
interviewed both parties separately, asking th.em not 
to proceed in a covetous or grasping spirit, but to 
make some concession rather than claim some acces- 
sion. When each party had agreed to this, there 
was a considerable strip of territory left between 
them. And so he set the boundary of each city 
as each had severally agreed ; and the tract in be- 
tween he awarded to the Roman People. Now that 
is swindhng, not arbitration. And therefore such 
sharp practice is under all circumstances to be 

XI. Again, there are certain duties that we owe Our duty to 
even to those who have wronged us. For there is a wrongrd us^^^^ 
limit to retribution and to punishment ; or rather, I 
am inclined to think, it is sufficient that the aggressor 
should be brought to repent of his wrong-doing, in 
d2 $& 

ut et ipse ne quid tale posthac et ceteri sint ad 
iniuriam tardiores. 

34 Atque in re publica maxime conservanda sunt 
iura belli. Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, 
unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, cumque 
illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugien- 
dum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore. 

35 Quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, 
ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur, parta autem victoria 
conservandi ii, qui non crudeles in bello, non im- 
manes fuerunt, ut maiores nostri Tusculanos, Aequos, 
Volscos, Sabinos, Hernicos in civitatem etiam acce- 
perunt, at Carthaginem et Numantiam funditus sus- 
tulerunt; nollemCorinthum,sedcredoaliquid secutos, 
opportunitatem loci maxime, ne posset aliquando ad 
bellum faciendum locus ipse adhortari. Mea quidem 
sententia paci, quae nihil habitura sit insidiarum, 
semper est consulendum. In quo si mihi esset op- 
temperatum, si non optimam, at aliquam rem publi- 
cam^ quae nunc nulla est, haberemus. 

Et cum iis, quos vi deviceris, consulendum est, tum 

ii, qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, 

quamvis murum aries percusserit, recipiendi. In quo 

tantopere apud nostros iustitia culta est, ut ii, qui 

BOOK I. xi 

order that he may not repeat the ofFence and that 
others may be deterred from doing wrong. 

!4 Then, too, in the case of a state in its external 
relations, the rights of war must be strictly observed. 
For since there are two ways of settling a dispute : 
first, by discussion; second, by physical force; and 
since the former is characteristic of man, the latter 
of the brute, we must resort to force only in case 

i5 we may not avail ourselves of discussion. The only Excuse for war. 
excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may 
live in peace unharmed; and when the victory is 
won, we should spare those who have not been 
blood-thirsty and barbarous in their warfare. For Justicetoward 
instance, our forefathers actually admitted to full ^ vanquis ea 
rights of citizenship the Tusculans, Aequians, Vol- 
scians, Sabines, and Hernicians, but they razed 
Carthage and Numantia to the ground. I wish they 
had not destroyed Corinth ; but I beheve they had 
some special reason for what they did — its con- 
venient situation, probably — and feared that its very 
location might some day furnish a temptation to 
renew the war. In my opinion, at least, we should 
always strive to secure a peace that shall not admit 
of guile. And if my advice had been heeded on 
this point, we should still have at least some sort of 
constitutional government, if not the best in the 
world, whereas, as it is, we have none at all. 

Not only must we show consideration for those 
whom we have conquered by force of arms but we 
must also ensure protection to those who lay down 
their arms and throw themselves upon the mercy of 
our generals, even though the battering-ram has 
hammered at their walls. And among our country- 
men justice has been observed so conscientiously in 


civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem recepis- 
sentj earum patroni essent more maiorum. 

36 Ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetiali populi 
Romani iure perscripta est. Ex quo intellegl potest 
nullum bellum esse iustum, nisi quod aut rebus repe- 
titis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum. 
[Popilius imperator tenebat provinciam, in cuius 
exercitu Catonis filius tiro militabat. Cum autem 
Popilio videretur unam dimittere legionem^ Catonis 
quoque filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimisit. 
Sed cum amore pugnandi in exercitu remansisset, 
Cato ad Popilium scripsit, ut, si eum patitur^ in 
exercitu remanere, secundo eum obliget militiae 
sacramento, quia priore amisso iure cum hostibus 

37 pugnare non poterat. Adeo summa erat observatio 
in bello movendo.]^ M. quidem Catonis senis est 
epistula ad M. filiunij in qua scribit se audisse eum 
missum factum esse a consule, cum in Macedonia 
bello Persico miles esset. Monet igitur, ut caveat, 
ne proelium ineat; negat enim ius esse, qui miles 
non sit, cum hoste pugnare. 

XII. Equidem etiam illud animadverto, quod, qui 
proprio nomine perduellis esset, is hostis vocaretur, 
lenitate verbi rei tristitiam mitigatam. Hostis enim 
apud maiores nostros is dicebatur, quem nunc pere- 

^Popilitis . . . movendo bracketed by Madvig, Edd. ; Popilius 
. . . poterat bracketed by Unger. 
^patitur A B H a b ; patiatur c. 

» Lucius Aemilius Paulus (b.C. i68). 

BOOK I. xi-xii 

this direction, that tliose who have given promise of 
protection to states or nations subdued in war become, 
after the custom of our forefathers, the patrons of 
those states. 

36 As for war, humane laws touching it are drawn Thehumanity 
up in the fetial code of the Roman People under all «f ^a"'^ '^'''^ 
the guarantees of reHgion ; and from this it may be 
gathered that no war is just, unless it is entered upon 

after an official demand for satisfaction has been sub- 
mitted or warning has been given and a formal decla- 
ration made. Popihus was general in command of 
a province. In his army Cato's son was serving on 
his first campaign. When PopiHus decided to dis- 
band one of his legions, he discharged also young 
Cato who was serving in that same legion, But 
when the young man out of love for the service 
stayed on in the field, his father wrote to Popihus to 
say that if he let him stay in the army, he should 
swear him into service with a new oath of allegiance, 
for in view of the voidance of his former oath he 
could not legally fight the foe. So extremely scrupu- 
lous was the observance of the laws in regai-d to tlie 

37 conduct of war. There is extant, too, a letter of the 
elder Marcus Cato to his son Marcus, in which he writes 
that he has heard that the youth has been discharged 
by the consul,* when he was serving in Macedonia in 
the war with Perseus. He warns him, therefore, to be 
careful not to go into battle ; for, he says, the man who is 
not legally a soldier has no right to be fighting the foe. 

XII. This also I observe — that he who would 
properly have been called a fighting enemy " 
{perduellis) was called " a guest " ihostis), thus re- 
heving the ughness of the fact by a softened 
expression; for "enemy" {hostis) meant to our an- 


grinum dicimus. Indicant duodecim tabulae: aut 


AETERNA AUCTORiTAS. Quid ad lianc mansuetudinem 
addi potest, eum, quicum bellum geras, tam molli 
nomine appellare? Quamquam id nomen durius 
efFecit^ iam vetustas; a peregrino enim recessit et 
proprie in eo, qui arma contra ferret, remansit. 
38 Cum vero de imperio decertatur belloque quaeritur 
gloria, causas omnino subesse tamen oportet easdem, 
quas dixi paulo ante iustas causas esse bellorum. 
Sed ea bella, quibus imperii proposita gloria est, 
minus acerbe gerenda sunt. Ut enim cum civi 
aliter contendimus, si^ est inimicus, aliter, si com- 
petitor (cum altero certamen honoris et dignitatis 
est, cum altero capitis et famae), sic cum Celtiberis, 
cum Cimbris bellum ut cum inimicis gerebatur, uter 
esset, non uter imperaret, cum Latinis, Sabinis, Sam- 
nitibus, Poenis, Pyrrho de imperio dimicabatur. 
Poeni foedifragi, crudelis Hannibal, reliqui iustiores. 
Pyrrhi quidem de captivis reddendis illa praeclara : 

Ennius, Ncc mi aurum posco nec mi pretium dederitis, 

Ann. VI. r tr 

Vah'en2, Ncc^ cauponantes bellum, sed belligerantes 
2^1 Ferro, non auro vitam cernamus utrique. 

' effecit Edd. ; efficit MSS. 

^ cuni cive [Edd.: ctvi] aliter contendimus st h, Anemoe- 
cius, Edd.; ctim civiliter contetidimns aliter 5/ A B H a b c. 
^Nec A B H b c; Non L p, Bt., Heine. 


BOOK I. xii 

cestors what we now call stranger " {peregrinus) . 
This is proved by the usage in the Twelve Tables: 
Or a day fixed for trial with a stranger" {hostis). 
And again: Right of ownership is inaHenable for 
ever in deahngs with a stranger" (hostis). What 
can exceed such charity, when he with whom one is 
at war is called by so gentle a name? And yet 
long lapse of time has given that word a harsher 
meaning : for it has lost its signification of stranger " 
and has taken on the technical connotation of an 
enemy under arms." 

But when a war is fought out for supremacy and justice in war. 
when glory is the object of war, it must still not fail 
to start from the same motives which I said a moment 
ago were the only righteous grounds for going to 
war. But those wars which have glory for their end 
must be carried on with less bitterness. For we 
contend, for example, with a fellow-citizen in one 
way, if he is a personal enemy, in another^ if he is a 
rival: with the rival it is a struggle for office and 
position, with the enemy for Hfe and honour. So 
with the Celtiberians and the Cimbrians we fought 
as with deadly enemies, not to determine which 
should be supreme, but which should survive ; but 
with the Latins, SabineSj Samnites, Carthaginians, 
and Pyrrhus we fought for supremacy. The Cartha- 
ginians violated treaties ; Hannibal was cruel ; the 
others were more merciful. From Pyrrhus we have 
this famous speech on the exchange of prisoners : 
Goldwill I none, nor price shall yegive; forlasknone; 
Come, let us not be chaifrers of war, but warriors 

Nay; let us venture our hves, and the sword, not 

gold, weigh the outcome. 



Vosne velit an me regnare era, quidve ferat Fors, 

Virtute experiamur. Et hoc simul accipe dictum : 
Quorum virtuti^ belli fortuna pepercit, 
Eorundem libertati me parcere certum est. 
Dono, ducite, doque volentibus cum magnis dis. 

Regalis sane et digna Aeacidarum genere sententia. 

39 XIII. Atque etiam si quid singuli temporibus 
adducti hosti promiserunt, est in eo ipso fides con- 
servanda, ut primo Punico bello Regulus captus a 
Poenis cum de captivis commutandis Romam missus 
esset iurassetque se rediturum, primum, ut venit, 
captivos reddendos in senatu non censuit, deinde, 
cum retineretur a propinquis et ab amicis, ad suppli- 
cium redire maluit quam fidem hosti datam fallere. 

40 [Secundo autem Punico bello post Cannensem 
pugnam quos decem Hannibal Romam astrictos 
misit iure iurando se redituros esse, nisi de redi- 
mendis iis, qui capti erant, impetrassent, eos omnes 

^virtvii h B" L c, Edd.; virtute B' H b; virtutei Vzhltn, 

ROOK I. xii-xiii 

Make we the trial by valour in arms and see if Dame 

Wills it that ye shall prevail or I^ or what be her 

Hear thou, too, this word, good Fabricius: whose 

valour soever 
Spared hath been by the fortune of war — their 

freedom I grant them. 
Such my resolve. I give and present them to you, 

my brave Romans ; 
Take them back to their homes ; the great gods' 

blessings attend you." 

A right kingly sentiment this and worthy a scion of 
the Aeacidae. 

XIII. Again, if under stress of circumstances Fideiity to n 
individuals have made any promise to the enemy, RT^r'^^! s 
they are bound to keep their word even then. For 
instance, in the First Punic War, when Regulus was 
taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, he was sent 
to Rome on parole to negotiate an exchange of 
prisoners; he came and, in the first place, it was 
he that made the motion in the senate that the 
prisoners should not be restored ; and in the second 
place, when his relatives and friends would have 
kept him back, he chose to return to a death by 
torture rather than prove false to his promise, though 
given to an enemy. 

And again in the Second Punic War, after the (2) Hannibal's 
Battle of Cannae, Hannibal sent to Rome ten Roman ^^'^°'^^' 
captives bound by an oath to return to him, if they 
did not succeed in ransoming his prisoners ; and as 
long as any one of them hved, the censors kept them 
all degraded and disfranchised, because they were 


censores, quoad quisque eorum vixit, qui peierassent, 
in aerariis reliquerunt nee minus illum, qui iuris 
iurandi fraude culpam invenerat. Cum enim Hanni- 
balis permissu exisset de eastris, rediit paulo post, 
quod se oblitum nescio quid diceret ; deinde egressus 
e castris iure iurando se solutum putabat, et erat 
verbis, re non erat. Semper autem in fide quid 
senseris, non quid dixeris, cogitandum. 

Maximum autem exemplum est iustitiae in hostem 
a maioribus nostris constitutum, cum a Pyrrho per- 
fuga senatui est polHcitus se venenum regi daturum 
et eum necaturum, senatus et C. Fabricius perfugam 
Pyrrho dedidit. Ita ne hostis quidem et potentis 
et bellum ultro inferentis interitum cum scelere 
41 Ac de bellicis quidem officiis satis dictum est. 

Meminerimus autem etiam adversus infimos iusti- 
tiam esse servandam. Est autem infima condicio et 
fortuna servorum, quibus non male praecipiunt qui 
ita iubent uti, ut mercennariis : operam exigendam, 
iusta praebenda. 

Cum autem duobus modis, id est aut vi aut fraude, 
fiat iniuria, fraus quasi vulpeculae, vis leonis videtur ; 
utnimque homine alienissimum, sed fraus odio digna 

^Secundo . . . re non erat om. L c; Sccundo . . . appro- 
havit om. A B H a b p, Edd. 

BOOK I. xiii 

guilty of perjury in not returning. And they punished 
in hke manner the one who had incurred guilt by an 
evasion of his oath: with Hannibars permission this 
man left the camp and returned a Httle later on the 
pretext that he had forgotten something or other ; 
and then, when he left the camp the second time, he 
claimed that he was released from the obhgation of 
his oath ; and so he was^ according to tlie letter of it, 
but not according to the spirit. In the matter of a 
promise one must always consider the meaning and 
not the mere words. 

Our forefathers have given us another striking 
example of justice toward an enemy : when a de- 
serter from Pyrrhus promised the senate toadminister 
poison to the king and thus work his death, the 
senate and Gaius Fabricius dehvered the deserter 
up to Pyrrhus. Thus they stamped with their dis- 
approval the treacherous murder even of an enemy 
who was at once powerful, unprovoked, aggressive, 
and successful. 

With this I will close my discussion of the duties 
connected with war. 

But let us remember that we must have regard Justicetoward 
for justice even towards the humblest. Now the 
humblest station and the poorest fortune are those 
of slaves ; and they give us no bad rule who bid us 
treat our slaves as we should our employees: they 
must be required to work ; they must be given their 

While wrong may be done, then, in either of two injustice cf 
waysj that is, by force or by fraud, both are bestial : '^yp"'^'''^^- 
fraud seems to belong to the cunning fox, force to 
the hon; both are wholly unworthy of man, but 
fraud is the more contemptible. But of all forms of 



maiore. Totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior quam 
eorumj qui tum, cum maxime fallunt^ id agunt, ut 
viri boni esse videantur. 
De iustitia satis dictum. 
Ch. VII 42 XIV. DeincepSj ut erat propositum, de benefi- 
centia ac de liberalitate dicatur, qua quidem nihil 
est naturae hominis accommodatius, sed habet multas 
cautiones. Videndum est enim, primum ne obsit 
benignitas et iis ipsis, quibus benigne videbitur fieri, 
et ceteris, deinde ne maior benignitas sit quam 
facultates, tum ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur; 
id enim est iustitiae fundamentum, ad quam haec 
referenda sunt omnia. Nam et qui gratificantur 
cuipiam, quod obsit illi, cui prodesse velle videantur, 
non benefici neque liberales, sed perniciosi assenta- 
tores iudicandi sunt, et qui aliis nocent, ut in alios 
liberales sint, in eadem sunt iniustitia, ut si in suam 
rem aliena convertant. 
43 Sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et 
gloriae, qui eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur, iique 
arbitrantur se beneficos in suos amicos visum iri, si 
locupletent eos quacumque ratione. Id autem tan- 
tum abest ab ^ officio, ut nihil magis officio possit esse 
contrarium. Videndum est igitur, ut ea liberalitate 
utamur, quae prosit amicis, noceat nemini. Quare 
L. Sullae, C. Caesaris pecuniarum translatio a iustis 

' ab c, Edd.; not in A B U L b. 

BOOK I. xiii-xiv 

injustice, none is more flagrant than that of the 
hypocrite who^ at the very moment when he is most 
false, makes it his business to appear virtuous. 

This must conclude our discussion of justice. 

XIV. Next in order, as outhned above, let us Justice and 
speak of kindness and generosity. Nothing appeals 
more to the best in human nature than this, but it 
calls for the exercise of caution in many particulars : 
we must, in the fii*st place, see to it that our act of 
kindness shall not prove an injury either to the 
object of our beneficence or to others; in the second 
place, that it shall not be beyond our means ; and 
finally, that it shall be proportioned to the worthiness 
of the recipient; for this is the corner-stone of 
justice; and by the standard of justice all acts of 
kindness must be measured. For those who confer 
a harmful favour upon some one whom they seem- 
ingly wish to help are to be accounted not generous 
benefactors but dangerous sycophants; and likewise 
those who injure one man, in order to be generous 
to another, are guilty of the same injustice as if 
they diverted to their own accounts the property of 
their neighbours. 

Now, there are many — and especially those who Generosity must 
are ambitious for eminence and glory — who rob one (i) hurtful to uo 
to enrich another ; and they expect to be thought °°®> 
generous towards their friends, if they put them in 
the way of getting rich, no matter by what means. 
Such conduct, however, is so remote from moral 
duty that nothing can be more completely opposed 
to duty. We must, therefore, take care to indulge 
only in such hberahty as will help our friends and 
hurt no one. The conveyance of property by Lucius 
SuUa and Gaius Caesar from its rightful owners to 


dominis ad alienos non debet liberalis videri; nihil 
est enim liberale, quod non idem iustum. 

44 Alter loeus erat cautionis, ne benignitas maior 
esset quam facultates, quod, qui benigniores volunt 
esse, quam res patitur, primum in eo peccant, quod 
miuriosi sunt in proximos ; quas enim copias his ^ et 
suppeditari aequius est et relinqui, eas transfex-unt 
ad ahenos. Inest autem in taU Uberalitate cupiditas 
plerumque rapiendi et auferendi per iniuriam, ut ad 
largiendum suppetant copiae. Videre etiam hcet 
plerosque non tam natura liberales quam quadam 
gloria ductos, ut benefici videantur, facere multa, 
quae proficisci ab ostentatione magis quam a volun- 
tate videantur. Tahs autem simulatio vanitati esl 
coniunctior quam aut hberahtati aut honestati. 

45 Tertium est propositum, ut in beneficentia dilectus 
esset dignitatis ; in quo et mores eius erunt spectandi, 
in quem beneficium conferetur, et animus erga nos et 
communitas ac societas vitae et ad nostras utihtates 
officia ante collata ; quae ut concurrant omnia, opta- 
bile est ; si minus, plures causae maioresque ponderis 
plus habebunt. 

46 XV. Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis 

^his H a, Edd.; iis A.Bh; eish c. 

BOOK I. xiv-xv 

the hands of strangers should^ for that reason, not 
be regarded as generosity ; for nothing is generous, 
if it is not at the same time just. 

The second point for the exercise of caution was (2) within our 
that our beneficence should not exceed our means; 
for those who wish to be more open-handed than 
tlieir circumstances permit are guilty of two faults : 
first, they do wrong to their next of kin; for they 
transfer to strangers property which would more 
justly be placed at their service or bequeathed to 
them. And second, such generosity too often en- 
genders a passion for plundering and misappropriating 
property, in order to supply the means for making 
large gifts. We may also observe that a great many 
people do many things that seem to be inspired 
more by a spirit of ostentation than by heart-felt 
kindness; for such people are not really generous 
but are rather influenced by a sort of ambition to 
make a show of being open-handed. Such a pose 
is nearer akin to hypocrisy than to generosity or 
moi'al goodness. 

The third rule laid down was that in acts of (3) according tc 
kindness we should weigh with discrimination the 
worthiness of the object of our benevolence; we 
should take into consideration his moral character, 
his attitude toward us, the intimacy of his relations 
to us, and our common social ties, as well as the 
services he has hitherto rendered in our interest. 
It is to be desired that all these considerations 
should be combined in the same person; if they 
are not, then the more numerous and the more 
important considerations must have the greater 

XV. Now, the men we hve with are not perfect 
E 49 


hominibus planeque sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus 

praeclare agitur si sunt simulacra virtutis, etiam hoc 

intellegendum puto, neminem omnino esse negle- 

gendumj in quo aliqua significatio virtutis appareat, 

colendum autem esse ita quemque maxime, ut quis- 

que maxime virtutibus his lenioribus erit ornatus, 

modestia, temperantia, hac ipsa, de qua multa iam 

dicta sunt, iustitia. Nam fortis animus et magnus 

in homine non perfecto nec sapiente^ ferventior ple- 

rumque est, illae virtutes bonum virum videntur 

potius attingere. 

Atque haec in moribus. 

47 De benivolentia autem, quam quisque habeat erga 

nos, primum illud est in officio, ut ei plurimum tri- 

buamus, a quo plurimum diligamur,^ sed benivolen- 

tiam non adulescentulorum more ardore quodam 

amoris, sed stabilitate potius et constantia iudicemus. 

Sin erunt merita, ut non ineunda, sed referenda sit 

gratia, maior quaedam cura adhibenda est; nullum 

enim officium referenda gratia magis necessarium 


Quodsi ea, quae utenda acceperis, maiore mensura, 

si modo possis, iubet reddere Hesiodus, quidnam 

beneficio provocati facere debemus ? an imitari agros 

fertiles, qui multo plus efferunt quam acceperunt? 

Etenim si in eos, quos speramus nobis profuturos, 

non dubitamus officia conferre, quales in eos esse 

debemus, qui iam profuerunt ? Nam cum duo genera 

' sapiente MSS. ; sapienti Wesenberg-, Bt. 
2 diligamur A B^ H L b c ; diligiynur BS Bt'. 



and ideally wise, but men who do very well, if there 
be found in them but the semblanee of virtue. I 
therefore think that this is to be taken for granted. 
that no one should be entirely neglected who shows 
any trace of virtue ; but the more a man is endowed 
with these finer virtues — temperance, self-control, 
and that very justice about which so much has al- 
ready beensaid — the more lie deserves to befavoured. 
I do not mention fortitude, for a courageous spirit 
in a man who has not attained perfection and ideal 
wisdom is generally too impetuous ; it is those other 
virtues that seem more particularly to mark the 
good man. 

So much in regard to the character of the object 
of our beneficence. 

But as to the affection which anyone may have Motives to 
for us, it is the first demand of duty that we do ^i"^o°|i*>'= 
most for him who loves us most; but we should 
measure affection, not Hke youngsters, by the ardour 
of its passion, but rather by its strength and con- 
stancy. But if there shall be obhgations already (2) requital, 
incurred, so that kindness is not to begin with us, 
but to be requited, still greater dihgencCj it seems, 
is called for; for no duty is more imperative than 
that of proving one's gratitude. 

But if, as Hesiod bids, one is to repay with inter- 
est, if possible, what one has borrowed in time 
of need, what, pray, ought we to do when challenged 
by an unsought kindness? Shall we not imitate 
the fruitful fields, which return more than they 
receive? For if we do not hesitate to confer fa- 
vours upon those who we hope will be of help to 
us, how ought we to deal with those who have al- 
ready helped us ? For generosity is of two kinds : 
e2 51 


liberalitatis sint, unum dandi beneficii, alterum red 
dendi, demus necne, in nostra potestate est^ non 
rcddere viro bono non licet, modo^ id facere possit 
sine iniuria. 

49 Acceptorum autem beneficiorum sunt dilectus ha- 
bendi, nec dubium^ quin maximo cuique plurimum 
debeatur. In quo tamen in primis, quo quisque 
animo, studio, benivolentia facerit, ponderandum est. 
Multi enim faciunt multa temeritate quadam sine 
iudicio vel morbo in omnes vel repentino quodam 
quasi vento impetu animi incitati; quae beneficia 
aeque magna non sunt habenda atque ea, quae iudi- 
cio, considerate constanterque delata sunt. 

Sed in collocando beneficio et in referenda gratia, 
si cetera paria sunt, hoc maxime officii est, ut 
quisque maxime opis indigeat, ita ei potissimum 
opitulari; quod contra fit a plerisque; a quo enim 
plurimum sperant/ etiamsi ille iis non eget, tamen 
ei potissimum inserviunt. 

50 XVI. Optime autem societas hominum coniuncti- 
oque servabitur, si, ut quisque erit coniunctissimus, 
ita in eum benignitatis plurimum conferetur. 

Sed, quae naturae principia sint communitatis et 
societatis humanae, repetendum videtur altius; est 
enim primum, quod cernitur in universi generis hu- 
mani societate. Eius autem vinculum est ratio et 

^ modo A H L b c ; 5/ viodo B. 

^sperant Marg. A, Edd.; spectant A b {spemant Marg. b). 

BOOK I. xv-xvi 

doing a kindness and requiting one. Whether we 
do the kindness or not is optional; but to fail to 
requite one is not allowable to a good manj provided 
he can make the requital without violating the rights 
of others. 

Furthermore, we must make some discrimination 
between favours received ; for^ as a matter of course, 
the greater the favour^ the greater is the obhga- 
tion. But in deciding this we must above all give 
due weight to the spirit, the devotion, the affection, 
that prompted the favour. For many people often 
do favours impulsively for everybody without dis- 
crimination^ prompted by a morbid sort of benevo- 
lence or by a sudden impulse of the heart, shifting as 
the wind. Such acts of generosity are not to be so 
highly esteemed as those which are performed with 
judgmentj dehberationj and mature consideration. 

But in bestowing a kindness, as well as in making 
a requitalj the first rule of duty requires us — other 
things being equal — to lend assistance preferably to 
people in proportion to their individual need. Most 
people adopt the contrary course : they put them- 
selves most eagerly at the service of the one from (3) seif-interest, 
whom they hope to receive the greatest favours, 
even though he has no need of their help. 

XVI. The interests of society, however, and its W reiationship, 
common bonds will be best conserved^ if kindness 
be shown to each individual in proportion to the 
closeness of his relationship. 

But it seems we must trace back to their ultimate The principles of 
sources the principles of fellowship and society that ^*'^'*" society. 
nature has estabUshed among men. The first principle i 

is that which is found in the connection subsisting j 

between all the members of the human race; and j 



oratio, quae docendoj discendo, communicando, di- 
sceptandoj iudicando conciliat inter se homines con- 
iungitque naturali quadam societate ; neque ulla re 
longius absumus a natura ferarum, in quibus inesse 
fortitudinem saepe dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, 
iustitiam, aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus; sunt 
enim rationis et orationis expertes. 

51 Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, 
omnibus inter omnes societas haec est ; in qua 
omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum 
natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut, quae 
discripta^ sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita tene- 
antur, ut sit constitutum legibus ipsis,^ cetera sic 
observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est, amico- 
rum esse communia omnia. Omnium^ autem com- 
munia hominum videntur ea, quae sunt generis eius, 
quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri in 
permultas potest : 

(Teiephus?) Homo, qui erranti comiter monstnit viam, 

Vahlen2, Fab. ^ i , n i , -, , r 

inc. 398 Quasi lumcn de suo iumine accendat, facit. 

Nihilo minus ipsi liicet/ cum illi accenderit. 

Una ex re satis praecipit, ut, quicquid sine detri- 

52 mento commodari possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto; ex 

quo sunt illa communia : non prohibere aqua proflu- 

ente, pati ab igne ignem capere, si qui velit,consilium 

^ ' discripta H b, Edd. ; descripta A B L a c. 

" legibus ipsis Gulielmus, Edd. ; e {ex c) quibtcs tpsis MSS. 

^ Omnium Zumpt, Edd. ; 07nnia MSS. 

* ipsi lucet Edd. ; ipsi luceat A B H b c ; ipsi ut luceat a. 

^KOwa. Th. (twv^ <pl\u3v (Plato, Phaedr. 279 C; Aristotle, 
Eth. Vni, 11). 


BOOK I. xvi 

that bond of connection is reason and speech^ which 
by the processes of teaching and learning, of com- 
municatingj discussing^ and reasoning associate men 
together and unite them in a sort of natural frater- 
nity. In no other particular are we farther removed 
from the nature of beasts ; for we admit that thcy 
may have courage (horses and lions, for example); 
but we do not admit that they have justice, equity, 
and goodness ; for they are not endowed with reason 
or speech. 
51 This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that 
unites together men as men and all to all ; and 
under it the common right to all things that nature 
has produced for the common use of man is to be 
maintained, with the understanding that, while 
everything assigned as private property by the 
statutes and by civil law shall be so held as pre- 
scribed by those same laws, everything else shall be 
regarded in the light indicated by the Greek pro- 
verb: "Amongst friends all things in common."^ 
Furthermore, we find the common property of all 
men in things of the sort defined by Ennius; and 
though restricted by him to one instance, the prin- 
ciple may be applied very generally : 

"Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way 
Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his: 
No less shines his, when he his friend's hath ht." 

In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow 
even upon a stranger what it costs us nothing to give. 
.52 On this principle we have the following maxims: 

"Deny no one the water that flows by;" Let 
anyone who will take fire from our fire;" ' Honest 
counsel give to one who is in doubt;" 


fidele deliberanti dare, quae sunt iis utilia, qui acci- 
piunt, danti non molesta. Quare et his utendum 
est et semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem 
afFerendum. Sed quoniam copiae parvae singulorum 
sunt, eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multi- 
tudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii 
finem: Nihilo minus ipsi lucet/' ut facultas sit, qua 
in nostros simus liberales. 

53 XVII. Gradus autem plures sunt societatis homi- 
nura. Ut enim ab illa infinita discedatur, propior^ 
est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae, qua maxime 
homines coniunguntur ; interius etiam est eiusdem 
esse civitatis ; multa enim sunt civibus inter se com- 
munia, forum, fana, porticus, viae, leges, iura, iudicia, 
sufFragia, consuetudines praeterea et famiUaritates 
multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae. 

Artior vero coUigatio est societatis propinquorum ; 
ab illa enim immensa societate humani generis in 

54 exiguum angustumque concluditur. Nam cum sit 
hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant lubi- 
dinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso coniugio est, 
proxima in liberis, deinde una domus, communia 
omnia ; id autem est principium urbis et quasi semi- 
narium rei pubhcae. Sequuntur fratrum coniun- 
ctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque, qui cum 
una domo iam capi non possint, in ahas donios tam- 

^ propior A a c (ex corr.), Edd.; proprior B H b. 


BOOK I. xvi-xvii 

for such acts are useful to the recipient and cause the 
giver no loss. We should, therefore, adopt these 
principles and always be contributing something to 
the common weal. But since the resources of indi- 
viduals are limited and the number of the needy is 
infinite, this spirit of universal Uberality must be 
regulated according to that test of Ennius — ' No 
less shines his" — in order that we raay continue to 
have the means for being generous to our friends. 

XVII. Then, too, there are a great many degrees Degrees of sociai 
of closeness or remoteness in human society. To ^i)'\iuzenship, 
proceed beyond the universal bond of our common 
humanity, there is the closer one of belonging to the 
same people, tribe, and tongue, by which men are 
very closely bound together ; it is a still closer rela- 
tion to be citizens of the same city-state ; for fellow- 
citizens have much in common — forum, temples, 
colonnadeSj streets, statutes, laws, courts, rights of 
suffrage, to say nothing of social and friendly circles 
and diverse business relations with many. 

But a still closer social union exists between kin- (2) kinship, 
dred. Starting with that infinite bond of union of the 
human race in general, the conception is now confined 
to a small and narrow circle. For since the repro- 
ductive instinct is by nature's gift the common pos- 
session of all Hving creatures, the first bond of union 
is that between husband and wife ; the next, that 
between parents and children; then we find one 
home, with everything in common. And this is the 
foundation of civil government, the nursery, as it 
were, of the state. Then follow the bonds between 
brothers and sisters, and next those of first and then 
of second cousins ; and when they can no longer be 
sheltered under one roof, they go out into other 



quam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur conubia et 
affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui ; quae 
propagatio et suboles origo est rerum publicarum. 
Sanguinis autem coniunctio et benivolentia devincit 

55 homines et^ caritate; magnum est enim eadem ha- 
bere monumenta maiorum, eisdem uti sacris, sepulcra 
habere communia. 

Sed omnium societatum nulla praestantior est, 
nulla firmior, quam cum viri boni moribus similes 
sunt familiaritate coniuncti ; illud enim honestum, 
quod saepe dicimus, etiam si in alio cernimus, [tamen]^ 
nos movet atque illi, in quo id inesse videtur, amicos 

56 facit. Et quamquam omnis virtus nos ad se alHcit 
facitque, ut eos diligamus, in quibus ipsa inesse vi- 
deatur, tamen iustitia et liberahtas id maxime efficit. 
Nihil autem est amabilius nec copulatius quam morum 
simihtudo bonorum; in quibus enim eadem studia 
sunt, eaedem voluntates, in iis fit ut aeque quisque 
altero delectetur ac se ipso, efficiturque id, quod 
Pythagoras vult in amicitia, ut^ unus fiat ex pluribus. 

Magna etiam illa communitas est, quae conficitur 
ex beneficiis ultro et citro datis acceptis, quae et 
mutua et grata dum sunt, inter quos ea sunt, firma 
devinciuntur societate. 

57 Sed cum omnia ratione anlmoque lustraris, omnium 
societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea, 
quae cum re pubhca est uni cuique nostrum. Cari 

^ ei Perizonius, Edd,; not in MSS. 

'^tamen MSS., Miiller; del. Unger, Bt., Heine. 

^efficiturque id quod P. ultimum in amicitia pictavit ut 
Nonius (s.v, uUimum) (i.e. Pythagoras's ideal of friendsliip 
is realized). 

BOOK I. xvii 

homes, as into colonies. Then follow between these, 
in turn^ marriages and connections by marriage, and 
from these again a new stock of relations ; and from 
this propagation and after-growth states have theii 
beginnings. The bonds of common blood hold men 

55 fast through good-will and afFection; for it means 
much to share in common the same family traditions, 
the same forms of domestic worship, and the same 
ancestral tombs. 

But of all the bonds of fellowship, there is none (3) friendship, 
more noble, none more powerful than when good 
men of congenial character are joined in intimate 
friendship ; for really, if we discover in another that 
moral goodness on which I dwell so much, it attracts 
us and makes us friends to the one in whose character 

56 it seems to dwell. And while every virtue attracts 
us and makes us love those who seem to possess it, 
still j ustice and generosity do so most of all. Nothing, 
moreover, is more conducive to love and intimacy 
than compatibility of character in good men; for 
when two people have the same ideals and the same 
tastes, it is a natural consequence that each loves the 
other as himself ; and the result is, as Pythagoras 
requires of ideal friendship, that several are united 
in one. 

Another strong bond of fellowship is effected by 
mutual interchange of kind services ; and as long as 
these kindnesses are mutual and acceptable, those 
between whom they are interchanged are united by 
the ties of an enduring intimacy. 

57 But when with a rational spirit you liave surveyed (4)ioveof 
the whole field, there is no social relation among *^°'^" ^^' 
them all more close, none more dear than that 
which links each one of us with our country. Parents 



sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares, sed 
omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, 
pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortemt oppetere, si ei 
sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior istorum im- 
manitas, qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam et in ea 
funditus delenda occupati et sunt et fuerunt. 

58 Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat, qui- 
bus plurimum tribuendum sit officii, principes sint 
patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obli- 
gati sumus, proximi liberi totaque domus, quae spectat 
in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfu- 
gium, deinceps bene convenientes propinqui, qui- 
buscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque est. 

Quam ob rem necessaria praesidia vitae debentur 
iis maxime, quos ante dixi, vita autem victusque 
communis, consilia, sermones, cohortationes, consol?. 
tiones, interdum etiam obiurgationes in amicitiis 
vigent maxime, estque ea iucundissima amicitia, quam 
similitudo morum coniugavit. 

59 XVIII. Sed in his omnibus officiis tribuendis 
videndum erit, quid cuique maxime necesse sit, et 
quid quisque vel sine nobis aut possit consequi aut 
non possit. Ita non iidem erunt necessitudinum 
gradus, qui temporum; suntque officia, quae ahis 
magis quam aliis debeantur; ut vicinum citius adiu- 
veris in fructibus percipiendis quam aut fratrem aut 

(^Antony and his associates. ''Caesar, Clodius, Catiline. 


BOOK I. xvii-xviii 

are dear; dear are childrenj relatives^ friends; but 
one native land embraces all our loves ; and who that 
is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by 
his death he could render her a service ? So much 
the more execrable are those monsters who have 
torn their fatherland to pieces with every form of 
outrage and who are^ and have bcen'' engaged in 
compassing her utter destruction. 

Now, if a contrast and comparison were to be 
made to find out where most of our moral obligation 
is due, country would come first^ and parents; for 
their services have laid us under the heaviest obhga- 
tion ; next come children and the whole family, who 
look to us alone for support and can have no other 
protection ; finally, our kinsmen, with whom we Hve 
on good terms and with whom^ for the most part, 
our lot is one. 

All needful material assistance is, therefore, due 
first of all to those whom I have named ; but inti- 
mate relationship of hfe and living, counsel, conversa- 
tion, encouragementj comfort^ and sometimes even 
reproof flourish best in friendships. And that friend- 
ship is sweetest which is cemented by congeniality 
of character. 

XVIII. But in the performance of all these duties Duties maj^ var^ 
we shall have to consider what is most needful in ckcumstancef. 
each indivldual case and what each individual person 
can or cannot procure without our help. In this 
way we shall find that the claims of social relation- 
shipj in its various degrees, are not identical with 
the dictates of circumstances ; for there are obliga- 
tions that are due to one individual rather than 
to another: for example, one would sooner assist 
a neighbour in gathering his harvest than either 



familiarem, at, si lis in iudicio sit, propinquum potius 
et amicum quam vicinum defenderis. Haec igitur 
et talia circumspicienda sunt in omni officio [et 
consuetudo exercitatioque capiendaj/ ut boni ratioci- 
natores officiorum esse possimus et addendo dedu- 
cendoque^ videre, quae reliqui summa fiat, ex quo, 
quantum cuique debeatur, intellegas. 

60 Sed ut nec medici nec imperatores nec oratores, 
quamvis artis praecepta perceperint, quicquam magna 
laude dignum sine usu et exercitatione consequi pos- 
sunt, sic officii conservandi praecepta traduntur illa 
quidem, ut facimus ipsi, sed rei magnitudo usum 
quoque exercitationemque desiderat. 

Atque ab iis^ rebus, quae sunt in iure societatis 
humanae, quem ad modum ducatur lionestum, ex 
quo aptum est officium, satis fere diximus. 

61 Intelligendum autem est, cum proposita sint ge- 

nera quattuor, e quibus honestas officiumque manaret, 

splendidissimum videri, quod animo magno elatoque 

humanasque res despiciente factum sit. Itaque in pro- 

bris maxime in promptu est si quid tale dici potest: 

" Vos enim,* iuvenes, animum geritis muliebrem, 
Mi >. . " . .,.5 
illa virgo vin 

et si quid eius modi : 

Salmacida, spolia sine sudore et sanguine. 

Contraque in laudibus, quae magno animo et fortiter 

^ et . . . capienda om. Facciolati, Edd. 

^ deducendoqzie p; duccndoqiie A B H L a b (superscr 
sec. m. demendd) ; demendoque c. 

3«sEdd.; AwMSS. 

*enim A B H b c ; etenim a. 

^ illa" virgo "viri" Ed.; illa virgo vtrt MSS.; virago 

^ Cloelia (see Index). 


BOOK I. xviii 

a brother or a friend; but should it be a case in 
court, one would defend a kinsman and a friend 
rather than a neighbour. Such questions as these 
must, therefore^ be taken into consideration in every 
act of moral duty [and we must acquire the habit 
and keep it up], in order to become good calculators 
of duty, able by adding and subtracting to strike a 
balance correctly and find out just how much is due 
to each individual. 

But as neither physicians nor generals nor orators 
can achieve any signal success without experience 
and practice, no matter how well they may under- 
stand the theory of their profession^ so the rules for 
the discharge of duty are formulated, it is true, as I 
am doing now^ but a matter of such importance 
requires experience also and practice. 

This must close our discussion of the ways in 
which moral goodness, on which duty depends, is 
developed from those principles which hold good in 
human society. 

We must reahze, however, that while we have set C. Fortitude 
down four cardinal virtues from which as sources 
moral rectitude and moral duty emanate, that 
achievement is most glorious in the eyes of the 
world which is won with a spirit great, exaltedj and 
superior to the vicissitudes of earthly Hfe. And so, 
when we wish to hurl a taunt, the very first to rise to 
our Hps is, if possible, something Hke this : 

For ye, young men^ show a womanish soul, yon 
maiden^ a man's;" 
and this: 

Thou son of Salmacis, win spoils that cost nor 
sweat nor blood." 
When, on the other hand, we wish to pay a compli- 



excellenterque gesta sunt, ea nescio quo modo quasi 
pleniore ore laudamus. Hinc rhetorum campus de 
Marathone, Salammej Plataeis, Thermopylis, Leu- 
ctris, hinc noster Cocles/ hinc Decii, hinc Cn. et P. 
Scipiones, hinc M. MarcelluSj innumerabiles alii, 
maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi magnitu- 
dine excelHt. Declaratur autem studium belHcae 
gloriae, quod statuas quoque videmus ornatu fere 
62 XIX. Sed ea animi elatio, quae cernitur in pericuhs 
et laboribuSj si iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute 
communi, sed pro suis commodisj in vitio est; non 
modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est potius imma- 
nitatls omnem humanitatem repellentis. Itaque 
probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem 
esse dicunt propugnantem pro aequitate. Quocirca 
nemo, qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est insidiis 
et malitia, laudem est adeptus; nihil enim^ hone- 
stum esse potest, quod iustitia vacat. 
Menex. gg Pracclarum igitur illud Platonis: Non/* inquit, 
Lachw ' solum scientia, quae est remota ab iustitia, calHdi- 

107 B 

tas potius quam sapientia est appeHanda, verum 
etiam animus paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate, 
non utilitate communi impeUitur, audaciae potius 
nomen habeat quam fortitudinis." Itaque viros for- 
tes et^ magnanimos eosdem bonos et simpHces, 
veritatis amicos minimeque faUaces esse volumus; 
quae sunt ex media laude iustitiae. 

^ Leuctris, hinc noster Cocles Baldwin, Edd. ; leutris ster- 
cocles A B H a b ; leutrister chodes c ; leutris stercodes L. 
"^enim A C, Edd.; not in A B H L b, Bt^. 
» et a, Edd. ; not in A B H L b c p. 


B g/- I. xviii-xix 

ment, we somehc ^jg^- other praise in more eloquent 
strain the brave .j^ ' .oble work of some great soul. 
Hence there is ; f/ en field for orators on the sub- 
jects of Marathf w Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, 
and Leuctra, anr icnce our own Cocles, the Decii, 
Gnaeus and Pu ms Scipio, Marcus Marcellus, and 
countless others, fud, above all, the Roman People 
as a nation are ^elebrated for greatness of spirit. 
Their passion for miUtary glory, moreover, is shown 
in the fact that we see their statues usually in 
soldier's garb. 

XIX. But if the exaltation of spirit seen in times Fortitude in the 
of danger and toil is devoid of justice and fights for 
selfish ends instead of for the common good, it is a 
vice ; for not only has it no element of virtue, but 
its nature is barbarous and revolting to all our finer 
feeUngs. The Stoics, therefore, correctly define 
courage as "that virtue which champions the cause 
of right." Accordingly, no one has attained to true 
glory who has gained a reputation for courage by 
treachery and cunning ; for nothing that lacks justice 
can be morally right. 

This, then, is a fine saying of Plato's : Not only 
must all knowledge that is divorced from justice be 
called cunning rather than wisdom," he says, but 
even the courage that is prompt to face danger, if it 
is inspired not by public spirit, but by its own selfish 
purposes, should have the name of effrontery rather 
than of courage." And so we demand that men 
who are courageous and high-souled shall at the 
same time be good and straightforward, lovers of 
truth, and foes to deception ; for these qualities are 
the centre and soul of justice. 

F 65 


64 Sed illud odiosum est, quiAscin hac elatione et 
magnitudine animi facillime jet^inacia et nimia 
cupiditas principatus innascituiTl' Ut enim apud 

Laches Platonem est, omnem morem Lao^jdaemoniorum in- 

182 E 

flammatum esse cupiditate vincendi, sic, ut quisque 
animi magnitudine maxime excellet/ ita maxime 
vult princeps omnium vel potius solus esse. Difficile 
autem est, cum praestare omnibus concupieris, ser- 
vare aequitatem, quae est iustitiae maxime propria. 
Ex quo fit, ut neque disceptatione vinci se nec ullo 
publico ac legitimo iure patiantur, existuntque in re 
publica plerumque largitores et factiosi, ut opes quam 
maximas consequantur et sint vi^ potius superiores 
quam iustitia pares. Sed quo difficilius, hoc prae- 
clarius ; nullum enim est tempus, quod iustitia vacare 

65 Fortes igitur et magnanimi sunt habendi, non qui 
faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam. Vera autem 
et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod 
maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in 
gloria iudicat principemque se esse mavult quam 
videri ; etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis 
pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus. Facil- 
lime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque 
altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate^; qui locus 
est sane lubricus, quod vix invenitur, qui laboribus 
susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem 
rerum gestarum desideret gloriam. 

' excellet A B H L b c ; excellit a, Bt. 

* vi a, Edd. ; w/* A B H b ; utcumque L c. 

' altissimo ajiimo est, gloriae cupiditnte Pearce (confirmed 
by several MSS. ), Edd. ; alt. an. et gloriae cupiditate A B H 
b p ; est alt. an. et gloria et cupiditate L c. 

BOOK I. xix 

But the mischief is that from this exaltation and 
greatness of spirit spring all too readily self-will and 
excessive lust for power. For just as Plato tells us that 
the whole national character of the Spartans was on 
fire with passion for victory^ so, in the same way, the 
more notable a man is for his greatness of spirit, the 
more ambitious he is to be the foremost citizen, or, I 
should say rather, to be sole ruler. But when one 
begins to aspire to pre-eminence, it is difficult to 
preserve that spirit of fairness which is absolutely 
essential to justice. The result is that such men do 
not allow themselves to be constrained either by 
argument or by any public and lawful authority ; but 
they only too often prove to be bribers and agitators 
in pubhc Hfe, seeking to obtain supreme power and 
to be superiors through force rather than equals 
through justice. But the greater the difficulty, the 
greater the glory; for no occasion arises that can 
excuse a man for being guilty of injustice. 

So then, not those who do injury but those who xrue greatness 
prevent it are to be considered brave and courageous. °^sp"'*' 
Moreover, true and philosophic greatness of spirit 
regards the moral goodness to which nature most 
aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and pre- 
fers to be first in reahty rather than in name. And 
we must approve this view ; for he who depends upon 
the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be num- 
bered among the great. Then, too, the higher a 
man's ambition, the more easily he is tempted to 
acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now, 
to be sure, on very shppery ground ; for scarcely can 
the man be found who has passed through trials and 
encountered dangers and does not then wish for 
glory as a reward for his achievements. 

v2 67 


66 XX. Omnino fortis animus et magnus duabus 
rebus maxime cernitur, quarum una in rerum exter- 
narum despicientia ponitur, cum persuasum est 
nihil hominem, nisi quod honestum decorumque sit, 
aut admirari aut optare aut expetere oportere nulh- 
que neque homini neque perturbationi animi nec 
fortunae succumbere. Altera est res, ut, cum ita 
sis afFectus animo, ut supra dixi, res geras magnas 
illas quidem et maxime utiles, sed [utj vehementer 
arduas plenasque laborum et periculorum cum vitae, 
tum multarum rerum, quae ad vitam pertinent. 

67 Harum rerum duarum splendor omnis, ampHtudo, 
addo etiam utihtatem, in posteriore est, causa autem 
et ratio efficiens magnos viros in priore; in eo est 
enim illud, quod excellentes animos et humana con- 
temnentes facit. Id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus, 
si et solum id, quod honestum sit, bonum iudices et 
ab omni animi perturbatione Hber sis. Nam et ea, 
quae eximia plerisque et praeclara videntur, parva 
ducere eaque ratione stabiH firmaque contemnere 
fortis animi magnique ducendum est, et ea, quae 
videntur acerba, quae multa et varia in hominum 
vita fortunaque versantur, ita ferre, ut nihil a statu 
naturae discedas, niliil a dignitate sapientis, robusti 

68 animi est magnaeque constantiae. Non est autem 
consentaneum, qui metu non frangatur, eum frangi 
cupiditate nec, qui invictum se a labore praestiterit, 
vinci a voluptate. Quam ob rem et haec vitanda^ 

^ persuasum est Madvig (ad de Fin. p. 448 ff. ), Edd. ; p. sit 

■■^ vitanda Edd. (cum duobus codd. Guelpherbytanis); 
'idenda MSS. 


XX. The soul that is altogether courageous and Characteristica 
great is marked above all by two charaeteristics : " 
one of these is indifference to outward circumstances ; 
for such a person cherishes the conviction that 
nothing but moral goodness and propriety deserves to 
be either admired or wished for or striven after, and 
that he ought not to be subject to any man or any 
passion or any accident of fortune. The second 
characteristic is that, when the soul is disciplined in 
the way above mentioned, one should do deeds not only 
great and in the highest degree useful, but extremely 
arduous and laborious and fraught with danger both 
to hfe and to many things that make hfe worth hving. 
>7 All the glory and greatness and, I may add, all the (i) ^oral 
usefulness of these two characteristics of courage are 
centred in the latter ; the rational cause that makes 
men great, in the former. For it is the former that indifference 
contains the element that makes souls pre-eminent fortunes!'^ 
and indifferent to worldly fortune. And this quahty 
is distinguished by two criteria: (l) if one account 
moral rectitude as the only good ; and (2) if one be 
free from all passion. For we must agree that it 
takes a brave and heroic soul to hold as shght what 
most people think grand and glorious, and to dis- 
regard it from fixed and settled principles. And it 
requires strength of character and great singleness 
of purpose to bear what seems painful, as it comes 
to pass in many and various forms in human hfe, and 
to bear it so unflinchingly as not to be shaken in the 
least from one's natural state of the dignity of a 
68 philosopher. Moreover, it would be inconsistent 
for the man who is not overcome by fear to be over- 
come by desire, or for the man who has shown himself 
invincible to toil to be conquered by pleasure. We 

. 69 


et pecuniae fugienda cupiditas ; nihil enim est tam 
angusti animi tamque parvi quam amare divitias, 
nihil honestius magnificentiusque quam pecuniam 
contemnere, si non habeas, si habeas, ad beneficen- 
tiam liberalitatemque conferre. 

Cavenda etiam est gloriae cupiditas, ut supra 
dixi; eripit enim libertatem, pro qua magnanimis 
viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nec vero imperia 
expetenda ac potius aut non accipienda interdum 
aut deponenda non numquam. 

69 Vacandum autem omni est animi perturbatione, 
cum cupiditate et metu^ tum etiam aegritudine et 
voluptate nimia^ et iracundia, ut tranquillitas animi 
et securitas adsit, quae affert cum constantiam, tum 
etiam dignitatem. Multi autem et sunt et fuerunt, 
qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes a 
negotiis publicis se removerint ad otiumque perfu- 
gerint; in his et nobihssimi philosophi longeque 
principes et quidam homines severi et graves nec 
populi nec principum mores ferre potuerunt, vixe- 
runtque non nulli in agris delectati re sua famihari. 

70 His idem propositum fuit, quod regibus, ut ne qua 
re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur, cuius 
proprium est sic vivere, ut vehs. 

XXI. Quare cum hoc commune sit potentiae 
cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi, otiosis, alteri se 

^ voluptate nimia Orelli, Miiller ; vohiptate animi k H L 
a b c ; vol. animi et secnritas {et iraciindia ut tr. animi by a 
laterband on the margiii) B ; voluptate [a?iitni], Bt., Heine. 

» As Cicero did at the expiration of his consulship. 
^ As Sulla did in his dictatorship. The cont rast to Caesar 
is the more striking for Cicero's not mentioning it. 

oe.g. Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, 
^ Snch as Cicero's friend, Atticus, and Marcus Piso. 

70 . 

BOOK I. xx-xxi 

must, therefore, not only avoid the latter, but also 
beware of ambition for wealth ; for there is nothing so 
characteristic of narrowness and littleness of soul as 
the love of riches; and there is nothing more 
honourable and noble than to be indifferent to 
money . if one does not possess it, and to devote it to 
beneficence and Uberahty, if one does possess it. 

As I said before, we must also beware of ambition 
for glory ; for it robs us of Hberty, and in defence of 
hberty a high-souled man should stake everything. 
And one ought not to seek miHtary authority ; nay, 
rather it ought sometimes to be declined,^ sometimes 
to be resigned.^ 

) Again, we must keep ourselves free from every (3) Freedom 
disturbing emotion, not only from desire and fear, but 
also from excessive pain and pleasure, and from angei*^ 
so that we may enjoy that calm of soul and freedom 
from care which bring both moral stabiHty and dig- 
nity of character. But there have been many and stiH The retired life 
are many who^ while pursuing that calm of soul of 
vvhich I speak, have withdrawn from civic duty and 
taken refuge in retirement. Among such have been 
found the most f amous and by far the foremost philo- 
sophers*^ and certain other'^ earnest, thoughtful men 
who could not endure the conduct of either the 
people or their leaders; some of them, too^ Hved in 
the country and found their pleasure in the manage- 

[) ment of their private estates. Such men have had 
the same aims as kings — to suffer no want, to be 
subject to no authority, to enjoy their Hberty, that 
is, in its essence, to Hve just as they please. 

XXI. So, while this desire is common to men of 
poHtical ambitions and men of retirement, of whom 
I have just spoken, the one class think they cau 



adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant, 
alteri, si contenti sint et suo et parvo. In quo 
neutrorum omnino contemnenda sententia est, sed 
et facilior et tutior et minus aliis gravis aut molesta 
vita est otiosorum^ fructuosior autem hominum generi 
et ad claritatem amplitudinemque aptior eorum, qui 
se ad rem publicam et ad magnas res gerendas ac- 

71 Quapropter et iis forsitan concedendum sit rem 
pubhcam non capessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio 
doctrinae sese dediderunt, et iis, qui aut valetudinis 
imbecillitate aut aHqua graviore causa impediti a r( 
publica recesserunt, cum eius administrandae potC' 
statem aliis laudemque concederent. Quibus autem 
talis nulla sit causa, si despicere se dicant ea, quae 
plerique mirentur, imperia et magistratus, iis non 
modo non laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto; 
quorum iudicium in eo, quod gloriam contemnant et 
pro nihilo putent, difficile factu est non probare ; sed 
videntur labores et molestias, tum offensionum et 
repulsarum quasi quandam ignominiam timere et 
infamiam. Sunt enim, qui in rebus contrariis parum 
sibi constent, voluptatem severissime contemnant, in 
dolore sint molliores, gloriam neglegant, frangantur 
infamia, atque ea quidem non satis constanter. 

72 Sed iis, qui habent a natura adiumenta rerum 

gerendarum, abiecta omni cunctatione adipiscendi 

BOOK I. xxi 

attain their end if they secure large means; the Theiifeof 
other, if they are content with the httle they have. ^^ icsemce 
And in this matter^ neither way of thinking is alto- reUremen^t 
gether to be condemned ; but the life of retirement is 
easier and safer and at the same time less burden- 
some or troublesome to others, while the career 
of those who apply themselves to statecraft and to 
conducting great enterprises is more profitable to 
mankind and contributes more to their own great- 
ness and renown. 

So perhaps those men of extraordinary genius 
who have devoted themselves to learning must be 
excused for not taking part in pubhc affairs; hke- 
wise, those who from ill-health or for some still 
more vahd reason have retired from the service of 
the state and left to others the opportunity and the 
glory of its administration. But if those who have 
no such excuse profess a scorn for civil and mihtary 
offices, which most people admire, I think that this 
should be set down not to their credit but to their 
discredit; for in so far as they care Httle, as they 
say, for glory and count it as naught, it is difficult 
not to sympathize with their attitude; in reahty, 
however, they seem to dread the toil and trouble 
and also, perhaps, the discredit and humihation of 
political failure and defeat. For there are people 
who in opposite circumstances do not act consist- 
ently: they have the utmost contempt for pleasure, 
but in pain they are too sensitive; they are in- 
different to glory, but they are crushed by disgrace ; 
and even in their inconsistency they show no great 

But those whom Nature has endowed with the Pubiicservic 
eapacity for administering pubhc affairs should put * '^"'^* 



magistratus et gerenda res publica est; nec enim 
aliter aut regi civitas aut declarari animi magnitudo 
potest. Capessentibus autem rem publicam nihilo ^ 
minus quam philosophis, haud scio an magis etiam 
et magnificentia et despicientia adhibenda est ^ re- 
rum humanarum, quam saepe dico^ et tranquilhtas 
animi atque secui'itas, siquidem nec anxii futuri 

73 sunt et cum gravitate constantiaque victuri. Quae 
faciUora sunt philosophis, quo minus multa patent 
in eorum vita^ quae fortuna feriat, et quo minus 
multis rebus egent, et quia, si quid adversi eveniat, 
tam graviter cadere non possunt. Quocirca non 
sine causa maiores motus animorum concitantur 
maioraque studia efficiendi^ rem pubhcam geren- 
tibus quam quietis, quo magis iis et magnitudo est 
animi adhibenda et vacuitas ab angoribus. 

Ad rem gerendam autem qui accedit, caveat, ne 
id modo consideret, quam illa res honesta sit, sed 
etiam ut habeat efficiendi facultatem; in quo ipso 
considerandum est, ne aut temere desperet propter 
ignaviam aut nimis confidat propter cupiditatem. 
In omnibus autem negotiis, prius quam aggrediare, 
adhibenda est praeparatio dihgens. 

74 XXII. Sed cum plerique arbitrentur res belhcas 
maiores esse quam urbanas, minuenda est haec 
opinio. Multi enim bella saepe quaesiverunt propter 
gloriae cupiditatem, atque id in magnis animis in- 
geniisque plerumque contingit, eoque magis, si 
sunt ad rem mihtarem apti et cupidi bellorum 

^nihilo Wesenberg', Edd. ; nihil MSS. 

'^ est Maniitius, Edd.; sit MSS. 

'^ maioraque studia efficiendi Ung^er, Miiller ; maioraque 
efficiendi A^ B H L b c ; maiorque cura efficiendi a, Bt., 
Heine ; maioraque efficienda A'-' p. 


BOOK I. xxi-xxii 

aside all hesitation, enter the race for pubhc office, 
and take a hand in directing the government; for 
in no other way can a government be administered 
or greatness of spirit be made manifest. Statesmen, 
too, no less than philosophers — perhaps even more 
so — should carry with them that greatness of spirit 
and indifference to outwai'd circumstances to which 
I so often refer, together with calm of soul and free- 
dom from care, if they are to be free from worries 

73 and lead a dignified and self-consistent life. This is 
easier for the philosophers ; as their hfe is less exposed 
to the assaults of fortune, their wants are fewer ; and 
if any misfortune overtakes them, their fall is not so 
disastrous. Not without reason, therefore, are stronger 
emotions aroused in those who engage in pubhc hfe 
tlian in those who Uve in retirement, and greater is 
their ambition for success; the more, therefore, do 
they need to enjoy greatness of spirit and freedom 
from annoying cares. 

If anyone is entering pubHc life, let him beware 
of thinking only of the honour that it brings ; but 
let him be sure also that he has the abihty to 
succeed. At the same time, let him take care not 
to lose heart too readily through discouragement nor 
yet to be over-confident through ambition. In a word, 
before undertaking any enterprise, careful prepara- 
tion must be made. 

Ji XXII. Most people think that the achievements Victories of war 
of war are more important than tliose of peace ; but victoriesof 
this opinion needs to be corrected. For many men peace. 
have sought occasions for war from the mere ambi- 
tion for fame. This is notably the case with men 
of great spirit and natural abihty, and it is the more 
Ukely to happen, if they are adapted to a soldier's 



gerendorum ; vere autem si volumus iudicare, multae 
res exstiterunt urbanae maiores clarioresque quam 

75 Quamvis enim Themistocles iure laudetur et sit 
eius nomen quam Solonis illustrius citeturque Sala- 
mis clarissimae testis victoriae, quae anteponatur 
consilio Solonis ei^quo primum constituit Areopagitas, 
non minus praeclarum hoc quam illud iudicandum 
est; illud enim semel profuit, hoc semper proderit 
civitati; hoc consilio leges Atheniensium, hoc maio- 
rum instituta servantur; et Themistocles quidem 
nihil dixerit, in quo ipse Areopagum adiuverit, at 
ille vere a^ se adiutum Themistoclem ; est enim 
bellum gestum consilio senatus eius, qui a Solone 
erat constitutus. 

76 Licet eadem de Pausania Lysandroque dicere, 
quorum rebus gestis quamquam imperium Lacedae- 
moniis partum ^ putatur, tamen ne minima quidem ex 
parte Lycurgi legibus et disciplinae conferendi sunt; 
quin etiam ob has ipsas causas et parentiores habue- 
runt exercitus et fortiores. Mihi quidem neque 
pueris nobis M. Scaurus C. Mario neque, cum ver- 
saremur in re publica, Q. Catulus Cn. Pompeio 
cedere videbatur; parvi enim sunt foris arma, nisi 
est consiUum domi; nec plus Africanus, singularis 

' a Edd. ; not in MSS. ; se adiutum A B H b, Edd. ; adinvit 
L' c p ; se adiutum ab illo dixerit (?) Thcmistoclcs \?. 

^ L. partum Lambinus, Miiller ; partum L., Bt.; om. par- 
tum A' B II L' a b ; L. dilatatum A'^; dilatatum L. L'-' c. 


BOOK I. xxii 

life and fond of warfare. But if we will face the 
facts, we shall find that there have been many 
instances of achievement in peace more important 
and no less renowned than in war. 

However highly Themistocles, for example, may Themistocles 
be extolled — and deservedly — and however much solon. "* 
more illustrious his name may be than Solon's, and 
however much Salamis may be cited as witness of 
his most glorious victory — a victory glorified above 
Solon's statesmanship in instituting the Areopagus 
— yet Solon's achievement is not to be accounted less 
illustrious than his. For Themistocles's victory served 
the state once and only once ; while Solon's work 
will be of service for ever. For through his legisla- 
tion the laws of the Athenians and the institutions 
of their fathers are maintained. And while The- 
mistocles could not readily point to any instance in 
which he himself had rendered assistance to the 
Areopagus, the Areopagus might with justice assert 
that Themistocles had received assistance from it; 
for the war was directed by the counsels of that 
senate which Solon had created. 

The same may be said of Pausanias and Lysander. Pausanias and 
Although it is thought that it was by their achieve- ^^^" yl 
ments that Sparta gained her supremacy, yet these Lycurgus. 
are not even remotely to be compared with the 
legislation and discipline of Lycurgus. Nay, rather, 
it was due to these that Pausanias and Lysander had 
armies so brave and so well disciplined. For my own 
partj I do not consider that Marcus Scaurus was inferior 
to Gaius Marius, when I was a lad, or Quintus Catulus 
to Gnaeus Pompey, when I was engaged in public 
life. For arms are of little value in the field unless 
there is wise counsel at home. So, too, Africanus, 


et vir et imperator, in exscindenda Numantia rei 
publicae profuit quam eodem tempore P. Nasica 
privatus, cura Ti. Gracchum interemit; quamquam 
haec quidem res non solum ex domestica est ratione 
(attingit etiam bellicam, quoniam vi manuque confecta 
est), sed tamen id ipsum est gestum consilio urbano 
sine exercitu. 

77 Illud autem optimum est, in quod invadi solere ab 
improbis et invidis audio : 

Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi." 

Ut enim alios omittam, nobis rem pubUcam guber- 
nantibus nonne togae arma cesserunt? neque enim 
periculum in re publica fuit gravius umquam nec 
maius otium. Ita consiliis diligentiaque nostra cele- 
riter de manibus audacissimorum civium delapsa 
arma ipsa ceciderunt. Quae res igitur gesta umquam 

78 in bello tanta? qui triumphus conferendus? licet 
enim mihi, M. fili, apud te gloriari^ ad quem et here- 
ditas huius gloriae et factorum imitatio pertinet. 
Mihi quidem certe vir abundans bellicis laudibus, 
Cn. Pompeius^ multis audientibus hoc tribuit, ut 
diceret frustra se triumphum tertium deportaturum 
fuisse, nisi meo in rem publicam beneficio, ubi tri- 
umpharet, esset habiturus. 

Sunt igitur domesticae fortitudines non inferiores 

»The praises of Cicero for his overthrow of the conspiracy 
of Catiline. 
^The laurels of Ihe triumphant general. 


BOOK I. xxii 

though a great man and a soldier of extraordinary 
abilitjj did no greater service to the state by destroy- 
ing Numantia than was done at the same time by 
Publius Nasica, though not then clothed with official 
authority, by removing Tiberius Gracchus. This 
deed does not, to be sure, belong wholly to the do- 
main of civil afFairs ; it partakes of the nature of war 
alsOj since it was efFected by violence ; but it waSj for 
all that, executed as a poKtical measure without the 
help of an army. 

77 The whole truth, however, is in this verse, against cicero's great 
which, I am told, the maHcious and envious are wont ^*° °^^' 

to rail : 
Yield, ye arms, to the toga ; to civic praises,^ ye 
Not to mention other instances, did not arms yield 
to the toga, when I was at the helm of state ? For 
never was the repubUc in more serious peril, never 
was peace more profound. Thus, as the result of my 
counsels and my vigilance, their weapons slipped 
suddenly from the hands of the most desperate 
traitors — dropped to the ground of their own accord ! 
What achievement in war, then, was ever so great ? 

78 What triumph can be compared with that? For I 
may boast to you, my son Marcus ; for to you belong 
the inheritance of that glory of mine and the duty 
of imitating my deeds. And it was to me, too, that 
Gnaeus Pompey, a hero crowned with the honours 
of war, paid this tribute in the hearing of many, 
when he said that his third triumph would have been 
gained in vain, if he were not to have through my 
services to the state a place in which to celebrate 

There are, therefore, instances of civic courage 



militaribus ; in quibus plus etiam quam in his operae 
studiique ponendum est. 

79 XXIII, Omnino illud honestum, quod ex animo 
excelso magnificoque quaerimus, animi efficitur, non 
corporis viribus. Exercendum tamen corpus et ita 
afficiendum est, ut oboedire consiho rationique possit 
in exsequendis negotiis et in labore tolerando. 
Honestum autem id, quod exquirimus, totum est 
positum in animi cura et cogitatione; in quo non 
minorem utihtatem afferunt, qui togati rei pubhcae 
praesunt, quam qui beUum gerunt. Itaque eorum 
consiho saepe aut non suscepta aut confecta beha 
sunt, non numquam etiam illata, ut M. Catonis 
bellum tertium Punicum, in quo etiam mortui valuit 

80 auctoritas. Quare expetenda quidem magis est 
decernendi ratio quam decertandi fortitudo, sed 
cavendum, ne id bellandi magis fuga quam utihtatis 
ratione faciamus. Bellum autem ita suscipiatur, ut 
nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur. 

Fortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari 
in rebus asperis nec tumultuantem de gradu deici, 
ut dicitur, sed praesenti animo uti et consiho nec a 
ratione discedere. 

81 Quamquam hoc animi, illud etiam ingenii magni 
est, praecipere cogitatione futura et aliquanto ante 

^aliquanto Edd.; aliguando MSS. 

BOOK I. xxii-xxiii 

that are not inferior to the cnurage of the soldier. 
Nay, the former calls for even greater energy and 
greater devotion than the latter. 

XXIII. That moral goodness which we look for in (2) Physicai 
a lofty, high-minded spirit is secured, of course, by '^°^'^^s^- 
moral, not by physical, strength. And yet the body 
must be trained and so disciplined that it can obey 
the dictates of judgment and reason in attending 
to business and in enduring toil. But that moral 
goodness which is our theme depends whoUy upon 
the thought and attention given to it by the mind. 
And in this way, the men who in a civil capacity 
direct the affairs of the nation render no less impor- 
tant service than they who conduct its wars : by their 
statesmanship oftentimes wars are either averted or 
terminated ; sometimes also they are declared. Upon 
Marcus Cato's counsel, for example, the Third Punic 
War was undertaken, and inits conduct hisinfluence 
was dominant, even after he was dead. And so 
diplomacy in the friendly settlement of controversies 
is more desirable than courage in setthng them on 
the battlefield ; but we must be careful not to take 
tliat course merely for the sake of avoiding war 
rather than for the sake of public expediency. War, 
however, should be undertaken in such a way as to 
make it evident that it has no other object than to 
secure peace. 

But it takes a brave and resolute spirit not to be 
disconcerted in times of difficulty or ruffled and 
thrown ofF one's feet, as the saying is, but to keep 
one's presence of mind and one's self-possession and 
not to swerve from the path of reason. 

Now all this requires great personal courage ; but courage and 
it calls also for great intellectual abihty by reflection discretion. 
G 81 


constituere, quid accidere possit in utramque partem, 
et quid agendum sit, cum quid evenerit, nec com- 
mittere, ut aliquando dicendum sit : Non putaram." 
Haec sunt opera magni animi et excelsi et pru- 
dentia consilioque fidentis; temere autem in acie 
versari et manu cum lioste confligere immane quid- 
dam et beluarum simile est ; sed cum tempus necessi- 
tasque postulat, decertandum manu est et mors 
servituti turpitudinique anteponenda. 

82 XXIV. De evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus 
valde considerandum est ne quid temere, ne quid cru- 
deliter. Idque est magni viri, rebus agitatis punire 
sontes, multitudinem conservare, in omni fortuna 
recta atque honesta retinere. Ut enim sunt, quem 
ad modum supra dixi, qui urbanis rebus bellicas 
anteponant, sic reperias multos, quibus periculosa et 
calida consilia quietis et cogitatis^ splendidiora et 
maiora videantur. 

83 Nunquam omnino periculi fuga committendum est, 
ut imbelles timidique videamur, sed fugiendum illud 
etiam, ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa, quo esse 
nihil potest stultius. Quapropter in adeundis peri- 
cuHs consuetudo imitanda medicorum est, qui leviter 
aegrotantes leniter curant, gravioribus autem morbis 
periculosas curationes et ancipites adhibere cogun- 
tur. Quare in tranquillo tempeslatem adversam 

^calida Nonius, Edd.; callida MSS. 

* consilia quietis et cogiiatis Edd. ; consilia et quietis et 
cogitationis A. B H a b; consilia et quietis cogitationibus Q p. 

BOOK I. xxiii-xxiv 

to anticipate the future, to discover some time in 
advance what may happen whether for good or for 
ill, and what must be done in any possible event, and 
never to be reduced to having to say "l had not 
thought of that." 

These are the activities that mark a spirit, strong, 
high, and self-rehant in its prudence and wisdom. 
But to mix rashly in the fray and to fight hand to 
hand with the enemy is but a barbarous and brutish 
kind of business. Yet when the stress of circum- 
stances demands it, we must gird on the sword and 
prefer death to slavery and disgrace. 

XXIV. As to destroying and plundering cities, let 
rae saj- that great care should be taken that nothing 
be done in reckless cruelty or wantonness. And it is 
a great man's duty in troublous times to single out 
the guilty for punishment, to spare the many, and in 
every turn of fortune to hold to a true and honour- 
able course. For whereas there are many, as I have 
said before, who place the achievements of war above 
those of peace, so one may find many to whom 
adventurous, hot-headed counsels seem more brilliant 
and more impressive than calm and well-considered 

We must, of course, never be guilty of seeming Courage in timc 
cowardly and craven in our avoidance of danger ; but aingeu ^^"^ 
we must also beware of exposing ourselves to danger 
needlessly. Nothing can be more foolhardy than 
that. Accordingly, in encountering danger we 
should do as doctors do in their practice : in light 
cases of illness they give mild treatment ; in cases of 
dangerous sickness they are compelled to apply 
hazardous and even desperate remedies. It is, there- 
fore, only a madman who, in a calm, would pray 
g2 83 


optare dementis est, subvenire autem tempestati 
quavis ratione sapientis, eoque magis, si plus adipi- 
scare re explicata boni quam addubitata mali. 

Periculosae autem rerum actiones partim iis^ sunt, 
qui eas suscipiunt, partim rei publicae. Itemque 
alii de vita, alii de gloria et benivolentia civium in 
discrimen vocantur. Promptiores igitur debemus 
esse ad nostra pericula quam ad communia dimicare- 
que paratius de honore et gloria quam de ceteris 
84 Inventi autem multi sunt, qui non modo pecu- 
niam, sed etiam -vitam profundere pro patria parati 
essent, iidem gloriae iacturam ne minimam quidem 
facere vellent, ne re publica quidem postulante ; ut 
Callicratidas, qui, cum Lacedaemoniorum dux fuisset 
Peloponnesiaco bello multaque fecisset egregie, ver- 
tit ad extremum omnia, cum consilio non paruit 
eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam nec 
cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant; quibus 
ille respondit Lacedaemonios classe illa amissa aHam 
parare posse, se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse. 
Atque haec quidem Lacedaemoniis^ plaga mediocris, 
illa pestifera, qua, cum Cleombrotus invidiam timens 
temere cum Epaminonda conflixisset Lacedaemoni- 
orum opes corruerunt. 

* iis Edd. ; his MSS. 

^guidem Lacedaemoniis Edd., quidem de Lacedaemoniis 

''Such as the esteem and good-will of fellow-citizens ; 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the exisf*"'^^^ of 
the state and all the advantages it brings. 


BOOK I. xxiv 

for a storm ; a wise man's way is, when the storm 
does come, to withstand it with all the means at his 
commandj and especially, when the advantages to 
be expected in case of a successful issue are greater 
than the hazards of the struggle. 

The dangers attending great afFairs of state fall Patriotism and 
sometimes upon those who undertake them, some- ^^ "^^"' °*' 
times upon the state. In carrying out such enter- 
prises, some run the risk of losing their Hves, others 
their reputation and the good-will of their fellow- 
citizens. It is our duty, then, to be more ready to 
endanger our own than the pubhc welfare and to 
hazard honour and glory more readily than other 

Many, on the other hand, have been found who 
were ready to pour out not only their money but 
their hves for their country and yet would not 
consent to make even the shghtest sacrifice of per- 
sonal glory — even though the interests of their 
country demanded it. For example, when Calhcra- 
tidas, as Spartan admiral in the Peloponnesian War, 
had won many signal successes, he spoiled every- 
thing at the end by refusing to hsten to the proposal 
of those who thought he ought to withdraw his fleet 
from the Arginusae and not to risk an engagement 
with the Athenians. His answer to them was that 
" the Spartans could build another fleet, if they lost 
that one, but he could not retreat without dishonour 
to himself " And yet what he did dealt only a 
shght blow to Sparta; there was another which 
proved disastrous, when Cleombrotus in fear of criti- 
cism recklessly went into battle against Epaminon- 
das. In consequence of that, the Spartan power 


Ann. xii, Ouanto Q. Maximus melius! de quo Ennius: 

Vahlen-^, 370-372 ^^ , ,. , . . 

Unus nomo nobis cunetando restituit rem. 

Noenum rumores ponebat ^ ante salutem. 

Ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret. 
Quod genus peccandi vitandum est etiam in rebus 
urbanis. Sunt enim, qui, quod sentiunt, etsi opti- 
mum sitj tamen invidiae metu non audeant ^ dicere. 

85 XXV. Omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt, 
Rep. i. 342 E (Juo Platonis praecepta teneant, unum, ut utilitatem 

civium sic tueantur, ut, quaecumque agunt, ad eam 
Rep. iv, 420 R refcrant obliti commodorum suorum, alterum, ut 
totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem 
aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Ut enim tutela, 
sic procuratio rei publicae ad eorum utilitatem, qui 
commissi sunt, nbn ad.eorum, quibus commissa est, 
gerenda est. Qui afttem parti civium consulunt, 
partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam in civitatem 
inducunt, seditionem atque discordiam; ex quo 
evenit, ut alii populares, alii studiosi optimi cuius- 
que videantur, pauci universorum. 

86 Hinc apud Atheniensis magnae discordiae, in 
nostra re publica non solum seditiones, sed etiam 
pestifera bella civilia; quae gravis et fortis civis et 

"^ Noenum rumores ponehat Lachmann (ad Lucr. III, 
198) ; Non enim rumores ponebat MSS. ; A^on ponebat enim 

^ audeant Ernesti ; audent MSS., Bt.', Heine. 

*Sacrificing public interests to personal glory. 
l» From the death of Pericles on. 
i^Such as the conspiracy of Catiline. 
^ The civil wars of Marius and SuUa, Caesar and 

BOOK 1. xxiv-xxv 

How much better was the conduct of Quintus 
Maximus! Of him Ennius says : 

"One man — and he alone — restored our state by 

Not in the least did fame with him take prece- 

dence of safety ; 
Therefore now does his glory shine bright, and it 

grows ever brighter." 

This sort of ofFence'* niust be avoided no less in 
poUtical Ufe. For there are men who for fear of 
giving offence do not darc to express their honest 
opinion, no matter how exceUent. ^^^ 

XXV. Those who propose to take charge of the P^^K , .. 

^:, ^ . administration 

affairs of government sliould not lail to remember two must be iree 
of Plato's rules : first, to keep the good of the people ^""^ 
so clearly in view that regardless of their own in- 
terests they wiU make their every action conform to 
that; second, to care for the welfare of the whole 
body poUtic and not in serving the interests of some (i) partisanship 
one party to betray the rest. For the administra- 
tion of the government, Uke the office of a trustee, 
must be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted 
to one's care, not of those to whom it is entrusted. 
Now, those who care for the interests of a part of 
the citizens and neglect another part, introduce 
into the civil service a dangerous element — dissen- 
sion and party strife. The result is that some 
are found to be loyal supporters of the democratic, 
others of the aristocratic party, and few of the nation 
as a whole. 
i As a result of this party spirit bitter strife arose 
at Athens,'' and in our own country not only dis- 
sensions'^ but also disastrous civil wars^ broke oct. 



in re publica dignus principatu fugiet atque oderit 

tradetque se totum rei publicae neque opes aut 

potentiam consectabitur totamque eam sic tuebitur, 

ut omnibus consulat; nec vero criminibus falsis in 

odium aut invidiam quemquam vocabit omninoque 

ita iustitiae honestatique adliaerescetj ut, dum ea 

conservet, quamvis graviter offendat mortemque 

oppetat potius quam deserat illa, quae dixi. 

87 Miserrima omnino est ambitio honorumqtie con- 

ep. vi, 48S B; tcntio, de qua praeclare apud eundem est Platonem, 
J9C ^^ 

similiter facere eos, qui inter se contenderent, uter 

potius rem publicam administraret, ut si nautae cer- 

seTc^"' tarent, quis eorum potissimum gubernaret." Idem- 

856B ' que praecipit, ut eos adversarios existimemus, qui 

arma contra ferant, non eos, qui suo iudicio tueri 

rem publicam velint," qualis fuit inter P. Africanum 

et Q. Metelhim sine acerbitate dissensio. 

S8 Nec vero audiendi, qui graviter inimicis irascen- 

dum putabunt idque magnanimi et fortis viri esse 

censebunt; nihil enim laudabilius, nihil.magno et 

praeclaro viro dignius placabihtate atque clementia. 

In libcris vero popuhs et in iuris aequabihtate exer- 


All this the citizen who is patriotic, brave, and wortliy 
of a leading place in the state will shim with abhor- 
rence ; he will dedicate himself unreservedly to his 
country, without aiming at influence or power for 
himself; and he will devote himself to the state in 
its entirety in such a way as to further the interests 
of all. Besides, he will not expose anyone to hatred 
or disrepute by groundless charges, but he will 
surely cleave to justice and honour so closely that he 
will submit to any loss, however heavy, rather than 
be untrue to them, and will face death itself rather 
than renounce them. 

A most wretched custom, assuredly, is our elec- (2) self-seeking, 
tioneering and scrambling for office. Concerning 
this also we find a fine thought in Plato: Those 
who compete against one another/' he says, to see 
which of two candidates shall administer the govern- 
ment, are like sailors quarrelhng as to which one of 
them shall do the steering." And he Hkewise lays 
down the rule that we should regard only those as 
adversaries who take up ai-ms against the state, not 
those who strive to have the government adminis- 
tered according to their convictions. This was the 
spirit of the disagreement between PubHus Africanus 
and Quintus Metelhis : there was in it no trace of 

Neither must we hsten to those who think that (3) vindictive- 
one should indulge in violent anger against one's '^*'^*' 
pohtical enemies and imagine that such is the 
attitude of a great-spirited, brave man. For 
nothing is more commendable, nothing more 
becoming in a pre-eminently great man than cour- 
tesy and forbearance. Indeed, in a free people, 
where all enjoy equal rights before the law^ we 


cenda etiam est facilitas et altitudo animi, quae 
dicitur, ne, si irascamur aut intempestive accedenti- 
bus aut impudenter rogantibus, in morositatem 
inutilem et odiosam incidamus. Et tamen ita pro- 
bunda est mansuetudo atque clementia, ut adhibeatur 
rei publicae causa severitas^ sine qua administrari 
civitas non potest. Omnis autem et animadversio 
et castigatio contumelia vacare debet neque ad eius, 
qui punitur' aliquem aut verbis castigat/ sed ad rei 
publicae utilitatem referri. 

89 Cavendum est etiam, ne maior poena quam culpa 
sit, et ne isdem de causis alii plectantur, alii ne 
appellentur quidem. Prohibenda autem maxime 
est ira in puniendo ; numquam enim, iratus qui acce- 
det ad poenam, mediocritatem illam tenebit, quae 
est inter nimium et parum, quae placet Peripateticis, 
et recte placet, modo ne laudarent iracundiam et 
dicerent utiliter a natura datam. Illa vero omnibus 
in rebus repudianda est optandumque, ut ii, qui 
praesunt rei publicae, legum similes sint, quae ad 
puniendum non iracundia, sed aequitate dicuntur. 

90 XXVI. Atque etiam in rebus prosperis et ad 
voluntatem nostram fluentibus superbiam magno- 

^ puiiitur Nonlus, Edd. ; punii a ; puniet A B H b c. 
2 castigat MSS.; fatigat Nonius, Orelli. 

» The quality elsewliere expressed by Cicero with paO&rrit 
— ' depth,' ' reserve,' the art of concealing' and controUing' 
one's feelings under an outward serenity of manner. 


BOOK I. xxv-xxvi 

must school ourselves to afFability and what is called 
mental poise"*; for if we are irritated when people 
intrude upon us at unseasonable hours or make un- 
reasonable requests, we shall develop a sour^ churHsh 
temper, prejudicial to ourselves and ofFensive to 
others. And yet gentleness of spirit and forbear- 
ance are to be commended only with the under- 
standing that strictness may be exercised for the 
good of the state; for without that, the govern- 
ment cannot be well administered. On the other 
hand, if punishment or correction must be adminis- 
tered, it need not be insulting; it ought to have 
regard to the welfare of the state, nottothe personal 
satisfaction of the man who administers the punish- 
ment or reproof. 

We should take care also that the punishment W anger 
shall not be out of proportion to the ofFence, and 
that some shall not be chastised for the same fault 
for which others are not even called to account. In 
administering punishment it is above all necessary 
to allow no trace of anger. For if anyone proceeds 
in a passion to inflict punishment, he will never 
observe that happy mean which lies between excess 
and defect. This doctrine of the mean is approved 
by the Peripatetics — and wisely approved, if only 
they did not speak in praise of anger and tell us 
that it is a gift bestowed on us by Nature for a good 
purpose. But in reality, anger is in every circum- 
stance to be eradicated ; and it is to be desired that 
they who administer the government should be Hke 
the laws, which are led to inflict punishment not by 
wrath but by justice^^^ 

XXVI. Again, when fortune smiles and the stream Fortitude in 
of hfe flows according to our wishes, let us dihgently P''"*?®"'^* 


pere, fastidium arrogantiamque fugiamus. Nam ut 
adversas res, sic seeundas immoderate ferre levitatis 
est, praeclaraque est aequabilitas in omni vita et 
idem semper vultus eademque frons, ut de Socrate 
itemque^ de C. Laelio accepimus.^ Philippum qui- 
dem, Macedonum regem^ rebus gestis et gloria 
superatum a filio, facilitate et humanitate video 
superiorem fuisse ; itaque alter semper magnus, alter 
saepe turpissimus; ut recte praecipere videantur, 
qui monent, ut, quanto superiores simus, tanto nos 
geramus summissius. Panaetius quidem Africanum, 
auditorem et famiharem suum, solitum ait dicere, 
'^ut equos propter crebras contentiones proeliorum 
ferocitate exsultantes domitoribus tradere soleant, 
ut iis ^ facilioribus possint uti, sic homines secundis 
rebus effrenatos sibique praefidentes tamquam in 
gyrum rationis et doctrinae duci oportere, ut 
perspicerent rerum humanarum imbecilHtatem varie- 
tatemque fortunae." 
91 Atque etiam in secundissimis rebus maxime est 
utendum consilio amicorum iisque maior etiam quam 
ante tribuenda auctoritas. Isdemque temporibus 
cavendum est, ne assentatoribus patefaciamus auris 
neve^ adulari nos sinamus, in quo faUi facile est; 
tales enim nos esse putamus, ut iure laudemur; ex 

^ itenique H- a, Edd. ; idcmqiie A B H* L b c. 
2 accepitmis B'^ a c, Edd. ; accipiinus A B' H b. 
8«^ Edd.; A«5MSS. 
* neve Nonius, Edd. ; nec MSS. 

BOOK I. xxvi 

avoid all arrogance, haughtiness, and pride. For it 
is as much a sign of weakness to give way to one's 
feelings in success as it is in adversity. But it 
is a fine thing to keep an unruffled temper, an un- 
changing mien, and the same cast of countenance 
in every condition of life; tliis, history tells us, 
was characteristic of Socrates and no less of Gaius 
Laehus. Philip, king of Macedon, I observe, how- 
ever surpassed by his son in achievements and fame, 
was superior to him in affabihty and refinement. 
Philip, accordingly, was always great ; Alexander, 
often infamously bad. There seems to be sound 
advice, therefore, in this word of warning : The 
higher we are placed, the more humbly should we Humility. 
walk." Panaetius tells us that Africanus, his pupil 
and friend, used to say : As, when horses have 
become mettlesome and unmanageable on account 
of their frequent participation in battles, their 
owners put them in the hands of trainers to make 
them more tractable; so men, who through pros- 
perity have become restive and over self-confident, 
ought to be put into the training-ring, so to speak, 
of reason and learning, that they may be brought to 
comprehend the fiailty of human affairs and the 
fickleness of fortune." 

The greater our prosperity, moreover, the more 
should we seek the counsel of friends, and the 
greater the heed that should be given to their 
advice. Under such circumstances also we must 
beware of lending an ear to sycophants or allowing 
them to impose upon us with their flattery. For 
it is easy in this way to deceive ourselves, since 
we thus come to think ourselves duly entitled to 
praise ; and to this frame of mind a thousand delusions 



quo nascuntur innumerabilia peccata, cum homines 
inflati opinionibus turpiter irridentur et in maximis 
versantur erroribus. 

Sed haec quidem hactenus. 

92 Illud autem sic est iudicandum, maximas geri res 
et maximi animi ab iis,^ qui res publicas regant, 
quod earum administratio latissime pateat ad phiri- 
mosque pertineat; esse autem magni animi et fuisse 
multos etiam in vita otiosa, qui aut investigarent 
aut conarentur magna quaedam seseque suarum 
rerum finibus continerent aut interiecti inter philo- 
sophos et eos, qui rem publicam administrarent, 
delectarentur re sua famihari non eam quidem omni 
ratione exaggerantes neque excludentes ab eius usu 
suos potiusque et amicis impertientes et rei pubhcae, 
si quando usus esset. Quae primum bene parta^ sit 
nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso, deinde 
augeatur ratione, diligentia, parsimonia,^ tum quam 
plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat nec 
Hbidini potius luxuriaeque quam hberahtati et bene- 
ficentiae pareat. 

Haec pi-aescripta servantem licet magnifice, gra- 
viter animoseque vivere atque etiam simphciter, 
fideliter, t vere hominum amice. 

93 XXVII. Sequitur, ut de una rehqua parte 
honestatis dicendum sit, in qua verecundia et quasi 

Uts Edd.; /iis MSS. 

2 parfa BS Edd. ; parata A B^ H L a b c. 
'^ deinde . . . parsimonia Edd., after Unger, transpose ; 
in MSS. it follows tum . . . pareat. 



BOOK 1. xxvi-xxvfi 

may be traced, when men are pufFed up with conceit 
and expose themselves to ignominy and ridicule by 
committing the most egregious blunders. 

So much for this subject. 

To revert to the original question^ — we must Greatness of 
decide that the most important activities, those ^nd in"private 
most indicative of a great spirit, are performed by ''^^- 
the men who direct the afFairs of nations ; for such 
public activities have the widest scope and toucli 
the lives of the most people. But even in the Hfe 
of retirement there are and there have been many 
high-souled men who have been engaged in impor- 
tant inquiries or embarked on most important 
enterprises and yet kept themselves within the 
Hmits of their own affairs; or, taking a middle 
course between philosophers on the one hand and 
statesmen on the other, they were content with 
managing their own property — not increasing it by 
any and every means nor debarring their kindred 
from the enjoyment of it, but rather, if ever there 
were need, sharing it with their friends and with 
the state. Only let it, in the first place, be honestly 
acquired, by the use of no dishonest or fraudulent 
means; let it, in the second place, increase by 
wisdom, industry, and thrift; and, finally, let it 
be made available for the use of as many as possible 
(if only they are M-orthy) and be at the service of 
generosity and beneficence rather than of sensuality 
and excess. 

By observing these rules, one may live in magnifi- 
cence, dignity, and independence, and yet in honour, 
truth and charity toward all. 

XXVII. We have next to discuss the one re- d. Temperance. 
maining division of moral rectitude. That is the one 



quidam ornaUis vitae, temperantia et modestia 
omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum 
modus cernitur. Hoc loco continetur id, quod dici 
Latine decorum potest ; Graece enim TrpeTrov dici- 
tur. Huius' vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat 

94- separari ; nam et, quod decet, honestum est et, 
quod honestum est, decet ; qualis autem differentia 
sit honesti et decori, facilius intellegi quam explanari 
potest. Quicquid est enim, quod deceat, id tum 
apparet, cum antegressa est honestas. Itaque non 
solum in hac parte honestatis, de qua hoc loco 
disserendum est, sed etiam in tribus superioribus 
quid deceat apparet. Nam et ratione uti atque 
oratione prudenter et agere, quod agas, considerate 
omnique in re quid sit veri videre et tueri decet, 
contraque falli, errare, labi, decipi tam dedecet 
quam delirare et mente esse captum ; et iusta omnia 
decora sunt, iniusta contra, ut turpia, sic indecora. 

Similis est ratio fortitudinis. Quod enim viriliter 
animoque magno fit, id dignum viro et decorum 
videtur, quod contra, id ut turpe, sic indecorum. 

95 Quare pertinet quidem ad omnem honestatem 
hoc, quod dico, decorum, et ita pertinet, ut non 
recondita quadam ratione cernatur, sed sit in 
promptu. Est enim quiddam, idque intellegitur 

^ dicitur. Huius Y.A6..; dicitur decorum. Aw/w.y MSS. 

!' Decorum Cicero's attempt to translate irpiwov, means 
an appreciation of the fitness of thingfs, propriety iii inward 
feeling- or outward appearance, inspeech, behaviour, dress, 
etc. Decorum is as didicult to translate into EngHsh as 
irpiirov is to reproduce in Latin ; as an adjective, it is here 
rendered by ' proper,' as a noun, by ' propriety.' 


BOOK I. xxvii 

in which we find considerateness and self-control, 

which give, as it were, a sort of pohsh to Hfe; it 

embraces also temperance, complete subjection of 

all the passions, and moderation in all things. 

Under this head is further included what, in Latin, Propriety 

may be called decorum^ (propriety); for in Greek 

it is called ■Kpkirov.^ Such is its essential nature, 

that it is inseparable from moral goodness ; for wliat 

is proper is morally right, and what is morally right 

is proper. The nature of the difference between 

morahty and propriety can be more easily felt than 

expressed. For whatever propriety may be, it is 

manifested only when there is pre-existing moral 

rectitude. And so, not onlj'^ in this division of moral 

rectitude which we have now to discuss but also in 

the three preceding divisions, it is clearly brought out 

what propriety is. For to employ reason and speech Proprietyand 

rationally, to do with careful consideration what- virtyl^ '" 

ever one does, and in everything to discern the 

truth and to uphoid it — that is proper. To be 

mistaken, on the other hand, to miss the truth, 

to fall into error, to be led astray — that is as 

improper as to be deranged and lose one's mind. 

And all things just are proper; all things unjust, 

Hke all things immoral, are improper. 

The relation of propriety to fortitude is similar. 
What is done in a manly and courageous spirit seems 
becoming to a man and proper; what is done in a 
contrary fashion is at once immoral and improper. 

This propriety, therefore, of which I am speak- 
ing belongs to each division of moral rectitude; 
and its relation to the cardinal virtues is so close, 
that it is perfectly self-evident and does not require 
any abstruse process of reasoning to see it. For 
H 97 

in omni virtute, quod deceat ; quod cogitatione 
magis a virtute potest quam re separari. Ut venu- 
stas et pulchritudo corporis secerni non potest a 
valetudine, sic hoc^ de quo loquimur, decorum totum 
illud quidem est cum virtute confusum, sed mente 
et cogitatione distinguitur. 

96 Est autem eius discriptio^ duplex; nam et gene- 
rale quoddam decorum intellegimus, quod in omni 
honestate versatur, et ahud huic subiectum, quod 
pertinet ad singulas partes honestatis. Atque illud 
superius sic fere definiri solet: decorum id esse, 
quod consentaneum sit hominis excellentiae in eo, in 
quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus difFerat. 
Quae autem pars subiecta generi est, eam sic defini- 
unt, ut id decorum velint esse, quod ita naturae 
consentaneum sit, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia 
appareat cum specie quadam Hberali. 

97 XXVIII. Haec ita intellegi possumus existimare 
ex eo decoro, quod poetae sequuntur: de quo aho 
loco plura dici solent. Sed tum^ servare illud poe- 
tas, quod deceat, dicimus, cum id, quod quaque 
persona dignum est, et fit et dicitur; ut, si Aeacus 
aut Minos diceret: 

oderint, dum metuant, 


natis sepulchro ipse 6st parens, 

* discriptio b Edd. ; descriptio A B H a ; distinctio L c 
' Sed tum L c, Edd. ; sed ut tum A B H b. 


BOOK I. xxvii-xxviii 

there is a certain element of propriety perceptible 
in every act of moral rectitude; and tliis can be 
separated from virtue theoretically better than it 
can be practically. As comeHness and beauty of 
person are inseparable from the notion of health, 
so this propriety of which we are speaking, while 
in fact completely blended with virtue, is mentally 
and theoretically distinguishable from it. 

The classification of propriety, moreover, is two- Propriety 
fold : (l ) we assume a general sort of propriety, which "^ '^^ ' 
is found in moral goodness as a whole; then (2) 
there is another propriety, subordinate to this, which 
belongs to the several divisions of moral goodness. 
The former is usually defined somewhat as follows: 

Propriety is that which harmonizes with man's 
superiority in those respects in which his nature 
differs from that of the rest of the animal creation." 
And they so define the special type of propriety 
which is subordinate to the general notion, that 
they repi-esent it to be that propriety which 
harmonizes with nature, in the sense that it 
manifestly embraces temperance and self-control, 
together with a certain deportment such as becomes 
a gentleman. 

XXVIII. That this is the common acceptation of Poetic 
propriety we may infer from that propriety which P''°p"^*''' 
poets aim to secure. Concerning that, I have occa- 
sion to say more in another connection. Now, 
we say that the poets observe propriety, when every 
word or action is in accord with each individual 
character. For example, if Aeacus or Minos said : 

Let them hate, if only they fear/' 

The father is himself his ch.:ldren's tomb," 
h2 qo 

indecorum videretur, quod eos fuisse iustos accepi- 
mus; at Atreo dicente plausus excitantur; est enim 
digna persona oratio. Sed poetae^ quid quemque 
deceat, ex persona iudicabunt; nobis autem perso- 
nam imposuit ipsa natura magna cum excellentia 
praestantiaque animantium reliquarum. 

98 Quoeirca poetae in magna varietnte personarum, 
etiam vitiosis quid conveniat et quid deceat, vide- 
bunt, nobis autem cum a natura constantiae, mode- 
rationis, temperantiae, verecundiae partes datae sint, 
cumque eadem natura doceat non neglegere, quem 
ad modum nos adversus homines geramus, efficitur, 
ut et illud, quod ad omnem honestatem pertinet, 
decorum quam late fusum sit, appareat et hoc, quod 
spectatur in uno quoque genere virtutis. Ut enim 
pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum 
movet oculos et delectat hoc ipso, quod inter sc 
omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt, sic 
hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approba- 
tionem eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ordine et con- 
stantia et moderatione dictorum omnium at^ue 

99 Adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adver- 
sus homines et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum. Nam 
neglegere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arro- 

* reliquarum A' B' H a b ; reliquorum S^ B- c. 

BOOK I. xxviii 

that would seem improper, because we are told that 
they were just men. But when Atreus speaks those 
lines, they call forth applause ; for the sentiment is 
in keeping with the character. But it will rest 
with the poets to decidc;, according to the individual 
characters^ what is proper for each ; but to us Nature 
herself has assigned a character of surpassing excel- 
lence, far superior to that of all other living crea- 
tures, and in accoi-dance with that we shall have to 
decide what propriety requires. 

The poets will observe^ therefore, amid a great 
variety of characters, what is suitable and proper 
for all — even for the bad. But to us Nature Morai 
has assigned the roles of steadfastness, temperance, ^^°P^'''-^y 
self-control, and considerateness of others ; Nature 
also teaches us not to be careless in our behaviour 
towards our fellow-men. Hence we may clearly see 
how wide is the application not only of that pro- 
priety which is essential to moral rectitude in 
general, but also of the special propriety which is 
displayed in each particular subdivision of virtue. 
For, as physical beauty with harmonious symmetrj^ 
of the limbs engages the attention and delights the 
eye, for the very reason that all the parts combine 
in harmony and grace, so this propriety, which 
shines out in our conduct, engages the approbation 
of our fellow-men by the order, consistency, and 
self-control it imposes upon every word and deed. 

We should, therefore, in our dealings with people Considerateuesi 
show what I may almost call reverence toward all 
men — not only toward the men who are the best, but 
toward others as well. For indifference to publie 
opinion implies not merely self-sufficiency, but even 
total lack of principle. There is, too, a difference be- 



gantis estj sed etiam omnino dissoluti. Est autem, quod 
differat in hominum ratione habenda inter iustitiam 
et verecundiam. lustitiae partes sunt non violare 
homines, verecundiae non offendere ; in quo maxime 
vis perspicitur decori. 

His igitur expositis, quale sit id, quod decere 
dicimuSj intellectum puto. 

100 Officium autem, quod ab eo ducitur, hanc primum 
habet viam, quae deducit ad convenientiam conser- 
vationemque naturae; quam si sequemur ducem, 
numquam aberrabimus sequemurque et id, quod 
acutum et perspicax natura est, et id, quod ad ho- 
minum consociationem accommodatum, et id, quod 
vehemens atque forte. Sed maxima vis decori in 
hac inest parte, de qua disputamus; neque enim 
solum corporis, qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed multo 
etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui item ad 
naturam accommodati sunt. 

101 Duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura;^ 
una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est opiii] Graece, 
quae hominem huc et illuc rapit, altera in ratione, 
quae docet et" explanat, quid faciendum fugiendum- 
que ^ sit. Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtem- 

XXIX. Omnis autem actio vacare debet teme- 
ritate et neglegentia nec vero agere quicquam, 
cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere; haec 
est enim fere discriptio* officii. 

102 Efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus rationi 

^ natura Edd.; naturae MSS. 
2 ^^ L c, Edd. ; not in A B H b. 
^ fugiendumque A B H a b ; fugiendumve L c p. 
*discriptio B H, Bt.^; descriptio A L a b c, Bt.'^ MuIIer, 


BOOK I. xxviii-xxix 

twecR justice and considerateness in one's relations 
'o one's fellow-men. It is the function of justice 
not to do wrong to one's fellow-men; of consider- 
ateness, not to wound their feehngs ; and in this the 
essence of propriety is best seen. 

With the foregoing exposition, I think it is clear 
what the nature is of what we term propriety. 

Further, as to the duty which has its source in Dutiespre- 
propriety, the first road on which it conducts us p^J^ew^ ^^ ^*^"* 
leads to harmony with Nature and the faithful ob- 
servance of her laws. If we follow Nature as our (i) foUow 
guide, we shall never go astray, but we shall be '^^^"'^®' 
pursuing that wliich is in its nature clear-sighted 
and penetrating (Wisdom), that which is adapted to 
promote and strengthen society (justice), and that 
which is strong and courageous (Fortitude). But 
the very essence of propriety is found in the division 
of virtue which is now under discussion (Temper- 
ance). For it is only when they agree with Nature's 
laws that we should give our approval to the move- 
ments not only of the body, but still more of the 

Now we find that tne essential activity of the (2)subject 
spirit is twofold : one force is appetite (that is, opfir'), reason!^ *" 
in Greek), which impels a man this way and that ; 
the other is reason, which teaches and explains 
what should be done and what should be left undone. 
The result is that reason commands, appetite obeys. 

XXIX. Again, every action ought to be free from 
undue haste or carelessness ; neither ought we to 
do anything for which we cannot assign a reasonable 
motive; for in these words we have practically a 
definition of duty. 

The appetites, moreover, must be made to obey 



oboediant eamque neque praecurrant nec propter 
pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant sintque tranquilli 
atque omni animi perturbatione careant; ex quo 
elucebit omnis constantia omnisque moderatio. Nam 
qui appetitus longius evagantur et tamquam ex- 
sultantes sive cupiendo sive fugiendo non satis a 
ratione retinentur, ii^ sine dubio finem et modum 
transeunt ; relinquunt enim et abiciunt oboedientiam 
nec rationi parent, cui sunt subiecti lege naturae; 
a quibus non modo animi perturbantur, sed etiam 
corpora. Licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum aut eorum, 
qui aut libidine aliqua aut metu commoti sunt aut 
voluptate nimia gestiunt; quorum omnium voltus, 
voces, motus statusque mutantur. 
103 Ex quibus illud intellegitur, ut ad officii formam 
revertamur, appetitus omnes contrahendos sedan- 
dosque esse excitandamque animadversionem et 
dibgentiam^ ut ne quid temere ac fortuito, incon- 
siderate neglegenterque agamus. Neque enim ita 
generati a natura sumus^ ut ad ludum et iocum facti 
esse videamur, ad severitatem potius et ad quaedam 
studia graviora atque maiora. Ludo autem et ioco 
uti illo quidem licetj sed sicut somno et quietibus 
ceteris tum, cum gravibus seriisque rebus satis 
fecerimus. Ipsumque genus iocandi non profusum 
nec immodestum^ sed ingenuum et facetum esse 
debet. Ut enim pueris non omnem ludendi licen- 
tiam damus, sed eam, quae ab honestatis actionibus 

' ii Edd. ; hi a ; hii H ; hij c. 

BOOK I. xxix 

the reins of reason and neither allowcd to run ahead 

of it nor from listlessness or indolence to lag behind ; 

but people should enjoy calm of soul and be free 

from every sort of passion. As a result strength Seif-controi ir 

of character and self-control will shine forth in all passions, 

their lustre. For when appetites overstep their 

bounds and galloping away, so to speak, whether 

in desire or aversion, are not well held in hand 

by reason, they clearly overleap all bound and 

measure; for they throw obedience ofF and leave 

it behind and refuse to obey the reins of reason^ 

to which they are subject by Nature's laws. And 

not only minds but bodies as well are disordered by 

such appetites. We need only to look at the faces 

of men in a rage or under the influence of some 

passion or fear or beside themselves with extravagant 

joy : in every instance their features, voices, motions, 

attitudes undergo a change. 

From all this — to return to our sketch of duty — 
we see that all the appetites must be controlled 
and calmed and that we must take infinite pains 
not to do anything from mere impulse or at random, 
without due consideration and care. For Nature has (2) amusemcnts,' 
not brought us into the world to act as if we were 
created for play or jest, but rather for earnestness 
and for some more serious and important pursuits. 
We may, of course, indulge in sport and jest, but in 
the same way as we enjoy sleep or other relaxations, 
and only wlien we have satisfied the claims of our 
earnest, serious tasks. Further than that, the man- (3) raiUery, 
ner of jesting itself ouglit not to be extravagant or 
immoderate, but refined and witty. For as we do 
not grant our children unlimited licence to play, 
but only such freedom as is not incompatible with 



non sit aliena, sic in ipso ioco aliquod probi ingenii 

104 lumen eluceat. Duplex omnino est iocandi genus, 
unum illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscenum, 
alterum elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum. 
Quo genere non modo Plautus noster et Atticorum 
antiqua comoedia, sed etiam philosophorum Socra- 
ticorum libri referti sunt, multaque multorum facete 
dicta, ut ea, quae a sene Catone collecta sunt, quae 
vocant aTTo4>Biyiiara. Facilis igitur est distinctio 
ingenui et illiberalis ioci. Alter est, si tempore 
fit, ut si remisso animo, gravissimo homine dignus,^ 
alter ne libero quidem, si rerum turpitudini adhi- 
betur verborum^ obscenitas. 

Ludendi etiam est quidam modus retinendus, 
ut ne nimis omnia profundamus elatique voluptate 
in aliquam turpitudinem delabamur. Suppeditant 
autem et campus noster et studia venandi honesta 
exempla ludendi. 

105 XXX. Sed pertinet ad omnem officii quaestionem 
semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis 
pecudibus reliquisque beluis antecedat; illae nihil 
sentiunt nisi voluptatem ad eamque feruntur omni 
impetu, hominis autem mens discendo alitur et 
cogitando, semper ahquid aut anquirit aut agit 
videndique et audiendi delectatione ducitur. Quin 
etiam, si quis est paulo ad voluptates propensior, 
modo ne sit ex pecudum genere (sunt enim quidam 
homines non re, sed nomine), sed si quis est paulo 

^ Jit, ut si remisso animo, gravissimo homine dignus Ed.; 
fit, ut (et c) remisso animo homine dignus MSS,;Jit aut si 
rem. an. magno homine Madvig ',Jit, ut sit remissio animo, 
hojnine dignus Ung^er. 

^ turpitudini adhibetur verhorum A B H a b, Edd. ; turpi» 
tudo adhibetur et verborum L c. 


BOOK I. xxix-xxx 

good conduct, so even in our jesting let the light 
)4 of a pure character shine forth. There are, generally 
speaking, two sorts of jest: the one^ coarse^ rude, 
vicious, indecent ; the other, refined, polite, clever, 
witty. With this latter sort not only our own 
Plautus and the Old Comedy of Athens, but also 
the books of Socratic philosophy abound; and we 
have many witty sayings of many men — hke those 
collected by old Cato under the title of Bons Mots 
(or Apophthegms). So the distinction between the 
elegant and the vulgar jest is an easy matter: the 
one kind, if well timed (for instance, in hours of 
mental relaxation), is becoming to the most dignified 
person ; the other is unfit for any gentleman, if the 
subject is indecent and the words obscene. 

Then, too, certain bounds must be observed in 
our amusements and we must be careful not to 
carry things too far and, swept away by our passions, 
lapse into some shameful excess. Our Campus, 
however, and the amusements of the chase are 
examples of wholesome recreation. 
•5 XXX. But it is essential to every inquiry about 
duty that we keep before our eyes how far superior 
man is by nature to cattle and other beasts: they 
have no thought except for sensual pleasure and 
this they are impelled by every instinct to seek; 
but man's mind is nurtured by study and medita- 
tion; he is always either investigating or doing, 
and he is captivated by the pleasure of seeing and 
hearing. Nay, even if a man is more than ordinarily 
inchned to sensual pleasures, provided, of course, (4)pleasure. 
that lie be not quite on a level with the beasts of 
the field (for some people are men only in name, 
not in fact) — if, I say, he Is a little too susceptible 


erectior, quamvis voluptate capiatur, occultat et 
dissimulat appetitum voluptatis propter verecun- 

106 Ex quo intellegitur corporis voluptatem non satis 
esse dignam hominis praestantia, eamque contemni 
et reici oportere ; sin sit quispiam, qui aliquid tribuat 
voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fruendae 
modum. Itaque victus cultusque corporis ad vale- 
tudinem referatur et ad vires, non ad voluptatem. 
Atque etiam si considerare volumus/ quae sit in 
natura excellentia et dignitas, intellegemus, quam 
sit turpe diffluere luxuria et delicate ac molliter 
vivere quamque honestum parce, continenter, severe, 

107 Intellegendum etiam est duabus quasi nos a na- 
tura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis 
est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis 
praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua 
omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio 
inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae pro- 
prie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus 
magnae dissimilitudines sunt (aHos videmus veloci- 
tate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, 
itemque in formis ahis dignitatem inesse, aliis venu- 
statem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varieta- 

1 08 tcs. Erat in L. Crasso, in L. PhiHppo multus lepos, 
maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare 

* volumus A B' H* b; volemus B- H-, Bt., Heine; velimus 
L ; vellemus c. 


to the attractions of pleasure, he hides the fact, 
however much he may be caught in its toils, and 
for very shame conceals his appetite. 

From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite 
unworthy of the dignity of man and that we ought 
to despise it and cast it from us; but if some one 
should be found who sets some value upon sensual 
gratification, he must keep strictly within the limits 
of moderate indulgence. One's physical comforts 
and wants, therefore, should be ordered according 
to the demands of health and strength, not accord- 
ing to the calls of pleasure. And if we will only 
bear in mind the superiority and dignity of our 
nature, we shall realize how wi'ong it is to abandon 
ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and vokiptu- 
ousness, and how right it is to live in thrift, self- 
denial, simplicity, and sobriety, 

We must reahze also that we are invested by xhe universai 
Nature with two characters, as it were : one of these vufuaUature ot 
is universal, arising from the fact of our being all man. 
alilvc endowed with reason and with that superiority 
which Hfts us above tlie brute. From this all 
moraUty and propriety are derived, and upon it 
depends the rational method of ascertaining our 
duty. The other character is the one that is ludividual 
assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter ^^'^^'^'"«nts. 
of physical endowment there are great differences : 
some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in 
strength for wrestling; so in point of personnl ap- 
pearance, some have statehness, others comeliness. 
Diversities of character are greater still. Lucius 
Crassus and Lucius PhiHppus had a large fund of 
wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer 
fund and employed it with more studied purpose. 

L. filio; at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in 
M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas, in C. 
Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione am- 
bitio maior, vita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem 
et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni orati- 
one simulatorem, quem etpoiva Graeci^ nominarunt, 
Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem 
summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. 
Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris duci- 
bus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, 
dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. 
In quo genere Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum 
lasonem ceteris anteponunt ; in primisque versutum 
et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius 
vita esset et plus ahquanto rei publicae prodesset, 
furere se simulavit. 
1 09 Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti, 
qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, 
veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui" 
quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod 
velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum vide- 
bamus. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientis- 
simum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, con- 
traque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus 
post Lysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium 
[quemque], quamvis^ praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus 

' eipuua Graeci Edd. ; ironia graeci A B H b ; ironian graect 
a ; greci mironian c. 

'^qui A L c ; 51 B H a b. 

^ aliunt [quemque] quamvis Ed. ; alium quemque quamvis 
MSS. ; quemque aliuni quamvis p ; aliquem, quamvis 
Pearce, Bt. ; alium quamvis, Facciolati, Heine. 



Contemporary with them, Marcus Scam-us and 
Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of 
unusual seriousness; Gaius LaeHus, of unbounded 
jollity; while his intimate friend, Scipio, cherished 
more serious ideals and lived a more austere life. 
Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was 
fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist ; 
he was what the Greeks call etpcov — in every con- 
versation, pretending to need information and pro- 
fessing admiration for the wisdom of his companion. 
Pythagoras and Pericles, on the other hand, reached 
the heights of influence and power without any 
seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, 
among the Carthaginian generals^ and Quintus 
Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready 
at conceahng their plans, covering up their tracks, 
disguising their movements, laying stratagems, fore- 
stalHng the enemy's designs. In these quaUties the 
Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae 
a.bove all others. Especially crafty and shrewd was 
the device of Solon, who, to make his own life safer 
and at the same time to do a considerably larger ser- 
vice for his country, feigned insanity. 

Then there are others, quite different from these, 
straightforward and open, who think that nothing 
should be done by underhand means or treachery. 
They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are 
others still who will stoop to anything, truckle to any- 
body, if only they may gain their ends. Such, we 
saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most crafty 
and most persevering man of this type was Lysan- 
der of Sparta, we are told ; of the opposite type was 
Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander as admii*al of 
the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how 



de multis esse videatur; quod in Catulo, et in 
patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio t Mancia^ 
vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse 
in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illuni 
qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam 
comitatem habuisse sermonis [ne Xenocratem qui- 
dem, severissimum philosophorumj ^ ob eamque rem 
ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse. 

Innumerabiles aliae dissimiHtudines sunt naturae 
morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum. 

110 XXXI. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique 
non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum 
illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est 
faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil con- 
tendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram 
sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque mehora, 
tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula* 
metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare 
nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex 
quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo 
quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est 
adversante et repugnante natura. 

1 1 1 Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est pro- 

• et in patre et injilio A B b, Ed<l. ; et inpatre et filio H a ; 
et patre et Jilio h c. itemque Vi H*, Bt'., Muller ; idemqiie 
A H' L abc, Bt.'^, Heirte. in O Mucio\ Mancia Heine, Bt.^; 
in q. mucio mantia B ; in q. vuitio mancia H L c ; in q, 
viutio mantia a ; inq^ie mucio mantia b ; inque mutio mantia 
A ; in q. muntio mantia p ; in Q. Mucio, Mancia Mullcr. 

"^ ne [nec c) Xenocratem (-n L c) . . . philosophorum MSS.; 
bracketed by Heumaiin, Edd. 

* studia nostra nostrae naturae rc^ula Einesti, Bt., Hejne ; 
studia nostra nostra (corr. e.\ nostii) regula A ; studia nostrac 
regulae B ; studia nistrae reguld I \ ; studia nostra regula a ; 
studia (corr. in studii) nostriregula b ; studia nostra naturae 
regula L c, Nonius ; studia nostrae naturae regula Miiller. 


BOOK I. xxx-xxxi 

eminent he may be, will condescend in social inter- 
course to make himself appear but a very ordinary 
person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen m 
the case of Catulus — both father and son — and also 
of Quintus Mucius Mancia. I have heard from my 
elders that Pubhus Scipio Nasica was another master 
of this art ; but his father, on the other hand — the 
man who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefari- 
ous undertakings — had no such gracious manner in 
social intercourse [...], and because of that very fact 
he rose to greatness and fame. 

Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and 
charactersj and they are not in the least to be criti- 

XXXI. Everybody, howeverj must resolutely hold Conduct must 
fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are individuai 
peculiar only and not vicious^ in order that propriety, ®° owments 
which is the object of our inquiry, may the more 
easily be secured. For we must so act as not to 
oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, 
while safeguarding those^ to follow the bent of our 
own particular nature; and even if other careers 
should be better and nobler, we may still regulate 
our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature. 
For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or to 
aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this 
fact the nature of that propriety defined above comes 
into still clearer light, inasmuch as nothing is proper 
that goes against the grain," as the saying is — 
that is, if it is in direct opposition to one's natural 

If there is any such thing as propriety at all, 
I 113 


fecto magis quam aequabilitas cuvi^ universae vitae, 
tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non 
possiSj si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. 
Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus^ est 
nobiSj ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure 
optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam 

112 nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. Atque 
haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non 
numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, 
alius [in eadem causa] non debeat.^ Num enim alia 
in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa 
Caesari tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio 
datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod 
lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores, Catoni 
cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eam- 
que ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperquc 
in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, mo- 
riendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. 

113 Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore 
diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso 
mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni 
sermone omnibus afFabilem [et iucundum]* esse 
se vellet! domi vero etiam contumelias servorum 
ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod 
cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, 
milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. 

Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid 

^ cum Lambiniis, Edd.; not in MSS. 
*innattis Bt., Edd. ; notus MSS. 

' alius in eadem causa non deheat L c p, MuUer, Heine ; 
not in A B H b ; alixis non debeat a ; alius [in eadem causa] 
non debeat Bt., Ed. 

* et iocundum L c p ; not in A B H a b ; [^/ iucundum] 


BOOK I. xxxi 

it can be nothing more than uniform consistency 

in the course of our life as a whole and all its indi- 

vidual actions. And this uniform consistency one 

could not maintain by copying the personal traits of 

others and eHminating one's own. Por as we ought 

to employ our mother-tongue, lest^ Hke certain peo- 

ple who are continually dragging in Greek words, 

we draw well deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we 

ought not to introduce anything foreign into our 

actions or our hfe in general. Indeed, such diver- Thesame 

sity of cliaracter carries witli it so great significance Hgh? fJr oni^' 

that suicide may be for one man a duty, for another wrongfor 

r,, . -\ -r^-, another. 

[under tne same circumstancesj a cnme. Did 
Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and 
were the others, who surrendered to Caesar in 
Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they would 
have been condemned, if they had taken their lives ; 
for their mode of Hfe had been less austere and 
their characters more phable. But Cato had been 
endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, 
and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving 
consistency and had remained ever true to his pur- 
pose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die 
rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant. 

How much Ulysses endured on those long 
wanderings^ when he submitted to the service 
even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be called 
women) and strove in every word to be courteous 
and complaisant to all! And arrived at home, he 
brooked even the insults of his men-servants and maid- 
servants, in order to attain in the end the object of 
his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is repre- 
sented as having, would have chosen to meet death 
a thousand times rather than sufFer such indignities ! 

If we take this into consideration, we shall see 
I2 115 


quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nec velle ex- 
periri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime 
quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. 

114 Suum} quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque 
se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem prae- 
beat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere 
prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi ac- 
commodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti 
sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu, Melanippam, 
Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, 
Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio 
hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in 

Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissi- 
mum elaborabimus ; sin aliquando necessitas nos ad 
ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis 
adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si 
non decore, at quam minime indecoi-e facere possi- 
mus; nec tam^ est enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis 
data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia fugiamus. 

115 XXXII. Ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, 
tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus 
imponit; quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsi iudicio 
nostro accommodamus. Nam regna, imperia, nobi- 
litas, honores, divitiae,' opes eaque, quae sunt his 
contraria, in casu sita temporibus gubemantur; ipsi 

' Suum Orelli ; not in MSS. ; but p has ingenium suum. 
' tam L c, Edd. ; tam (i.e. tamen) A B H b. 
^nobilitas, A., divitiae Ung-er; nobilitatem, h,, divitias 

«• The universal and the individual; § 107. 

BOOK I. xxxi-xxxii 

that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are Let every one 
his own peculiar traits of character^ to regulate these character. 
properly^ and not to wish to try how another man's 
would suit him. For the more pecuharly his own 
a man's character is, the better it fits him. 

Every one, thereforCj should make a proper 
estimate of his own natural abihty and show him- 
self a critical judge of his own merits and defects; 
in this respect we should not let actors display 
more practical wisdom than we have. They select, 
not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their 
talents. Those who rely most upon the quahty of 
their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus ; those 
who place more stress upon the action, choose the 
Melanippa and the Cly taemnestra ; Rupihus, whom 
I remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus 
rarely in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to 
this in choosing his role upon the stage, and a wise 
man fail to do so in selecting his part in hfe ? 

We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage 
in that role to which we are best adapted. But 
if at some time stress of circumstances shall thrust 
us aside into some uncongenial part, we raust devote 
to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that 
we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety, 
at least with as httle impropriety as possible; and 
we need not strive so hard to attain to points of 
excellence that liave not been vouchsafed to us as 
to correct the faults we have. 

XXXII. To the two above-mentioned characters' 
is added a third, which some chance or some cir- 
cumstance imposes, and a fourth also, which we 
assume by our own dehberate choice. Regal powers 
and mihtavy commands, nobihty of birth and political 
office, wealth and influence, and their opposites 



autem gerere quam personam velimus, a nostra 
voluntate proficiscitur. Itaque se alii ad philoso- 
phiam, ahi ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam apphcant, 
ipsarumque virtutum in aha ahus mavult excellere. 

116 Quorum vero patres aut maiores ahqua gloria 
praestiterunt, ii student plerumque eodem in genere 
laudis excellere, ut Q. Mucius P. f. in iure civih, 
Pauli fihus Africanus in re mihtari. Quidam autem 
ad eas laudes, quas a patribus acceperunt, addunt 
ahquam suam, ut hic idem Africanus eloquentia 
cumulavit belhcam gloriam; quod idem fecit Timo- 
theus Cononis fihus, qui cum belh laude non inferior 
fuisset quam pater, ad eam laudem doctrinae et 
ingenii gloriam adiecit. Fit autem interdum, ut 
non nulli omissa imitatione maiorum suum quoddam 
institutum consequantur, maximeque in eo plerum- 
que elaborant ii,^ qui magna sibi proponunt obscuris 
orti maioribus. 

117 Haec igitur omnia, cum quaerimus, quid deeeat, 
complecti animo et cogitatione debemus; in primis 
autem constituendum est, quos nos et qualcs esse 
vehmus et in quo genere vitae, quae dehberatio est 
omnium difficillima. Ineunte enim adulescentia, 
cum est maxima imbecilhtas consilii, tum id sibi 
quisque genus aetatis degendae constituit, quod 
maxime adamavit; itaque ante imphcatur ahquo 

^ ti Edd. ; hii A H b ; hij c ; hi B a. 

BOOK I. xxxii 

depeiid upon chance and are, thereforej controlled 

by circumstances. But what role we ourselves may Seiection of & 

choose to sustain is decided by our own free choice. '^^^^^^- 

And so some turn to philosophy, others to the civil 

law, and still othei-s to oratory, while in case of the 

virtues themselves one man prefers to excel in one, 

another in another. 

They, whose fathers or forefathers have achieved (D inheritance, 
distinction in some particular field, often strive to 
attain eminence in the same department of service : 
for example, Quintus^ the son of Publius Mucius, in 
the law ; Africanus, the son of Paulus, in the army. 
And to that distinction which they have severally 
inherited from their fathers some have added lustre 
of their own ; for example, that same Africanus^ who 
crowned his inherited miUtary glory with his own 
eloquence. Timotheus, Conon's son^ did the same : 
he proved himself not inferior to his father in railitary 
renown and added to that distinction the glory of 
culture and intellectual power. It happens some- (2) choice 
times, too, that a man declines to follow in the 
footsteps of his fathers and pursues a vocation of 
his own. And in such callings those very frequently 
achieve signal success who, though sprung from 
humble parentage, have set their aims high. 

All these questions, therefore, we ought to bear 
thoughtfully in mind, when we inquire into the 
nature of propriety ; but above all we must decide 
who and what manner of men we wish to be and 
what calUng in Ufe we would follow; and this is the 
most difficult problem in the world. For it is in the 
years of early youth, when our judgment is most 
immature, that each of us decides that his caUing in 
Ufe shaU be that to which he has taken a special 
Uking. And thus he becomes engaged in some 



certo genere cursuque vivendi, quam potuit, quod 
optimum esset, iudicare. 

Nam quod^ Herculem Prodicus^ dicit, ut est 
apud Xenophontemj cum primum pubesceret, quod 
tempus a natura ad deligendum, quam quisque viam 
vivendi sit ingressurus, datum est, exisse in solitu- 
dinem atque ibi sedentem diu secum multumque 
dubitasse, cum duas cerneret vias, unam Voluptatis, 
alteram Virtutis, utram ingredi melius esset, hoc 
Hercuh lovis satu edito" potuit fortasse contingere, 
nobis non item,^ qui imitamur, quos cuique visum 
est, atque ad eorum studia institutaque impelhmur ; 
plerumque autem parentium praeceptis imbuti ad 
eorum consuetudinem moremque deducimur ; ahi 
multitudinis iudicio feruntur, quaeque maiori parti 
pulcherrima videntur, ea maxime exoptant; non 
nulh tamen sive fehcitate quadam sive bonitate 
naturae sine* parentium disciphna rectam vitae 
secuti sunt viam. 
119 XXXIII. Illud autem maxime rarum genus est 
eorum, qui aut excellenti^ ingenii magnitudine aut 
praeclara eruditione atque doctrina aut utraque re 
ornati spatium etiam dehberandi habuerunt, quem 
potissimum vitae cursum sequi vehent; in qua deh- 
beratione ad suam cuiusque naturam consihum est 
omne revocandum. Nam cum in omnibus, quae 
aguntur, ex eo, quo modo quisque natus est^ ut su- 
pra dictum est, quid deceat, exquirimus, tum in tota 

' Nam quod L c, Edd. ; namque A B H a b. 

* Prodicus Manutius, YAi^.^prodigus L c ',prodigvm B H b. 
' item Edd. ; idem MSS. 

*sine Stuerenburg-, Edd. plerique ; sive MSS., Bt.^ 

* excellenti L c ; excellente A B H a b ; excellentis p. 


BOOK I. xxxii-xxxiii 

particular calling and career in lifej before he is fit 
to decide intelligently what is best for him. 

For we cannot all have the experience of Hercules^ Hercules at the 
as we find it in the words of Prodicus in Xenophon : 1%^^ °^ ^^^ 

When Hercules was just coming into youth's 
estate (the time which Nature has appointed unto 
every man for choosing the path of life on which 
he would enter), he went out into a desert place. 
And as he saw two paths, the path of Pleasure and 
the path of Virtue, he sat down and debated long 
and earnestly which one it were better for him to 
take." This might, perhaps^ happen to a Hercules, 

scion of the seed of Jove" ; but it cannot well hap- 
pen to us ; for we copy, each the model he fancies, 
and we are constrained to adopt their pursuits and 
vocations. But usually, we are so imbued with the 
teachings of our parents, that we fall irresistibly into 
their manners and customs. Others drift with (3) accident, 
the current of popular opinion and make especial 
choice of those calHngs which the majority find most 
attractive. Some, however^ as the result either of 
some happy fortune or of natural abiUty, enter upon 
the right path of hfej without parental guidance. 

XXXIII. There is one class of people that is very 
rarely met with: it is composed of those who are 
endowed with marked natural abihty^ or exceptional 
advantages of education and culture, or both, and 
who also have time to consider carefully what career 
in life they prefer to follow ; and in this deliberation 
the decision must turn wholly upon eachindividuars 
natural bent. For we try to find out from each one's W naturai bias. 
native disposition, as was said above, just what is 
proper for him ; and this we require not only in case 
of each individual act but also in ordering the whole 
course of one's life ; and this last is a matter to 



vita constituenda multo est ei rei ^ cura maior adhi- 
benda, ut constare in perpetuitate vitae possimus 
nobismet ipsis nec in ullo officio claudicare. 

120 Ad hanc autem rationem quoniam maximam vim 
natura habet, fortuna proximam, utriusque omnino 
habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae, sed 
naturae magis; multo enim et firmior est et con- 
stantior, ut fortuna non numquam tamquam ipsa 
mortalis cum immortali natura pugnare videatur. 
Qui igitur ad naturae suae non vitiosae genus consi- 
lium vivendi omne contulerit, is constantiam teneat 
(id enim maxime decet), nisi forte se intellexerit 
errasse in dehgendo genere vitae. Quod si acciderit 
(potest autem accidere), facienda morum instituto- 
rumque mutatio est. Eam mutationem si tempora 
adiuvabunt, facilius commodiusque faciemus ; sin 
minus, sensim erit pedetemptimque facienda, ut 
amicitias, quae minus delectent et minus probentur, 
magis decere censent sapientes sensim diluere quam 

121 repente praecidere. Commutato autem genere vitae 
omni ratione curandum est, ut id bono consilio fe- 
cisse videamur. 

Sed quoniam paulo ante dictum est imitandos 
esse maiores, primum illud exceptum sit, ne vitia 
sint imitanda, deinde si natura non feret, ut quae- 
dam imitari possit^ (ut superioris filius Africani, qui 
hunc Paulo natum adoptavit, propter infirmitatem 

* est ei rei Gruter, Edd. ; est eius rei L c p ; «^ rei A B H 
b ; est ei a. 
^possit]. M. Heusinger, Edd. ; /oss/n^ MSS. 


BOOK I. xxxiii 

which still greater care must be given^ in order 
that we may be true to ourselves throughout all our 
Hves and not falter in the discharge of any duty. 

But since the most powerful influence in the 
choice of a career is exerted by Nature, and the next 
most powerful by Fortune, we must, of course, take 
account of them both in deciding upon our calUng 
inlife; but of the two, Nature claims the more atten- 
tion. For Nature is so much more stable and 
steadfast, that for Fortune to come into conflict with 
Natui*e seems Uke a combat between a mortal and a 
goddess. If, therefore, anyone has conformed his 
Avhole plan of hfe to the kind of nature that is his 
(that is, his better nature), let him go on with it 
consistently — for that is the essence of Propriety — 
unless, perchance, he should discover that he has 
made a mistake in choosing his Hfe work, If this Chanpe of 
should happen (and it can easily happen), he must ^°*^* '°°' 
changehis vocation and mode of life. If circumstances 
favour such change, it will be effected with greater 
ease and convenience. If not, it must be made grad- 
ually, step by step, just as, when friendships become 
no longer pleasing or desirable, it is moi'e proper 
(so wise men think) to undo the bond little by little 
than to sever it at a stroke. And when we have 
once changed our calling in life, we must take all 
possible care to make it clear that we have done so 
with good reason. 

But whereas I said a moment ago that we have to 
follow in the steps of our fathers, let me make the 
following exceptions: first, we need not imitate 
their faults ; second, we need not imitate certain 
other things, if our nature does not permit such 
imitation; for example, the son of the elder Africa- 
nus (that Scipio who adopted the younger Africanus, 



valetudinis non tam potuit patris similis esse^ quam 
ille fuerat sui) ; si igitur non poterit sive causas de- 
fensitare sive populum contionibus tenere sive bella 
gerere^ illa tamen praestare debebit^ quae erunt in 
ipsius potestate, iustitiam, fidem, liberalitatem, mo- 
destiamj temperantiam, quo minus ab eo id, quod 
desit, requiratur. Optima autem hereditas a patri- 
bus traditur liberis omnique patrimonio praestantior 
gloria virtutis rerumque gestarum, cui dedecori esse 
nefas [et vitiumj ^ iudicandum est. 

122 XXXIV. Et quoniam officia non eadem disparibus 
aetatibus tribuuntur aliaque sunt iuvenum, alia seni- 
orum, aliquid etiam de hac distinctione dicendum 

Est igitur adulescentis maiores natu vei'eri exque 
iis deligere optimos et probatissimos, quorum consilio 
atque auctoritate nitatur; ineuntis enim aetatis in- 
scitia senum constituenda et regenda prudentia est. 
Maxime autem haec aetas a Hbidinibus arcenda est 
exercendaque in labore patientiaque et animi et 
corporis, ut eorum et in belHcis st in civihbus officiis 
vigeat industria. Atque etiam cum relaxare animos 
et dare se iucunditati volent, caveant intemperan- 
tiam, meminerint verecundiae, quod erit faciUus, si 
ne in eius modi quidem rebus maiores natu nolent^ 

123 Senibus autem labores corporis minuendi, exerci- 

' ei (sed b) vUium A B H a b ; [^^ vitiutn] Bt.^, Ed. ; et vici- 
um c; et impium L p, Bt.^, Heine. 

"^sl 7ie in . . . nolent Stuerenburg-, Edd. ; si in . . . nolinl 
A B H a b ; « /» . . . volent L c ; ^» in . . non nolint Lam- 

BOOK I. xxxiii-xxxiv 

the son of Paulus) could not on account of ill-health 
be so much like his father as Africanus had been 
Hke his. If;, then, a man is unable to conduct cases 
at the bar or to hold the people spell-bound with 
his eloquence or to conduct wars, still it will be his 
duty to practise these other virtues^ which are within 
his reach — ^justice, good faith, generosity, temper- 
ance, self-control — that his deficiencies in other re- 
spects may be less conspicuous. The noblest heritage, 
however^thatishandeddown from fathers to children, 
and one more precious than any inherited wealth, is 
a reputation for virtue and worthy deeds ; and to dis- 
honour this must be branded as a sin and a shame. 

XXXIV. Since, too, the duties that properly be- 
long to difFerent times of Hfe are not the same, but 
some belong to the young, others to those more 
advanced in years, a word must be said on this dis- 
tinction also. 

It is, then, the duty of a young man to show defer- Duties of 
ence to his elders and to attach himself to the best^ ^) ^°^^^' 
and most approved of them, so as to receive the benefit 
of their counsel and influence. For the inexperi- 
ence of youth requires the practical wisdom of age 
to strengthen and direct it. And this time of life 
is above all to be protected against sensuahty and 
trained to toil and endurance of both mind and 
body, so as to be strong for active duty in miHtary 
and civil service. And even when they wish to relax 
their minds and give themselves up to enjoyment 
they should beware of excesses and bear in mind 
the rules of modesty. And this will be easier, if 
the young are not unwiUing to have their elders join 
them even in their pleasures. 

The old, on the other hand, should, it seems, have (2) age, 
their physical labours reduced ; their mental activi- 



tationes animi etiam augendae videntur ; danda vero 
opera^ ut et amicos et iuventutem et maxime rem 
publicam consilio et prudentia quam plurimum adiu- 
vent. Nihil autem magis cavendum est senectuti, 
quam ne languori se desidiaeque dedat ; luxuria vero 
cum omni aetati turpis, tum senectuti foedissima est ; 
sin autem etiam libidinum intemperantia accessit, 
duplex malum est, quod et ipsa senectus dedecus 
concipit et facit adulescentium impudentiorem in- 

1 24 Ac ne illud quidem alienum est, de magistratuum, 
de privatorum, [de civiumj^ de peregrinorum officiis 

Est igitur proprium munus magistratus intellegere 
se gerere personam civitatis debereque eius dignita- 
tem et decus sustinere, servare leges, iura discribere,^ 
ea fidei suae commissa meminisse. 

Privatum autem oportet aequo et pari cum civibus 
iure vivere neque summissum et abiectum neque se 
efFerentem,^ tum in re publica ea velle, quae tran- 
quilla et honesta sint ; talem enim solemus et sentire 
bonum civem et dicere. 

125 Peregrini autem atque incolae officium est nihil 
praeter suum negotium agere, nihil de alio anquirere 
minimeque esse in aliena re publica curiosum. 

Ita fere officia reperientur, cum quaeretur, quid 
deceat, et quid aptum sit personis, temporibus, 

^de ctvium MSS. ; \cle ctvium] Hieron., Wolff, Edd. 
^ discribere Bt. , Ed., Heine; describere MSS. 
^ efferentem A H' L a b c; ecferentem B H^, Ed. 


BOOK I. xxxiv 

ties should be actually increased. They should 
endeavour, too, by means of their counsel and prac- 
tical wisdom to be of as much service as possible to 
their friends and to the young, and above all to the 
state. But there is nothing against which old age 
has to be more on its guard than against surrender- 
ing to feebleness and idleness, while luxury, a vice 
in any time of Ufe, is in old age especially scandalous. 
But if excess in sensual indulgence is added to 
luxurious living, it is a twofold evil; for old age not 
only disgraces itself; it also serves to make the 
excesses of the young more shameless. 

At this point it is not at all irrelevant to discuss 
the duties of magistrates, of private individuals, [of 
native citizensj and of foreigners. 

It iSj then, peculiarly the place of a magistrate to (3) magistrates, 
bear in mind that he represents the state and that 
it is his duty to uphold its honour and its dignity, to 
enforce the law, to dispense to all their constitutional 
rights, and to remember that all this has been com- 
mitted to him as a sacred trust. 

The private individual ought first, in private rela- (4) private 
tions, to live on fair and equal terms with his fellow- 
citizens, with a spirit neither servile and grovelling 
nor yet domineering; and second, in matters per- 
taining to the state, to labour for her peace and 
honour; for such a man we are accustomed to 
esteem and call a good citizen. 

As for the foreigner or the resident alien, it is his (5) aiiens, 
duty to attend strictly to his own concerns, not to pry 
into other people's business, and under no condition 
to meddle in the politics of a country not his own. 

In this way I think we shall have a fairly clear puty and 
view of our duties when the question arises what is Prop"ety 
proper and what is appropriate to each character, 


aetatibus, Nihil est autem, quod tam deceat, quam 
in omni re gerenda consilioque capiendo servare 

126 XXXV. Sed quoniam decorum illud in omnibus 
factis, dictis, in corporis denique motu et statu cer- 
nitur idque positum est in tribus rebus, formositate, 
ordine, ornatu ad actionem apto, difficilibus ad elo- 
quendumj sed satis erit intellegi, in his autem tribus 
continetur cura etiam illa^ ut probemur iis, quibus- 
cum apud quosque vivamus, his quoque de rebus 
pauca dicantur. 

Principio corporis nostri magnam natura ipsa 
videtur habuisse rationem, quae formam nostram 
reliquamque figuramj in qua esset species honesta, 
eam posuit in promptu, quae partes autem corporis 
ad naturae necessitatem datae aspectum essent defor- 
mem habiturae atque foedum/ eas contexit atque 

127 abdidit. Hanc naturae tam dihgentem fabricam 
imitata est hominum verecundia. Quae enim natura 
occultavit, eadem omnes, qui sana mente sunt, re- 
movent ab ocuHs ipsique necessitati dant operam ut 
quam occultissime pareant ; quarumque partium cor- 
poris usus sunt necessarii, eas neque partes neque 
earum usus suis nominibus appellant; quodqiie 
facere turpe non est,* modo occulte, id dicere obsc( - 
num est. Itaque nec actio rerum illarum aperta 
petulantia vacat nec orationis obscenitas. 

^foedum Klotz, MuUer, Heine •,formam A B H a b ; turpem 
L c, Bt. 

'Hurpe non est a, Edd. ; non turpe est L ; non turpe (om. est) 
c ; turpe non turpe ^5^ A B H b (the first turpe crossed out 
in A B). 

BOOK I. xxxiv-xxxv 

circumstance, and age. But there is nothing so 
essentially proper as to maintain consistency in the 
performance of every act and in the conception of 
every plan. 

XXXV. But the propriety to which I refer shows Propnety in 
itself also in every deed, in every word, even in every ° ' ^' ^*^''""' 
movement and attitude of the body, And in out- 
ward, visible propriety there are three elements — 
beauty, tact, and taste ; these conceptions are difficult 
to express in words, but it will be enough for my 
purpose if they are understood. In these three 
elements is included also our concern for the good 
opinion of those with whom and amongst whom we 
live. For these reasons I should Hke to say a few 
words about this kind of propriety also. 

First of all, Nature seems to have had a wonderful 
plan in the construction of our bodies. Our face and 
our figure generally, in so far as it has a comely 
appearance, she has placed in sight; but the parts 
of the body that are given us only to serve the 
needs of nature and that would present an unsightly 
and unpleasant appearance she has covered up and 
concealed from view. Man's modesty has followed Modesty 
this careful contrivance of Nature's ; all right-minded 
people keep out of sight what Nature has hidden 
and take pains to respond to nature's demands as 
privately as possible ; and in the case of those parts 
of the body which only serve nature's needs, neither 
the parts nor the functions are called by their real 
names. To perform these functions — if only it be 
done in private — is nothing immoral ; but to speak 
of them is indecent. And so neither pubHc per- 
formance of those acts nor vulgar mention of them 
is free from indecency, 

K 129 


128 Nec vero audiendi sunt Cynicij aut si qui fuerunt 
Stoici paene Cynici^ qui reprehendunt et irrident, 
quod ea^ quae turpia^ non sint, verbis flagitiosa duca- 
mus, illa autem, quae turpia^ sint, nominibus appel- 
lemus suis. Latrocinai*i, fraudare, adulterare re^ 
turpe est, sed dicitur non obscene ; liberis dare ope- 
ram re honestum est, nomine obscenum; pluraque 
in eam sententiam ab eisdem contra verecundiam 
disputantur. Nos autem naturam sequamur et ab 
omni, quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque appro- 
batione, fugiamus; status incessus, sessio accubitio, 
vultus oculi manuum motus teneat illud decorum. 

129 Quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda, ne 
quid effeminatum aut molle et ne quid durum aui 
rusticum sit. Nec vero histrionibus oratoribusque 
concedendum est, ut iis haec apta sint, nobis disso- 
luta. Scaenicorum quidem mos tantam habet vetere 
disciplina verecundiam, ut in scaenam sine subliga- 
culo prodeat nemo; verentur enim, ne, si quo casu 
evenerit, ut corporis partes quaedam aperiantur, 
aspiciantur non decori. Nostro quidem more cum 
parentibus puberes fihi, cum soceris generi non 
lavantur. Retinenda igitur est huius generis vere- 
cundia, praesertim natura ipsa magistra et duce. 

130 XXXVI. Cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera 
sint, quorum in altero venustas sit, in altero dignitas, 

^quae turpia B b, Edd. ; quae re turpia^ L c ; quae . . . autem 
om. H. 
^quae turpia B H b, Edd. ; quae re turpia L c 
V<? B H, Edd.; not in A Lb c p. 

BOOK I. xxxv-xxxvi 

But we should give no heed to the Cynics (or to 
some Stoies who are practieally Cynics) who censure 
and ridicule us for holding that the mere mention of 
some actions that are not immoral is shameful, while 
other things that are immoral we call by their real 
names. Robbery, fraud, and adultery, for example, 
are immoral in deed, but it is not indecent to name 
them. To beget children in wedlock is in deed 
morally right; to speak of it is indecent. And they 
assail modesty with a great many other arguments 
to the same purport. But as for us, let us follow 
nature and shun everything that is ofFensive to our 
eyes or our ears. So, in standing or walking, in 
sitting or reclining, in our expression, our eyes, or 
the movements of our hands, let us preserve what 
we have called propriety." 

In these matters we must avoid especially the two 
extremes: our conduct and speech should not be 
effeminate and over-nice, on the one handj nor coarse 
and boorish, on the other. And we surely must not 
admit that while this rule appHes to actors and ora- 
tors, it is not binding upon us. As for stage-people, 
their custom, because of its traditional disciphne, 
carries modesty to such a point that an actor would 
never step out upon the stage without a bi-eech-cloth 
on, for fear he might make an improper exhibition, 
if by some accident cei*tain parts of his person should 
happen to become exposed. And in our own custom, 
grown sons do not bathe with their fathers, nor 
sons-in-law with their fathers-in-law. We must, 
therefore, keep to the path of this sort of modesty, 
especially when Nature is our teacher and guide. 

XXXVI. Again, there are two orders of beauty : m°^"outward 
in the one, loveliness predominates ; in the other, appearance; 
k2 131 


venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus^ dignitatem 
virilem. Ergo et a forma removeatur omnis viro non 
dignus ornatus, et huic simile vitium in gestu motu- 
que caveatur. Nam et palaestrici motus sunt saepe 
odiosiores, et histrionum non nulH gestus ineptiis 
non vacant,^ et in utroque genere quae sunt recta et 
simphcia, laudantur. Formae autem dignitas coloris 
bonitate tuenda est, color exercitationibus corporis. 
Adhibenda praeterea munditia est non odiosa neque 
exquisita nimis, tantum quae fugiat agrestem et in- 
humanam neglegentiam. Eadem ratio est habenda 
vestitus, in quo, sicut in plerisque rebus, mediocritas 
optima est. 

131 Cavendum autem est, ne aut tarditatibus utamur 
in^ ingressu molHoribuSj ut pomparum fercuHs similes 
esse videamur, aut in festinationibus suscipiamus 
nimias celeritates, quae cum fiunt, anlielitus moven- 
tur, vultus mutanturj ora torquentur; ex quibus 
magna significatio fit non adesse constantiam. Sed 
multo etiam magis elaborandum est, ne animi motus 
a natura recedant; quod assequemur, si cavebimus, 
ne in perturbationes atque exanimationes incidamus, 
et si attentos animos ad decoris conservationem 

132 Motus autem animorum dupHces sunt, alteri cogi- 

' ineptiis non vacant A B H a b ; inepti non vacant o^en- 
sione L c p. 

'Hn Edd.; not in MSS. 


BOOK I. xxxvi 

dignity ; of these, we ouglit to regard loveliness as 
the attribute of woman^ and dignity as the attribute 
of man. Therefore^ let all finery not suitable to a 
man's dignity be kept ofF his person, and let him 
guard against the Hke fault in gesture and action. 
The manners taught in the palaestra/ for example, 
are often rather objectionable, and the gestures of 
actors on the stage are not always free from aflPec- 
tation ; but simple, unaffected manners are commend- 
able in both instances. Now dignity of mien is also 
to be enhanced by a good complexion; the complexion 
is the result of physical exercise. We must besides 
present an appearance of neatness — not too punctil- 
ious or exquisite, but just enough to avoid boorish 
and ill-bred slovenhness. We must follow the same 
principle in regard to dress. In this, as in most 
things, the best rule is the golden mean. 

We must be careful, too, not to fall into a habit of 
hstless sauntering in our gait, so as to look hke car- 
riers in festal processions, or of hurrying too fast, 
when time presses. If we do this, it puts us out of 
breath, our looks are changed, our features distorted ; 
and all this is clear evidence of a lack of poise. But (2) in inward 
it is much more important that we succeed in keep- seif-controi. 
ing our mental operations in harmony with nature's 
laws. And we shall not fail in this if we guard 
against violent excitement or depression, and if we 
keep our minds intent on the observance of pro- 

Our mental operations, moreover, are of two 

^The Greek palaestra, a public school of wrestling and 
athletics, adopted by the Romans became a place of exer- 
cise where the youth were trained in gestures and attitudes 
a nursery of foppish manners. 



tationis^ alteri appetitus ; cogitatio in vero exquirendo 
maxime versatur, appetitus impellit ad agendum. 
Curandum est igitur, ut cogitatione ad res quam 
optimas utamur, appetitum rationi oboedientem 

XXXVII. Et quoniam magna vis orationis est, 
eaque duplex, altera contentionis, altera sermonis, 
contentio disceptationibus tribuatur iudiciorum, con- 
tionum, senatus, sermo in circulis, disputationibus, 
congressionibus familiarium versetur, sequatur etiam 
convivia. Contentionis praecepta rhetorum sunt, 
nuUa sermonis, quamquam haud scio an possint haec 
quoque esse. Sed discentium studiis inveniuntur 
magistri, huic autem qui studeant, sunt nulli, rheto- 
rum turba referta omnia ; quamquam, quae ^ verborum 
sententiarumque praecepta sunt, eadem ad sennonem 
133 Sed cum orationis indicem vocem habeamus, in 
voce autem duo sequamur, ut clara sit, ut suavis, 
utrumque omnino a natura petundum est, verum 
alterum exercitatio augebit, alterum imitatio presse 
loquentium et leniter. 

Nihil fuit in Catulis, ut eos exquisito iudicio pu- 
tares uti litterarum, quamquam erant litterati ; sed 
et alii ; hi autem optime uti lingua Latina putaban- 

quae A^ c, Edd. ifuoniam (per compend.) A' B H a b, 

BOOK I. xxxvi-xxxvii 

kinds: some have to do with thought, others with 
impulse. Thought is occupied chiefly with the dis- 
covery of truth; impulse prompts to action. We 
must be careful, therefore, to employ our thoughts 
on themes as elevating as possible and to keep our 
impulses under the control of reason. 

I. XXVII. The power of speech in the attainment Propriety in 
of pi*opriety is great, and its function is twofold : tlie Ind^conver-*""^^ 
first is oratory ; the second, conversation. Oratory sation. 
is the kind of discourse to be employed in pleadings in 
court and speeches in popular assembHes and in the 
senate ; conversation should find its natural place in 
social gatherings, in informal discussions, and in inter- i 

course with friends ; it should also seek admission at 
dinners. There are rules for oratory laid down by 
rhetoricians ; there are none for conversation ; and 
yet I do not know why there should not be. But 
where there are students to learn, teachers are 
found; there are^ however^ none who make conver- 
sation a subject of study, whereas pupils throng 
about the rhetoricians everywhere. And yet the 
same rules that we have for words and sentences in 
rhetoric will apply also to conversation. 

Now since we have the voice as the organ of 
speech, we should aim to secure two properties 
for it: that it be clear, and that it be musical. 
We must, of course, look to nature for both gifts. 
But distinctness may be improved by practice ; the 
musical qualities, by imitating those who speak 
with smooth and articulate enunciation. 

There was nothing in the two Catuli to lead one 
to suppose that they had a refined literary taste; 
tliey were men of culture, it is true ; and so were 
others ; but the Catuli were looked upon as the perfect 


tur; sonus erat dulcis^ litterae neque expressae 
neque oppressae, iie aut obscurum esset aut putidum, 
sine contentione vox nec languens nec canora. 
Uberior oratio L. Crassi nec minus facetaj sed bene 
loquendi de Catulis opinio non minor. Sale vero et 
facetiis Caesar, Catuli patris frater, vicit omnes, ut in 
illo ipso forensi genere dicendi contentiones aliorum 
sermone vinceret. 

In omnibus igitur his elaborandum est, si in omni 
re quid deceat exquirimus. 

134 Sit ergo hic sermo, in quo Socratici maxime excel- 
lunt, lenis minimeque pertinax, insit in eo lepos; 
nec vero, tamquam in possessionem suam venerit, 
excludat ahos, sed cum reliquis in rebus, tum in 
sermone communi vicissitudinem non iniquam putet ; 
ac videat in primis, quibus de rebus loquatur; si 
seriis, severitatem adhibeat, si iocosis, leporem ; in 
primisque provideat, ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet 
inesse in moribus ; quod maxime tum solet evenire, 
cum studiose de absentibus detrahendi causa aut per 
ridiculum aiit severe maledice contumehoseque di- 

135 Habentur autem plerumque sermones aut de 

domesticis negotiis aut de re publica aut de artium 

BOOK I. xxxvii 

masters of the Latin tongue. Their pronunciation 
was charming; their words were neither mouthed 
nor mumbled : they avoided both indistinctness and 
aiFectation; their voices were free from strain, yet 
neither faint nor shrill. More copious was the speech 
of Lucius Crassus and not less brilliant^ but the re- 
putation of the two CatuH for eloquence was fully 
equal to his. But in wit and humour Caesar, the 
elder Catulus's half-brother^ surpassed them all: 
even at the bar he would with his conversational 
style defeat other advocates with their elaborate 

If, therefore, we are aiming to secure propriety in 
every circumstance of hfe, we must master all these 

Conversation, then, in which the Socratics are the Conversation 
best models, should have these qualities. It should 
be easy and not in the least dogmatic ; it should have 
the spice of wit. And the one who engages in con- 
versation should not debar others from participating 
in it, as if he were entering upon a private monopoly ; 
but, as in other things, so in a general conver- 
sation he should think it not unfair for each to have 
his turn. He should observe, first and foremost, 
what the subject of conversation is. If it is grave, 
he should treat it with seriousness; if humorous, 
with wit. And above all, he should be on the watch 
that liis conversation shall not betray some defect in 
his character. This is most Hkely to occur, when 
people in jest or in earnest take dehght in making 
mahcious and slanderous statements about the ab- 
sent, on purpose to injure their reputations. 

The subjects of conversation are usually affairs of 
the home or peUtics or the practice of the professions 



studiis atque doctrina, Danda igitur opera est, ut, 
etiamsi aberrare ad alia coeperit, ad haec revocetur 
oratio, sed utcumque aderunt; neque enim isdem^ 
de rebus nec omni tempore nec similiter delecta- 
mur. Animadvertendum est etiam, quatenus sermo 
delectationem habeat, et, ut incipiendi ratio fuerit, ita 
sit desinendi modus. 

136 XXXVIII. Sed quo modo in omni vita rectissime 
praecipitur, ut perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus 
animi nimios rationi non optemperantes, sic eius 
modi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira exsistat 
aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale 
aliquid appareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, 
quibuscum sermonem conferemus, et vereri et dili- 
gere videamur. 

Obiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt ne- 
cessariae, in quibus utendum est fortasse et vocis 
contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore, id 
agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut 
ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi 
raro invitique veniemus nec umquam nisi necessario, 
si nulla reperietur alia medicina ; sed tamen ira procul 
absit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. 

137 Magnam autem partem^ clementi castigatione licet 
uti, gravitate tamen adiuncta, ut severitas adhibea- 
tur et contumelia repellatur, atque etiam illud ipsum, 
quod acerbitatis habet obiurgatio, significandum est, 
ipsius id causa, qui obiurgetur, esse susceptum. 

' enim isdem (hisdem B H) A B H b, Miiller ; enim omnes 
isdem L c, most Edd. 

^magnam autem partem Lambinus, Edd.; magna autem 
parte MSS. 

BOOK T. xxxvii-xxxviii 

and learning. Accordingly, if the talk begins to 
drift ofF to other channels, pains should be taken to 
bring it back again to the matter in hand — but with 
due consideration to the company present; for we 
are not all interested in the same things at all times 
or in the same degree. We must observe, too, how 
far the conversation is agreeable and, as it had a 
reason for its beginning, so there should be a point 
at which to close it tactfully. 

XXXVIII. But as we have a most excellent rule Propriety 
for every phase of life^ to avoid exhibitions of passion, ° ^^^^*^ 
that iSj mental excitement that is excessive and un- 
controlled by reason ; so our conversation ought to 
be free from such emotions : let there be no exhibition 
of anger or inordinate desire, of indolence or indiffe- 
rence, or anything of the kind. We must also take 
the greatest care to show courtesy and consideration 
toward those with whom we converse. 

It may sometimes happen that there is need of fiHnreproofs, 
administering reproof. On such occasions we should, 
perhapsj use a more emphatic tone of voice and 
more forcible and severe terms and even assume an 
appearance of being angry. But we shall have re- 
course to this sort of reproof, as we do to cautery 
and amputation, rarely and reluctantly — never at all, 
unless it is unavoidable and no other remedy can be 
discovered. We may seem angry, but anger should 
be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judi- 
cious can be done. In most cases, we may apply a 
mild reproof, so combined, however, with earnest- 
ness, that while severity is shown^ offensive language 
is avoided. Nay more, we must show clearly that 
even that very harshness which goes with our re- 
proof is designed for the good of the person reproved. 



Rectum est autem etiam in illis eontentionibus, 
quae cum inimicissimis fiunt, etiamsi nobis indigna 
audiamusj tamen gravitatem retinere, iracundiam 
pellere. Quae enim cum aliqua perturbatione fiunt, 
ea nec constanter fieri possunt neque iis, qui adsunt, 

Deforme etiam est de se ipsum praedicare falsa 
praesertim et cum irrisione audientium imitari mili- 
tem gloriosum. 

138 XXXIX. Et quoniam omnia persequimur, volu- 
mus quidem certe, dicendum est etiam, qualem 
hominis honorati et principis domum placeat esse, 
cuius finis est usus/ ad quem accommodanda est 
aedificandi descriptio et tamen adhibenda commo- 
ditatis dignitatisque diligentia. 

Cn. Octavio, qui primus ex illa familia consul 
factus est, honori fuisse accepimus, quod praeclaram 
aedificasset in Palatio et plenam dignitatis domum ; 
quae cum vulgo viseretur, sufFragata domino, novo 
homini, ad consulatum putabatur ; hanc Scaurus 
demolitus accessionem adiunxit aedibus. Itaque 
ille in suam domum consulatum primus attulit, hic, 
• summi et clarissimi viri fiUus, in domum multipli- 
catam non repulsam solum rettuHt, sed ignominianj 

139 etiam et^ calamitatem. Ornanda enim est dignitas 
domo, non ex domo tota quaerenda, nec domo 
dominus, sed domino domus honestanda est, et, ut 

' est usus L c, Edd. ; et usus B H a b. 
• ^^ L c, Edd. ; not in B H b. 


BOOK I. xxxviii-xxxix 

The right course, moreover, even in our difFerences (2) in disputes, 
with our bitterest enemies, is to maintain our dig- 
nity and to repress our anger, even though we are 
treated outrageously. For what is done under some 
degree of excitement cannot be done with perfect 
self-respect or the approval of those who witness it. 

It is bad taste also to talk about oneself — especi- praise!^ 
ally if what one says is not true— and, amid the 
derision of one's hearers^ to play The Braggart 
Captain." ^ 

XXXIX. But since 1 am investigating this subject J^^P''"^*'' 
in all its phases (at least, that is my purpose), I 
must discuss also what sort of house a man of rank 
and station should, in my opinion, have. Its prime 
object is serviceableness. To this the plan of the 
building should be adapted ; and yet careful atten- 
tion should be paid to its convenience and distinction. 

We have heard that Gnaeus Octavius — the first 
of that family to be elected consul — distinguished 
himself by building upon the Palatine an attractive 
and imposing house. Everybody went to see it, 
and it was thought to have gained votes for the 
owner, a new man^ in his canvass for the consulship. 
That house Scaurus demoHshed, and on its site he 
built an addition to his own house. Octavius^ then, 
was the first of his family to bring the honour of a 
consulship to his house ; Scaurus, though the son of 
a very great and illustrious man, brought to the 
same house, when enlarged, not only defeat, but dis- 
grace and ruin. The truth is, a man's dignity may be 
enhanced by the house he hves in, but not wholly 
secured by it ; the owner should bring honour to his 

^ Like Pyrgopolinices in the Miles Gloriosus of Plautus, 
or Thraso in the Eunuchus of Terence. 


in ceteris habenda ratio non sua solurn, sed etiam 
aliorum, sic in domo clari hominis, in quam et 
hospites multi recipiendi et admittenda hominum 
cuiusque modi multitudo, adhibenda cura est laxi- 
tatis; ahter ampla domus dedecori saepe domino 
fit, si est in ea solitudo, et maxime, si aliquando 
alio domino soHta est frequentari. Odiosum est 
enim, cum a praetereuntibus dicitur : 

o domus antiqua^ heu^ quam dispari 
dominare dominol 

quod quidem his temporibus in multis licet dicere. 
140 Cavendum autem est, praesertim si ipse aedifices, 
ne extra modum sumptu et magnificentia prodeas; 
quo in genere multum mali etiam in exemplo est. 
Studiose enim plerique praesertim in hanc partem 
facta principum imitantur, ut L. Luculli, summi viri, 
virtutem quis? at quam multi villarum magnificen- 
tiam imitati ! quarum quidem certe est adhibendus 
modus ad mediocritatemque ^ revocandus. Eademque 
mediocritas ad omnem usum cultumque vitae trans- 
ferenda est. 

Sed haec hactenus. 

^fit Bt, Ed.; «V B H a b ; est L (corr. ex sit b), Muller, 
Heine; not in c. 

« heu Edd. ; et MSS. ; ei Schenkl. 

^* mediocritatemque : que italicized by Ed. but attested by 
B H L b c. 

BOOK I. xxxix 

house^ not the house to its owner. And, as in 
everything else a man must have regard not for 
himself alone but for others also, so in the home of 
a distinguished man^ in which numerous guests must 
be entertained and crowds of every sort of people 
received, care must be taken to have it spacious. 
But if it is not frequented by visitors, if it has an 
air of lonesomeness^ a spacious palace often becomes 
a discredit to its owner. This is sure to be the 
case if at some other time, when it had a different 
owner, it used to be thronged. For it is unpleasant, 
when passers-by remark : 

O good old house, alas ! how different 
The owner who now owneth thee ! " 
And in these times that may be said of many a 
house ! ^ 

One must be careful, too, not to go beyond 
proper bounds in expense and display, especially 
if one is building for oneself. For much mischief 
is done in this way, if only in the example set. 
For many people imitate zealously the foibles of 
the great, particularly in this direction : for example, 
who copies the virtues of Lucius Lucullus, excel- 
lent man that he was ? But how many there are who 
have copied the magnificence of his villas ! Some 
Hmit should surely be set to this tendency and it 
should be reduccd at least to a standard of modera- 
tion; and by that same standard of moderation the 
comforts and wants of life generally should be regu- 

But enough on this part of my theme. 

' Members of Caesar's party were now occupylng' the 
houses that had been the homes of Pompey's friends, 
Antony, for example, lived in Pompey's house. 



141 In omni autem actione suscipienda tria sunt 
tenenda, primum ut appetitus rationi pareat, quo 
nihil est ad officia conservanda accommodatius, 
deinde ut animadvertatur, quanta illa res sit, quam 
efficere velimus, ut neve maior neve minor cura et 
opera suscipiatur, quam causa postulet. Tertium 
est, ut caveamus, ut ea, quae pertinent ad liberalem 
speciem et dignitatem,^ moderata^ sint. Modus 
autem est optimus decus ipsum tenere, de quo ante 
diximus, nec progredi longius. Horum tamen trium 
praestantissimum est appetitum optemperare rationi. 

142 XL. Deinceps de ordine rerum et de opportunitate 
temporum dicendum est. Haec autem scientia con- 
tinentur ea, quam Graeci evra^tav nominant, non 
hanc, quam interpretamur modestiam, quo in verbo 
modus inest, sed illa est ^vra^ia, in qua intellegitur 
ordinis conservatio. Itaque, ut eandem nos mode- 
stiam appellemus, sic definitur a Stoicis, ut modestia 
sit scientia rerum earum, quae agentur aut dicentur, 
loco suo collocandarum. Ita videtur eadem vis 
ordinis et coUocationis fore; nam et ordinem sic 
definiunt: compositionem rerum aptis et accommo- 
datis locis; locum autem actionis opportunitatem' 
temporis esse dicunt; tempus autem actionis oppor- 
tunum* Graece fVKaLpla, Latine appellatur occasio. 
Sic fit, ut modestia haec, quam ita interpretamur, ut 

' ad liberalem speciem et dignitatem B H b, Edd. ; ad 
liberalitatem specie et dignitate L c p. 

^moderata L c p, Edd.; moderanda B H a b. 
^oportunitate{m) Ed. *oportunum Ed» 


BOOK I. xxxix-xl 

In entering upon any course of action^ then^ Three ruies for 
we must hold fast to three principles : first, that proprkt^y° 
impulse shall obey reason; for there is no better 
way than this to secure the observance of duties; 
second, that we estimate carefully the importance 
of the object that we wish to accomplish, so that 
neither more nor less care and attention may be 
expended upon it than the case requires; the tliird 
principle is that we be careful to observe moderation 
in all that is essential to the outward appearance 
and dignity of a gentleman. Moreover, the best 
rule for securing this is strictly to observe that 
propriety which we have discussed above, and not 
to overstep it. Yet of these three principles, the 
one of prime importance is to keep impulse sub- 
servient to reason. 

XL. Next, then, we must discuss orderliness of Orderiiness— 
conduct and seasonableness of occasions. These two a^^the^^* '^'°^ 
quahties are embraced in that science which the "ght time. 
Greeks call exra^ia — not that evTa^ui which we 
translate with moderation [inodesLia], derived from 
moderate; but this is the ivra^ia by which we under- 
stand orderly conduct. And so, if we may call it 
also moderation, it is defined by the Stoics as follows : 

Moderation is the science of disposing aright 
everything that is done or said." So the essence 
of orderhness and of right-placing, it seems, will be 
the same ; for orderliness they define also as the 
arrangement of things in their suitable and appro- 
priate places." By place of action," moreover, 
they mean seasonahleness of circumstance ; and the 
seasonable circumstance for an action is called in 
Greek evKaipia, in Latin occasio (occasion). So it 
comes about that in this sense moderation, which we 
t 145 


dixi, scientia sit opportunitatis* idoneorum ad agen- 
dum temporum. 

143 Sed potest eadem esse prudentiae definitio, de 
Ch. vi qua principio diximus ; lioc autem loco de modera- 

tione et temperantia et harum similibus virtutibus 
quaerimus. Itaque, quae erant prudentiae propria, 
suo loco dicta sunt ; quae autem harum virtutum, de 
quibus iam diu loquimur, quae pertinent ad vere- 
cundiam et ad eorum approbationem, quibuscum 
vivimus, nunc dicenda sunt. 

144 Talis est igitur ordo actionum adhibendus, ut, 

quem ad modum in oratione constanti, sic in vita 

omnia sint apta inter se et convenientia ; turpe 

enim valdeque vitiosum in re severa convivio digna^ 

aut delicatum aliquem inferre sermonem. Bene 

Pericles, cum haberet collegam in praetura Soplio- 

clem' poetam iique de communi officio convenissent 

et casu formosus puer praeteriret dixissetque 

Sophocles: O puerum pulchrum, Pericle!" "A1 

enim praetorem, Sophocle, decet non solum manus, 

ved etiam oculos abstinentes habere." Atqui^ lioc 

idem Sophocles si in athletarum probatione dixisset, 

iusta reprehensione caruisset, Tanta vis est et loci 

et temporis. Ut, si qui, cum causam sit acturus, in 

itinere aut in ambulatione secum ipse meditetur, aut 

si quid aliud attentius cogitet, non repreliendatur, at 

' oportnnitatis Ed. 

* convivio digna B H a b, Edtl. ; convivio dignum c ; convu 
vii dicta L p. 

^ Atqui Miiller, Heine; atque MSS., Bt. 


BOOK I. xl 

explain as I have indicated, is the science of doing 
tlie right thing at the right time. 

A similar definition can be given for prudence, of 
which I have spoken in an early chapter. But in 
this part we are considering temperance and self- 
control and related virtues. Accordingly, the 
properties which, as we found, are peculiar to pru- 
dence, were discussed in their proper place, while 
those are to be discussed now which are peculiar to 
these virtues of which we have for some time been 
speaking and which relate to considerateness and to 
the approbation of our fellow-men. 

Such orderHness of conduct is, therefore, to be ob- 
served, that everything in the conduct of our Hfe 
shaH balance and harmonize, as in a finished speech. seasonabiene» 
For it is unbecoming and highly censurable, when °^ spcech. 
upon a serious theme, to introduce such jests as are 
proper at a dinner, or any sort of loose talk. When 
Pericles was associated with the poet Sophocles as 
his coHeague in command and they had met to 
confer about ofiicial business tliat concerned tliem 
both, a handsome boy chanced to pass and Sophocles 
said: Look, Pericles; what a pretty boy!" How 
pertinent was Pericles's reply : " Hush, Sophocles, 
a general should keep not only his liands but his 
eyes under control." And yet, if Sophocles had 
made tliis same remark at a trial of athletes, he 
would have incurred no just reprimand. So great 
is the significance of botli place and circumstance. 
For example, if anyone, while on a journey or on a 
vvalk, should rehearse to liimself a case which he is 
preparing to conduct in court, or if he should under 
similar circumstances apply his closcst thought to 
some other subject, he would not be open to censure : 
h2 J47 


hoc idem si in convivio faciat, inhumanus videatur 
inscitia temporis. 

145 Sed ea, quae multum ab humanitate discrepant, ut 
si qui in foro cantet, aut si qua est alia magna per- 
versitas, facile apparet nec magnopere admonitionem 
et praecepta desiderat; quac auteni parva videntur 
esse delicta neque a multis intellegi possunt, ab iis' 
est diligentius declinandum. Ut in fidibus aut ti- 
biis, quamvis paulum discrepent, tamen id a sciente 
animadverti solet, sic videndum^ est in vita ne forte 
quid discrepet, vel multo etiam magis, quo maior et 
melior actionum quam sonorum concentus est. 

146 XLI. Itaque,utinfidibusmusicorumauresvelmini- 
ma sentiunt, sic nos, si acres ac diligentes esse volumus 
animadversores[que] ■* vitiorum, magna saepe intelle- 
gemus ex parvis. Ex oculoi'um optutu, superciliorum 
aut remissione aut contractione, ex maestitia, ex 
hilaritate, ex risu, ex locutione, ex reticentia, ex 
contentione vocis, ex summissione, ex ceteris simili- 
bus facile iudicabimus, quid eorum apte fiat, quid ab 
officio naturaque discrepet. Quo in genere non est 
incommodum, quale quidque eorum sit, ex aliis iudi- 
care, ut, si quid dedeceat in illis,* vitemus ipsi ; fit 
enim nescio quo modo, ut magis in aliis cernamus 
quam in nobismet ipsis, si quid delinquitur. Itaque 
facillime corriguntur in discendo, quorum vitia imi- 
tantur emendandi causa magistri. 


• videndum L c, Edd. ; vivendutn B H a b. 

^ animadversores [que\ Ed.; animadversoresque MSS. ; 
* animadversoresque Bt.; animadversores Orelli, Miiller, 

* dedeceat a c, Edd ; deceat H L b; non deceat B. in illis 
a Bt.', Ed.; in illos B H b c; illos L, Bt.« 


BOOK t. xl-xli 

but if he should do that same tlvng at a dinner, 
he would be tliought ill-bred, because he ignored 
the proprieties of the occasion. 

But flagrant breaches of good breeding, like sing- Theiittie 
ing in the streets or any other gross misconduct, are colllu. 
easily apparent and do not call especially for ad- 
monition and instruction. But we must even more 
carefully avoid those seemingly trivial faults wliich 
pass unnoticed by the many. However shghtly out 
of tune a harp or flute may be, the fault is still 
detected by a connoisseur; so we must be on the 
watch lest haply something in our life be out of 
tune — nay, rather, far greater is the need for pains- 
taking, inasmucli as harmony of actions is far better 
and far more important tlian harmony of sounds. 

XLI. As, therefore, a musical ear detects even the we correct om 
shghtest falsity of tone in a harp, so we, if we wish (i^by observiV 
to be keen and careful observers of moral faults, shall others, 
often draw important conclusions from trifles. We 
observe othcrs and from a glance of the eyes, from 
a contracting or relaxing of the brows, from an air 
of sadness, from an outburst of joy, from a laugh, 
from speech, from silence, from a raising or lowering 
of the voice, and the hke, we shall easily judge which 
of our actions is proper, and which is out of accord 
with duty and nature. And, in the same manner, it 
is not a bad plan to judge of the nature of our every 
action by studying others, that so we may ourselves 
avoid anything that is unbecoming in them. For it 
happens somehow or other that we detect another's 
failings more readily than we do our own; and so 
in the school-room tliose pupils learn most easily 
to do better wliose faults the masters mimic for the 
sake of correcting them. 



1 47 Nec vero alienum est ad ea eligenda, quae dubita- 
tionem afferunt, adhibere doctos homines vel etiam 
usu peritos et, quid iis de quoque officii genere pla- 
ceat, exquirere. Maior enim pars eo fere defcrri 
solet, quo a natura ipsa deducitur. In quibus viden- 
dum est, non modo quid quisque loquatur, sed 
etiam quid quisque sentiat atque etiam de qua 
causa quisque sentiat. Ut enim pictores et ii, 
qui si;?na fabricantur, et vero etiam poetae suum 
quisque opus a vulgo considerarivult,ut,si quid repre- 
hensum sit a pluribus, id corrigatur, iique et secum 
et ab ahis,^ quid in eo peccatum sit, exquirunt, sic 
aliorum iudicio permulta nobis et facienda et non 
facienda et mutanda et corrigenda sunt. 

1 48 Quae vero more agentur institutisque civilibus, de 
iis nihil est praecipiendum; illa enim ipsa praecepta 
sunt, nec quemquam hoc errore duci oportet, ut, si 
quid Socrates aut Aristippus contra morem consue- 
tudinemque civilem fecerint locutive sint, idera sibi 
arbitretur licere; magnis illi et divinis bonis hanc 
licentiam assequebantur. Cynicorum vero ratio tota 
est eicienda ; est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua 
nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum. 

1 49 Eos autem, quorum vita perspecta in rebus honestis 
atque magnis est, bene de re publica sentientes ac 
bene raeritos aut merentes sic ut^ ahquo honore aut 

' et ab aliis a, Bt., Ed.; aliis B H b; et cum aliis c; et ex 
aliis Unger, Muller. 
^sic ut L p, Nonius ; not in B H b c. 


BOOK I xli 

Nor is it out of place in naaking a clioice between (2) by the criti 
duties involving a doubt, to consult men of learning ^i^! ° 
or practical wisdom and to ascertain what their views 
are on any particular question of duty. For the 
majority usually drift as the current of their own 
natural inchnations carries them; and in deriving 
counsel from one of these, we have to see not only 
what our adviser says, but also what he thinks, and 
what his reasons are for thinking as he does. For, 
as painters and sculptors and even poets, too, wish 
to have their works reviewed by the pubhc, in order 
thatj if any point is generally criticized, it may be 
improved ; and as they try to discover both by them- 
selves and witli the help of otliers what is wrong in 
their work ; so through consulting the judgment of 
others we find that there are many things to be done 
and left undone, to be altered and improved. 

But no rules need to be given about what is done The laws oi 
in accordance with the established customs and con- Jufes'of duty. 
ventions of a community; for these are in themselves 
rules; and no one ought to make the mistake of 
supposing that, because Socrates or Aristippus did 
or said something contrary to the manners and estab- 
Ushed customs of their city, he has a right to do the 
same ; it was only by reason of their great and super- 
human virtues that those famous men acquired this 
special privilege. But the Cynics' whole system of 
philosophy must be rejected, for it is inimical to moral 
sensibihty, and without moral sensibility nothing 
can be upright, nothing morally good. 

It is, furthermore, our duty to honour and rever- Special rules* 
ence those whose hves are conspicuous for conduct 
in keeping with their high moral standards, and who, 
«« true patriots, have rendered or are now renderinp' 


imperio afFectos observare et colere debemus, tribu- 
ere etiam multum senectuti, cedere iis, qui magistra- 
tum habebuut, habere dilectum civis et peregrini in 
ipsoque peregrino, privatimne an pubHce venerit. 
Ad summam, ne agam de singuHs, communem totius 
generis hominum concihationem et consociationem 
colere, tueri, servare debemus. 
150 XLII. lam de artificiis et quaestibus, qui Uberales 
habendi, qui sordidi sint, haec fere accepimus. 
Primum improbantur ii quaestus, qui in odia 
hominum incuri*unt, ut portitorum, ut faeneratorum. 
Illiberales autem et sordidi quaestus mercennari- 
orum omnium, quorum operae, non quorum artes 
emuntur ; est enim in ilhs ipsa merces auctora- 
mentum servitutis. Sordidi etiam putandi, qui 
mercantur a mercatoribus, quod statim vendant ; 
nihil enim proficiant, nisi admodum mentiantur ; 
nec vero est quicquam turpius vanitate. Opificesque 
omnes in sordida arte versantur ; nec enim quic- 
quam ingenuum habere potest officina. Minimeque 
artes eae probandae, quae ministrae sunt volup- 
tatum : 
Eunuchus II. Ceijirii, lanif, coqui, fartores, piscatorep 


BOOK I. xli-xlii 

eHicient service to their country^ just as much as it 
they were invested with some civil or mihtary author- 
ity; it is our duty also to show proper respect to old 
age, to yield precedence to magistrates, to make a 
distinction bctween a fellow-citizen and a foreigner, 
and, in the case of the foreigner himself, to discrimi- 
nate according to whether he has come in an official 
or a private capacity. In a word, not to go into de- 
tails, it is our dutj'^ to respect, defend, and maintain 
the common bonds of union and fellowship subsist- 
ing between all the members of the human race. 

XLII. Now in regard to trades and other means pccupationsj 
of Uvehhood, which ones are to be considered 
becoming to a gentleman and which ones are 
vulgar, we have been taught, in general, as follows. 
First, those means of Uvehhood are rejected as un- 
desirable which incur people's ill-will, as those 
of tax-gatherers and usurers. Unbecoming to a 
gentleman, too, and vulgar are the means of HveH- 
hood of all hired workmen whom we pay for mere 
manual labour, not for artistic skill ; for in their 
case the very wages they receive is a pledge of their 
slavery. Vulgar we must consider those also who 
buy from wholesale merchants to retail immediately ; 
for they would get no profits without a great deal 
of downright lying; and verily, there is no action 
that is meaner than misrepresentation. And all 
mechanics are engaged in vulgar trades; for no 
workshop can have anything Hberal about it. Least 
respectable of all are those trades which cater to 
sensual pleasures : 

Fishmongers, butchers, cooks, and poulterers, 
And fishermen," 



ut ait Terentius ; adde huc, si placet, unguentarios, 
saltatores totumque ludum talarium. 

151 Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest 
aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, 
ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honestarum, eae 
sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae. Mer- 
catura autem, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est ; 
sin magna et copiosa, multa undique apportans 
multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum 
vituperanda, atque etiam, si satiata quaestu vel 
contenta potius, ut saepe ex alto in portum, ex ipso 
portu se in agros possessionesque contuUt, videtur 
iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, 
ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura 
melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine 
libero^ dignius ; de qua quoniam in Catone Maiore 
satis multa diximus, illira assumes, quae ad hunc 
locum pertinebunt. 

1.52 XLIII. Sed ab iis partibus, quae sunt honestatis, 
quem ad modum officia ducerentur, satis expositum 
videtur. Eorum autem ipsorum, quae honesta sunt, 
potest incidere saepe contentio et comparatio, 
de duobus honestis utrum honestius, qui locus 
a Panaetio est praetermissus. Nam cum omnis 
honestas manet a partibus quattuor, quarum una 
sit cognitionis, altera communitatis, tertia magnani- 

' homine libcro Edd. ; homine nihil lihero B H L a b c. 
• illim B', Edd. ; illum H ; illa B^ p ; iUinc a b c ; illic L, 


BOOK I. xlii-xliii 

as Terence says. Add to tlicse, if you please, the 
perfumers, dancers, and the whole corps de hallet. 

But the professions in which either a higher (2)Uberal 
degree of intelHgence is required or from which no 
small benefit to society is derived — medicine and 
architecture, for example, and teaching — these are 
proper for those whose social position they become. 
Trade, if it is on a small scale, is to be considered 
vulgar; but if wliolesale and on a large scale, im- 
porting large quantities from all parts of the world 
and distributing to many without misrepresentation, 
it is not to be greatly disparaged. Nay, it even 
seems to deserve the highest respect, if those who 
are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I should say, 
satisfied with the fortunes they have made, make 
their way from the port to a country estate, as they 
have often made it from the sea into port. But of 
all the occupations by which gain is secured, 
none is better than agriculture, none more profit- 
able, none more dehghtful, none more becoming 
to a freeman. But since I have discussed this quite 
fully in my Cato Major, you will find there the 
material that apphes to this point. 

XLIII. Now, I think I have explained fully Comparative 
enough how moral duties are derived from the four ^^tj]^'* "* 
divisions of moral rectitude. But between those 
vory actions which are morally right, a conflict and 
comparison may frequently arise, as to which of two 
moral actions is morally better — a point overlooked by 
Panaetius. For, since all moral rectitude springs from 
four sources (one of which is prudence ; the second, 
social instinct ; the third, courage ; the fourth, tem- 

' The ludus talarius was a kind of low variety show, with 
loose songs and dances and bad music. 



mitatis, quarta moderatioiiis, haec in deligendo 
officio saepe inter se comparentur necesse est. 
153 Placet igitur aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae 
ex communitate^ quam ea, quae ex cognitione 
ducantur, idque hoc ai-gumento confirmari potest, 
quod, si contigerit ea vita sapienti, ut omnium 
rerum affluentibus copiis [quamvis] omnia,^ quae 
cognitione digna sint, summo otio secum ipse con- 
sideret et contempletur, tamen, si solitudo tanta 
sit, ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita, 
Princepsque omnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam 
cro4>iav Graeci vocant — prudentiam enim, quam 
Graeci 4>p6vr]criv dicunt, aliam quandam intellegimus, 
quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scien- 
tia; illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est 
divinarum et humanai*um scientia, in qua continetur 
deorum et hominum communitas et societas intcr 
ipsos ; ea si maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est, quod a 
communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum. Ete- 
nim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca quodam 
modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequa- 
tur. Ea autera actio in hominum commodis tuendis 
maxime cernitur ; pertinet igitur ad societatem 
generis humani ; ergo haec cognitionianteponenda est. 

^ copiis \quamvis\ 07nma, Ed. ; copiis quamvis otnnia MSS. ; 
copiis omnia Lambinus, Bt., Miiller, Heine. 

"Cicero is guilty of a curious fallacy. If it foliows from 
his premises, (i) some one virtue is the highest virtue, and 
(2) the duties derived from the highest virtue are the highcst 
duties, and if (3) wisdom is the highest virtue, then it can 
only follow that the duties derived from wisdom are the high- 
est duties. But Cicero throws in a fourth premise that the 
*' bonds of union between gods and men and the relations of 
man to man" are derived from wisdom, and therewith side- 
tracks wisdom and gives the duties derived from the social 

BOOK I. xliii 

per.ance) it is often necessary in deciding a question of 
duty that these virtues be weighed against one another. 

My view, therefore, is that those duties are closer J"**^*^ 
to nature which depend upon the social instinct Wisdom 
than those which depend upon knowledge ; and this 
view can be confirmed by the following argument: 
(l) suppose that a wise man should be vouclisafed 
such a life that, with an abundance of everything 
pouring in upon him^ he might in perfect peace 
study and ponder over everything that is worth 
knowing, still^ if the solitude were so complete that 
he could never see a human being, he would die. 
And then, the foremost of all virtues is wisdom — what 
the Greeks call o-oc^ia; for by prudence, which they 
call <f)p6vr)(Ti<;, we understand something else, namely, 
the practical knowledge of things to be sought for 
and of things to be avoided. (2) Again, that wisdom 
which I have given the foremost place is the know- 
ledge of things human and divine, which is concerned 
also with the bonds of union between gods and men 
and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the 
most important of the virtues^ as it certainly is, it 
necessarily follows that that duty which is connected 
with the social obligation is the most important duty.* 
And (3) service is better than mere theoretical know- 
ledge^ for the study and knowledge of the universe 
would somehow be lame and defective, were no practi- 
cal results to follow. Such results, moreover, are best 
seen in the safe-guarding of human interests. It is 
essential, then,to human society ; and it should, there- 

fore, be ranked above speculative knowledge. 

instinct the place IVom wliich wisdoni has been shunted. 

Cicero coiild not refrain from introducing' a bit of 
theoretical speculation that has no value for his practical 
position — it actually prejudices it and confuses the reader. 



r54 Atque id optimus quisque re ipsa ^ ostendit et 
iudicat. Quis enim est tam cupidus in perspicienda 
cognoscendaque rerum natura, ut, si ei tractanti 
contemplantique res cognitione dignissimas subito 
sit allatum periculum discrimenque patriae, cui sub- 
venire opitularique possit, non illa omnia relinquat 
atque abiciat, etiamsi dinumerare se stellas aut 
metiri mundi magnitudinem posse arbitretur ? atque 
hoc idem in parentis, in amici re aut periculo 

155 Quibus rebus intellegitur studiis officiisque sci- 
entiae praeponenda esse officia iustitiae, quae pertinent 
ad hominum utiHtatem,^ qua nihil homini esse debet 

XLIV. Atque illi, quorum studia vitaque omnis in 
rerum cognitione versata est, tamen ab augendis 
hominum utiHtatibus et commodis non recesserunt; 
nam et erudiverunt multos, quo meliores cives utili- 
oresque rebus suis pubHcis essent, ut Thebanum 
Epaminondam Lysis Pythagoreus, Syracosium Dio- 
nem Plato multique multos, nosque ipsi, quicquid ad 
rem publicam attuHmus, si modo aHquid attuHmus, a 
doctoribus atque doctrina instructi ad eam et ornati 

156 accessimus. Neque solum vivi atque praesentes 
studiosos discendi erudiunt atque docent, sed hoc 
idem etiam post mortem monumentis litterarum 
assequuntur. Nec enim locus ullus est praetermissus 

' re ipsa B H a b, Bt., Ed. ', re ab se L.C (i.e. reapse Orelli, 
Moller, Heine); ab ipsa re p. 
* utilitatem B H a b; caritatem L c p (affection). 


BOOK I. xliii-xliv 

4 Upon this all the best men agree, as they prove 
by their conduct. For who is so absorbed in the 
investigation and study of creation, but that, even 
though he were working and pondering over tasks 
never so much worth mastering and even though he 
thought lie could immber the stars and measure the 
length and breadth of the universe, he would drop 
all those problems and cast them aside, if word were 
suddenly bi*ought to him of some critical peril to his 
country, which he could relieve or repel? And he 
would do tlie same to further the interests of parent 
or friend or to save him from danger. 

From all this we conclude that the duties pre- 
scribed by justice must be given precedence over 
the pursuit of knowledge and the duties imposed' 
by it ; for the former concern the welfare of our 
fellow-men; and nothing ought to be more sacred 
in men's eyes than that. 

XLIV. And yet scholars, whose whole life and wisdominthe 
interests have-been devoted to the pursuit of know- ju^tice." 
ledge, have not, after all, failed to eontribute to the 
advantages and blessings of mankind. For they have 
trained many to be better citizens and to render 
larger service to their country. So, for example, the 
Pythagorean Lysis taught Epaminondas of Thebes ; 
Plato, Dion of Syracuse ; and many, many others. As 
for me myself, whatever service I have rendered to 
my country — if, indeed, I have rendered any— 1 
came to my task trained and equipped for it by my 

»6 teachers and wliat they taught me. And not only while 
present in the flesh do they teach and train those who 
are desirous of learning, but by the written memorials 
of their learning they continue the same service after 
they are dead. For they have overlooked no point 



ab iis, qui ad leges, qui ad mores, qui ad disciplinam 
rei publicae pertineret, ut otium suum ad nostrum 
negotium contulisse videantur. Ita illi ipsi doc- 
trinae studiis et sapientiae dediti ad hominum utili- 
tatem suam prudentiam intellegentiamque potissi- 
mum conferunt; ob eamque etiam causam eloqui 
copiose, modo prudenter, melius est quam vel acutis- 
sime sine eloquentia cogitare, quod cogitatio in se 
ipsa vertitur, eloquentia complectitur eos, quibuscum 
communitate iuncti sumus. 
1 57 Atque ut apium examina non fingendorum favorum 
causa congregantur, sed, cum congregabilia natura 
sint, fingunt favos, sic homines, ac multo etiam magis, 
natura congregati adhibent agendi cogitandique * 
sollertiam. Itaque, nisi ea virtus, quae constat ex 
hominibus tuendis, id est ex societate generis 
humani, attingat cognitionem rerum, solivaga cogni- 
tio et ieiuna videatur, itemque magnitudo animi 
remota communitate coniunctioneque humana 
feritas sit quaedam et iraDanitas. Ita fit, ut vincat 
cognitionis studium consociatio hominum atque 
lato, 158 Nec verum est, quod dicitiT a quibusdam, propter 
X/^h . necessitatem vitae, quod ea, quae natura desideraret, 

Poi*V consequi sine aliis attiue efficere non possemus, 

'»53 A idcirco initam esse cum hominibus communitatem et 

societatem; quodsi omnia nobis, quae ad victum 

' cogitandiqtie L c p, Edd. ; con^regandique B H a b. 
^communitate p (per compendium), Bt.'*, Miiller, Heine; 
comitate A B H L a b c, 


BOOK I. xliv 

that has a bearing upon laws, customs, or politicai 
science ; in fact, they seem to have devoted their re- 
tirement to the benefit of us who are engaged in 
pubHc business. The principal thing done, thereforej 
by those very devotees of the pursuits of learnirig 
and science is to apply their own practical wisdom 
and insight to the service of humanity. And for that 
reason also much speaking (if only it contain wisdom) 
is better than speculation never so profound withbut 
speech; for mere speculation is self-centred, while 
speech extends its benefits to those with whom we 
are united by the bonds of society. ^ 

And again, as swarms of bees do not gather for 
the sake of making honeycomb but make the honey- 
comb because theyare gregarious by nature,so human 
beings— and to a much higher degree — exercise their 
skill together in action and thouglit because they are 
naturally gregarious. And so, if that virtue [justice] justicemorfe 
which centres in the safeguarding of human inter- wudom and'' 
ests, that is, in the maintenance of human society, Fortitude. 
were not to accompany the pursuit of knowledge, 
that knowledge would seem isolated and barren of 
results. In the same way, courage [Fortitude], if 
unrestrained by the uniting bonds of society, would 
be but a sort of brutahty and savagery. Hence it 
follows that the claims of human society and the 
bonds that unite men together take precedence of 
the pursuit of speculative knowledge. 

And it is not true, as certain people maintain, that 
the bonds of union in human society were instituted 
in order to provide for the needs of daily life ; for, 
they say, without the aid of others we could not 
secure for ourselves or supply to others the things 
that nature requires; but if all that is essential to our 
M 161 


cultumque pertinent, quasi virgula divina, ut aiunt, 
suppeditarentur, tum optimo quisque ingenio negotiis 
omnibus omissis totum se in cognitione et scientia 
collocaret. Non est ita; nam et solitudinem fugeret 
et socium studii quaereret, tum docere tum discere 
vellet, tum audire tum dicere. Ergo omne officium, 
quod ad coniunctionem hominum et ad societatem 
tuendam valet, anteponendum est illi officio, quod 
cognitione et scientia continetur, 

\59 XLV. Illud forsitan quaerendum sit, num haec 
communitas, quae maxime est apta naturae, sit etiam 
moderationi modestiaeque semper anteponenda. 
Non placet; sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda 
partim ita flagitiosa, ut ea ne conservandae quidem 
patriae causa sapiens facturus sit. Ea Posidonius 
collegit permulta, sed ita taetra quaedam, ita ob- 
scena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia. Haec 
igitur non suscipiet rei publicae causa, ne res pubHca 
quidem pro se suscipi volet. Sed Iioc^ commodius 
se res habet, quod non potest accidere tempus, ut 
intersit rei pubhcae quicquam illorum facerc sapien- 

1 60 Quare hoe quidem effectum sit, in officiis dcHgendis 
id^ genus officiorum excellere, quod teneatur homi- 
num societate. [Etenim cognitionem prudentiam- 

' hoc L c p, Edd. ; haec B H a b. 
» id a, Edd. , ut h; AocB H L c p. 


BOOK 1. xliv-xlv 

wants and comtbrb were supplied by some magic 
wand, as in the stories, then every man of first-rate 
abiUty could drop all other responsibility and devote 
himself exclusively to learning and study. Not at 
all. For he would seek to escape from his lonehness 
and to find some one to share his studies ; he would 
wish to teach, as well as to learn ; to hear, as well as 
to speak. Every duty, therefore, that tends effect- 
ively to maintain and safeguard human society should 
be given the preference over that duty which arises 
from speculation and science alone. 

XLV. The following question should, perhaps, be Justice 
asked : whether this social instinct, which is the Temperance. 
deepest feehng in our nature, is always to have prece- 
dence over temperance and moderation also. I think 
not. For there are some acts either so repulsive or so 
wicked, that a wise man would not commit them, 
even to save his country. Posidonius has made a 
large collection of them; but some of them are so 
shocking, so indecent, that it seems immoral even 
to mention them. The wise man, therefore, will not 
think of doing any such thing for the sake of his 
country; no more will his country consent to have 
it done for her. But the problem is the more easily 
disposed of because the occasion cannot arise when 
it could be to the state's interest to have the wise 
man do any of those things. 

This, then, may be regarded as settled : in choos- Order of prece- 
ing between conflicting duties, that class takes pre- ^^"'^^ °* duties. 
cedence which is demanded by the interests of 
human society. [And this is the natural sequence; 
for discreet action will presuppose learning and prac- 
m2 J63 


que sequetur considerata aeti(J; ita fit, ut agere 
considerate pluris sit quam cogitare prudenter.]^ 

Atque haec quidem hactenus. Patefactus enim 
locus est ipse^ ut non difficile sit in exquirendo 
officio, quid cuique sit praeponendum, videre. In 
ipsa autem communitate sunt gradus officiorum, ex 
quibus, quid cuique praestet, ini^llegi possit, ut 
prima dis immortalibus, secunda patriae, tertia paren- 
tibus, deinceps gradatim reliquis debeantur. 
161 Quibus ex rebus breviter disputatis intellegi 
potest non solum id homines solere dubitare, hone- 
stumne an turpe sit, sed etiam duobus propositis 
honestis utrum honestius sit. Hic locus a Panaetio 
est, ut supra dixi, praetermissus. Sed iam ad reliqua 

* Etenim . . . prudenter bracketed by Unger. 


BOOK 1. xlv 

tical wisdom; it follows, therefore, that discreet 
action is of more value than wise (but inactive) 

So nuich must suffice for this topic. For, in its 
essence, it has been made so clear, that in deter- 
mining a question of duty it is not difficult to 
see which duty is to be preferred to any other. 
Moreover, even in the social relations themselves 
there are gradations of duty so well defined that 
it can easily be seen which duty takes prece- 
dence of any other : our first duty is to the immortal 
gods ; our second, to country ; our third, to parents ; 
and so on, in a descending scale, to the rest, 

From this brief discussion, then, it can be under- 
stood that people are often in doubt not only whether 
an action is morally right or wrong, but also, when 
a choice is offered between two moral actions, which 
one is morally better. This point, as I remarked 
above, has been overlooked by Panaetius. But let us 
now nass on to what remains. 





I. Quem ad modum officia ducerentur ab hone- 
state, Marce fili, atque ab omni genere virtutis^ satis 
explicatum arbitror libro superiore. Sequitur, ut 
haec officiorum genera persequar, quae pertinent ad 
vitae cultum et ad earum rerum, quibus utuntur 
homines, facultatem, ad opes, ad copias [; in quo tura 
quaeri dixi, quid utile, quid inutile, tum ex utilibus 
quid utilius aut quid maxime utile].^ De quibus 
dicere aggrediar, si pauca prius de instituto ac de 
iudicio meo dixero. 

Quamquam enim Hbri nostri complures non modo 
ad legendi, sed etiam ad scribendi studium excitave- 
runt, tamen interdum vere(W„ ae quibusdam bonis 
viris philosophiae nomen sit invisum niirenturque in 
ea tantum me operae et temporis ponere. 

Ego autem, quam diu res publica per eos gereba- 
tur, quibus se ipsa commiserat, omnis meas curas 
cogitationesque in eam conferebam ; cum autem 
dorainatu unius omnia tenerentur neque esset us- 
quam consilio aut auctoritati locus, socios denique 
tuendae rei publieae, summos viros, amisissem, ncc 
me angoribus dedidi, quibus essem confectus, nisi 

' in quo . . . rnaxime utile bracketed by Heumann, Faccio- 
lati, liiid. ; tum ex . . . maxime utile not in 6 li a b. 



I. I believe, Marcus, my son, that I have fully statementol 
explained in the preceding book liow duties are s"bject. 
derived from moral rectitude, or rather from each of 
virtue's four divisions. My next step is to trace out 
those kinds of duty which have to do with the com- 
forts of Hfe, with the means of acquiring the things 
that people enjoy, with influence, and with wealth. 
[in this connection, the question is, as I said: (l) 
what is expedient, and what is inexpedient; and (2) 
of several expedients, which is of more and which 
of most importance.] These questions I shall pro- 
ceed to discuss, after I have said a few words in 
vindication of my present purpose and my principles 
of philosophy. 

Although my books have aroused in not a few men vvhy cicero 
the desire not only toread butto write, yet I sometimes ^y?''^ °" 
fear that what we term philosophy is distasteful to 
certain worthy gentlemen, and that they wonder that 
I devote so much time and attention to it. 

Now, as long as the state was administered by the 
men to whose care she had voluntarily entrusted 
herself, I devoted all my eftbrt and thought to her. 
But when everything passed under the absolute 
control of a despot and there was no longer any 
room for statesmanship or authority of mine; and 
finally when I had lost the friends^ who had been 
associated with me in the task of serving the interests 
of the state, and who were men of the highest 
standing, I did not resign myself to grief, by which 
I should have been overwhelmed, had I not struggled 
' Such as Pompey, Cato, Hortensius, and Piso. 


iis restitissem, nec rursum indignis homine docto 

Atque utinam res publica stetisset, quo coeperat, 
statu nec in homines non tam commutandarum 
quam evertendarum rerum cupidos incidisset I Pri- 
mum enim, ut stante re publica facere solebamus, in 
agendo plus quam in scribendo operae poneremus, 
deinde ipsis scriptis non ea, quae nunc, sed actiones 
nostras mandaremus, ut saepe fecimus. Cum autem 
res publica, in qua omnis mea cura, cogitatio, opera 
poni solebat, nuUa esset omnino, illae scilicet litterae 
eonticucrunt forenses et senatoriae. Nihil agere 
autem cum animus non posset, in his studiis ab initio 
versatus aetatis existimavi honestissime molestias' 
posse deponi, si me ad pliilosophiam rettuHssem. 
Cui cum multum adulescens discendi causa temporis 
tribuissem, posteaquam honoribus inservire coepi 
meque totum rei publicae tradidi, tantum erat pliilo- 
sophiae loci, quantum supcrfuerat amicorum et rei 
publicae temporibus;^ id autem omne consumebatur 
in legeudo, scribendi otium non erat. 

II. Maximis igitur in maUs hoc tamen boni asse- 
cuti videmur, ut ea litteris mandaremus, quae nec 
erant satis nota nostris et erant cognitione dignis- 
sima. Quid enim est, per deos, optabilius sapientia, 

^ molestias L c p, Noiiius, Edd. ; not in B H a b. 
"^ teniporibus Victorius, Edd. ; temporis B H a b; tempori 
L c p. 


BOOK II. i-ii 

against It ; neitherj on the other hand^ did I sur- 
render myself to a life of sensual pleasure unbe- 
coming to a philosopher. 

I would that the government had stood fast in 
the position it had begun to assume and had not 
fallen into the hands of men who desired not so 
much to reform as to abohsh the constitution. For 
then, in the first place, I should now be devoting 
my energies more to public speaking than to writ- 
ing, as I used to do when the repubhc stood ; and in 
the second place, I should be committing to written 
form not these present essays but my pubHc speeches, 
as I often formerly did. But when the republic, to 
which all my care and thought and eflfbrt used to be 
devoted, was no more, then, of course, my voice was 
silenced in the forum and in fhe senate. And since 
my mind could not be wholly idle, I thought, as I 
had been well-read along these Hnes of thought from 
my early youth, that the most honourable way for 
me to forget my sorrows would be by turning to 
philosophy. As a young man, I had devoted a great 
deal of time to philosophy as a discipHne ; but after 
I began to fill the high offices of state and devoted 
myself heart and soul to the pubHc service, there 
was only so much time for philosophical studies as 
was left over from the claims of my friends and of 
the state ; aH of this was spent in reading ; I had no 
leisure for writing. 

II. Therefore, amid aH the present most awful why philosophy 
calamities I yet flatter myself that I have won '* ^°'^^ whiie. 
this good out of evil — that I may commit to 
written form matters not at aH famihar to our 
countrymen but stiH very much worth their know- 
ing. For what, i^i the name of heaven, is more to 


quid praestantius, quid homini melius, quid homine 
dignius? Hanc igitur qui expetunt/ philosophi no- 
minantur, nec quicquam aliud est philosophia, si 
interpretari velis, praeter studium sapientiae. Sapi- 
entia autem est, ut a veteribus philosopliis definitum 
est, rerum divinarum et humanarum causarumque, 
quibus eae res continentur, scientia; cuius studium 
qui vituperat, haud sane intellego, quidnam sit, 

6 quod laudandum putet. Nam sive oblectatio quae- 
ritur animi requiesque curarum, quae conferri cum 
eorum studiis potest, qui semper aUquid anquirunt, 
quod spectet et valeat ad bene beateque vivendum? 
sive ratio constantiae virtutisqi^e ducitur, aut hc^c 
ars est aut nulla omnino, per quam eas assequamur. 
Nullam dicere maximarum rerum artem esse, cum 
minimarum sine arte nuUa sit, hominum est parum 
considerate loquentium atque in maximis rebus 
errantium. Si autem est ahqua disciplina virtutis, 
ubi ea quaeretur, cum ab hoc discendi genere disces- 
seris ? 

Sed haec, cum ad philosophiam cohortamur, accu- 
Eioitensius, de ratius disputari solent, quod alio quodam hbro 

Div., II, I 

fecimus; hoc autem tempore tantum nobis decla- 
randum fuit, cur orbati rei publicae muneribus ad 
hoc nos studium potissimum contuhssemus. 

7 Occurritur autem nobis, et quidem a doctis et 

' expetunt L c p, Edd. ; expetant H ; expectant B a b. 


be desired than wisdom? What is more to be 
prized? What is better for a man, what more 
worthy of his nature? Those who seek after it are 
called philosophers ; and philosophy is nothing else, 
if one will translate the word into our idiom, than 

the love of wisdom." Wisdom, moreover, as the 
word has been defined by the philosophers of old, is 

the knowledge of things human and divine and of 
the causes by which those things are controlled." 
And if the man hves who would beUttle the study of 
philosophy, I quite fail to see wliat in the world he 
would see fit to praise. For if we are looking for 
mental enjoyment and relaxation, what pleasure can 
be compared with the pursuits of those whoare always 
studying out something that will tend toward and 
effectively promote a good and happy Hfe ? Or, if 
regard is had for strength of cliaracter and virtue, 
then this is the method by which we can attain td 
those qualities, or there is none at all. And to say that 
there is no method " for securing the highest bless- 
ings, when none even of the least important concerns 
is without its method, is the language of people who 
talk without due reflection and who blunder in mat- 
ters of the utmost importance. Furthermore, if 
there is really a way to learn virtue, where shall one 
look for it, when one has turned aside from this 
field of learning? 

Now, wlien I am advocating the study of philoso- 
phy, I usually discuss this subject at greater length, 
as I have done in another of my books. For the 
present I meant only to explain why, deprived of 
the tasks of public service, I have devoted myself to 
this particular pursuit. 

But people raise other objections against me — 



eruditis quaerentibus, satisne eoiistanter facere vi- 

deamur, qui, cum percipi nihil posse dicamus, tamen 

et aliis de rebus disserere soleamus et hoc ipso 

tempore praecepta officii persequamur. Quibus vel- 

lem satis cognita esset nostra sententia. Non enim 

sumus ii, quorum vagetur animus errore nec habeat 

umquam, quid sequatur. Quae enim esset ista mens 

vel quae vita potius non modo disputandi, sed etiam 

vivendi ratione sublata? Nos autem, ut ceteri alia 

certa, alia incerta esse dicunt, sic ab his dissentientes 

alia probabilia, contra alia dicimus. 

8 Quid est igitur, quod me impediat ea, quae proba- 

bilia mihi videantur, sequi, quae contra, improbare 

atque affirmandi arrogantiam vitantem fugere teme- 

ritatem, quae a sapientia dissidet plurimum ? Contra 

autem omnia disputatur^ a nostris, quod hoc ipsum 

probabile elucere non posset,^ nisi ex utraque parte 

causarum esset facta contentio. 

11, ao ff. Sed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris 

satis, ut arbitror, diligenter. Tibi autem, mi Cicero, 

quamquam in antiquissima nobiHssimaque philoso- 

phia Cratippo auctore versaris iis similhmo, qui ista 

' disputatur Edd. ; disputantur MSS. 
"^posset a c ; possit B H b. 

BOOK II. ii 

and that, too, philosophers and scholars — asking Position o< the 

whether I think I am quite consistent in my con- "^" ^^* ^™^ 

duct : for although our school maintains that nothing 

can be known for certain, yet, they urge, I make a 

habit of presenting my opinions on all sorts of sub- 

jects and at this very moment am trying to formulate 

rules of duty. But I wish that they had a proper 

understanding of our position. For we Academi- 

cians are not men whose minds wander in uncer- 

tainty and never know what principles to adopt. 

For what sort of mental habit, or rather what sort 

of life would that be which should dispense with all 

rules for reasoning or even for living? Not so with 

us; but, as other schools maintain that some things 

are certain, others uncertain, we, differing with 

them, say that some things are probable, others im- 


What, then, is to hinder me from accepting what 
seems to me to be probable, while rejecting what 
seems to be improbable, and from shunning the 
presumption of dogmatism, while keeping clear of 
that recklessness of assertion which is as far as 
possible removed from true wisdom? And as to the 
fact that our school argues against everything, that 
is only because we could not get a clear view of 
what is probable," unless a comparative estimate 
were made of all the arguments on both sides. 

But this subject has been, I think, quite fuUy set 
forth in my Academics." And althougli, my dear 
Cicero, you are a student of that most ancient and 
celebrated school of phikjsophy, with Cratippus as 
your master— and he deserves to be classed with the 
founders of that illustrious sect^ — still I wish our 
' Aristotle and Theophrastus. 

praeclara pepererunt, tamen haec nostra finitima ve- 
stris ignota esse nolui. 

Sed iam ad instituta pergamus. 
9 III. Quinque igitur rationibus propositis officii 
persequendij quarum duae ad decus honestatemque 
pertinerent, duae ad commoda vitae, copias, opes, 
facultates, quinta ad eligendi iudicium, si quando 
ea, quae dixi, pugnare inter se viderentur, honestatis 
pars confecta est, quam quidem tibi cupio esse notis- 

Hoc autem, de quo nunc agimus, id ipsum est, 
quod utile" appellatur. In quo verbo lapsa consue- 
tudo deflexit de via sensimque eo deducta est, ut 
honestatem ab utilitate secernens constitueret esse 
honestum aliquid, quod utile non esset, et utile, 
quod non honestum, qua nuUa pernicies maior ho- 
minum vitae potuit afferri. 
10 Summa quidem auctoritate philosophi severe sane 
atque honeste haec tria genera confusa^ cogitatione 
distinguunt. [Quicquid enim iustum sit, id etiam utile 
esse censent, itemque quod honestum, idem iustum ; 
ex quo efficitur, ut, quicquid honestum sit, idem sit 
utile.] ^ Quod qui parum perspiciunt, ii saepe versu- 

^ haec tria genera confusa B H a b, Bt.^, Heine; haec tria 

5enere confusa c, Bt.*, Miiller; haec tria genera, re confusa 
. F. Heusinger. 

"^ Quicquid . . . sit utile brackeled by Unger, Bt.^ Miil- 
ler, Heinf^. 


BOOK II. ii-iii 

school, which is closely related to j^ours, not to be 
unknown to you. 

Let us now proceed to the task in hand. 

III. Five principles, accordingly, have been laid Expediency and 

j /•■1 rji.j.*i'i.i-i j. Moral Rectitude 

aown lor the pursuance ot duty : two ot them have to identicai. 
do with propriety and moral rectitude ; two, with the 
external conveniences of life — means, wealth, influ- 
ence ; the fifth, with the proper choice, if ever the 
four first mentioned seem to be in conflict. The 
division treating of moral rectitude, then, lias been 
completed, and this is the part with which I desire 
you to be most famihar. 

The pi*inciple with which we are now deahng is 
that one which is called Expediency. The usage 
of this word has been corrupted and perverted and 
has gradually come to the point where, separating 
moral rectitude from expediencj^, it is accepted that 
a thing may be morally right without being expedi- 
ent, and expedient without being morally right. No 
more pernicious doctrine than this could be intro- 
duced into human hfe. 

There are, to be sure, philosophers of the very 
highest reputation who distinguish theoretically be- 
tween these three conceptions,^ although they are 
indissolubly blended together; and they do this, I 
assume, on moral, conscientious principles. [For 
whatever is just, they hold, is also expedient; and in 
Uke manner, whatever is morally right is also just. It 
follows, then, that whatever is morally right, is also 
expedient.] Those who fail to comprehend that 

^ That is, they make a false distinction between (i) moral 
rectitude that is at the same time expedient; (2) moral 
rectitude that is (apparently) not expedient; and (3) the 
expedient that is (apparently) not morally right. 

N . 177 ' 


tos homines et callidos admirantes malitiam sapien- 
tiam iudicant. Quorum error eripiendus est opinio- 
que omnis ad eam spem traducenda, ut honestis 
consiliis iustisque factis, non fraude et mahtia se in- 
tellegant ea, quae velint, consequi posse. 

1 1 Quae ergo ad vitam hominum tuendam pertinent, 
partim sunt inanima, ut aurum, argentum, ut ea, 
quae gignuntur e terra, ut aha generis eiusdem, 
partim animalia, quae habent suos impetus et rerum 
appetitus. Eorum autem alia^ rationis expertia sunt, 
alia ratione utentia; expertes rationis equi, boves, 
reliquae pecudes, [apes,]^ quarum opere efficitur ali- 
quid ad usum hominum atque vitam ; ratione autem 
utentium duo genera ponunt, deorum unum, alterum 
hominum. Deos placatos pietas efficiet et sanctitas, 
proxime autem et secundum deos homines homini- 
bus maxime utiles esse possunt. 

12 Earumque item rerum, quae noceant et obsint, 
eadem divisio est. Sed quia deos nocere non pu- 
tant, iis exceptis homines hominibus obesse plurimum 

Ea enim ipsa, quae inanima diximus, pleraque 
sunt hominum operis effecta ; quae nec haberemus, 
nisi manus et ars accessisset, nec iis sine hominum 
administratione uteremur. Neque enim valetudi- 
nis curatio neque navigatio neque agri cultura 
neque frugum fructuumque reliquorum perceptio et 

' alia H^ (inserted above thc line) a, Edd.; not in B H' b; 
tiartim c. 

^apes MSS.; bracketed by Facciolati, Edd. 


BOOK II. iii 

theory do often, in their admiration for shrewd and 
clever men, take craftiness for wisdom. But they 
must be disabused of this error and their way of 
thinking must be wholly converted to the hope and 
conviction that it is only by moral character and 
righteousness, not by dishonesty and craftiness, that 
they may attain to the objects of their desires. 

Of the things^ then, that are essential to the sus- ciassificationof 
tenance of human life, some are inanimate (gold and ^^^^ '®°'*' 
silver, for example, the fruits of the earth, and so 
forth), and some are animate and have their own 
pecuUar instincts and appetites. Of these again 
some are rational, others irrational. Horses, oxen, 
and the other cattle, [bees,] whose labour contributes 
more or less to the service and subsistence of man, 
are not endowed with reason ; of rational beings two 
divisions are made — gods and men. Worship and 
purity of character will win the favour of the gods ; 
and next to the gods, and a close second to them, 
men can be most helpful to men. 

The same classification may Hkewise be made of 
the things that are injurious and hurtful. But as 
people think that the gods bring us no harm, they 
decide (leaving the gods out of the question) that 
men are most hurtful to men. 

As for mutual helpfulness, those very things Necessityof 
which we have called inanimate are for the most nets to^^man? 
part themselves produced by man's labours; we 
should not have them without the application of 
manual labour and skill nor could we enjoy thera 
without the intervention of man. And so with many 
other things : for without man's industry there could 
have been no provisions for health, no navigation, 
no agriculture, no ingathering or storing of the 
n2 179 


conservatio sine hominum opera ulla esse potuisset. 

J 3 lam vero et earum rerum, quibus abundaremus, ex- 

portatio et earum, quibus egeremus, invectio certe 

nulla esset, nisi his^ muneribus homines fungeren- 

tur. Eademque ratione nec lapides ex terra excide- 

Attius, Prome- rentur ad usum nostrum necessarn, nec lerrum, aes, 

fab"Ribbeck2r' aurum, argentum" efFoderetur " penitus abditum" 

^54 sine hominum labore et manu. 

IV. Tecta vero, quibus et frigorum vis pelleretur et 
calorum molestiae sedarentur, unde aut initio generi 
humano dari potuissent aut postea subveniri,^ si aut vi 
tempestatis aut terrae motu aut vetustate cecidissent, 
nisi communis vita ab hominibus harum rerum auxiha 
1 4 petere didicisset ? Adde ductus aquarum, derivationes 
fluminum, agrorum irrigationes, moles oppositas flu- 
ctibus, portus manu factos, quae unde sine hominum 
opere habere possemus ? Ex quibus multisque ahis 
perspicuum est, qui fructus quaeque utihtates ex rebus 
iis, quae sint inanimae, percipiantur, eas nos nullo 
modo sine hominum manu atque opera capere potuisse. 
Qui denique ex bestiis fructus aut quae commodi- 
tas, nisi homines adiuvarent, percipi posset ? Nam 
et qui principes inveniendi fuerunt, quem ex quaque 
belua usum habere possemus, homines certe fuerunt, 
nec hoc tempore sine hominum opera aut pascere eas 
aut domare aut tueri aut tempestivos fructus ex iis 
capere possemus ; ab eisdemque et, quae nocent,^ in- 
terficiuntur et, quae usui possunt esse, capiuntur. 
1 5 Quid enumerem artium multitudinem, sine quibus 
vita omnino nuUa esse potjusset ? Qui enim aegris 

' kts H, Edd. ; m B L b ; htjs c. 

* subvcniri L c, MuUer, Heine; subvenire B H ab, Bt., Ed. 
* et, quae nocent Rt.'*; et eae, quae nocent B H b, Bt,'; ct 
ea quac nocent L; ea quae nocen. c. 


BOOK II. iii-iv 

3 fruits of the field or other kinds of produce. Then, 
too, there would surely be no exportation of our 
superfluous commodities or importation of those we 
lack, did not men perform these services. By the 
same process of reasoning, without the labour of 
man's hands, the stone needful for our use would 
not be quarried from the earth, nor would iron, cop- 
per, gold, and silver, hidden far within," be mined. 

IV. And how could houses ever have been pro- Mutuai heip- 
vided in the first place for the human race, to keep to'crv?iizatioa^ 
out the rigours of the cold and alleviate the discom- 
forts of the heat; or how could the ravages of 
furious tempest or of earthquake or of time upon 
them afterward have been repaired, had not the 
bonds of social life taught men in such events to 

4 look to their fellow-men for help ? Think of the 
aqueducts, canals, irrigation works, breakwaters, 
artificial harbours ; how should we have these 
without the work of man ? From these and many 
other illustrations it is obvious that we could not in 
any way, without the work of man's hands, have re- 
ceived the profits and the benefits accruing from 
inanimate things. 

Finally, of what profit or service could animals be, 
without the co-operation of man ? For it was men 
who were the foremost in discovering what use could 
be made of each beast ; and to-day, if it were not 
for man's labour, we could neither feed them nor 
break them in nor take care of them nor yet secure 
the profits from them in due season. By man, too, 
noxious beasts are destroyed, and those that can be 
of use are captured. 

5 WJiy should I recount the multitude of arts without 
which hfe would not be worth living at all? For 



subveniretur/ quae esset oblectatio valentium, qui 
victus aut cultus, nisi tam multae nobis artes mini- 
strarent ? quibus rebus exculta hominum vita tantum 
distat^ a victu et cultu bestiarum. Urbes vero sine 
hominum coetu non potuissent nec aedificari nec 
frequentari ; ex quo leges moresque constituti, tum 
iuris aequa discriptio ' certaque vivendi disciplina ; 
quas res et mansuetudo animorum consecuta et vere- 
cundia est effectumque^ ut esset vita munitior^ atque 
ut dando et accipiendo mutuandisque facultatibus 
et commodandis* nulla re egeremus. 
16 V. Longiores hoc loco sumus, quam necesse est. 
Quis est enim, cui non perspicua sint illa, quae phiribus 
verbis a Panaetio commemorantur, neminem neque 
ducem bello ^ nec principem domi magnas res et salu- 
tares sine hominum studiis gerere potuisse? Com- 
memoratur ab eo Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, 
Agesilaus, Alexander, quos negat sine adiumentis 
hominum tantas res efficere potuisse. Utitur in re 
non dubia testibus non necessariis. 

Atque ut magnas utihtates adipiscimur conspira- 
tione hominum atque consensu, sic nulla tam dete- 
stabiHs pestis est, quae non homini ab homine nascatur. 
Est Dicaearchi Hber de interitu hominum, Peripate- 
^ qui . . . subvejiiretur Gernhaird, Edd. ; qui . . . subveniret 
B H ; quis . . . subveniret L c; quid . . . subveniret a b. 

* distat L c p, Miiller, Heine ; destitit B H a b, Bt. 
' discriptio H b ; descriptio B a c. 

* mutuandisque facultatibus et commodandis Nonius, 
Bt.*, Miiller; mutandisque facultatibus et commodis MSS., 
Bt.', Heine. 

» bello B H a b, Muller, Heine; bclli L c p, Bt. 


BOOK II. iv-v 

how would the sick be healed ? What pleasure 
would the well enjoy ? What comforts should we 
liave, if there were not so many arts to minister to 
our wants ? In all these respects the civiHzed life 
of nian is far removed from the standard of the 
comforts and wants of the lower animals. And with- 
out the association of men, cities could not have been 
built or peopled. In consequence of city Hfe, laws 
and customs were estabhshed, and then came the 
equitable distribution of private rights and a definite 
social system. Upon these institutions followed a 
more humane spirit and consideration for others, 
with the result that Hfe was better supplied with aU 
it requires, and by giving and receiving, by mutual 
exchange of commodities and conveniences, we 
succeeded in meeting all our wants. 

V. I have dwelt longer on this point than was 
necessary. For who is there to whom those facts 
which Panaetius narrates at great length are not 
self-evident — namely, that no one, either as a 
general in war or as a statesman at home could have 
accompHshed great things for the benefit of the 
state, without the hearty co-operation of other men ? 
He cites the deeds of Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, 
Agesilaus, Alexander, who, he says, could not liave 
achieved so great success without the support of 
other men. He calls in witnesses, whom he does 
not need, to prove a fact that no one questions. 

And yet, as, on the one hand, we secure great Man'shurtfui- 
advantages tlirough the sympathetic co-operation of "^^^* '° ™*°' 
our fellow-men ; so, on the other, tliere is no curse 
so terrible but it is brought down by man upon 
man. There is a book by Dicaearchus on The 
Destruction of Human Life." He was a famous 



tici magni et copiosi, qui collectis ceteris causis 
eluvionis^ pestilentiae^ vastitatis, beluarum etiam 
repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet quae- 
dam hominum genera esse consumpta, deinde com- 
pai'at, quanto plures deleti sint homines hominum 
impetu, id est bellis aut seditionibus, quam omni 
reliqua calamitate. 

1 7 Cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin 
homines plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint, 
proprium hoc statuo esse virtutis, conciliare animos 
hominum et ad usus suos adiungere. Itaque, quae 
in rebus inanimis quaeque in usu et^ tractatione 
beluarum fiunt utiliter ad hominum vitam, artibus ea 
tribuuntur operosis, hominum autem studia ad am- 
pHficationem nostrarum rerum prompta ac parata 
[virorum praestantiumj ^ sapientia et virtute excitan- 

1 8 tur. Etenim virtus omnis tribus in rebus fere ver- 

titur, quarum una est in perspiciendo, quid in quaque 

re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique, 

quid consequens, ex quo quaeque gignantur, quae 

cuiusque rei causa sit, alterum cohibere motus animi 

turbatos, quos Graeci TrdOr] nominant, appetitiones- 

que, quas illi opfids, oboedientes efficere rationi, 

tertium iis, quibuscum congregemur, uti moderate 

et scienter, quorum studiis ea, quae natura desiderat, 

expleta cumulataque habeamus, per eosdemque, si 

quid importetur nobis incommodi, propulsemus 

ulciscamurque eos, qui nocere nobis conati sint, 

' usu ^^ L c p ; not in B H a b ; bracketed by Bt.' 
* virorunt praestantium bracketed by Ed. 



and eloquent Peripatetic and he gathered together 
all the other causes of destruction — floods, epidemics, 
famines, and sudden incursions of wild animals in 
myriadSj by whose assaults, he informs us, whole 
tribes of men have been wiped out. And then he 
proceeds to show by way of comparison how many 
more men have been destroyed by the assaults 
of men — that is, by wars or revolutions — than by 
any and all other sorts of calamity. 

Since, therefore, there can be no doubt on thisCo-operationand 
pointj that man is the source of both the greatest 
help and the greatest harm to man, I set it down as 
the peculiar function of virtue to win the hearts of 
men and to attach them to one's own service. And 
so those benefits that human life derives from inani- 
mate objects and from the employment and use of 
animals are ascribed to the industrial arts ; the 
co-operation of men, on the other hand, prompt and 
ready for the advancement of our interests, is secured 
through wisdom and virtue [in men of superior 
abiUty]. And, indeed, virtue in general may be 
said to consist almost wholly in three properties : 
the first is [Wisdom,] the abihty to perceive what in 
any given instance is true and real, what its relations 
are, its consequences, and its causes; the second is 
[Temperance,] the ability to restrain the passions 
(which the Greeks call TrdOr]) and make the impulses 
{opfiai) obedient to reason; and the third is [jus- 
tice,] the skill to treat with consideration and 
wisdom those with whom we are associated, in order 
that we may through their co-operation have our 
natural wants supplied in full and ovei^flowing mea- 
sure, that we may ward off" any impending trouble, 
avenge ourselves upon those who have attempted to 


tantaque poena afficiamus, quantam aequitas huma- 
nitasque patitur. 

19 VI, Quibus autem rationibus hano facultatem 
assequi possimus, ut hominum studia complectamur 
eaque teneamus, dicemus, neque ita multo post, sed 
pauca ante dicenda sunt. 

Magnam vim esse in fortuna in utramque partem, 
vel secundas ad res vel adversas, quis ignorat ? Nam 
et, cum prospero flatu eius utimur, ad exitus perve- 
himur optatos et, cum reflavit, affligimur. Haec 
igitur ipsa fortuna ceteros casus rariores habet, pri- 
mum ab inanimis procellas, tempestates, naufragia, 
ruinas, incendia, deinde a bestiis ictus, morsus, im- 

20 petus ; haec ergo, ut dixi, rariora. At vero interitus 
exercituum, ut proxime trium, saepe multorum, cla- 
des imperatorum, ut nuper summi et singularis viri, 
invidiae praeterea multitudinis atque ob eas bene 
meritorum saepe civium expulsiones, calamitates, 

, fugae, rursusque secundae res, honores, imperia, 
victoriae, quamquam fortuita sunt, tamen sine ho- 
minum opibus et studiis neutram in partem effici 

Hoc igitur cognito dicendum est, quonam modo 
hominum studia ad utilitates nostras allicere atque 
excitare possimus. Quae si longior fuerit oratio, 

BOOK II. v-vi 

injure us, and visit them with such retribution as 
justice and humanity will permit. 

1 9 VI. I shall presently discuss the means by which we 
can gain the abihty to win and hold the afFections of 
our fellow-men ; but I must say a few words by way 
of preface. 

Who fails to comprehend the enormous^ two-fold Co-operation 
power of Fortune for weal and for woe? When we Fortune. 
enjoy her favouring breeze, we are wafted over to 
the wished for haven ; wlien she blows against us, 
we are dashed to destruction. Fortune herself, 
then, does send tiiose other less usual calamities, 
arising, first, from inanimate nature — hurricanes, 
storms, shipwrecksj catastrophes, conflagrations ; 
second, from wild beasts — kicks, bites, and attacks. 
But these, as I have said, are comparatively rare. 

20 But think, on the one side, of the destruction of 
armies (three lately, and many others at many dif- 
ferent times), the loss of generals (of a very able and 
eminent commander recently), the hatred of the 
masses, too, and the banishment that as a conse- 
quence frequently coroes to men of eminent ser- 
vices, their degradation and voluntary exile ; think, 
on the other hand, of the successes, the civil and 
mihtary honours, and the victories ; — though all 
these contain an element of chance, still they 
cannot be brought about, whether for good or for 
ill, without the influence and the co-operation of our 

With this understanding of the influence of For- 
tune, I may proceed to explain how we can win the 
affectionate co-operation of our fellows and enhst it 
in our service. And if the discussion of this point 
is unduly prolonged, let the length be compared 


cum magnitudine utilitatis comparetur; ita fortasse 
etiam brevior videbitur. 

21 Quaeeumque igitur homines homini tribuunt ad 
eum augendum atque honestandum, aut benivolen- 
tiae gratia faciunt, cum aliqua de causa quempiam 
diligunt, aut honoris, si cuius virtutem suspiciunt, 
quemque dignum fortuna quam amphssima putant, 
aut cui fidem habent et bene rebus suis consulere 
arbitrantur, aut cuius opes metuunt, aut contra, a 
quibus ahquid exspectant, ut cum reges popularesve 
homines largitiones ahquas proponunt, aut postremo 
pretio ac mercede ducuntur, quae sordidissima est 
illa quidem ratio et inquinatissima et iis, qui ea 
tenentur, et ilh's, qui ad eam^ confugere conantur; 

22 male enim se res habet, cum, quod virtute effici de- 
bet, id temptatur pecunia. Sed quoniam non num- 
quam hoc subsidium necessarium est,quem ad modum 
sit utendum eo, dicemus, si prius iis ^ de rebus, quae 
virtuti propiores sunt, dixerimus. 

Atque etiam subiciunt se homines imperio alterius 
et potestati de causis pluribus. Ducuntur enim aut 
benivolentia aut beneficiorum magnitudine aut digni- 
tatis praestantia aut spe sibi id utile futurum aut 
metu, ne vi parere cogantur, aut spe largitionis 

' eam c, Edd. ; ^a B H a b. 
^ iis Edd. ; his B H a b ; hijs c. 

BOOK II. vi 

with the importance of the object in view. It will 
then, perhaps, seem even too short. 

Whenever, then, people bestow anything upon how men a-.? 
a fellow-man to raise his estate or his dignity, anothe^^s""'^'* 
it may be from any one of several motives : (l ) interests. 
it may be out of good-will, when for some reason 
they are fond of him ; (2) it may be from es- 
teem, if they look up to his worth and think him 
deserving of the most splendid fortune a man can 
have ; (.s) they may have confidence in him and think 
that they are thus acting for their own interests ; or 
(4) they may fear his power ; (5) they may, on the 
contrary, hope for some favour — as, for example, when 
princes or demagogues bestow gifts of money ; or, 
finally, (6) they may be moved by the promise of 
payment or reward. This last is, I admit, the 
meanest and most sordidmotive of all, both for those 
who are swayed by it and for those who venture to 
resort to it. For things are in a bad way, when that 
which should be obtained by merit is attempted 
by money. But since recourse to tliis kind of sup- 
port is sometimes indispensable, I shall explain 
how it should be employed; but first I shall 
discuss those quaUties which are more closely aUiec 
to merit. 

Now, it is by various motives that people are led 
to submit to another's authority and power: they 
may be influenced (l) by good-will ; (s) by gratitude 
for generous favours conferred upon them ; (s) by the 
eminence of that other's sociai position or by the hope 
that their submission will turn to their own account ; 
(4) by fear that they may be compelled perforce to 
submit ; (5) they may be captivated by the hope of 
gifts of money and by hberal promises ; or, finally, 



promissisque ^ capti aut postremo, ut saepe in nostra 
re publica videmus, mercede conducti. 

VII. Omnium autem rerum nec aptius est quic- 
quam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligi nec 
alienius quam timeri. Praeclare enim Ennius : 

Quem metuunt, oderunt; quem quisque odit, peri- 
isse expetit. 

Multorum autem odiis nullas opes posse obsistere, si 
antea fuit ignotum, nuper est cognitum. Nec vero 
huius tyranni solum, quem armis oppressa pertulit 
civitas ac paret cum maxime mortuo,^ interitus 
declarat, quantum odium hominum valeat ad pestem, 
sed reliquorum similes exitus tyrannorum, quorum 
haud fere quisquam talem interitum effugit; malus 
enim est custos diuturnitatis metus contraque beni- 
volentia fidelis vel ad perpetuitatem. 
24 Sed iis, qui vi oppressos imperio coercent, sit sane 
adhibenda saevitia, ut eris* in famulos, si aliter 
teneri non possunt; qui vero in libera civitate ita se 
instruunt, ut metuantur, iis^ nihil potest esse demen- 
tius. Quamvis enim sint demersae leges ahcuius 
opibus, quamvis timefacta libertas, emergunt tamen 
haec ahquando aut iudiciis tacitis aut occultis de 
honore sufFragiis. Acriores autem morsus sunt inter- 

^ proniissisque L c, Edd. ; promissionisque B H a b ; pro- 
missionibnsque alii. 

"^ ac paret cum viaxime mortuo, Halm, Miiller, Heine ; 
paretque cum maxime mortuo c', Bt. ; paretque, c. m. m. L ; 
apparet, cuius maxime mortui b ; apparet cuius maxime 
portui B H a. 

^ valeat c ; valet B H a b. 

* ut eris Baiter; ut eriis B; uteris L ; utere hiis H ; utere 
iis b ; utere his a ; utantur eis c. 

^ iis Edd. ; his B H L a ; hijs c ; hiis b. 


BOOK II. vi-vii 

(6) they may be bribed with money, as we have fre- 
quently seen in our own country. 

VII. But of all motives, none is better adapted to Themotiveot 
secure influence and hold it fast than love ; nothing \lll'''- "^^'°* 
is more foreign to that end than fear. For Ennius 
says admirably : 
" Whom they fear they hate. And whom one hates, 

one hopes to see him dead." 
And we recently discovered, if it was not known be- 
fore, that no amount of power can withstand th e hatred 
of the many. The death of this tyrant,^ whose yoke Hatredof 
the state endured under the constraint of armed 'y'^*""^* 
force and whom it still obeys more humblj' than 
ever, though he is dead, illustrates the deadly effects 
of popular hatred ; and the same lesson is taught by 
the similar fate of all other despots, of whom practi- 
cally no one has ever escaped such a death. For 
fear is but a poor safeguard of lasting power; while 
affection, on the other hand, may be trusted to keep 
it safe for ever. 

But those who keep subjects in check by force 
would of course have to employ severity — masters, for 
example, toward their servants, when these cannot 
be held in control in any other way. But those who 
in a free state deliberatelj' put themselves in a 
position to be feared are the maddest of the mad. 
For let the laws be never so much overborne by some 
one individuaFs power, let the spirit of freedom be 
never so intimidated, still sooner or later they assert 
themselves either through unvoiced public sentiment, 
or through secret ballots disposing of some high 
office of state. Freedom suppressed and again re- 
gained bites witli keener fangs than freedom never 
^ Julius Caesar. 



missae libertatis quam retentae. Quod igitur latis- 
sime patet neque ad incolumitatem solum, sed etiam 
ad opes et potentiam valet plurimum, id amplecta- 
mur, ut metus absit, caritas retineatur. Ita facillime, 
quae volemus, et privatis in rebus et in re publica 

Etenim qui se metui volent, a quibus metuentur, 

25 cosdem metuant ipsi necesse est. Quid enim cense- 
mus superiorem illum Dionysium quo cruciatu timoris 
angi solitum, qui cultros metuens tonsorios candente 
carbone sibi adurebat capillum? quid Alexandrum 
Pheraeum quo animo vixisse arbitramur? qui, ut 
scriptum legimus, cum uxorem Theben admodum 
diligeret, tamen adeamex epulis incubiculumveniens 
barbarum, et eum quidem, ut scriptum est, compun- 
ctum notis Thraeciis, destricto gladio iubebat anteire 
praemittebatque de stipatoribus suis, qui scrutarentur 
arculas muHebres et, ne quod in vestimentis telum 
occultaretur, exquirerent. O miserum, qui fideHorem 
et barbarum et stigmatiam putaret quam coniugem ! 
Nec eum fefelHt ; ab ea est enim ipsa propter peH- 
catus suspicionem interfectus. 

Nec vero ulla vis imperii tanta est, quae premente 

26 metu possit esse diuturna. Testis est Phalaris, cuius 
est praeter ceteros nobiHtata crudeHtas, qui non ex 
insidiis interiit, ut is, quem modo dixi, Alexander, 
non a paucis, ut hic noster, sed in quem universa 
Agrigentinorum multitudo impetum fecit. 

Quid? Macedones nonne Demetrium reHquerunt 

BOOK II. vii 

endangered. Let us, then, embrace this policy, which 
appeals to every heart and is the strongest support 
not only of security but also of influence and power 
— namely, to banish fear and cleave to love. And 
thus we shall most easily secure success both in pri- 
vate and in public life. 

Furthermore, those who wish to be feared must in- 
evitably be afraid of those whom they intimidate. 
What, for instance, shall we think of the elder Diony- The wretched- 
sius ? With what tormenting fears he used to be 
racked ! For through fear of the barber's razor he 
used to have his hair singed offwith a glowing coal. In 
what state of mind do we fancy Alexander of Pherae 
lived ? We read in history that he dearly loved his 
wife Thebe ; and yet, whenever he went from the 
banquet hall to her in her chamber, he used to order 
a barbarian — one, too, tattooed hke a Thracian, as 
the records state — to go before him with a drawn 
sword ; and he used to send ahead some of his body- 
guard to pry into the lady's caskets and to search and 
see whether some weapon were not concealed in her 
wardrobe. Unhappy man ! To think a barbarian, a 
branded slave, more faithful than his own wife ! Nor 
was he mistaken. For he was murdered by her own 
hand, because she suspected him of infideUty. 

And indeed no power is strong enough to be last- 
ing, if it labours under the weight of fear. Witness 
Phalaris, whose cruelty is notorious beyond that of 
all others. He was slain, not treacherously (hke tliat 
Alexander whom I named but now), not by a few 
conspirators (hke that tyrant of ours), but the whole 
population of Agrigentum rose against him with one 

Again, did rrot the Maeedonians abandon Deme- 
o 193 

universique se ad Pyrrhum contulerunt? Quid? 
Lacedaemonios iniuste imperantes nonne repente 
omnes fere socii deseruerunt spectatoresque se otiosos 
praebuerunt Leuctricae calamitatis? 

VIIL Externa libentius in tali re quam domestica 
recordor. Verum tamen, quam diu imperium populi 
Romani beneficiis tenebatur, non iniuriis, bella aut 
pro sociis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus erant 
bellorum aut mites aut necessarii, regum, populo- 
rum, nationum portus erat et refugium senatus, 
27 nostri autem magistratus impei*atoresque ex hac una 
re maximam laudem capere studebant, si provincias, 
(27) si socios aequitate et fide defendissent ; itaque illud 
patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium po- 
terat nominari. 

Sensim hanc consuetudinem et disciplinam iam 

antea minuebamus, post vero Sullae victoriam peni- 

tus amisimus ; desitum est enim videri quicquam in 

socios iniquum, cum exstitisset in cives tanta crudeU- 

tas. Ergo in illo secuta est honestam causam non 

honesta victoria ; est enim ausus dicere, hasta posita 

cum bona in foro venderet et bonorum virorum 

et locupletium et certe civium^ "praedam se suam 

BOOK II. vii-viii 

trius and march over as one man to Pyrrhus ? And 
again, when the Spartans exercised their supremacy 
tyrannically^ did not practically all the allies desert 
them and view their disaster at Leuctra^ as idle 
spectators ? 

VIII. I prefer in this connection to draw my The oid 
illustrations from foreign history rather than from ne^w"despotism. ' 
our own. Let me add, however, that as long as the 
empire of the Roman People maintained itself by 
acts of service, not of oppression, wars were waged 
in the interest of our alhes or to safeguard our 
supremacy ; the end of our wars was marked by acts 
of clemency or by only a necessary degree of severity ; 
the senate was a haven of refuge for kings, tribes, 

27 and nations; and the highest ambition of our magis- 
trates and generals was to defend our provinces and 

27) alUes with justice and honour. And so our govern- 
ment could be called more accurately a protectorate 
of the world than a dominion. 

This policy and practice we had begun gradually 
to modify even before Sulla's time; but since his 
victory we have departed from it altogether. For 
the time had gone by when any oppression of the 
allies could appear wrong, seeing that atrocities so 
outrageous were committed against Roman citizens. 
In Sulla's case, therefore, an unrighteous victory 
disgraced a righteous cause. For when he had 
planted his spear^ and vvas selling under the hammer 
in the forum the property of men who were patriots 
and men of wealth and, at least, Roman citizens, he 
had the effrontery to announce tliat he was selling 

'The Romans were accustomed to set up a spear as a 
sign of an auction-sale — a symbol derivcd from the sale of 
booty taken in war. 

o2 1 95 


vendere." Secutus est, qui in causa impia, victoria 
etiam foediore non singulorum civium bona publica- 
ret, sed universas provincias regionesque uno calami- 
tatis iure comprehenderet. 

28 Itaque vexatis ac perditis exteris nationibus ad 
exemplum amissi imperii portari in triumpho Massi- 
Ham vidimus et ex ea urbe triumphari, sine qua num- 
quam nostri imperatores ex Transalpinis belHs 
triumpharunt. Multa praeterea commemorarem ne- 
faria in socios, si hoc uno quicquam sol vidisset 
indignius. lure igitur plectimur. Nisi enim multo- 
rum impunita scelera tuHssemus, numquam ad unum 
tanta pervenisset Hcentia ; a quo quidem rei famiH- 
aris ad paucos, cupiditatum ad multos improbos 

29 venit hereditas. Nec vero umquam bellorum civiHum 
semen et causa deerit, dum homines perditi hastam 
illam cruentam et meminerint et sperabunt ; quam 
R^ Sulla cum vibrasset dictatore propinquo suo, 
idem sexto tricesimo anno post a sceleratiore hasta 
non recessit ; alter autem, qui in illa dictatura scriba 
fuerat, in hac fuit quaestor urbanus. Ex quo debet 
iiitellegi taHbus praemiis propositis numquam de- 
futura bella civilia. 

Itaque parietes modo urbis stant et manent, iique 
ipsi iam extrema scelera metuentes, rem vero pubH- 
cam penitus amisimus. Atque in has clades incidimus 
(redeundum est enim ad propositum), dum metui 

' P. c, Edd, ; Z. B H a b. 

BOOK II. viii 

his spoils." After him came one who, in an unholy 
cause, made an even more shameful use of victory; 
for he did not stop at confiscating the property of 
individual citizens, but actually embraced whole 
provinces and countries in one common ban of ruin. 

28 And so, when foreign nations had been oppressed 
and ruined, we have seen a model of Marseilles carried 
in a triumphal procession, to serve as proof to the world 
that the supremacy of the people had been forfeited ; 
and that triumph we saw celebrated over a city with- 
out whose help our generals have never gained a 
triumph for their wars beyond the Alps. I might 
mention many other outrages against our allies, if 
the sun had ever beheld anything more infamous 

than this particular one. Justly, therefore, are The wages of 
we being punished. For if we had not allowed the ^^^^'"^ °^ ^°'^'" 
crimes of many to go unpunished, so great licence 
would never have centred in one individual. His 
estate descended by inheritance to but a few indi- 

29 viduals, his ambitions to many scoundrels. And 
never will the seed and occasion of civil war be 
wanting, so long as villains remember that blood- 
stained spear and hope to see anotlier. As Pubhus 
Sulla wielded that spear, when his kinsman was 
dictator, so again thirty-six years later he did not 
shrink from a still more criminal spear. And still an- 
other SuIIa, who was a mere clerk under the former 
dictatorship, was under the later one a city quaestor. 
From this, one would realize that, if such rewards are 
offered, civil wars will never cease to be. 

And so in Rome only the walls of her houses remain 
standing — and even they wait now in fear of the 
most unspeakable crimes — but our republic we have 
lost for ever. But to return to my subject: it is 


quam cari esse et diligi malumus. Quae si populo 
Romano iniuste imperanti accidere potuerunt, quid 
debent putare singuli ? Quod cum perspicuum sit, 
benivolentiae vim esse magnam, metus imbecillam, 
sequitur, ut dissei*amus, quibus rebus facillime possi- 
mus eam, quam volumus, adipisci cum honore et fide 

50 Sed ea non pariter omnes egemus; nam ad cuius- 
que vitam institutam accommodandum est, a multisne 
opus sit an satis sit a paucis diligi. Certum igitur 
hoc sit, idque et primum et maxime necessarium, 
familiaritates habere fidas amantium nos amicorum 
et nostra mirantium ; haec enim una res prorsus, ut 
non multum differat inter summos et mediocris viros, 
aeque^ utrisque est propemodum comparanda. 

51 Honore et gloria et benivolentia civium fortasse 
non aeque omnes egent, sed tamen, si cui haec sup- 
petunt, adiuvant aliquantum cum ad cetera, tum ad 
amicitias comparandas. 

IX. Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui in- 
scribitur Laelius ; nunc dicamus de gloria, quamquam 
ea quoque de re duo sunt nostri libri, sed attingamus, 
quandoquidem ea in rebus maioribus administrandis 
adiuvat plui*imum. 

Summa igitur et perfecta gloria constat ex tribus 

* enim una Baiter ; entm est una MSS. 

* aeque Lund ; eaque MSS. 


BOOK II. viii-ix 

while we have preferred to be the object of fear 
rather than of love and affection, that all these mis- 
fortunes have fallen upon us. And if such retribution 
could overtake the Roman People for their injustice 
and tyranny, what ought private individuals to ex- 
pect? And since it is manifest that the power of 
good-will is so great and that of fear is so weak, it 
remains for us to discuss by what means we can most 
readily win the afFection, linked with honour and 
confidence, which we desire. 

But we do not all feel this need to the same The acquisitioi 
extent ; for it must be determined in conformitj ° "^° *' 
with each individuaVs vocation in hfe whether it is 
essential for him to have the affection of many or 
whether the love of a few will suffice. Let this then 
be settled as the first and absohite essential — that 
we have the devotion of friends, affectionate and 
loving, who value our worth. For in just this one 
point there is but Uttle difference between the 
greatest and the ordinary man ; and friendship is to 
be cultivated almost equally by both. 

All men do not, perhaps, stand equally in need of 
political honour, fame, and the good-will of their 
fellow-citizens ; nevertheless, if these honours come 
to a man, they help in many ways, and especially in 
the acquisition of friends. 

IX. But friendship has been discussed in another 
book of mine, entitled Laehus." Let us now take The 
up the discussion of Glory, although I have published o"|ior™^°* 
two books^ on that subject also. Still, let us touch 
briefly on it here, since it is of very great help in 
the conduct of more important business. 

The highest, truest glory depends upon the fol- 

' Now lost, thongh they were still known to Petrarch. 



his : si diligit multitudo, si fidem habet, si cum ad- 
miratione quadam honore dignos putat. Haec 
autem^ si est simpliciter breviterque dicendum, 
quibus rebus pai*iuntur a singuhs, eisdem fere a mul- 
titudine. Sed est alius quoque quidam aditus ad 
multitudinem, ut in universorum animos tamquam 
influere possimus. 

32 Ac primum de illis tribus, quae ante dixi, benivo- 
lentiae praecepta videamus; quae quidem capitur 
beneficiis maxime, secundo autem loco voluntate 
benefica benivolentia movetur, etiamsi res forte non 
suppetit ; vehementer autem amor multitudinis com- 
movetur ipsa fama et opinione hberalitatis, benefi- 
centiaCj iustitiae, fidei omniumque earum virtutum, 
quae pertinent ad mansuetudinem morum ac facih- 
tatem. Etenim illud ipsum, quod honestum deco- 
rumque dicimus, quia per se nobis placet animosque 
omnium natura et specie sua commovet maximeque 
quasi perlucet ex iis, quas commemoravi, virtutibus, 
idcirco illos, in quibus eas virtutes esse remur, a 
natura ipsa diligere cogimur. Atque hae quidem 
causae dihgendi gravissimae ; possunt enim praeterea 
non nullae esse leviores. 

33 Fides autem ut habeatur, duabus rebus effici 

potest, si existimabimur adepti coniunctam cum 

iustitia prudentiam. Nam et iis fidem habemus, 

BOOK II. ix 

lowing three things : the afFectionj the confidence, 

and the mingled admiration and esteem of the 

people. Such sentiments, if I may speak plainly and 

concisely, are awakened in the masses in the same 

way as in individuals. But there is also another how to gain 

avenue of approach to the masses, by which we can, P°P"ianty: 

as it were, steal into the hearts of all at once. 

But of the three above-named requisites, let us (i) through 
look first at good-will and the rules for securing it. ^°° "^' ' 
Good-will is won principally through kind services^; 
next to that, it is eHcited by the will to do a kind 
service, even though nothing happen to come of it. 
Then, too, the love of people generally is powerfully 
attracted by a man's mere name and reputation for 
generosity, kindness, justice, honour, and all those 
virtues that belong to gejitleness of character and 
afFabihty of manner. And because that very quahty 
which we term moral goodness and propriety is 
pleasing to us by and of itself and touches all our 
hearts both by its inward essence and its outward 
aspect and shines forth with most lustre through 
those virtues named above, we are, therefore, com- 
pelled by Nature herself to love those in whom we 
believe those virtues to reside. Now these are only 
the most powerful motives to love — not all of them ; 
there may be some minor ones besides. 

Secondly, the command of confidence can be (2) through 
secured on two conditions: (l) if people think us '^°'^*^^°'^^' 
possessed of practical wisdom combined with a sense 
of justice. For we have confidence in those who we 
think have more understanding than ourselves, who, 

' Cicero means by "kind services" the services of the 
lawyer; he was forbidden by law to accept a fee; his 
services, if hc contributed them, vvere " acfls of kindness." 



quos plus intellegere quam nos arbitramur quosque 
et futura prospicere credimus et, cum res agatur in 
discrimenque ventum sit, expedire rem et consilium 
ex tempore capere posse ; hanc enim utilem homines 
existimant veramque prudentiam. lustis autem et 
fidis^ hominibus, id est bonis viris, ita fides habetur, 
ut nulla sit in iis^ fraudis iniuriaeque suspicio. 
Itaque his salutem nostram, his fortunas, his liberos 
rectissime committi arbitramur. 

34 Harum igitur duarum ad fidem faciendam iustitia 
plus pollet, quippe cum ea sine prudentia satis habeat 
auctoritatis, prudentia sine iustitia nihil valet ad 
faciendam fidem. Quo enim quis versutior et calli- 
dior, hoc invisior et suspectior est detracta opinione 
probitatis. Quam ob rem intellegentiae iustitia 
coniuncta, quantum volet, habebit ad faciendam 
fidem virium ; iustitia sine prudentia multum poterit, 
sine iustitia nihil valebit prudentia. 

35 X. Sed ne quis sit admiratus, cur, cum inter 
omnes philosophos constet a meque ipso saepe dis- 
putatum sit, qui unam haberet, omnes habere vir- 
tutes, nunc ita seiungam, quasi possit quisquam, qui 
non idem prudens sit, iustus esse, alia est illa, cum 
veritas Ipsa limatur in disputatione, subtilitas, aha, 
cum ad opinionem communem omnis accommodatur 

^etfidis MSS.; del. Facciolati, Pearce ; {et fidis\ Bt., Ed. 
"^iis B ; his H a b ; hijs c. 

BOOK II. ix-x 

we believe, have better insight into the future, and 
who^ when an emergency arises and a crisis comes, can 
clear away the difficulties and reach a safe decision 
according to the exigencies of the occasion ; for that 
kind of wisdom the world accounts genuine and 
practical. But (2) confidence is reposed in men 
who are just and true — that is, good men — on 
the definite assumption that their characters admit 
of no suspicion of dishonesty or wrong-doing. And 
so we beheve that it is perfectly safe to entrust 
our lives, our fortunes, and our children to their 

Of these two qualities, then, justice hasthe greater Justice 
power to inspire confidence; for even without the wisdom; 
aid of wisdom, it has considerable weight; but 
wisdom without justice is of no avail to inspire 
confidence; for take from a man his reputation for 
probity, and the more shrewd and clever he is, the 
more hated and mistrusted he becomes. Therefore, 
justice combined with practical wisdom will command 
all the confidence we can desire; justice without 
wisdom will be able to do much ; wisdom without 
justice will be of no avail at all. 

X. But I am afraid some one may wonder why I am 
now separating the virtues — as if it were possible for 
anyone to be just who is not at the same time wise ; 
for it is agreed upon among all philosophers, and 
I myself have often argued, that he who has one 
virtue has them all. The explanation of my appa- 
rent inconsistency is that the precision of speech we 
employ, when abstract truth is critically investigated 
in philosophic discussion, is one thing; and that 
employed, when we are adapting our language 
entirely to popular thinking, is another. And there- 



oratio. Quam ob rem, ut volgus, ita nos lioc loco 
loquimur, ut alios fortes, alios viros bonos, alios pru- 
dentes esse dicamus; popularibus enim verbis est 
agendum et usitatis, cum loquimur^ de opinione 
populari, idque eodem modo fecit Panaetius. Sed ad 
propositum revertamur. 

36 Erat igitur ex iis^ tribus, quae ad gloriam perti- 
nerent, hoc tertium, ut cum admiratione hominum 
honore ab iis' digni iudicaremur. Admirantur igitur 
communiter illi quidem omnia, quae magna et praeter 
opinionem suam animadverterunt, separatim autem, 
in singulis si perspiciunt necopinata quaedam bona. 
Itaque eos viros suspiciunt maximisque efferunt laudi- 
bus, in quibus existimant se excellentes quasdam et 
singulares perspicere virtutes, despiciunt autem eos et 
contemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil 
nervorum putant. Non enim omnes eos contemnunt, 
de quibus male existimant. Nam quos improbos, male- 
dicos, fraudulentos putant et ad faciendam iniuriam 
instructos, eos haud contemnunt quidem,^ sed de iis^ 
male existimant. Quam ob rem, ut ante dixi, conte- 
mnuntur ii,^ qui nec sibi nec alteri," ut dicitur, in 
quibus nullus labor, nulla industria, nulla cura est. 

S7 Admiratione autem afficiuntur ii, qui anteire 
ceteris virtute putantur et cum omni carere dedecore, 
tum vero iis vitiis, quibus alii non facile possunt 
obsistere. Nam et vohiptates, blandissimae dominae, 
maioris partis animos' a virtute detorquent et, dolo- 
rum cum admoventur faces, praeter modum plerique 
exterrentur; vita mors, divitiae paupertas omnes 

^ loqutmur B ; loquamur H a b ; loquemur c. 

"^iis Bl. ; his H H ; hijs c ; not in a b. 

'^iis Bt. ; his B H a b ; hijs c. 

*haud contemnunt quidcm b, Bt.' ; contemnunt quidem 


BOOK 11. X 

fore I am speaking here in the popular sense, when 
I call some men brave, others good, and still others 
wise ; for in dealing with popular conceptions we 
must employ familiar words in their common accepta- 
tion ; and this was the practice of Panaetius likewise. 
But let us return to the subject. 

The third, then, of the three conditions I named (3) through 
as essential to glory is that we be accounted worthy admi^Uon, 
of the esteem and admiration of our fellow-men. 
While people admire in general everything that is 
great or better than they expect, they admire in par- 
ticular the good qualities that they find unexpectedly 
in individuals. And so they reverence and extol 
with the highest praises those men in whom they 
see certain pre-eminent and extraordinary talents; 
and they look down with contempt upon those who 
they think have no abihty, no spirit, no energy. For 
they do not despise all those of whom they think ill. 
For some men they consider unscrupulous, slander- 
ous, fraudulent, and dangerous; they do not despise 
them, it may be ; but they do think ill of them. 
And therefore, as I said before, those are despised 
who are of no use to themselves or their neigh- 
bours," as the saj-ing is, who are idle, lazy, and 

On the other hand, those are regarded with ad- 
miration who are thought to excel others in abihty 
and to be free from all dishonour and also from 
those vices which others do not easily resist. For 
sensual pleasure, a most seductive mistress, turns the 
hearts of the greater part of humanity away from 
virtue ; and when the fiery trial of affliction draws 
near, most people are terrified beyond measure. 
Life and death, -«'ealth and want afFect all wen most 



homines vehementissime permovent. Quae qui in 
utramque partem excelso animo magnoque despici- 
unt, cumque aliqua iis ampla et honesta res obiecta 
est, totos ad se convertit et rapit, tum quis non ad- 
miretur splendorem pulchritudinemque virtutis ? 

38 XI. Ergo et haec animi despicientia admirabihta- 
tem magnam facit et maxime iustitia, ex qua una 
virtute viri boni appellantur, mirifica quaedam mul- 
titudini videtur, nec iniuria ; nemo enim iustus esse 
potest, qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exsihum, qui 
egestatem timet, aut qui ea, quae sunt his contraria, 
aequitati anteponit. Maximeque admirantur eum, 
qui pecunia non movetur; quod in quo viro perspe- 
ctum sit, hunc igni spectatum arbitrantur. 

Itaque illa tria, quae proposita sunt ad gloriam, 
omnia iustitia conficit, et benivolentiam, quod prod- 
esse vult plurimis, et ob eandem causam fidem et 
admirationem, quod eas res spernit et neglegit, ad 
quas plerique inflammati aviditate rapiuntur. 

39 Ac mea quidem sententia omnis ratio atque insti- 
tutio vitae adiumenta hominum desiderat, in primis- 
que ut habeat, quibuscum possit famihares conferre 
sermones; quod est difficile, nisi speciem prae te 
boni viri feras. Ergo etiam sohtario homini atque in 
agro vitam agenti opinio iustitiae necessaria est, 
eoque etiam magis, quod, eam si non habebunt, 
[iniusti habebuntur,]' nulhs praesidiis saepti multis 

^iniusii habebuniurli H b; bracketed by Facciolati, Edd. 

nautiquam B H a p, Bt.', Heine ; contemnunt quidem nequa- 
quam c ; non contemnunt quidem Madvig, Miiller. 

* iis B, Edd. ; his H a b ; hijs c. 

«M B b ; hii H ; hi a.; hij c. So § 37. 

^maioris partis animos c, Edd.; maiores partis aniini B; 
maiores partes animi H a b. 


BOOK II. x-xi 

powerfully. But when men, with a spirit great and 
exalted, can look down upon sueh outward circum- 
stances, whether prosperous or adverse, and when 
some noble and virtuous purpose, presented to their 
minds, converts them wholly to itself and carries 
them away in its pursuit, Avho then could fail to 
admire in them the splendour and beauty of virtue ? 

XI. As, then, this superiority of mind to such Justicdsthe 
externals inspires great admiration, so justice, popuTarlty" 
above all, on the basis of which alone men are called 
good men," seems to people generally a quite mar- 
vellous virtue — and not without good reason ; for no 
one can be just who fears death or pain or exile or 
poverty, or who values their opposites above equity. 
And people admire especially the man who is unin- 
fluenced by money ; and if a man has proved himself 
in this direction, they think him tried as by fire. 

Those three requisites, therefore, which were pre- 
supposed as the means of obtaining glory, are all 
secured by justice: (l) good-will, for it seeks to be 
of help to the greatest number ; (2) confidence, for 
tlie same reason; and (s) admiration, because it 
scorns and cares nothing for those things, with a 
consuming passion for which most people are carried 

Now, in my opinion at least, every walk and 
vocation in life calls for human co-operation — first 
and above all, in order that one may have friends 
with whom to enjoy social intercourse. And this is 
not easy, unless one is looked upon as a good man. 
So, even to a man who shuns society and to one who 
spends his life in the country a reputation for justice 
is essential — even more so than to others ; for they 
■who do not have it [but are considered unjust] will 


1.96 40 afficientur iniuriis. Atque iis^ etiam, qui vendunt 
emunt, conducunt locant contrahendisque negotiis 
implicantur, iustitia ad rem gerendam necessaria est, 
cuius tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem, qui maleficio 
et scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula 
iustitiae vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una 
latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in 
latrocinio quidem relinquit locum, ille autem, qui 
archipirata dicitur, nisi aequabiliter praedam disper-, aut interficiatur a sociis aut relinquatur; quin 
etiam leges latronum esse dicuntur, quibus pareant, 
quas observent. Itaque propter aequabilem praedae 
partitionem et Barduhs Illj^rius latro, de quo est 
apud Theopompum, magnas opes habuit et multo 
maiores Viriathus Lusitanus; cui quidem etiam 
exercitus nostri imperatoresque cesserunt; quem C. 
Laelius, is qui Sapiens usui*patur, praetor fregit et 
comminuit ferocitatemque eius it£ 1'epressit, ut facile 
bellum reliquis traderet. 

Cum igitur tanta vis iustitiae sit, ut ea etiam latro- 
num opes firmet atque augeat, quantam eius vim 
inter leges et iudicia et in constituta re publica fore 
putamus ? 
41 XII. Mihi quidem non apud Medos solum, ut ait 
Herodotus, sed etiam apud maiores nostros iustitiae 
fruendae causa videntur olim bene morati reges con- 
stituti. Nam cum premeretur inops ^ multitudo ab 
iis, qui maiores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem 

^iis Edd. ; his B H a b, not in c. 

^inops inferior MSS. , Edd.; in otio (i.e. "at vviU") B H 
a b p ; inicio (= iniiio) c. 

BOOK II. xi-xii 

have no defence to protect them and so will be 

40 the victims of many kinds of wrong. So also to 
buyers and sellers, to employers and employed, and 
to those who are engaged in commercial dealings 
generally, justice is indispensable for the conduct of 
business. Its importance is so great, that not even Honouramong 
those who live by wickedness and crime can get on *^'^^*s 
without some small element of justice. For if a rob- 

ber takes anything by force or by fraud from another 
member of the gang, he loses his standing even in a 
band of robbers ; and if the one called the Pirate 
Captain" should not divide the plunder impartially, 
he would be either deserted or murdered by his 
comrades. Why, they say that robbers even have a 
code of laws to observe and obey. And so, because 
of his impartial division of booty, Bardulis, the Illyr- 
ian bandit, of whom we read in Theopompus, 
aequired great power, Viriathus, of Lusitania, much 
greater. He actually defied even our armies and 
generals. But Gaius Laelius — the one surnamed 
the Wise" — in his praetorship crushed his power, 
reduced him to terms, and so checked his intrepid 
daring, that he left to his successors an easy conquest. 
Since, therefore, the efficacy of justice is so great 
that it strengthens and augments the power even of 
robbers, how great do we think its power will be in 
a constitutional government with its laws and courts ? 

41 XII. Now it seems to me, at least, that not only Kingschosen 
among the Medes, as Herodotus tells us, but also justke.^^''* °* 
among our own ancestors, men of high moral char- 

acter were made kings in order that the people 
might enjoy justice. For, as the masses in their 
helplessness were oppressed by the strong, they 
appealed for protection to some one man who wa' 
p 209 

confugiebant virtute praestantem; qui cum prohi- 
beret iniuria tenuiores^ aequitate constituenda sum- 
mos cum infimis ' pari iure retinebat.^ Eademque 

42 constituendarum legum fuit causa, quae regum. lus 
enim semper est quaesitum aequabile ; neque enim 
aliter esset ius. Id si ab uno iusto et bono viro con- 
sequebanturj erant eo contenti; cum id minus con- 
tingeret, leges sunt inventae, quae cum omnibus 
semper una atque eadem voce loquerentur. 

Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperan- 
dum deligi sohtos, quorum de iustitia magna esset 
opinio multitudinis. Adiuncto vero, ut idem etiam 
prudentes haberentur, niliil erat, quod homines iis 
auctoribus non posse consequi se arbitrarentur. Omni 
igitur ratione colenda et retinenda iustitia est cum 
ipsa per sese (nam aliter iustitia non esset), tum 
propter amplificationem honoris et gloriae. 

Sed ut pecuniae non quaercndae solum ratio est, 
verum etiam collocandae, quae perpetuos sumptus 
suppeditet, nec solum necessarios, sed etiam liberales, 
sic gloria et quaerenda et coUocanda ratione est. 

43 Quamquam praeclare Socrates hanc viam ad gloriam 
proximam et quasi compendiariam dicebat esse, si 
quis id ageret, ut, quahs haberi vellet, taHs esset. 
Quodsi qui simulatione et inani ostentatione et ficto 
non modo sermone, sed etiam voltu stabilem se 
gloriam consequi posse rentur, vehementer errant. 

* infimis c, Edd. ; infirmis B a b ; infirmos H. 

• retinebat c, Edd. ; pertinebat B H a p ; pertinebant b. 


BOOK II. xii 

conspicuous for his virtue; and as he shielded the 
weaker classes from wrong, he managed by establish- 
ing equitable conditions to hold the higher and the 
lower classes in an equality of right. The reason for 
making constitutional laws was the same as that for 

t2 making kings. For what people have always sought 
is equality of rights before the law. For rights that 
were not open to all aUke would be no rights. If 
the people secured their end at the hands of one 
just and good man, they were satisfied with that; 
but when such was not their good fortune, laws were 
invented, to speak to all men at all times in one and 
the same voice. 

This, then, is obvious : nations used to select for 
their rulers those men whose reputation for justice 
was high in the eyes of the people. If in addition 
they Were also thought wise, there was nothing that 
men did not think they could secure under such 
leadership. Justice is, therefore, in every way to be 
cultivated and maintained, both for its own sake (for 
otherwise it would not be justice) andforthe enhance- 
ment of personal honour and glory. 

But as there is a method not only of acquiring 
money but also of investing it so as to yield an in- 
come to meet our continuously recurring expenses — - 
both for the necessities and for the more refined 
comforts of Ufe — so there must be a method of gain- 
ing glory and turning it to account. And yet, as 

iS Socrates used to express it so admirably, 'the near- xhewayto 
est way to glory — a short-cut, as it were — is to strive ^^°^^ '* Justwa 
to be what you wish to be thought to be." For if 
anyone thinks that he can win lasting glory by 
pretence, by empty show, by hypocritical talk and 
looks, he is very much mistaken. True glory strikes 
p2 2H 

Vera gloria radices agit atque etiam propagatur, ficta 
omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi decidunt, nec simu- 
latum potest quicquam esse diuturnum Testes sunt 
permulti in utramque partem, sed brevitatis causa 
familia contenti erimus una. Ti. enim Gracchus P. 
f. tam diu laudabitur, dum memoria rerum Roma- 
narum manebit; at eius filii nec vivi probabantur 
bonis et mortui numerum optinent iure caesorum. 

XIII. Qui igitur adipisci veram gloriam^ volet, 
iustitiae fungatur officiis. Ea quae essent, dictum 
I, «0-4» gg|. jj^ ixbro superiore. 

44 (XIII.) Sed ut facillime, quales simus, tales esse 
videamur, etsi in eo ipso vis maxima est, ut sin is ii, 
qui haberi velimus, tamen quaedam praecepta danda 
sunt. Nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causan 
celebritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptam, quod 
tibi, mi Cicero, arbitror contigisse, aut aliquo casu 
atque fortuna, in hunc oculi omnium coniciuntur 
atque in eum, quid agat, quem ad modum vivat, in- 
quiritur et, tamquam in clarissima luce versetur, ita 
nullum obscurum potest nec dictum eius esse nec 

45 factum. Quorum autem prima aetas propter humili- 
tatem et obscuritatem in hominum ignoratione ver- 
satur, ii,' simul ac iuvenes esse coeperunt, magna 
spectare et ad ea rectis studiis debent contendere ; 

^ veram gloriam Edd.; veram iustitiae gloriam MSSi 
"iV B, Edd. ; hi H ; iis b; hij c\ his a. 

BOOK II. xii-xiii 

deep root and spreads its branches wide; but all 
pretences soon fall to the ground like fragile 
flowers, and nothing counterfeit can be lasting. 
There are very many witnesses to both facts; 
but for brevity's sake, I shall confine myself to one 
family: Tiberius Gracchus, Publius's son, will be 
held in honour as long as the memory of Rome 
shall endure; but his sons were not apprpved by 
patriots while they Hved, and since they are dead 
they are numbered among those whose murder was 

XIII. If, therefore, anyone wishes to win true Ways of winnJn( 
glory, let him discharge the duties required by jus- * ^°° °*™*" 
tice. And what they are has been set forth in the 
course of the preceding book. 

I-^ (XIII.) But although the very essence of the 
problem is that we actually be what we wish to be 
thought to be, still some rules may be laid down to 
enable us most easily to secure the reputation of being 
what we are. For if anyone in his early youth has 
the responsibihty of Uving up to a distinguished name 
acquired either by inheritance from his father (as, I 
think, my dear Cicero, is your good fortune) or by 
some chance or happy combination of circumstances, 
the eyes of the world are turned upon him ; his lifr 
and character are scrutinized ; and, as if he move( 
in a blaze of light, not a word and not a deed of his 

45 can be kept a secret. Those, on the other hand, 
whose humble and obscure origin has kept them un- 
known to the world in their early years ought, as 
soon as they approach young manhood, to set a high 
ideal before their eyes and to strive with unswerv- 
ing zeal towards its realization. This they will 
do with the better heart, because that time of Ufe is 



quod eo firmiore animo facient, quia non modo non 
invidetur illi aetati, verum etiam favetur. 

Prima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad 
gloriam, si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest, in 
qua multi apud maiores nostros exstiterunt ; semper 
enim fere bella gerebantur. Tua autem aetas incidit 
in id bellum, cuius altera pars sceleris nimium habuit, 
altera felicitatis parum. Quo tamen in bello cum te 
Pompeius alae [alteri] ' praefecisset, magnam laudem 
et a summo viro et ab exercitu consequebare equi- 
tando, iaculando, omni militari labore tolerando. 
Atque ea quidem tua laus pariter cum re publica 

Mihi autem haec oratio suscepta non de te est, sed 
de gcnere toto ; quam ob rem pergamus ad ea, quae 
46 Ut igitur in reliquis rebus multo maiora opera sunt 
animi quam corporis, sic eae rcs, quas ingenio ac 
ratione persequimur, gratiores sunt quam illae, quas 
viribus. Prima igitur commendatio proficiscitur a 
modestia cum^ pietate in parentes, in suos benivo- 
lentia. FacilHme autem et in optimam partem 
cognoscuntur ad«lescentes, qui se ad claros et sapi- 
entes viros bene consulentes rei publicae contule- 
runt; quibuscum si frequentes sunt, opinionem 
afferunt populo eorum fore se similes, quos sibi ipsi 

^alteri MSS.; om. Graevius, Edd, 
'^cum Victorius, Edd.; tutn MSS. 


BOOK II. xiii 

accustomed to find favour rather than to meet with 

Well, then, the first thing to recommend to a young (i) by a miutary 
man in his quest for glory is that he try to win it, if <^*'^®^''« 
he can, in a military career. Among our forefathers 
many distinguished themselves as soldiers; for war- 
fare was almost continuous then. The period of your 
own youth, however, has coincided with that war in 
which the one side was too prolific in crime, the 
other in failure. And yet, when Pompey placed you 
in command of a cavalry squadron in this war, you 
won the applause of that great man and of the army 
for your skill in riding and spear-throwing and for 
endurance of all the hardships of the soldier's life. 
But that credit accorded to you came to nothing 
along with the fall of the repubhc. 

The subject of this discussion, however, is not 
your personal history, but the general theme. Let 
us, therefore, proceed to the sequel. 

As, then, in everything else brain-work is far (2) by personal 
more important than mere hand-work, so those 
objects which we strive to attain through intellect 
and reason gain for us a higher degree of gratitude 
than those which we strive to gain by physical 
strength. The best recommendation, then, that a 
young man can have to popular esteem proceeds from 
self-restraint, filial affection, and devotion to kinsfolk. 
Next to that, young men win recognition most easily (3) by associatioi 
and most favourably, if they attach themselves to *'* ^ ^ ^^^^^' 
men who are at once wise and renowned as well as 
patriotic counsellors in pubHc affairs. And if they 
associate constantly with such men, they inspire in 
the public the expectation that they will be like 
them, seeing that they have themselves selected them 



47 delegerint ad imitandum. P. Rutili adulescentiam ad 
opinionem et innocentiae et iuris scientiae P. Muci com- 
mendavit domus. Nam L. quidem Crassus, cum esset 
admodum adulescens, non aliunde mutuatus est, sed 
sibi ipse peperit maximam laudem ex illa accusatione 
nobili et gloriosa, et, qua^ aetate qui exercentur, laude 
affici solent, ut de Demosthene accepimus, ea aetate 
L. Crassus ostendit id se in foro optime iam facere, 
quod etiam tum poterat domi cum laude meditari. 

48 XIV. Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis, quarum 
in altera sermo sit, in altera contentio, non est id 
quidem dubium, quin contentio [orationis] '^ maiorem 
vim habeat ad gloriam (ea est enim, quam eloquen- 
tiam dicimus); sed tamen difficile dictu est, quanto- 
pere conciliet animos comitas affabilitasque sermonis. 
Exstant epistulae et Philippi ad Alexandrum et 
Antipatri ad Cassandrum et Antigoni ad Phihppum 
filium, trium prudentissimorum (sic enim accepimus) ; 
quibus praecipiunt, ut oratione benigna multitudinis 
animos ad benivolentiam alHciant mihtesque blande 
appellando [sermone]^ dehniant. Quae autem in 
multitudine cum contentione habetur oratio, ea 
saepe universam excitat [gloriam] * ; magna est enim 
admiratio copiose sapienterque dicentis; quem qui 
audiunt, intellegere etiam et sapere plus quam cete- 

' et, qua Mamitius, Edd. ; ex qua MSS. ^ orationis MSS., 
Ed.; bracketed by Fleckeisen, Bt.'^, Miiller, Heine. 

' blande appellando sermone a c, Edd. ; blando appellando 
sermone 15 H b; blande appellando Gulielmus (with three 
inferior MSS.), Bt., Heine; [sermone] Ed. * excitat 

gloriam MSS. ; excitat \gloriam\ VA.', excitat Lang-e. 

• At the age of 21 Crassus conducted the case ag-ainst 
Gaius Papirius Carbo, a former supporter of the Gracchi. 
The prosecution was so ably conducted that Carbo com- 
mitted suicide to escape certain concJcmnation. 


BOOK II. xiii-xiv 

tbr Imitation. His frequent visits to the home of 
Publiuc. Mucius assisted young Publius Rutilius to 
gain a reputation for integrity of character and for 
ability as a jurisconsult. Not so, however, Lucius 
Crassus ; for though he was a mere boy, he looked to 
no one else for assistance, but by his own unaided 
ability he won for himself in that brilHant and 
famous prosecution* a splendid reputation as an 
orator. And at an age when young men are ac- 
customed with their school exercises to win applause 
as students of oratory, this Roman Demosthenes, 
Lucius Crassus, was ah'eady proving himself in the 
law-courts a master of the art which he might even 
then have been studying at home with credit to 

XIV. But as the classification of discourse is a two- (4)byeloquence. 
fold one — conversation, on the one side ; oratory, on 
the other — there can be no doubt that of the two 
this debating power (for that is what we mean by 
sloquence) counts for more toward the attainment of 
glory ; and yet, it is not easy to say how far an afFable 
and courteous manner in conversation may go toward 
winning the affections. We have, for instance, the 
letters of PhiHp to Alexander, of Antipater to Cas- 
sander, and of Antigonus to Phihp the Younger. 
The authors of these letters were, as we are in- 
formed, three of the wisest men in history ; and in 
them they instruct their sons to woo the hearts of 
the populace to affection by words of kindness and 
to keep their soldiers loyal by a winning address. 
But the speech that is dehvered in a debate before 
an assembly often stirs the hearts of thousands at 
once ; for the eloquent and judicious speaker is re- 
ceived with high admiration, and his hearers think 


ros arbitrantur. Si vero inest in oratione mixta mo- 
destia gravitas, nihil admirabilius fieri potest, eoque 
magis, si ea sunt in adulescente. 

4*) Sed cum sint plura causarum genera, quae elo- 
quentiam desiderent, multique in nostra re publica 
adulescentes et apud iudices et apud populum^ et 
apud senatum dicendo laudem assecuti sint, maxima 
est admiratio in iudiciis. 

Quorum ratio duplex est. Nam ex accusatione et 
ex defensione constat; quarum etsi laudabilior est 
defensio, tamen etiam accusatio probata persaept 
est. Dixi paulo ante de Crasso; idem fecit adule- 
scens M. Antonius. Etiam P. Sulpici eloquentiam 
accusatio illustravit, cum seditiosum et inutilem 

50 civem, C. Norbanum, in iudicium vocavit. Sed hoc 
quidem non est saepe faciendum nec umquam nisi 
aut rei publicae causa, ut ii, quos ante dixi, aut 
ulciscendi, ut duo Luculli, aut patrocinii, ut nos pro 
Siculis, pro Sardis in Albucio luHus. In accusando 
etiam M'. Aquilio L. Fufi cognita industria est. 
Semel igitur aut non saepe certe. Sin erit, cui 
faciendum sit saepius, rei publicae tribuat hoc mu- 
neris, cuius inimicos ulcisci saepius non est repre- 

^ et apudpopulum c, Edd.; not in B H a b. 

BOOK II. xiv 

him understanding and wise beyond all others. And 
if his speech have also dignity combined with mode- 
ration, he will be admired beyond all measure, 
especially if these quahties are found in a young man. 

+9 But while there are occasions of many kinds that 
call for eloquence, and while many young men in 
our republic have obtained distinction by their 
speeches in the courts, in the popular assembhes, 
and in the senate, yet it is the speeches before our 
courts that excite the highest admiration. 

The classification of forensic speeches also is a Prosecution 
twofold one : they are divided into arguments for jefence. 
the prosccution and arguments for the defence. And 
while the side of the defence is more honourable, 
still that of the prosecution also has very often 
estabhshed a reputation. I spoke of Crassus a mo- 
ment ago ; Marcus Antonius, when a youth, had the 
same success. A prosecution brought the eloquence 
of Pubhus Sulpicius into favourable notice, when he 
brought an action against Gaius Norbanus, a sedi- 

50 tious and dangerous citizen. But this should not be 
done often — never, in fact, except in the interest of 
the state (as in the cases of those above mentioned) 
or to avenge wrongs (as tlie two LuculH, for example, 
did) or for the protection of our provincials (as I did 
in the defence of the Sicilians, or Julius in the prose- 
cution of Albucius in behalf of the Sardinians). The 
activity of Lucius Fufius in the impeachment of 
Manius Aquihus is hkewise famous. This sort of 
work, then, may be done once in a lifetime, or at all 
events not often. But if it shall be required of any- 
one to conduct more frequent prosecutions, let him 
do it as a service to his country ; for it is no disgrace 
to be often employed in the prosecution of her 



hendendum ; modus tamen adsit. Duri enim hominis 
vel potius vix hominis videtur periculum capitis 
inferre multis. Id cum periculosum ipsi est, tum 
etiam sordidum ad famam, committere, ut accusator 
nominere; quod contigit M. Bruto summo genere 
nato, illius filio, qui iuris civilis in primis peritus fuit. 
51 Atque etiam hoc praeceptum officii diligenter 
tenendum est, ne quem umquam innocentem iudicio 
capitis arcessas; id enim sine scelere fieri nullo 
pacto potest. Nam quid est tam inhumanum quam 
eloquentiam a natura ad salutem hominum et ad 
conservationem datam ad bonorum pestem pernici- 
emque convertere? Nec tamen, ut hoc fugiendum 
est, item est habendum religioni nocentem aliquando, 
modo ne nefarium^ impiumque, defendere ; vult hoc 
multitudo, patitur consuetudo, fert etiam humanitas. 
ludicis est semper in causis verum sequi, patroni non 
numquam veri simile, etiamsi minus sit verum, 
defendere; quod scribere, praesertim cum de philo- 
sophia scriberem, non auderem, nisi idem placeret 
gravissimo Stoicorum, Panaetio. Maxime autem et 
gloria paritur et gratia defensionibus, eoque maior, 
si quando accidit, ut ei subveniatur, qui potentis 
ahcuius opibus circumveniri urguerique vidcatur, ut 
nos et saepe alias et adulescentes contra L. Sullae 

^modo ne nefarium L c, Edd.; modo nefarium Nonius; et 
nefarium B H a b. 

a A ''capital charge" meant to the Roman a charg-e en- 
dangering a person's capuf, or civil status. A conviction 
on such a charge resulted in his civil degradation aiid the 
loss of his privileg-es as a Roman citizen. 

BOOK II. xiv 

enemies. And yet a limit should be set even to 
that. For it requires a heartless man, it seems, or 
rather one who is well-nigh inhuman, to be arraign- 
ing one person after another on capital charges." It is 
not only fraught with danger to the prosecutor him- 
self, but is damaging to his reputation, to allow 
himself to be called a prosecutor. Such was the 
effect of this epithet upon Marcus Brutus, the scion 
of a very noble family and the son of that Brutus who 
was an eminent authority in the civil law. 

Again, the following rule of duty is to be carefiill}' Spare the inno- 
observed: never prefer a capital charge against an\ g?inVy.^*° '^ 
person who may be innocent. For that cannot 
possibly be done without making oneself a criminal. 
For what is so unnatural as to turn to the ruin and 
destruction of good men the eloquence bestowed by 
nature for the safety and protection of our fellow- 
men? And yet, while we should never prosecute 
the innocent, we need not have scruples against 
undertaking on occasion the defence of a guilty 
person, provided he be not infamously depraved and 
wicked. For people expect it ; custom sanctions it ; 
humanity also accepts it. It is always the business of 
the judge in a trial to find out the truth ; it is some- 
times the business of the advocate to maintain what 
is plausible, even if it be not strictly true, though I 
should not venture to say this, especially in an ethical 
treatise, if it were not also the position of Panaetius, 
that strictest of Stoics. Then, too, briefs for the de- 
fence are most Ukely to bring glory and popularity 
to the pleader, and all the more so, if ever it falls to 
him to lend his aid to one who seems to be oppressed 
and persecuted by the influence of some one in power. 
This I have done on many other occasions ; and once 


dominantis opes pro Sex. Roscio Amerino fecimus, 
quae, ut scis, exstat oratio. 

52 XV. Sed expositis adulescentium officiis, quae 
valeant ad gloriam adipiscendam, deinceps de bene- 
ficentia' ac de liberalitate dicendum est; cuius est 
ratio duplex ; nam aut opera benigne fit indigentibus 
aut pecunia. Facilior est haec posterior, locupleti 
praesertim, sed illa lautior ac splendidior et viro forti 
claroque dignior. Quamquam enim in utroque inest 
gratificandi liberalis voluntaSj tamen altera ex arca, 
altera ex vix-tute depromitur, largitioque, quae fit e> 
re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit. Ita 
benignitate benignitas tollitur; qua quo in plures 

53 usus sis, eo minus in multos uti possis. At qui opera, 
id est virtute et industria, benefici et liberales erunt, 
primum, quo pluribus profuerint, eo plures ad benigne 
faciendum adiutores habebunt, dein consuetudine 
beneficentiae paratiores erunt et tamquam exercita- 
tiores ad bene de multis promerendum. 

Praeclare in' epistula' quadam Alexandrum fihum 

Philippus accusat, quod largitione benivolentiam 

Macedonum consectetur : Quae te, nialum ! " inquit, 

ratio in istam spem induxit, ut eos tibi fideles pu- 

^beneficentia Edd.; beneficientia MSS. (ublque). 
'/w B H a b; not in L c p. 
'^epistula H, Heine; epistola B L a b C« 

BOOK II. xiv-xv 

in particular, in my younger days, I defended Sextui 
Roscius of Ameria against tlie power of Lucius Sulla 
when he was acting the tyrant. The speech is pub- 
lished, as you know. 

XV. Now that I have set forth the moral duties of Generosity of 
a young man, in so far as they may be exerted for *^*° ^ 
the attainment of glory, I must next in order discuss 
kindness and generosity. The manner of showing 
it is twofold : kindness is shown to the needy either 
by personal service, or by gifts of money. The latter 
way is the easier, especially for a ricli man ; but the 
former is nobler and more dignified and more be- 
coming to a strong and eminent man. For although 
both ways ahke betray a generous wish to oblige, 
still in the one case the favour makes a draft upon 
pne's bank account, in the other upon one's personal 
energy; and the bounty wliich is drawn from one's 
material substance tends to exhaust the very fountain 
of hberaUty. LiberaHty is thus forestalled by Ube- 
raHty: for the more people one has helped with 
gifts of money, the fewer one can help. But if 
people are generous and kind in the way of personal 
service — that is, with their abiHty and personal 
effbrt — various advantages arise: first, the more 
people they assist, the more lielpers they will have 
in works of kindness ; and second, by acquiring the 
habit of kindness they are better prepared and in 
better training, as it were, for bestowing favours 
upon many. 

In one of his letters PhiHp takes his son Alexander 
sharply to task for trying by gifts of money to secure 
the good-wiU of the Macedonians: "What in the 
mischief induced you to entertain such a hope," he 
says, as that those men would be loyal subjects to 


tares fore, quos pecunia corrupisses ? An tu id agis, 
ut Macedones non te regem suum, sed ministrum et 
praebitorem' sperent fore ? " 

Bene ' ministrum et praebitorem," * quia sordidum 
regi, melius etiam, quod largitionem corruptelam" 
dixit esse; fit enim deterior, qui accipit, atque ad 
idem semper exspectandum paratior. 

54 Hoc ille filio, sed praeceptum putemus omnibus. 
Quam ob rem id quidem non dubium est, quin illa 

benignitas, quae constet ex opera et industria, et 
honestior sit et latius pateat et possit prodesse pluri- 
bus; non numquam tamen est largiendum, nec hoc 
benignitatis genus omnino repudiandum est et saepe 
idoneis hominibus indigentibus de re familiari imper- 
tiendum, sed diligenter atque moderate ; multi enim 
patrimonia effuderunt inconsulte largiendo. Quid 
autem est stultius quam, quod libenter facias, curare, 
ut id diutius facere non possis ? Atque etiam sequun- 
tur largitionem rapinae ; cum enim dando egere 
coeperunt, alienis bonis manus afferre coguntur. Ita, 
cum benivolentiae comparandae causa benefici esse 
vehnt, non tanta studia assequuntur eorum, quibus 
dederunt, quanta odia eorum, quibus ademerunt. 

55 Quam ob rem nec ita claudenda res est familiaris, 
ut eam benignitas aperire non possit, nec ita rese- 
randa, ut pateat omnibus; modus idhibeatur, isque 

^praebitorem B H L b c p; praebito m putafit a. 
*sperent . . . praebitorem L c p, Edd not in B H a b. 

ajulius Caesar was a strikingf exaniple of this. 

bCicero evidently had in mind such instances as Sulla, 
Caesar, Antony, and Catiline— o/«V»» appetens, sui pro/usus 
(Sall., Cat. V). 



you whom you had corrupted with money? Or are 
you trying to do what you can to lead the Macedo- 
nians to expect that you will be not their king but 
their steward and purveyor?" 

Steward and purveyor" was well said, because 
it was degrading for a prince ; better still, when he 
called the gift of money corruption." For the 
recipient goes from bad to worse and is made all the 
more ready to be constantly looking for one bribe 
after another. 

It was to his son that Philip gave this lesson ; but 
let us all take it diligently to heart. 

That liberality, therefore, which consists in per- 
sonal service and efFort is more honourable, has wider 
application, and can benefit more people. There can 
benodoubtaboutthat. Nevertheless,weshouldsome- (i)giftsoj 
times make gifts of money ; and this kind of liberality ™°°*y' 
is not to be discouraged altogether. We must 
often distribute from our purse to the worthy poor, 
but we must do so with discretion and moderation. 
For many* have squandered their patrimony by in- 
discriminate giving. But what is worse folly than 
to do the thing you like in such a way that you can 
no longer do it at all? Then, too, lavish giving 
leads to robbery''; for when through over-giving 
men begin to be impoverished, they are constrained 
to lay their hands on the property of others. And 
so, when men aim to be kind for the sake of winning 
good-will, the afFection they gain from the objects 
of their gifts is not so great as the hatred they incur 
from those whom they despoil. 

One's purse, then, should not be closed so tightly 
that a generous impulse cannot open it, nor yet so 
loosely held as to be open to everybody. A limit 
9 SS5 

referatur ad facultates. Omnino meminisse debemus, 
id quod a nostris hominibus saepissime usurpatum 
iam in proverbii consuetudinem venit, largitionem 
fundum non habere"; etenim quis potest modus esse, 
cum et idem, qui consuerunt, et idem illud alii 

XVI. Omnino duo sunt genera largorum, quorum 
alteri prodigi, alteri liberales: prodigi, qui epulis et 
viscerationibus et gladiatorum muneribus, ludorum 
venationumque apparatu pecunias profundunt in eas 
res,. quarum memoriam aut brevem aut nullan: 
56 omnino sint relicturi, liberales autem, qui suis facul- 
tatibus aut captos a praedonibus redimunt aut aes 
alienum suscipiunt amicorum aut in filiarum coUoca- 
tione adiuvant aut opitulantur in re vel quaerenda 
(,56) vel augenda. Itaque miror, quid in mentem venerit 
Theophrasto in eo Hbro, quem de divitiis scripsit ; in 
quo multa praeclate, illud absurde : est enim multus 
in laudanda magnificentia et apparatione popularium 
munerum tahumque sumptuum facultatem fructum 
divitiarum putat. Mihi autem ille fructus hberali- 
tatis, cuius pauca exempla posui, multo et maior 
videtur et certior. 
No. Quanto Aristoteles grayius et verius nos repre- 

lound In /r i 

our hendit! qui has pecuniarum eiiusiones non admire- 


mur, quae fiunt ad multitudiuem dehniendam. Aii 

BOOK II. xv-xvi 

should be observed and that Hmit should be deter- 
mined by our means. We ought, in a word^ to 
remember the phrase, which, through being repeated 
so very often by our eountrymen, has come to be a 
common proverb: Bounty has no bottom." For 
indeed what Hmit can there be, when those who 
have been accustomed to receive gifts claim what 
they have been in the habit of getting, and those 
who have not wish for the same bounty? 

XVI. There are, in general, two classes of those Extravagani 
who give largely: the one class is the lavish, the ^^^y "yj^*, 
other the generous. The lavish are those who 
squander their money on pubhc banquets, doles of 
meat among the people, gladiatorial sliows, magnifi- 
cent games, and wild-beast fights— vanities of which 
but a brief recollection will remain, or none at all. 

) The generous, on the other hand, are those who 
employ their own means to ransom captives from 
brigands, or who assume their friends' debts or help 
in providing dowries for their daughters, or assist 
them in acquiring property or increasing what they 

) have. And so I wonder what Theophrastus could 
have been thinking about when he wrote his book 
on Wealth." It contains much that is fine; but 
his position is absurd, when he praises at great length 
the magnificent appointments of the popular games, 
and it is in the means for indulging in such expen- 
ditures that he finds the highest privilege of weaith. 
But to me the privilege it gives for the exercise of 
generosity, of which I have given a few illustrations, 
seems far higher and far more certain. 

How much more true and pertinent are Aristotle's 
words, as he rebukes us for not being amazed at this 
gxtravagant waste of money, all to win the fcivour of 
«2 287 

enim, qui ab hoste obsidentur, si emere aquae sex- 
tarium cogerentur^mina, hoc primo incredibile nobis 
videri, omnesque mirari, sed cum attenderint, veniam 
necessitati dare, in his immanibus iacturis infinitisque 
sumptibus nihil nos magnopere mirari, cum praeser- 
tim neque necessitati subveniatur nec dignitas 
augeatur ipsaque illa delectatio multitudinis ad breve 
exiguumque tempus capiatur,^ eaque a levissimo 
quoque, in quo tamen ipso una cum satietate memoria 
57 quoque moriatur voluptatis." Bene etiam colligit 
haec pueris et mulierculis et servis et servorum 
simillimis Hberis esse grata, gravi vero homini et ea, 
quae fiunt, iudicio certo ponderanti probari posse 
nuUo modo." 

Quamquam intellego in nostra civitate invete 
rasse iam bonis temporibus, ut splendor aediUtatum 
ab optimis viris postuletur.* Itaque et P. Crassus 
cum cognomine dives, tum copiis functus est aedilicio 
maximo munere, et paulo post L. Crassus cum 
omnium hominum moderatissimo Q. Mucio magnifi- 
centissima aedilitate functus est, deinde C. Claudius 
App. f., multi post, Luculli, Hortensius, Silanus; 
omnes autem P. Lentulus me consule vicit superi- 
ores ; hunc est Scaurus imitatus ; magnificentissima 

' Ait enim Ed.; at hi a; at hii H; at ii B b; at htfc 

^ cogerentur B H a b; cogantur L c p. 

' capiatur Beier; not in MSS. 

*postuletur B H a b, Heine; postularetur L c p, Bt. 


BOOK II. xvi 

the populace. If people in time of siege," he says, 
" are required to pay a mina for a pint of water, this 
seems to us at first beyond belief, and all are amazed ; 
but when they think about it, they make allowances 
for it on the plea of necessity. But in the matter of 
this enormous waste and unlimited expenditure we 
are not very greatly astonished, and that, too, though 
by it no extreme need is relieved, no dignity is en- 
hanced, and the very gratification of the populace is 
but for a brief, passing moment ; such pleasure as it 
is, too, is confined to the most frivolous, and even in 
these the very memory of their enjoyment dies as 
)7 soon as the moment of gratification is past." His 
conclusion, too, is excellent: This sort of amuse- 
ment pleases children, silly women, slaves, and the 
servile free ; but a serious-minded man who weighs 
such matters with sound judgment cannot possibly 
approve of them." 

And yet I reahze that in our country, even in the Magnificent 
good old times, it had become a settled custom to Ixpected^f 
expect magnificent entertainments from the very ^° aed»ie. 
best men in their year of aedileship. So both Pub- 
lius Crassus, who was not merely surnamed The 
Rich" but was rich in fact, gave splendid games in 
his aedileship; and a little later Lucius Crassus (with 
Quintus Mucius, the most unpretentious man in the 
world, as his colleague) gave most magnificent enter- 
tainments in his aedileship. Then came Gaius 
Claudius, the son of Appius, and, after him, many 
others — the Luculli, Hortensius, and Silanus. Publius 
Lentulus, however, in the year of my consulship, 
eclipsed all that had gone before him, and Scaurus 
emulated him. And my friend Pompey's exhibitions 
in his second consulship were tlie most magnificent 


vero nostri Pompei munera secundo consulatu; in 
quibus omnibus quid mihi placeat, vides. 

58 XVII. Vitanda tamen suspicio est avaritiae. 
Mamerco, homini divitissimo, pi-aetermissio aedili- 
tatis consulatus repulsam attulit. Quare et, si po- 
stulatur a populo, bonis viris si non desiderantibus, at 
tamen approbantibus faciundum est, modo pro facul- 
tatibus, nos ipsi ut fecimus, et, si quando aliqua res 
maior atque utilior populari largitione acquiritur, ut 
Oresti nuper prandia in semitis decumae nomine 
magno honori fuerunt. Ne M.^ quidem Seio vitio 
datum est, quod in caritate asse modium populo 
dedit; magna enim se et inveterata invidia nec 
turpi iactura, quando erat aedilis, nee maxima libera- 
vit. Sed honori summo nuper nostro Miloni fuit. 
qui gladiatoribus emptis rei publicae causa, quae 
salute nostra continebatur, omnes P. Clodi conatus 
furoresque compressit. 

Causa igitur largitionis est, si aut necesse est aut 

59 utile. In his^ autem ipsis mediocritatis regula opti- 
ma est. L. quidem Pliilippus Q. f, magno vir 
ingenio in primisque clarus, gloriari solebat se sine 

> M. Orelli, Ed.; Ma co MSS. 
^his H, E<ld.; hijs c; iis B b; is L. 

aThe as was a copper coin worlh somewhat less thati a 
penny. Selling' grain to tiie people at such a price was 
practicaliy giving it away lo purchase their gfood-will. 

BOOK II. xvi-xvii 

of all. And so you see what I think about all this 
sort ot thing. 
J8 XVII. Still we should avoid any suspicion of 
peniiriousness. Mamercus was a very wealthy man, 
and his refusal of the aedileship was the cause of his 
defeat for the consulship. If, therefore, such enter- 
tainment is demanded by the people, men of right Justificationoi 

sticn Gxtr«ivft" 

judgment must at least consent to furnish it, even if gance. 
they do not like the idea But in so doing they 
should keep within their means, as I myself did, 
They should hkewise afford such entertainment, if 
gifts of money to the people are to be the means of 
securing on some occasion some more important or 
more useful object. Thus Orestes recently won 
great honour by his public dinners given in the 
streets, on the pretext of their being a tithe-offering. 
Neither did anybody find fault with Marcus Seius 
for supplying grain to the people at an as^ the peck 
at a time when the market-price was prohibitive; 
for he tlius succeeded in disarming the bitter and 
deep-seated prejudice of the people against him at 
an outlay neither very great nor discreditable to him 
in view of the fact that he was aedile at tlie time. But 
tlie highest honour recently fell to my friend Milo, 
who bought a band of gladiators for the sake of the 
country, whose preservation then depended upon 
my recall from exile, and with them put down the 
desperate schemes, the reign of terror, of Publius 

The justification for gifts of money, therefore, is 
59 either necessity or expediency. And in making them 

even in such cases, the rule of thegolden mean is best. xhegolden 
To be sure, Lucius Phihppus, the son of Quintus, a ™^a°'sbe»» 
man of great abihty and unusual renown, used to 1 

'^31 ' \' 

ullo munere adeptum esse omnia, quae haberentur 
amplissima. Dieebat idem Cotta, Curio. Nobis 
quoque lieet in hoc quodam modo gloriari ; nam pro 
amplitudine honorum, quos cunetis sufFragiis adepti 
sumus nostro quidem anno, quod contigit eorum 
nemini, quos modo nominavi, sane exiguus sumptus 
aedilitatis fuit. 
60 Atque etiam illae impensae meh'ores, muri, navaha, 
portus, aquarum ductus omniaque, quae ad usum rei 
pubhcae pertinent. Quamquam, quod praesens tam- 
quam in manum datur, iucundius est; tamen haec 
in posterum gratiora. Theatra, porticus, nova templa 
verecundius reprehendo propter Pompeium, sed do- 
ctissimi non probant, ut et hic ipse Panaetius, quem 
multum in his Ubris secutus sum, non interpretatus, 
et Phalereus Demetrius, qui Periclem, principem 
Graeciae, vituperat, quod tantam pecuniam in prae- 
clara illa propylaea coniecerit. Sed de hoc genere 
r^*P°'^- toto in iis libris, quos de re pubHca scripsi, diUgen- 

lotefMt. *^^ ^^*' disputatum. 

Tota igitur ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa 

est, temporibus necessaria, et tum ipsum et ad facul- 

tates accommodanda et mediocritate moderanda est. 

^l XVIII. In illo autem altero genere largiendi, quod 

" The saving clause is added, because Cicero never filled 
the office of Censor. 

BOOK II. xvii-xviii 

make it his boast that without giving any entertain- 
ments he had risen to all the positions looked upon 
as the highest within the gift of the state. Cotta 
could say the same, and Curio. I, too, may make 
this boast my own — to a certain extent* ; for in com- 
parison with the eminence of the offices to which I 
was unanimously elected at the earUest legal age — 
and this was not the good fortune of any one of 
those just mentioned — the outlay in my aedileship 
was very inconsiderable. 

Again, the expenditure of money is better justified LavUh 

,.. ic n 1111 expenditure on 

when it is made lor walls, docks, narbours, aque- pubUc works. 
ducts, and all those works which are of service to 
the community. There is, to be sure, more of present 
satisfaction in what is handed out, Uke cash 
down; nevertheless pubHc improvements win us 
greater gratitude with posterity. Out of respect 
for Pompey's memory I am rather diffident about 
expressing any criticism of theatres, colonnades, and 
new temples ; and yet the greatest philosophers do 
not approve of them — our Panaetius himself, for 
example, whom I am following, not slavishly trans- 
lating, in these books; so, too, Demetrius of 
Phalerum, who denounces Pericles, the foremost 
man of Greece, for throwing away so much money 
on the magnificent, far-famed Propylaea, But this 
whole theme is discussed at length in my books on 
The Repubhc." 

To conclude, the whole system of pubUc bounties 
in such extravagant amount is intrinsically wrong; 
but it may under certain circumstances be necessary 
to make them ; even then they must be proportioned 
to our abiUty and regulated by the golden mean. 

XVIII. Now, as touching that second division of ben«ficence** 


a liberalitate proficiscitur, non uno modo in dispari- 
bus causis affecti esse debemus. Alia causa est 
eius, qui calamitate premitur, et eius, qui res me- 

62 liores quaerit nullis suis rebus adversis. Propensior 
benignitas esse debebit in calamitosos, nisi forte 
erunt digni calamitate. In iis tamen, qui se adiu- 
vari volent, non ne affligantur, sed ut altiorem 
gradum ascendant, restricti omnino esse nullo modo 
debemus, sed in deligendis idoneis iudicium et dili- 
gentiam adhibere. Nam praeclare Ennius: 

Bene facta male locata i»iale facta arbitror. 

63 Quod autem tributum est bono viro et grato, in eo 
cum ex ipso fructus est, tum etiam ex ceteris. Teme- 
ritate enim remota gratissima est liberalitas, eoqut 
eam studiosius plerique laudant, quod summi cuius- 
que bonitas commune perfugium est omnium. Danda 
igitur opera est, ut iis beneficiis quam plurimos af- 
ficiamus, quorum memoria liberiS posterisque pro- 
datur, ut iis ingratis esse non liceat. Omnes enim 
immemorem beneficii oderunt eamque iniuriam in 
deterrenda liberalitate sibi etiam fieri eumque, qui 
faciat, communem hostem tenuiorum putant. 

Atque haec benignitas etiam rei publicae est utihs, 
redimi e servitute captos, locupletari tenuiores ; (juod 

BOOK II. xviii 

gifts of money, those which are prompted by a spirli 
of generosity, we oiight to look at different cases 
difFerently. Tlie case of the man who is over- 
whelmed by misfortune is different from that of tlie 
one who is seeking to better his condition, though 
he sufFers from no actual distress. It will be the 
duty of charity to incline more to the unfortunate, 
unless, perchance, they deserve their misfortune. 
But of course we ought by no means to withhold 
our assistance altogether from those who wish for 
aid, not to save them from utter ruin but to enable 
them to reach a higher degree of fortune. But in 
selecting worthy cases, we ought to use judgment 
and discretion. For, as Eimius says so admirably, 

Good deeds misplaced, xnethinks, are evil deeds." 

Furthermore, the favour conferred upon a man 
who is good and grateful finds its reward, in such a 
case, not only in his own good-will but in that of 
others. For when generosity is not indiscriminate 
giving, it wins most gratitude and people praise it 
with more enthusiasm, because goodness of heart in 
a man of high station becomes the common refuge 
of everybody. Pains must, therefore, be taken to 
benefit as many as possible with such kindnesses 
that the memory of them shall be handed down to 
children and to children's children, so that they too 
may not be ungrateful. For all men detest in- 
gratitude and look upon the sin of it as a wrong 
committed against themselves also, because it dis- 
courages generosity ; and they regard the ingrate as 
the common foe of all the poor. 

Ransoming prisoners from servitude and relieving 
^he poor is a form of eharity that is a service to the 



quidem volgo solitum fieri ab ordine nostro in ora- 
tione Crassi scriptum copiose videmus. Hanc ergo^ 
consuetudinem benignitatis largitioni munerum longe^ 
antepono; haec est gravium hominum atque ma- 
gnorum, illa quasi assentatorum populi multitudinis 
levitatem voluptate quasi titillantium. 
64 Conveniet autem cum in dando munificum esse, 
tum in exigendo non acerbum in omnique re contra- 
henda, vendundo emendo, conducendo locando, 
vicinitatibus et confiniis, aequum, facilem, multa 
multis de suo iure cedentem, a Utibus vero, quan- 
tum liceat et nescio an paulo plus etiam, quam 
liceat, abhorrentem. Est enim non modo Uberale 
paulum non numquam de suo iure decedere, sed 
interdum etiam fructuosum. Habenda autem ratio 
est rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi^ sinere flagi- 
tiosum est, sed ita, ut illiberalitatis avaritiaeque 
absit suspicio ; posse enim liberalitate uti non spoli- 
antem se patrimonio nimirum est pecuniae fructus 

Recte etiam a Theophrasto est laudata hospitalitas ; 
est enim, ut mihi quidem videtur, valde decorura 
patere domus hominum illustrium hospitibus illu- 
stribus, idque etiam rei pubHcae est ornamento, 
homines externos hoc Hberalitatis genere in urbe 
nostra non egere. Est autem etiam vehementer 

^ ergo B H a b, Muller; ego L c p, Lactantius, Bi., Heinp 
^longe L c p, Lactantius, Edd. ; nnt in B H a b, 
*dilabi L c, Ed., Heine; delabi B H a b, Bt. 

BOOK II. xviii 

state as well as to the iiidividual. And we find in 
one of Crassus's orations the full proof given that 
such beneficence used to be the common practice 
of our order. This form of charity, then, I much 
prefer to the lavish expenditure of money for public 
exhibitions. The former is suited to men of worth 
and dignity, the latter to those shallow flatterers, if 
I may call them so, who tickle with idle pleasure, 
so to speak, the fickle fancy of the rabble. 

It will, moreover, befit a gentleman to be at the 
same time Hberal in giving and not inconsiderate in 
exacting his dues, but in every business relation — 
in buying or selHng, in hiring or letting, in relations 
arising out of adjoining houses and lands — to be fair, 
reasonable, often freely yielding much of his own 
right, and keeping out of Htigation as far as his 
interests wiU permit and perhaps even a Httle 
farther. For it is not only generous occasionally to 
abate a Httle of one's rightful claims, but it is some- 
times even advantageous. We should, however, 
have a care for our personal property, for it is dis- 
creditable to let it run through our fingers ; but we 
must guard it in such a way that there shall be no 
suspicion of meanness or avarice. For the greatest 
privilege of wealth is, beyond all peradventure, the 
opportunity it affords for doing good, without sacri- 
ficing one's fortune. 

Hospitality also is a theme of Theophrastus's praise, Another ejt- 
and rightly so. For, as it seems to me at least, it is ^enefiMiTce is 
most proper that the homes of distinguished men hospitaiity. 
should be open to distinguished guests. And it is 
to the credit of our country also that men from 
abroad do not fail to find hospitable entertainment 
of this kind in our city. It is, moreover, a very 



litile iis, qui honeste posse multum volunt, per 
hospites apud externos populos valere opibus et 
gratia. Theoplirastus quidem scribit Cimonem 
Athenis etiam in suos curiales Laciadas hospitalem 
fuisse ; ita enim instituisse et vilicis imperavisse, ut 
omnia praeberentur, quicumque Laciades in villam 
suam devertisset. 
65 XIX. Quae autem opera, non largitione beneficia 
dantur, haec tum in universam rem publicam, tum 
in singulos cives conferuntur. Nam in iure cavere 
[jConsilio iuvare J atque hoc scientiae genere prodesse 
quam plurimis vehementer et ad opes augendas 
pertinet et ad gratiam. 

Itaque cum multa praeclara maiorum, tum quod 
optime constituti iuris civiiis summo semper in honore 
fuit cognitio atque interpretatio ; quam quidem ante 
hanc confusionem temporum in possessione sua prin- 
cipes retinuerunt, nunc, ut honores, ut omnes digni- 
tatis gradus, sic huius scientiae splendor deletus est, 
idque eo indignius, quod eo tempore hoc contigit, 
cum is esset, qui omnes superiores, quibus honore par 
esset, scientia facile vicisset. Haec igitur opera 
grata multis et ad beneficiis obstringendos homines 

^consilio iuvare MSS., Ed. ; bracketedby Muther, Miiller, 

«Acts of kindness and peisonal service mean to Cicero 
throughoul this discussioii the services of the lawyer, which 
were voluntary and gratis. 

b This eniinent jurist was Servius Sulpicius Lcmonia 
Rufus, a close friend of Ciccro, author of Ihe weil-known 
letter of condolence to Cicero on the death of his daughter 

BOOK II. xviii-xix 

great advantage, too, for tliose who wish to obtain a 
powerful poHtical influence by honourable means to 
be able through their social relations with their 
guests to enjoy popularity and to exert influence 
abroad. For an instance of extraordinary hospi- 
tahty, Theophrastus writes that at Athens Cimon 
was hospitable even to the Laciads, the people of 
his own deme ; for he instructed his bailiffs to that 
end and gave them orders that every attention 
should be shown to any Laciad who should ever call 
at his country home. 

XIX. Again, the kindnesses shown not by gifts (2) personal 
of money but by personal service* are bestowed ^^"^^"^** 
sometimes upon the community at large, sometimes 
upon individual citizens. To protect a man in his 
legal rights [,to assist him with counsel,] and to serve 
as many as possible with that sort of knowledge 
tends grentlj' to increase one*s influence and popu- 

Thus, among the many admirable ideas of our The professioi^ 
ancestors was the high respectthey always accorded to ° *** 
the study and interpretation of the excellent body 
of our civil law. And down to the present unsettled 
times the foremost men of the state have kept this 
profession exclusively in their own hands ; but now 
the prestige of legal learning has departed along 
with offices of honour and positions of dignity; and 
this is the more deplorable, because it has come to 
pass in the lifetime of a man** who in knowledge of 
the law would easily have surpassed all his prede- 
cessors, while in honour he is their peer. Service ' 

such as this, then, finds many to appreciate it and is 
calculated to bind people closely to us by our good 



66 Atque huic arti finitima est dicendi [gravior] 
facultas ^ et gratior et ornatior. Quid enim eloquentia 
praestabilius vel admiratione audientium vel spe in- 
digentium vel eorum, qui defensi sunt, gratia? 
Huic [quoquej ergo^ a maioribus nostris est in toga 
dignitatis^ principatus datus. Diserti igitur hominis 
et facile laborantis, quodque in patriis est moribus, 
multorum causas et non gravate et gratuito defen- 
dentis beneficia et patrocinia late patent. 

67 Admonebat me res, ut hoc quoque loco intermis- 
sionem eloquentiae, ne dicam interitum, deplorarem, 
ni vererer, ne de me ipso aliquid viderer queri. Sed 
tamen videmus, quibus exstinctis oratoribus quam 
in paucis spes, quanto in paucioribus facultas, quam 
in multis sit audacia. Cum autem omnes non possint, 
ne multi quidem, aut iuris periti esse aut diserti, 
licet tamen opera prodesse multis beneficia petentem, 
commendantem iudicibus, magistratibus, vigilantem 
pro re alterius, eos ipsos, qui aut consuluntur aut 
defendunt, rogantem; quod qui faciunt, plurimum 
gratiae consequuntur, latissimeque eorum manat 

68 lam illud non sunt admonendi (est enim in 
promptu), ut animadvertant, cum iuvare alios vehnt, 
ne quos ofFendant. Saepe enim aut eos laedunt, 

' dtcendi gravior facultas B H b; gravior facultas L c p; 
dicendi[gravior]facultas Ed. ; dicendi facultas Lambinus 

* huic quoque ergo B H L b c, Bt.; nuic ergo Facciolati; 
huic [quoque] ergo Ed. 

* in toga dignitatis Lc p, Edd.; in tota dignitatis, B H b ; 
tn tota dignitate a. 


BOOK 11. xix 

Closely connected with this profession, further- Eioquence 
more, is the gift of eloquence ; it is at once more ^' '^*^ ^^^' 
popular and more distinguished. For what is better 
than eloquence to awaken the admiration of one's 
hearers or the hopes of the distressed or the gratitude 
of those whom it has protected ? It was to eloquence, 
therefore, that our fathers assigned the foremost 
rank among the civil professions. The door of op- 
portunity for generous patronage to others, then, is 
wide open to the orator whose heart is in his work 
and who follows the custom of our forefathers in 
undertaking the defence of many clients without 
reluctance and without compensation. 

My subject suggests that at this point I express The decUne of 
once more my regret at the decadence, not to say ®'°i"^"'^*- 
the utter extinction, of eloquence ; and I should do 
so, did I not fear that people would think that I 
were complaining on my own account. We see, 
nevertheless, what orators have lost their lives and 
how few of any promise are left, how far fewer there 
are who have ability, and how many there are who 
have nothing but presumption, But though not all 
— no, not even many — can be learned in the law or 
eloquent as pleaders, still anybody may be of service 
to many by canvassing in their support for appoint- 
ments, by witnessing to their character before juries 
and magistrates, by looking out for the interests of 
one and another, and by soliciting for them the aid 
of jurisconsults or of advocates. Those who perform 
such services win the most gratitude and find a 
most extensive sphere for their activities. 

Of course, those who pursue such a course do not a waming to 
need to be warned (for the point is self-evident) to «'oquence. 
be careful when they seek to oblige some, not to 
R 241 


quos non debent, aut eos, quos non expedit; si 
imprudentes, neglegentiae est, si scientes, temeri- 
tatis. Utendum etiam est excusatione adversus eos,. 
quos invitus ofFendas, quacumque possis, quare id^ 
quod feceriSj necesse fuerit nec aliter facere potueris, 
ceterisque operis et officiis erit id, quod violatum 
videbitur/ compensandum. 
69 XX. Sed cum in hominibus iuvandis aut mores 
spectari aut fortuna soleat, dictu quidem est proclive, 
itaque volgo loquuntur, se in beneficiis collocandis 
mores hominum, non fortunam sequi. Honesta 
oratio est ; sed quis est tandem, qui inopis et optimi 
viri causae non anteponat in opera danda gratiam 
fortunati et potentis? a quo enim expeditior et 
celerior remuneratio fore videtur, in eum fere est 
voluntas nostra propensior. Sed animadvertendum 
est dihgentius, quae natura rerum sit. Nimirum 
enim inops ille, si bonus est vir, etiamsi referre 
gratiam non potest, habere certe potest. Commode 
autem, quicumque dixit^ pecuniam qui habeat, non 
reddidisse, qui reddiderit, non habere, gratiam 
autem et, qui rettulerit, habere ^ et, qui habeat, rettu- 

At qui se locupletes, honoratos, beatos putant, ii 
ne obhgari quidem beneficio volunt; quin etiam 
beneficium se dedisse arbitrantur, cum ipsi quamvis 

^videbitur L c p, Edd. ; not in B H b; est, a. 
*gratiam . . . habere L c p, Edd.; not in B H a b. 

BOOK II. xix-xx 

ofFend others. For oftentimes they hurt those whom 
they ought not or those whom it is inexpedient to 
offend. If they do it inadvertently, it is carelessness ; 
if designedly, inconsiderateness. A man must apolo- 
gize also, to the best of his abiHty, if he has involun- 
tarily hurt anyone's feelingSj and explain why what 
he has done was unavoidable and why he could not 
have done otherwise ; and he must by future services 
and kind offices atone for the apparent offence. 

XX. Now in rendering helpful service to people, xhebasisfor 
we usually consider either their character or their i^^character not 
circumstances. And so it is an easy remark^ and fortune. 
one commonly made, to say that in investing kind- 
nesses we look not to people's outward circum- 
stances, but to their character. The phrase is 
admirable ! But who is there^ pray, that does not in 
performing a service set the favour of a rich and in- 
fluential man above the cause of a poor, though most 
worthy, person ? For, as a rule, our will is more in- 
clined to the one from whom we expect a prompter 
and speedier return. But we should observe more 
carefully how the matter really stands : the poor man 
of whom we spoke cannot return a favour in kind, of 
course, but if he is a good man he can do it at least 
in thankfulness of heart. As some one has happily 
said, A man has not repaid money, if he still has it ; 
if he has repaid it, he has ceased to have it. But a 
man still has the sense of favour, if he has returned 
tlie favour ; and if he has the sense of the favour, he 
has repaid it." 

On the other hand, they who consider themselves 

wealthy, honoured, the favourites of fortune, do not 

wish even to be put under obhgations by our kind 

services. Why, they actually think that they have 

r2 243 


magnum aliquod acceperint, atque etiam a se aut 
postulari aut exspectari aliquid suspicantur, patro- 
cinio vero se usos aut clientes appellari mortis instar 

70 putant. At vero ille tenuis, cum, quicquid factum 
sit, se spectatum, non fortunam putet,^ non modo illi, 
qui est meritus^ sed etiam illis, a quibus exspectat 
(eget enim multis), gratum se videri studet neque 
vero verbis auget suum munus, si quo forte fungitur, 
sed etiam extenuat. Videndumque illud est, quod, 
si opulentum fortunatumque defenderis, in uno illo 
aut, si ^ forte, in liberis eius manet gratia ; sin autenc 
inopem, probum tamen et modestum, omnes non 
improbi humiles, quae magna in populo multitudo 

71 est, praesidium sibi paratum vident. Quam ob rera 
melius apud bonos quam apud fortunatos beneficiunv 
coUocari puto. 

Danda omnino opera est, ut omni generi satis 
facere possimus; sed si res in contentionem veniet, 
nimirum Themistocles est auctor adhibendus; qui 
cum consuleretur, utrum bono viro pauperi an minus 
probato diviti filiam collocaret: Ego vero," inquit, 
malo virum, qui pecunia egeat, quam pecuniam, 
quae viro," Sed corrupti mores depravatique sunt 

^vero j« B H a b; vero tuo y^ L c p 

'^putefEd.', putat MSS. 

^ st L c p, Edd. ; not in B H a b. 



conferred a favour by accepting one, however great ; 
and they even suspect that a claim is thereby set up 
against them or that something is expected in return. 
Nay more, it is bitter as death to them to have 

70 accepted a patron or to be called clients. Your man 
of slender means, on the other hand, feels that what- 
ever is done for him is done out of regard for him- 
self and not for his outward circumstances. Hence Thepoormaa's 
he strives to show himself grateful not only to the ^^^ ' " ^' 
one who has obhged him in the past but also to those 
from whom he expects similar favours in the future 
— and he needs the help of many; and his own 
service, if he happens to render any in return, he does 
not exaggerate, but he actually depreciates it. This 
fact, furthermore, should not be overlooked — that if 
one defends a wealthy favourite of fortune, the 
favour does not extend further than to the man him- 
self or, possibly, to his children. But if one defends 
a man who is poor but honest and upright, all the 
lowly who are not dishonest — and there is a large 
proportion of that sort among the people — look upon 
such an advocate as a tower of defence raised up for 

Tl them. I think, therefore, that kindness to the good 
is a better investment than kindness to the favour- 
ites of fortune. 

We must, of course, put forth every efFort to obHge 
all sorts and conditions of men, if we can. But if it 
comes to a conflict of duty on this point, we must, I 
should say, follow the advice of Themistocles : when 
some one asked his advice whether he should give 
his daughter in marriage to a man who was poor but 
honest or to one who was rich but less esteemed, he Weaith no 
said : " For my part, I prefer a man without money nor"a b?r^to 
to money without a man." But the moral sense of personai swvim 



admiratione divitiarum ; quarum magnitudo quid ad 
unum quemque nostrum pertinet? Illum fortasse 
adiuvat, qui habet. Ne id quidem semper ; sed fac 
iuvare; utentior^ sane sit, honestior vero quomodo? 
Quodsi etiam bonus erit vir, ne impediant divitiae, 
quo minus iuvetur, modo ne adiuvent, sitque omne 
iudicium, non quam locuples, sed qualis quisque sit ! 
Extremum autem praeceptum in beneficiis opera- 
que danda, ne quid contra aequitatem contendas, ne 
quid pro iniuria; fundamentum enim est perpetuae 
commendationis et famae iustitia, sine qua nihil 
potest esse laudabile. 
72 XXI. Sed, quoniam de eo genere beneficiorum 
dictum est, quae ad singulos spectant, deinceps de 
iis, quae ad universos quaeque ad rem publicam 
pertinent, disputandum est. Eorum autem ipsorum 
partim^ eius modi sunt, ut ad universos cives perti- 
neant, partim, singulos ut attingant; quae sunt 
etiam gratiora. Danda opera est omnino, si possit, 
utrisque, nec minus, ut etiam singulis consulatur, sed 
ita, ut ea res aut prosit aut certe ne obsit rei publicae. 
C. Gracchi frumentaria magna largitio; exhauriebat 
igitur aerarium; modica M. Octavi et rei publicae 

^ utenfwr MSS., Bt.*, Heine; potentior later MSS.; opit- 
lentior one MS. (C. Lanj^e), Lambinus, Bt.*, Muller. 
' partim L c p, Edd.; quae {que=quae H) partim B H a b. 

BOOK 11. xx-xxi 

to-day is demoralized and depraved by our worship 
of wealth. Of what concern to any one of us is the 
size of another man's fortune? It is, perhaps^ an 
advantage to its possessor ; but not always even that. 
But suppose it is; he may, to be sure, have more 
money to spend ; but how is he any the better man 
for that? Still, if he is a good man, as well as a rich 
one, let not his riches be a hindrance to his being 
aided, if only they are not the motive to it ; but in 
conferring favours our decisionshoulddepend entirely 
upon a man's charactei^ not on his wealth. 

The supreme rule, then^ in the matter of kind- 
nesses to be rendered by personal service is never 
to take up a case in opposition to the right nor 
in defence of the wrong. For the foundation 
of enduring reputation and fame is justice, and 
without justice there can be nothing worthy of 

XXI. Now, since we have finished the discussion servke to the 
of that kind of helpful services which concern indi- ^^^*-^ through 

^ personal service 

vidualsj we must next take up those which touch the to individuais 
whole body pohtic and the state. Of these pubHc 
services, some are of such a nature that they concern 
the whole body of citizens ; others, that they affect 
individuals only. And these latter are the more pro- 
ductive of gratitude. If possible, we should by all 
means attend to both kinds of service ; but we must 
take care in protecting the interests of individuals 
that what we do for them shall be beneficial, or at 
least not prejudicial to the state. Gaius Gracchus 
inaugurated largesses of grain on an extensive scale ; 
this had a tendency to exhaust the exchequer. 
Marcus Octavius inaugurated a moderate dole ; thi 
was both practicable for the state and necessary fo 


tolerabilis et plebi necessaria; ergo et civibus et rei 
publicae salutaris. 

73 In primis autem videndum erit ei, qui rem publi- 
cam administrabit, ut suum quisque teneat neque de 
bonis privatorum publice deminutio fiat. Perniciose 
enim Philippus, in tribunatu cum legem agrariam 
ferret, quam tamen antiquari facile passus est et in 
eo vehementer se moderatum praebuit — sed cum in 
agendo multa populariter, tum illud male, "non esse 
in civitate duo milia hominum, qui rem haberent." 
Capitalis oratio est, ad aequationem bonorum perti- 
nens ; qua peste quae potest esse maior ? Hanc enim 
ob causam maxime, utsua tenerentur, res publicae 
civitatesque constitutae sunt. Nam, etsi duce natura 
congregabantur homines, tamen spe custodiae rerum 
suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant. 

74 Danda etiam opera est, ne, quod apud maiores no- 
stros saepe fiebat propter aerarii tenuitatem assidui- 
tatemque bellorum, tributum sit conferendum, idque 
ne eveniat, multo ante erit providendum. Sin quae 
necessitas huius muneris alicui rei publicae obvenerit 
(malo enim quam nostrae ominari ; neque tamen de 

^malo enim B H L b p; mulo enim alii a; malo enim 
aliene ( alienae) c 


BOOK II. xxi 

the commons; it was, therefore, a blessing both to 
the citizens and to the state. 

The man in an administrative officej however, must xhe statesmans 
make it his first care that every one shall have what nY^ro' er[^ 
belongs to him and that private citizens sufFer no in- rights, 
vasion of their property rights by act of the state. It 
was a ruinous policy that Philippus proposed when 
in his tribuneship he introduced his agrarian bill. 
However, when his law was rejected, he took his 
defeat with good grace and displayed extraordinary 
moderation. But in his public speeches on the 
measure he often played the demagogue, and that 
time viciously, when he said that "there were not 
in the state two thousand people who owned any 
property." That speech deserves unqualified con- 
demnation, for it favoured an equal distribution of 
property; and what more ruinous policy than that 
could be conceived ? For the chief purpose in the 
estabUshment of constitutional state and municipal 
governments was that individual property rights 
might be secured. For although it was by Nature's 
guidance that men were drawn together into com- 
munities, it was in the hope of safeguarding their 
possessions that they sought the protection of cities. 

The administration should also put forth every effort (2) taxation 
to prevent the levying of a property tax, and to this 
end precautions should be taken long in advance. 
Such a tax was often levied in the times of our fore- 
fathers on account of the depleted state of their 
treasury and their incessant wars. But if any state 
(l say "any," for I would rather speak in general 
terms than forebode evils to our own; however, I 
am not discussing our own state but states in general) 
■ — if any state ever has to face a crisis requiring the 



nostra, sed de omni re publica disputoX danda erit 
opera, ut omnes intellegant, si salvi esse velint, 
necessitati esse parendum. Atque etiam omnes, qui 
rem publicam gubernabunt, consulere debebunt, ut 
earum rerum copia sit, quae sunt^ necessariae. 
Quarum qualis comparatio fieri soleat et debeat, non 
est necesse disputare ; est enim in promptu ; tantum 
locus attingendus fuit. 

75 Caput autem est in omni procuratione negotii et 
muneris publici, ut avaritiae pellatur etiam minima 
suspicio. Utinam/' inquit C. Pontius Samnis, ad 
illa tempora me fortuna reservavisset et tum essem 
natus, quando Romani dona accipere^ coepissent! 
non essem passus diutius eos imperare." Ne illi 
multa saecula exspectanda fuerunt; modo enim hoc 
malum in hanc rem publicam invasit. Itaque facile 
patior tum potius Pontium fuisse, siquidem in illo 
tantum fuit roboris. Nondum centum et decem 
anni sunt, cum de pecuniis repetundis a L. Pisone 
lata lex est, nulla antea cum fuisset. At vero postea 
tot leges et proximae quaeque duriores, tot rei, tot 
damnati, tantum [italicumj^ bellum propter iudicio- 
rum metum excitatum, tanta sublatis legibus et 
iudiciis expilatio direptioque sociorum, ut imbecilli- 
tate aliorum, non nostra virtute valeamus. 

76 XXII. Laudat Africanum Panaetius, quod fuerit 
abrtinens. Quidni laudet? Sed in illo aUa maiora ; 

^ sunt B H b, Bt.^; sunt ad victum L c p, Bt.', Heine. 
^dona accipere B H L a p c; accipere dona b, Ed. 
'^tantum\Italicum\ Bake, Edd. ; tatitum Italicum L c p; 
tantum Iliacum B H; tanti militari cum b. 

"The Ital!an or Social War, B.c. 100-88. 

b During the didlatorships of Sulla and Caesar. 


BOOK II. xxi-xxii 

imposition of such a burden, every effort must be 
made to let all the people realize that they must 
bow to the inevitable, if they wish to be saved. And (3) necessiUes of 


it will also be the duty of those who direct the affairs ' 
of the state to take measures that there shall be an 
abundance of the necessities of Hfe. It is needless 
to discuss the ordinary ways and means; for the 
duty is self-evident ; it is necessary only to mention 
the matter. 

But the chief thing in all public administration (4) officiai 
and public service is to avoid even the slightest "^*®^"'^" 
suspicion of self-seeking. I would," says Gaius 
Pontius, the Samnite, that fortune had withheld 
my appearance until a time when the Romans began 
to accept bribes, and that I had been born in those 
days! I should then have suffered them to hold 
their supremacy no longer." Aye, but he would 
have had many generations to wait; for this plague 
has only recently infected our nation. And so I 
rejoice that Pontius lived then instead of now, seeing 
that he was so mighty a man ! It is not yet a hun- 
dred and ten years since the enactment of Lucius 
Piso's bill to punish extortion; there had been no 
such law before. But afterward came so many laws, 
each more stringent than the other, so many men 
were accused and so many convicted, so horrible a 
war* was stirred up on account of the fear of what 
our courts would do to still others, so frightful was 
the pillaging and plundering of the allies when the 
laws and courts were suppressed,^ that now we 
find ourselves strong not in our own strength but in 
the weakness of others. 

XXII. Panaetius praises Africanus for his integrity 
in Dublic life. Why should he not ? But Africanus 



laus abstinentiae ^ non hominis est solum, sed etiam 
temporum illorum. Omni Macedonum gaza, quae 
fuit maxima, potitus [est] ^ Paulus tantum in aerarium 
pecuniae invexit, ut unius imperatoris praeda finem 
attulerit tributorum. At hic nihil domum suam 
intulit praeter memoriam nominis sempiternam. 
Imitatus patrem Africanus nihilo locupletior Cartha- 
gine eversa. Quid ? qui eius collega fuit in censura, 
L. Mummius, numquid copiosior, cum copiosissimam 
urbem funditus sustulisset? Italiam ornare quam 
domum suam maluit ; quamquam Italia ornata domus 
ipsa mihi videtur ornatior. 

77 Nullum igitur vitium taetrius est, ut eo, unde 
egressa est, referat se oratio, quam avaritia, praeser- 
tim in principibus et rem publicam gubernantibus. 
Habere enim quaestui rem publicam non modo 
turpe est, sed sceleratum etiam et nefarium. Itaque, 

Tnst.' <1"°^ Apollo Pythius oraclum edidit, Spartam nulla 

239^"' ^^ *^'* ^^^^ avaritia esse perituram, id videtur non 

solum Lacedaemoniis, sed etiam omnibus opulentis 
populis praedixisse. Nulla autem re conciHare faci- 
lius benivolentiam multitudinis possunt ii, qui rei 
pubhcae praesunt, quam abstinentia et continentia. 

78 Qui vero se populares volunt ob eamque causam 
aut agrariam rem temptant, ut possessores pellantur 
suis sedibus, aut pecunias creditas debitoribus con- 

'^ dbstinentiae L c p, Edd.; sapientiae B II a b. 
^potitus J F. Heusinger; potitus [est\ Edd. ; potitus est 
'^intulit B H b, Edd.; detulit L c p. 

^.Nearly two million pounds steriingf. 

BOOK II. xxii 

had other and greater virtues. The boast of official 
integrity belongs not to that man alone but also to 
his times. When Paulus got possession of all the 
wealth of Macedon — and it was enormous — he brought 
into our treasury so much money ^ that the spoils of a 
single general did away with the need for a tax on 
property in Rome for all time to come. But to his 
own house he brought nothing save the glory of an 
immortal name. Africanus emulated his father's 
example and was none the richer for his overthrow 
of Carthage. And what shall we say of Lucius 
Mummius, his colleague in the censorship ? Was he 
one penny the richer when he had destroyed to its 
foundations the richest of cities? He preferred to 
adorn Italy rather than his own house. And yet by 
the adornment of Italy his own house was, as it 
seems to me, still more splendidly adorned. 

There is, then, to bring the discussion back to the integrity 
point from which it digressed, no vice more offensive 
than avarice, especially in men who stand foremost 
and hold the helm of state. For to exploit the state 
for selfish profit is not only immoral ; it is criminal, 
infamous. And so the oracle, which the Pythian 
Apollo uttered, that Sparta should not fall from any 
other cause than avarice," seems to be a prophecy 
not to the Lacedaemonians alone, but to all wealtliy 
nations as well. They who direct the aflfairs of 
state, then, can win the good-will of the masses by 
no other means more easily than by self-restraint 
and self-denial. 

But they who pose as friends of the people, and xhe menace of 
who for that reason either attempt to have agrarian ^grarian laws. 
laws passed, in order that the occupants may be 
driven out of their homes, or propose that money 



donandas putant, labefactant fundamenta rei pu- 
blicae, concordiam primum, quae esse non potest, cum 
aliis adimuntur^ aliis condonantur pecuniae, deinde 
aequitatem, quae tollitur omnis, si habere suum 
cuique non licet. Id enim est proprium, ut supra 
§ 73 dixi, civitatis atque urbis, ut sit libera et non solli- 

79 cita suae rei cuiusque custodia. Atque in hac per- 
nicie rei publicae ne illam quidem consequuntur, 
quam putant, gratiam; nam cui res erepta est, est 
inimicus, cui data est, etiam dissimulat se accipere 
voluisse et maxime in pecuniis creditis occultat suuni 
gaudium, ne videatur non fuisse solvendo; at vero 

lle, qui accepit^ iniuriam, et meminit et prae se fert 
dolorem suum, nec, si plures sunt ii, quibus inprobe 
datum est, quam illi, quibus iniuste ademptum est, 
idcirco plus etiam valent; non enim numero haec 
iudicantur, sed pondere. Quam autem habet aequi- 
tatem, ut agrum multis annis aut etiam saeculis 
ante possessum, qui nullum habuit, habeat, qui 
autem habuit, amittat? 

80 XXIII. Ac^ propter hoc iniuriae genus Lacedae- 
monii Lysandrum ephorum expulerunt, Agim regem, 
quod numquam antea apud eos acciderat, necaverunt, 
exque eo tempore tantae discordiae secutae sunt, ut 

' accepit L c, Edd. ; accipit B H a b p. 
McEdd.; «/ MSS. 

BOOK II. xxii-xxirl 

loaned should be remitted to the borrowers, are 
undermiuing the foundations of the commonwealth : 
first of all, they are destroying harmony^ which 
cannot exist when money is taken away from one 
party and bestowed upon another ; and secondj they 
do away with equity, which is utterly subverted, if 
the rights of property are not respected. For, as I 
said above, it is the peculiar function of the state 
and the city to guarantee to every man the free and 
undisturbed control of his own particular property. 
And yet, when it comes to measures so ruinous to 
pubhc welfare, they do not gain even that popularity 
which they anticipate. For he who has been robbed 
of his property is their enemy ; he to whom it has 
been turned over actually pretends that he had no 
wish to take it ; and most of all, when his debts are 
cancelled, the debtor conceals his joy, for fear that he 
may be thought to have been insolvent ; whereas the 
victim of the wrong both remembers it and shows 
his resentment openly Thus even though they to 
whom property has been wrongfully awarded be 
more in number than they from whom it has been un- 
justly taken, they do not for that reason have more 
influence; for in such matters influence is measured 
not by numbers but by weight. And how is it fair 
that a man who never had any pi"operty should take 
possession of lands that had been occupied for many 
years or even generations, and that he who had 
them before should lose possession of them ? 

XXIII. Now, it was on account of just this sort of instances of 
wrong-doing that the Spartans banished their ephor fellsiatron. 
Lysander^ and put their king Agis to death — an act 
without precedent in the history of Sparta. From 
that time od — and for the same reason — dissensions 



et tyranni exsisterent et optimates exterminarentur 
et praeclarissime constituta res publica dilaberetur; 
nec vero solum ipsa cecidit, sed etiam reliquam 
Graeciam evertit contagionibus malorum/ quae a 
Lacedaemoniis profectae manarunt latius. Quid? 
nostros Gracchos, Ti. Gracchi summi viri filios, Afri- 
cani nepotes, nonne agrariae coiitentiones perdide- 

81 At vero Aratus Sicyonius iure laudatur, qui, cum 
eius civitas quinquaginta annos a tyrannis teneretur, 
profectus Argis Sicyonem clandestino introitu urbe 
est potitus, cumque tyrannum Nicoclem improviso 
oppressisset,' sescentos exsules, qui locupletissimi 
fuerant eius civitatis, restituit remque publicam ad- 
ventu suo liberavit. Sed cum magnam animadver- 
teret in bonis et possessionibus difficultatem, quod et 
eos, quos ipse restituerat, quorum bona alii possede- 
rant, egere iniquissimum esse arbitrabatur et quin- 
quaginta annorum possessiones moveri^ non nimis 
aequum putabat, propterea quod tam longo spatio 
multa hereditatibus, multa emptionibus, mulla 
dotibus tenebantur sine iniuria, iudicavit neque 
illis adimi nec iis non satis fieri, quorum illa 

82 fuerant, oportere. Cum igitur statuisset opus 
esse ad eam rem constituendam pecunia, Alexan- 
dream se proficisci velle dixit remque integram ad 

^ malorum L c p, -Edd. ; maiorum B H a b. 
* oppressisset L c p, Edd.; pressisset B H a b. 
*moveri L c p, Edd. ; movere B H a b. 


BOOK II. xxiii 

so serious ensued that tyrants arose, the nobles were 
sent into exile, and the state, though most admir- 
ably constituted, crumbled to pieces. Nor did it 
fall alone, but by the contagion of the ills that, 
starting in Lacedaemon, spread widely and more 
widely, it dragged the rest of Greece down to ruin. 
What shall we say of our own Gracchi^ the sons of 
that famous Tiberius Gracchus and grandsons of 
Africanus ? Was it not strife over the agrarian issue 
that caused their downfall and death? 

Aratus of Sicyon, on the other hand, is justly Aratusoi 
praised. When his city had been kept for fifty Sicyon. 
years in the power of its tyrants, he came over 
from Argos to Sicyon, secretly entered the city and 
took it by surprise ; he fell suddenly upon the tyrant 
Nicocles, recalled from banishment six hundred 
exiles who had been the wealthiest men of the city, 
and by his coming made his country free. But he 
found great difficulty in the matter of property and 
its occupancy ; for he considered it most unjust, on 
the one hand, that those men should be left in want 
whom he had restored and of whose property others 
had taken possession ; and he thought it hardly fair, 
on the other hand, that tenure of fifty years' stand- 
ing should be disturbed. For in the course of that 
long period many of those estates had passed into 
innocent hands by right of inheritance, many by 
purchase, many by dower. He therefore decided that 
it would be wrong either to take the property away 
from the present incumbents or to let them keep it 
without compensation to its former possessors. So, 
when he had come to the conclusion that he must 
have money to meet the situation, he announced 
that he meant to make a trip to Alexandria and gave 
s 257 

reditum suum iussit esse, isque eeleriter ad Ptolo- 
maeum, suum hospitem, venit, qui tum regnabat 
alter post Alexandream conditam. Cui^ cum ex- 
posuisset patriam se liberare velle causamque do- 
cuisset, a rege opulento vir summus facile impetravit, 
ut grandi pecunia adiuvaretur. Quam cum Sicyonem 
attulisset, adhibuit sibi in consiHum quindecim prin- 
cipes, cum quibus causas cognovit et eorum, qui 
aliena tenebant, et eorum, qui sua amiserant, per- 
fecitque aestimandis possessionibus, ut persuaderet 
aliis, ut pecuniam accipere mallent, possessionibus 
cederent, aUis, ut commodius putarent numerari sibi, 
quod tanti esset, quam suum recuperare. Ita per- 
fectum est, ut omnes concordia constituta sine querella 
83 O virum magnum dignumque, qui in re pubhca 
nostra natus esset! Sic par est agere cum civibus, 
non, ut bis iam vidimus, hastam in foro ponere et 
bona civium voci subicere^ praeconis. At ille Graecus, 
id quod fuit sapientis et praestantis viri, omnibus 
consulendum putavit, eaque est simima ratio et sa- 
pientia boni civis, commoda civium non divellere 
atque omnis aequitate eadem continere. Habitent 

* cui Edd.; qui MSS. 

"^subicere L c p, Edd.; subiacere B H a b. 


BOOK II. xxiii 

orders that matters should remain as they were until 
his return. And so he went in haste to his friend 
Ptolemy, then upon the throne, the second king 
after the founding of Alexandria. To him he ex- 
plained that he wished to restore constitutional 
hberty to his country and presented his case to him. 
And, being a man of the highest standing, he easily 
secured from that wealthy king assistance in the 
form of a large sum of money. And when he had 
returned with this to Sicyon, he called into counsel 
with him fifteen of the foremost men of the city. 
With them he investigated the cases both of those 
who were holding possession of other people's pro- 
perty and of those who had lost theirs. And he 
managed by a valuation of the properties to persuade 
some that it was more desirable to accept money and 
surrender their present holdings; others he con- 
vinced that it was more to their interest to take a 
fair price in cash for their lost estates than to try to 
recover possession of what had been their own. As 
a resultj harmony was preserved^ and all oarties went 
their way without a word of complaint. 

A great statesman^ and worthy to have been justicethe 
born in our commonwealth ! That is the right way °t T^'^"!!?^* ° 
to deal with one's fellow-citizens, and not^ as we have 
already witnessed on two occasions, to plant the 
spear in the forum and knock down the property of 
citizens under the auctioneer's hammer. But yon 
Greek, hke a wise and excellent man, thought that 
he must look out for the welfare of all. And this 
is the highest statesmanship and the soundest wisdom 
on the part of a good citizen, not to divide the in- 
terests of the citizens but to unite all on the basis of 
impartial justice. Let them Hve in their neighbours 
s2 2.^9 


gratis in alieno. Quid ita? ut, cum ego emerim, 
aedificarim, tuear, impendam, tu me invito fruare 
meo? Quid est aliud aliis sua eripere, aliis dare 
84 aliena? Tabulae vero novae quid habent argumenti, 
nisi ut emas mea pecunia fundum, eum tu habeas, 
ego non habeam pecuniam? 

XXIV. Quam ob rem ne sit aes alienum, quod rei 
publicae noceat, providendum est, quod multis ra- 
tionibus caveri potest, non, si fuerit, ut locupletes 
suum perdant, debitores lucrentur alienum; nec 
enim ulla res vehementius rem pubHcam continet 
quam fides, quae esse nulla potest, nisi erit neces- 
saria solutio rerum creditarum. Numquam velie- 
mentius actum est quam rae consule, ne solveretur ; 
armis et castris temptata res est ab omni genere 
hominum et ordine ; quibus ita restiti, ut hoc totum 
malum de re pubhca tolleretur. Numquam nec 
maius aes ahenum fuit nec meUus nec facihus disso- 
lutum est; fraudandi enim spe sublata solvendi 
necessitas consecuta est. At vero hic nunc victor, 
tum quidem victus, quae cogitarat, ea^ perfecit, cum 
eius iam nihil interesset. Tanta in eo peccandi 
libido fuit, ut hoc ipsum eum delectaret, peccare, 
etiamsi causa non esset. 

' cogitarat, ^a B H a b, Bt.*, Miiller; cogitarat, acni ipsius 
intererat, tum ea c p, Bt.', Heine. 

aAn assumed appeal to one of Caesar's edicts. 

b Caesar, it seems, had had some part in the schemes of 
CatilineinB.C. 63and possibly in the plotofB.C. 66-65. When 
his conquests in Gaul had fieed him from his debts and 
made him rich, his party, with his consent, passed(B.C. 49) 
the obnoxious legislation here referred to — that all interest 
in arrears should bc remiltcd, and that that which had been 
paid should be deducted from the principal, 


BOOK II. xxiii-xxiv 

house rent-free."* Why so? In order that^ when I 
have bought, built, kept up^ and spent my money 
upon a place, you may without niy consent enjoy 
what belongs to me? What else is that but to rob 
one man of what belongs to him and to give to 
84 another what does not belong to him? And what 
is the meaning of an abolition of debts, except that 
you buy a farm with my money ; thct yon have the 
farm, and I have not my money ? 

XXIV. We must, therefore, take measures that Economics o 
there shall be no indebtedness of a nature to en- 
danger the pubHc safety. It is a menace that can 
be averted in many ways ; but should a serious debt 
be incurred, we are not to allow the rich to lose 
their property, while the debtors profit by what is 
their neighbour's. For there is nothing that upholds 
a government more powerfully than its credit ; and 
it can have no credit, unless the payment of debts 
is enforced by law. Never were measures for the 
repudiation of debts more strenuously agitated than 
in my consulship. Men of every sort and rank 
attempted with arms and armies to force the project 
through. But I opposed them with such energy 
tliat this plague was wholly eradicated from the body 
poUtic. Indebtedness was never greater ; debts were 
never Hquidated more easily or more fully ; for the 
hope of defrauding the creditor was cut ofF and pay- 
ment was enforced by law. But the present victor, 
though vanquished then, still carried out his old 
design, when it was no longer of any personal ad- 
vantage to him.** So great was his passion for wrong- 
doing that the very doing of wrong was a joy to him 
for its own sake, even when there was no motive 
for it. 



85 Ab hoc igitur genere largitionis, ut aliis detur, aliis 
auferatur^ aberunt ii, qui rem publicam tuebuntur, in 
primisque operam dabunt, ut iuris et iudiciorum 
aequitate suum quisque teneat et neque tenuiores 
propter humilitatem circumveniantur neque locuple- 
tibus ad sua vel tenenda vel recuperanda obsit 
invidia, praeterea, quibuscumque rebus vel belU vel 
domi poterunt, rem publicam augeant imperio, agris, 

Haec magnorum hominum sunt, haec apud maiores 
nostros factitata, haec genera officiorum qui perse- 
quentur,^ cum summa utihtate rei pubhcae magnam 
ipsi adipiscentur et gratiam et gloriam. 

86 In his autem utiHtatum praeceptis Antipater Ty- 
rius Stoicus, qui Athenis nuper est mortuus, duo 
praeterita censet esse a Panaetio, valetudinis cura- 
tionem et pecuniae; quas res a summo philosopho 
praeteritas arbitror, quod essent faciles; sunt certe 
utiles. Sed valetudo sustentatur notitia sui corporis 
et observatione, quae res aut prodesse soleant aut 
obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque cultu cor- 
poris tuendi causa [praetermittendis voluptatibus],^ 
postremo arte eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec 

^ persequentur c; persequuntur b, Bt.''^; persecuntur B H p, 
B(:.\ Heine. 

^ praetermittendis voluptatibus MSS. ; del. Heine, Edd. 


BOOK II. xxiv 

Those, then, whose office it is to look after the 
interests of the state will refrain from that form of 
hberality which robs one man to enrich another. 
Above all, they will use their best endeavours that Administration 
every one shall be protected in the possession of his in equity. 
own property by the fair administration of the law 
and the courts, that the poorer classes shall not be 
oppressed because of their helplessness, and that 
envy shall not stand in the way of the rich, to prevent 
them from keeping or recovering possession of what 
justly belongs to them ; they must strive, too, by what- 
ever means they can, in peace or in war, to advance 
the state in power, in territory, and in revenues. 

Such service calls for great men ; it was commonly 
rendered in the days of our ancestors ; if men will 
perform duties such as these, they will win popu- 
larity and glory for themselves and at the same time 
render eminent service to the state. 

Now, in this list of rules touching expediency, Sanitation. 
Antipater of Tyre, a Stoic philosopher who recently 
died at Athens, claims that two points were over- 
looked by Panaetius — the care of health and of 
property. I presume that the eminent philosopher 
overlooked these two items because they present no 
difficulty. At all events they are expedient. Al- 
though they are a matter of course, I will still say a 
few words on the subject. Individual health is pre- 
served by studying one's own constitution, by observ- 
ing what is good or bad for one, by constant self- 
control in supplying physical wants and comforts 
(but only to the extent necessary to self-preserva- 
tion), by foregoing sensual pleasures, and finally, by 
the professional skill of those to whose science these 
matters belong. 



87 Res autem familiaris quaeri debet iis rebus, a 
quibus abest turpitudo, conservari autem diligentia 
et parsimoniaj eisdem etiam rebus augeri. Has res 
coramodissime Xenophon Socraticus persecutus est 
in eo libro, qui Oeconomicus inscribitur, quem nos, 
ista fere aetate cum essemus, qua es tu nunc, e 
Gi'aeco in Latinum convertimus. ^Sed toto hoc de 
genere^ de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, 
(vellem^ etiam de utenda) commodius a quibusdam 
optimis viris ad lanum^ medium sedentibus quam 
ab ullis philosophis ulla in schola disputatur. Sunt 
tamen ea cognoscenda ; pertinent eaim ad utilitatem, 
de qua hoc libro disputatum est.^ 

88 XXV. Sed utiUtatum comparatio, quoniam hic 
locus erat quartus, a Panaetio praetermissus, saepe 
est necessaria. Nam et corporis commoda cum ex- 
ternis [et externa cum corporis]^ et ipsa inter se 
corporis et externa cum externis comparari solent. 
Cum externis corporis hoc modo compai-antur, valere 
ut malis quam dives esse, [cum corporis externa hoc 
modo, dives esse potius quam maximis corporis viri- 
bus,]^ ipsa inter se corporis sic, ut bona valetudo 
voluptati anteponatur, vires celeritati, externorum 
autem, ut gloi"ia divitiis, vectigaHa urhana rusticis. 

89 Ex quo genere comparationis illud est Catonis senis : 

^Sed . . . disputatum est transposed from § 90 by Unger, 
Edd. ^vellem c p, Bt.', Ed.; not in B H a b, Bt.« 

^ lanunt c, Edd.; ianuae B H a b p. 

*\et . . . corporis\ bracketed by Unger, Edd. 

' \cuni corporis . . . corporis viribus] bracketed by Ungcr, 


BOOK II. xxiv-xxv 

As for property, it is a duty to make money, but Finance. 
only by honourable means; it is a duty also to save 
it and increase it by care and thrift. These prin- 
ciples Xenophon, a pupil of Socrates, has set forth 
most happily in his book entitled Oeconomicus." 
When I was about your present age, I translated it 
from the Greek into Latin. 

But this whole subject of acquiring money, invest- 
ing money (l wish I could include also spending 
money) is more profitably discussed by certain worthy 
gentlemen on 'Change" than could be done by any 
philosophers of any school. For all that, we must 
take cognizance of them ; for they come fitly under 
the head of expediency, and that is the subject of 
the present book. 

XXV. But it is often necessary to weigh one Comparison of 
expediency against another ; — for this, as I stated, is a «xp^diencies. 
fourth point overlooked by Panaetius. For not only 
are pliysical advantages regularly compared with out- 
ward advantages [and outward^ with physical], but 
physical advantages are compared with one another, 
and outward with outward. Physical advantages 
are compared with outward advantages in some such 
way as this : one may ask whether it is more desir- 
able to have health than wealth; [external advan- 
tages with physical, thus : whether it is better to have 
wealth than extraordinary bodily strength;] while 
tlie physical advantages may be weighed against one 
another, so that good health is preferred to sensual 
pleasure, strength to agility. Outward advantages 
also may be weighed against one another : glory, for 
example, may be preferred to riches, an income 
derived IVom city property to one derived from the 
farm. To this class of comparisons belongs that 



a qu6 cum quaereretur, quid maxime in re familiari 
expediretj respondit: Bene pascere " ; quid secun- 
dum: Satis bene pascere " ; quid tertium : ^ Male 
pascere"; quidquartum: Arare"; et cum ille, qui 
quaesierat, dixisset: Quid faenerari?", tum Cato: 
"Quid hominem," inquit, occidere?" 

Ex quo et multis aliis intellegi debet utilitatum 
comparationes fieri solere, recteque hoc adiunctum 
esse quartum exquirendorum officiorum genus.^ 

Reliqua deinceps persequemur. 

^ guid tertium : " Male pasaere " c p, Edd. ; not in B H a b. 
'■^ officiorum genus. Heie foUows in MSS. Sed toto . . . dis- 
putatum est transposed to § 87. 



famous saying of old Cato's : when he was asked 
what was the most profitable feature of an estate^ he 
replied : Raising cattle successfully." What next 
to that? Raising cattle with fair success." And 
next? Raising cattle with but slight success." 
And fourth? Raising crops." And when his 
questioner said, How about money-lending ? " Cato 
replied: How about murder?" 

From this as well as from many other incidents we 
ought to realize that expediencies have often to be 
weighed against one another and that it is proper 
for us to add this fourth division in the discussion of 
moral duty. 

Let us now pass on to the remaining problems. 





I. P. Scipionem, M.^ fili, eum, qui primus Africa- 
nus appellatus est, dicere solitum scripsit Cato, qui 
fuit eius fere aequalis, numquam se minus otiosum 
essej quam cum otiosus^ nec minus solum, quam cum 
solus esset. Magnifica vero vox et magno viro ac 
sapiente digna ; quae declarat illum et in otio de ne- 
gotiis cogitare et in solitudine secum loqui solitum, 
ut neque cessaret umquam et interdum colloquio 
alterius non egeret. Ita duae res, quae languorem 
afFerxmt ceteris, illum acuebant, otium et solitudo. 
Vellem nobis hoc idem vere dicere liceret; sed si 
minus imitatione tantam ingenii praestantiam con- 
sequi possumus, voluntate certe proxime accedimus ; 
nam et a re publica forensibusque negotiis armis 
impiis vique prohibiti otium persequimur et ob eam 
causam urbe relicta rura peragrantes saepe soli 

Sed nec hoc otium cum Africani otio nec haec 
solitudo cum illa comparanda est. Ille enim requi- 
escens a rei publicae pulcherrimis muneribus otium 
sibi sumebat ahquando et e^ coetu hominum fre- 
quentiaque interdum tamquam in portum se in soli- 

' J/. Nonius ; Marce MSS. 
*e c, Edd. ; a a ; not in B H b. 


I. CatOj who was of about the same years, Marcus, Preface: Scipio 
my son, as that Publius Scipio who first bore the *°'^^'"'°- 
surname of Africanus, has given us the state- 
ment that Scipio used to say that he was never less 
idle than when he had nothing to do and never less 
lonely than when he was alone. An admirable 
sentiment, in truth, and becoming to a great and 
wise man. It shows that even in his leisure hours 
^is thoughts were occupied with public business and 
that he used to commune with himself when alone ; 
and so not only was he never unoccupied, but he 
sometimes had no need for company. The two 
conditionsj then, that prompt others to Idleness — 
leisure and sohtude — only spijrred him on. I wish 
I could say the same of myself and say it truly. But 
if by imitation I cannot attain to such excellence of 
character, in aspiration, at all events, I approach it as 
nearly as I can ; for as I am kept by force of armed 
treason away from practical pohtics and from my 
practice at the bar, I am now leading a life of leisure. 
For that reason I have left the city and, wandering in 
the country from place to place, I am often alone. 

But I should not compare this leisure of mine 
with that of Africanus, nor this soHtude with his. 
For he, to find leisure from his splendid services 
to his country, used to take a vacation now and then 
and to retreat from the assembhes and the throngs 
of men into solitude, as into a haven of rest. But 


tudinem recipiebat^ nostrum autem otium negotii 
inopia, non requiescendi studio constitutum est. 
Exstincto enim senatu deletisque iudiciis quid est 
quod dignum nobis aut in curia aut in foro agere 

3 possimus? Ita, qui in maxima celebritate atque in 
oculis civium quondam vixerimus, nunc fugientes 
conspectum sceleratorum, quibus omnia redundant, 
abdimus nos, quantum licet, et saepe soli sumus. Sed 
quia sic ab hominibus doctis accepimus, non solum 
ex malis eligere minima oportere, sed etiam excer- 
pere ex his ipsis,^ si quid inesset boni, propterea et 
otio fruor, non illo quidem, quo debebat is,^ qui 
quondam peperisset otium civitati, nec eam solitu- 
dinem languere patior, quam mihi affert necessitas, 
non voluntas. 

4 Quamquam Africanus maiorem laudem meo iudicio 
assequebatur. Nulla enim eius ingenii monumenta 
mandata litteris, nullum opus otii, nullum sohtudinis 
munus exstat; ex quo intellegi debet illum mentis 
agitatione investigationeque earum rerum, quas 
cogitando consequebatur, nec otiosum nec solum 
umquam fuisse ; nos autem, qui non tantum roboris 
habemus, ut cogitatione tacita a* solitudine abstra- 
hamur, ad hanc scribendi operam omne studium 
curamque convertimus. Itaque plura brevi tempore 
eversa quam multis annis stante re publica scripsi- 

^ex his tpsis c, Edd. ; ex his a ; ex ipsis B H b. 
^debehat is c, Edd.; dcbeat B H b; debcat is corr. 'v\ 
debeat a. 
'a c, Edd. ; not in B H a b. 



my leisure is foreed upon me by want of public Theorator*t 

1 . . . j 1 1 • /• retirement. 

busmess, not prompted by any desire for repose. 
For now that the senate has been abolished and the 
courts have been closed, what is there, in keeping with 
my self-respect, that I can do either in the senate- 
chamber or in the forum? So, although I once 
lived amid throngs of people and in the greatest 
publicity, I am now shunning the sight of the mis- 
creants with whom the world abounds and with- 
drawing from the public eye as far as I may, and I 
am often alone, But I have learned from philoso- 
phers that among evils one ought not only to choose 
the least, but also to extract even from these any 
element of good that they may contain. For that 
reason, I am turning my leisure to account — thougli 
it is not such repose as the man should be entitled 
to who once brought the state repose from civil 
strife — and I am not letting this solitude, which 
necessity and not my will imposes on me, find me idle. 
And yet, in my judgment, Africanus earned the 
higher praise. For no literary monuments of his 
genius have been published, we have no work pro- 
duced in his leisure hours, no product of his solitude. 
From this fact we may safely infer that, because ot 
the activity of his mind and the study of those prob- 
lems to which he used to direct his thought, he 
was never unoccupied, never lonely. But I have 
not strength of mind enough by means of silent 
meditation to forget my solitude; and so I have 
turned all my attention and endeavour to this kind 
of literary work. I have, accordingly, written more 
in this short time since the downfall of the republic 
than I did in the course of many years, while the 
republic stood. 

T 278 


5 II. Sed cum tota philosophia, mi Cicero, frugifera 
et fructuosa nec ulla pars eius inculta ac deserta sit, 
tum nullus feracior in ea locus est nec uberior ^ quam 
de officiis, a quibus constanter honesteque vivendi 
praecepta ducuntur. Quare, quamquam a Cratippo 
nostrOj principe huius memoriae philosoph( am, haec 
te assidue audire atque accipere confido, tamen con- 
ducere arbitror talibus aures tuas vocibus undique 
circumsonare, nec eas, si fieri possit, quicquam ahud 

6 audire. Quod cum omnibus est faciendum, qui 
vitam honestam ingredi cogitant, tum haud scio an 
nemini potius quam tibi; sustines enim non parvam 
exspectationem imitandae industriae nostrae, magnam 
honorum, non nullam fortasse nominis. Suscepisti 
onus praeterea grave et Athenarum et Cratippi ; ad 
quos cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium 
sis profectus, inanem redire turpissimum est dede- 
corantem et urbis auctoritatem et magistri. Quare, 
quantum coniti animo potes, quantum labore con- 
tendere, si discendi labor est potius quam voluptas, 
tantum fac ut efficias neve committas, ut, cum' 
omnia suppeditata sint a nobis, tute tibi defuisse 

Sed haec hactenus; multa enim saepe ad te 


*uberior c, Edd.; uerior B H a b. 
'ut, cum c, Edd.; ut ne, cum B II a b. 

II. But, my dear Cicero, while tlie whole field of YoungCicero 

1 ., 1 • /• fi 1 1 ,. 1 .. admonished to 

pnilosophy is lertile and productive and no portiou diligence in bis 

of it bai-ren and waste, still no part is richer or more ®'"'^'^*- 

fruitful than that which deals with nioral duties ; for 

from these are derived the rules for leading a con- 

sistent and moral hfe. And therefore, although 

you are, as I trust, dihgently studying and profiting 

by these precepts under the direction of our friend 

Cratippus, the foremost philosopher of the present 

age, I still think it well that your ears should be 

dinned with such precepts from every side and that, 

if it could be, they should hear nothing else. 

These precepts must be laid to heart by all who 

look forward to a career of honour, and I am 

inchned to think that no one needs them more than 

you. For you will have to fulfil the eager anticipa- 

tion that you will imitate my industry, the confident 

expectation that you will emulate my course of pohtical 

honours, and the hope that you will, perhaps, rival my 

name and fame. You have, besides, incurred a heavy 

responsibihty on account of Athens and Cratippus : 

for since you have gone to them for the purchase, 

as it were, of a store of Hberal culture, it would be 

a great discredit to you to return empty-handed, 

tliereby disgracing the high reputation of the city 

and of your master. Therefore, put forth the best 

mental effort of which you are capable; work as 

hard as you can (if learning is work rather than 

pleasure); do your very best to succeed; and do not, 

when I have put all the necessary means at your 

disposal, allow it to be said that you have failed to 

do your part. 

But enough of this. For I have written again 
and again for your encouragement. Let us now 
to 275 

cohortandi gratia scripsimus; nunc ad reliquam 
partem propositae divisionis revertamur. 

7 Panaetius igitur, qui sine controversia de officiis 
accuratissime disputavit, quemque nos correctione 
quadam adhibita potissimum secuti sumus, tribus 
generibus propositis, in quibus deUberare homines et 
consultare de officio solerent, uno, cum dubitarent, 
honestumne id esset, de quo ageretur, an turpe, 
altero, utilene esset an inutile, tertio, si id, quod 
speciem haberet honesti, pugnaret cum eo, quod 
utile videretur, quo modo ea discerni oporteret, de 
duobus generibus primis tribus hbris exphcavit, de 
tertio autem genere deinceps se scripsit dicturum nec 

8 exsolvit id, quod promiserat. Quod eo magis miror, 
quia scriptum a discipulo eius Posidonio est triginta 
annis vixisse Panaetium, posteaquam illos hbros 
edidisset. Quem locum miror a Posidonio breviter 
esse tactum in quibusdam commentariis, praesertim 
cum scribat nullum esse locum in tota philosophia 
tam necessarium. 

9 Minime vero assentior iis, qui negant eum locum 
a Panaetio praetermissum, sed consulto rehctum, nec 
omnino scribendum fuisse, quia numquam posset 
utihtas cum honestate pugnare. De quo alterum 
potest habere dubitationem, adhibendumne fuerit 
hoc genus, quod in divisione Panaeti tertium est, an 
plane omittendum, alterum dubitari non potest, quin 


feOOK tit ii 

return to the remaiiiing section of our subjeet as 

Panaetius, then, has given us what is unquestion- Panaetiuson 
ably the most thorough discussion of moral duties MoralDuties. 
that we have, and I have followed him in the main 
— but with shght modifications. He classifies under ■ 
three general heads the ethical problems which 
people are accustomed to consider and weigh : first, 
the question whether the matter in hand is morally 
right or morally wrong ; second, whether it is ex- 
pedient or inexpedient ; third, how a decision ought 
to be reached, in case tliat which has the appearance 
of being morally right clashes with that which seems 
to be expedient. He has treated the first two heads 
at length in three books ; but while he has stated 
that he meant to discuss the third head in its proper 
turn, he has never fulfilled his promise. And I 
wonder the more at this, because Posidonius, a pupil 
of his, records that Panaetius was still aUve thirty 
years after he pubhshed those three books. And I 
am surprised that Posidonius has but briefly touched 
upon this subject in certain memoirs of his, and 
especially, as he states that there is no otlier topic in 
the whole range of philosophy so essentially impor- 
tant as this. 

Now, I cannot possibly accept the view of those Why Panaetius 
who say that that point was not overlooked but pur- °'confl'|cr^ of 
posely omitted by Panaetius, and that it was not one ^^^ moral and 

,1 , j j j. • 1 ii theexpedient. 

that ever needed discussion, because there never can 
be such a thing as a conflict between expediency and 
moral rectitude. But with regard to this assertion, 
the one point may admit of doubt — whether that 
question which is third in Panaetius's classification 
ought to have been included or omitted altogether; 


a Panaetio susceptum sit, sed relictum. Nam qui e 
divisione tripertita duas partes absolverit, huic 
nccesse est restare tertiam; praeterea in extremo 
libro tertio de hac parte polHcetur se deinceps esse 

1 dicturum. Accedit eodem testis locuples Posidonius, 
qui etiam scribit in quadam epistula P. RutiHum 
Rufum dicere solere, qui Panaetium audierat, ut 
nemo pictor esset inventus, qui in Coa Venere eam 
partem, quam Apelles inchoatam reliquisset, absol- 
veret (oris enim pulchritudo reliqui corporis imitandi 
spem auferebat), sic ea, quae Panaetius praetermi- 
sisset [et non perfecisset] * propter eorum, quae per- 
fecisset, praestantiam neminem persecutum. 

11 III. Quam ob rem de iudicio Panaeti dubitari non 
potest; rectene autem hanc tertiam partem ad ex- 
quirendum officium adiunxerit an secus, de eo for- 
tasse disputari potest. Nam, sive honestum solum 
bonum est, ut Stoicis placet, sive, quod honestum 
est, id ita summum bonum est, quem ad modum 
Peripateticis vestris videtur, ut omnia ex altera parte 
collocata vix minimi momenti instar habeant, dubi- 
tandum non est, quin numquam possit utilitas cum 
honestate contendere. Itaque accepimus Socratem 
exsecrari solitum eos, qui primum haec natura cohae- 
rentia opinione distraxissent. Cui quidem ita sunt 
Stoici assensi, ut et, quicquid lionestum esset, id 

^etnonperfecisset MSS.; del. Muretus; bracketedby Edd. 

BOOK III. ii-iii 

but the other point is not open to debate — that it 
was included in Panaetius's plan but left unwritten. 
For if a writer Jias finished two divisions of a three- 
fold subject, the third must necessarily remain for 
him to do. Besides, he promises at the close of the 
third book that he will discuss this division also in its 
proper turn. We have also in Posidoniiis a com- 
petent witness to the fact. He writes in oiie of his 
ietters that Publius Rutihus Rufus, who also was a 
pupil of Panaetius's, used to say that as no painter 
had been found to complete that part of the Venus ot 
Cos which Apelles had left unfinished (for the beauty 
of her face made hopeless any attempt adequately to 
represent the rest of the figure), so no one, because 
of the surpassing excellence of what Panaetius did 
complete, would venture to supply what he had left 

III. In regard to Panaetius's real intentions, rheconflict 
therefore, no doubt can be entertained. But dfemfy an/^*" 
whether he was or was not iustified in adding this Morai Rectitude 

" , only apparent. 

third division to the inquiry about duty may, per- 
haps, be a matter for debate. For whether moraiL 
goodness is the only good, as the Stoics believe, or 
whether, as your Peripatetics think, moral goodness 
is in so far the highest good that everything else 
gathered together into the opposing scale would 
have scarcely the slightest weight, it is beyond 
question that expediency can never conflict with 
moral rectitude. And so, we have heard, Socrates 
used to pronounce a curse upon those who first drew 
a conceptual distinction between things naturally 
inseparable. With this doctrine the Stoics are in 
agreement in so far as they maintain that if anything 



uthe esse censerent nec utile quicquam, quod .lon 

12 Quodsi is esset Panaetius, qui virtutem propterea 
colendam diceret, quod ea efficiens utilitatis esset, 
ut ii, qui res expetendas vel voluptate vel indolentia 
metiuntur, liceret ei dicere utilitatem aliquando 
cum honestate pugnare ; sed cum sit is^ qui id solum 
bonom iudicet, quod honestum sit, quae autem huic 
repugnent specie quadam utilitatis, eorum neque 
accessione meliorem vitam fieri nec decessione 
peiorem, non videtur debuisse eius modi delibera- 
tionem introducere, in qua, quod utile videretur, 

13 cum eo, quod honestum est, compararetur. Etenim 
quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter 
naturae vivere, id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam : 
cum virtute congruere semper, cetera autem, quae 
secundum naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti 
non repugnarent. Quod cum ita sit, putant quidam 
hanc comparationem non recte introductam, nec 
omnino de eo genere quicquam praecipiendum fuisse. 

Atque^ illud quidem honestum, quod proprie 
vereque dicitur, id in sapientibus est solis neque a 
virtute divelli umquam potest; in iis autem, in qui- 
bus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud qui- 
dem perfectum honestum nuUp modo, similitu- 

14 dines honesti esse possunt. Haec enim officia, de 
quibus his Hbris disputamus, media Stoici appellant; 
ea communia sunt et late patent; quae et ingenii 

^Atque MSS., Bt.', Miiller, Heine ; atqui Fleckeisen, 
Bt.», Ed. 

• See note on I, 8. 

BOOK III. iii 

is morally right, it is expedient, and if anything is 
not morally right, it is not expedient. 

But if Panaetius were the sort of man to say that 
virtue is worth cultivating only because it is produc- 
tive of advantage, as do certain philosophers who 
measure the desirableness of things by the standard 
of pleasure or of absence of pain, he might argue that 
expediency sometimes clashes with moral rectitude. 
But since he is a man who judges that the morally 
right is the only good, and that tliose things which 
come in conflict with it have only the appearance of 
expediency and cannot make life any better by their 
presence nor any worse by their absence, it follows 
that he ought not to have raised a question involv- 
ing the weighing of what seems expedient against 
what is morally right. Furthermore, when the 
Stoics speak of the supreme good as "-living coniorm- 
ably to nature," they mean, as I take it, something 
like this : that we are always to be in accord with 
virtue, and from all other things that may be in 
harmony with nature to choose only such as are not 
incompatible with virtue. This being so, some 
people are of the opinion that it was not riglit to 
introduce this counterbalancing of right and expedi- 
ency and that no practical instruction should have 
been given on this question at all. 

And yet moral goodness, in the true and proper 
sense of the term, is the exclusive possession of the 
wise and can never be separated from virtue; but 
those who have not perfect wisdom cannot possibly 
have perfect moral goodness, but only a semblance 
of it. And indeed these duties under discussion in 
these books the Stoics call mean duties " ^; they are a xhe "absoiute 
common possession and have wide application ; and ^*"^ ^^ "mean 



honitate multi assequuntur et progressione discendi. 
Illud autem officium, quod rectum idem appellant, 
perfectum atque absolutum est et, ut idem dicunt, 
omnes numeros habet nec praeter sapientem cadere 

15 in quemquam potest. Cum autem aliquid actum 
est, in quo media officia compareant,^ id cumulate 
videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod volgus, quid 
ahsit a perfecto, non fere intellegit; quatenus autem 
intellegit, nihil putat praetermissum ; quod idem^in 
poematis, in picturis usu venit in ahisque compluri- ,. 
bus, ut delectentur imperiti laudentque ea, quae lau- J^ 
danda non sint, ob eam, credo, causam, quod insit in 
iis^ aUquid probi, quod capiat ignaros, qui quidem,* 
quid in una quaque re vitii sit, nequeant iudicare ; ita- 
que, cum sunt docti a peritis, desistunt facile sententia. 

IV. Haec igitur officia, de quihus his Hbris disseri- 
mus, quasi secunda quaedam lionesta esse dicunt, 
non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni homi- 

16 num genere communia. Itaque iis omnes, in quibus 
est virtutis indoles, commoventur. Nec vero, cum 
duo Decii aut duo Scipiones fortes viri commemo- 
rantur, aut cum Fabricius [aut Aristides]^ iustus 
nominatur, aut ab ilHs fortitudinis aut ab hoc*' iustitiae 
tamquam a sapiente petitur exemplum ; nemo enim 

^ compareant Anemoecius, Edd.; comparant B H a b; 
appareant c ; comparent p. 

^idem Nonius, Muller, Heine \autcm B H a b ; item c, Bt. 

3 iis Baiter, Miiller, Hetne ; his B H a b ; hijs c. 

* qui quidem many MSS., B\^,Mu\\Gr;quiidem B H abc ; 
qui[idem]Bi.^,\le\ne. ^ aut Aristides (Aristidesve p) 

MSS., Lactantius; bracketed by J. M. Heuainger, Edd. 

^hoc Lactantius, Edd., his MSS^^ 

aLe.,fills all the requirements of absoluteperfection— an 
allusion to the Pylhagorean doctrine that specific numbers 
stand for perfection of specific kinds; " absolute duty" 
«^■Tibines them all. 

BOOK III. iii-iv 

many people attain to the knowledge of them through 
natural goodness of heart and through advancement 
in Learning. But that duty which those same Stoics call 
right" is perfect and absolute and satisfies all the 
numbers," ^ as that same school says, and is attainable 

1 5 by none except the wise man. On the other hand, 
when some act is performed in which we see mean" 
duties manifested, that is generally regarded as 
fully perfect, for the reason that the common crowd 
does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls shortof 
real perfection; but as far as their comprehension 
does go, they think there is no deficiency. This same 
thing ordinarily occurs in the estimation of poems, 
paintings, and a great many other works of art: 
ordinary people enjoy and praise things that do not 
deserve praise. The reason for this, I suppose, is 
that those productions have some point of excellence 
which catches the fancy of the uneducated, because 
these have not the ability to discover the points of 
weakness in any particular piece of work before 
them. And so, when they are instructed by experts, 
they readily abandon their former opinion. 

IV. The performance of the duties, then, which I Absoiute good- 
am discussing in these books, is called by the Stoics "e^^^huma^hyr 
a sort of second-grade moralgoodness,notthe peculiar 
property of theirwise men,butshared bythem withall 

1 6 mankind. Accordingly, such duties appeal to all men 
who have a natural disposition to virtue. And when 
the two Decii or the two Scipios are mentioned as 

brave men" or Fabricius [or Aristides] is called "the 
just," it is not at all that the former are quoted as 
perfect models of courage or the latter as a perfect 
model of justice, as if we had in one of them the 
ideal wise man." For no one of them was wise in 


horum sic sapiens,ut sapientem volumus intellegi, nec 
ii, qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et C. 
Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem, 
sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia simiUtudinem 
quandam gerebant speciemque sapientium. 

17 Quocirca nec id, quod vere honestum est, fas est 
cum utiUtatis repugnantia comparari, nec id, quod 
communiter appellamus honestum, quod colitur ab 
iis, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt, cum emolumen- 
tis umquam est comparandum, tamque id honestum, 
quod in nostram intellegentiam cadit, tuendum 
conservanduinque nobis est quam illud, quod proprie 
dicitur vereque est honestum, sapientibus; aUter 
enim teneri non potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta 

Sed haec quidem de iis, qui conservatione officio- 
rum existimantur boni. 

18 Qui autem omnia metiuntur emolumentis et com- 

modis neque ea volunt praeponderari honestate, ii 

solent in deUberando honestum cum eo, quod utile 

putant, comparare, boni viri non solent. Itaque 

existimo Panaetium, cum dixerit homines solere in 

hac comparatione dubitare, lioc ipsum sensisse, quod 

dixerit, solere"modo,nonetiam oportere." Etenim 

non modo pluris putare, quod utile videatur, quam 


the sense in which avc wish to have wise " understood ; 
neither were Marcus Cato and Gaius LaeHus wise, 
though they were so considered and were surnamed 
'the wise." Not even the famous Seven were 
wise." But because of their constant observance of 
mean" duties they bore a certain semblance and 
Hkeness to wise men. 

For these reasons it is unlawful either to weigh 
true morahty against conflicting expediency, or 
common morahty, which is culiivated by those who 
wish to be considered good men, against what 
is profitable ; but we every-day people must observe 
and Hve up to that moral right which comes 
within the range of our comprehension as jealously 
as the truly wise men have to observe and Hve up 
to that which is moraHy right in the technical and 
true sense of the word. For otherwise we cannot 
maintain such progress as we have made in the 
direction of virtue. 

So much for those who have won a reputation for 
being good men by their careful observance of duty. 

Those, on the other hand, who measure every- Morai rectitude 
thing by a standard of profits and personal advantage exped^ency"' 
and refuse to have these outweighed by considera- 
tions of moral rectitude are accustomed, in consider- 
ing any question, to weigh the moraHy right against 
what they think the expedient; good men are not. 
And so I beHeve that when Panaetius stated that 
people were accustomed to hesitate to do such 
weighing, he meant precisely what he said — merely 
that such was their custom," not that such was 
their duty. And he gave it no approval ; for it is 
most immoral to think more highly of the apparently 
expedient than of the moraHy right, or even to set 



quod honestum sit/ sed etiam haec inter se compa- 
rare et in his addubitare turpissimum est. 

Quid ergo est, quod non numquam dubitationem 
afferre soleat considerandumque videatur? Credo, 
si quandp dubitatio accidit, quale sit id, de quo con- 

19 sideretur. Saepe enim tempore fit, ut, quod turpe 
plerumque haberi soleat, inveniatur non esse turpe ; 
exempH causa ponatur aliquid, quod pateat latius : 
Quod potest maius esse scelus quam non modo 
hominem, sed etiam famiharem hominem occidere? 
Num igitur se astrinxit scelere, si qui tyrannum 
occidit quamvis famiUarem ? Populo quidem Romano 
non videtur, qui ex omnibus praeclaris factis illud 
pulcherrimum existimat. Vicit ergo utilitas hone- 
statem ? Immo vero honestas utihtatem secuta est. ^ 

Itaque, ut sine ullo errore diiudicare possimus, si 
quando cum illo, quod honestum intellegimus, pu- 
gnare id videbitur, quod appellamus utile, formula 
quaedam constituenda est; quam si sequemur in 
comparatione rerum, ab officio numquam recedemus. 

20 Erit autem haec formula Stoicorum rationi discipU- 
naeque maxime consentanea ; quam quidem his hbris 
propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus 
Academicis et a Peripateticis vestris, qui quondam 
idem erant, qui Academici, quae honesta sunt, ante- 
ponuntur iis, quae videntur utiha, tamen splendidius 

^sit c, Bt.», Muller ; not in B H a b, Bt.» ; est Heine. 
* esse c, Edd. ; not in B H a b. 

^ utilitatem secuta ^s/MSS., Miiller, Hexne ; utilitatetn ; 
honestatem utilitas secuta est Baiter, Ed. 



these over against each other and to hesitate to 
choose between them. 

What, then, is it that may sometimes give room Occasion for 
for a doubt and seem to call for consideration ? It ^°^^^- 
is, I believej when a question arises as to the cliar- 
acter of an action under consideration. For it often 
happens, owing to exceptional circumstances, that 
what is accustomed under ordinary circumstances to 
be considered morally wrong is found not to be 
morally wrong. For the sake of illustration, let us 
assume some particular case that admits of wider 
application : what more atrocious crime can there be 
than to kill a fellow-man, and especially an intimate 
friend ? But if anyone kills a tyrant — be he never 
so intimate a friend — he has not laden his soul with 
guilt, has he ? The Roman People, at all events, are 
not of that opinion ; for of all glorious deeds they 
hold such an one to be the most noble. Has expedi- 
ency, then, prevailed over moral rectitude ? Not at 
all; moral rectitude has gone hand in hand with 

Some general rule, therefore, should be laid down Need of a ruie 
to enable us to decide without error, whenever ^°'^^""**°'^^" 
what we call the expedient seems to clash with what 
we feel to be morally right; and if we follow that 
rule in comparing courses of conduct, we shall never 
swerve from the path of duty. That rule, more- 
over, shall be in perfect harmony with the Stoics' 
system and doctrines. It is their teachings that 
I am following in these books, and for this 
reason: the older Academicians and your Peripa- 
tetics (who were once the same as the Academi- 
cians) give what is morally right the preference over 
what seems expedient; and yet the discussion of 



haec ab eis disserunturj ^ quibus, quicquid honestum 
est, idem utile videtur nec utile quicquam^ quod non 
honestum, quam ab iis,^ quibus et honestum aliquid 
non utile et utile^ non honestum. Nobis autem 
nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quod- 
cumque maxime probabile occurrat, id nostro iure 
liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam. 

21 V. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem 
hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis 
est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, 
quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori 
accidere aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit 
convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim sic 
erimus affecti, ut propter Guum quisque emolumen- 
tum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, 
eam quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani 

22 generis societatem. Ut, si unum quodque mem- 
brum sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se 
valere, si proximi membri valetudinem ad se tradu- 
xisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus necesse 
esset, sic, si unus quisque nostrum ad se rapiat com- 
moda aliorum detrahatque, quod cuique possit, 
emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum et com- 
munitas evertatur necesse est. Nam sibi ut quisque 
malit, quod ad usum vitae pertineat, quam alteri 
acquirere, concessum est non repugnante natura, 

* dtsseruniur certsLin MSS., C. Lange and Fr. Fabricius, 
Miiller, Heine ; disserentur MSS., Bt. 

'^iis Edd.; his {hijs c) MSS. 

^et honestum . . . . et tttile Lambinus, Bt.', Miiller, Heine, 
et honestum .... aut utile B H a b ; aut honestum .... aut 
utile c, Bt.' 

BOOK III iv-v 

these problems, if conducted by those who consider 
whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing 
expedient that is not at the same time morally right, 
will be more illuminating than if conducted by those 
who think that something not expedient may be 
morally right and that something not morally right 
may be expedient. But our New Academy allows 
us wide Hberty, so that it is within my right to 
defend any theory that presents itself to me asmost 
probable. But to return to my rule. 

V. Well then, for a man to take something from Wrongfui gains 
his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour's loss is faw^f*'"^* *^* 
more contrary to nature than is death or poverty or (i)ofnature, 
pain or anything else that can affect either our per- 
son or our property. For, in the first place, injus- 
tice is fatal to social Ufe and fellowship between man 
and man. For if we are so disposed that each, to 
gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his 
neighbour, then those bonds of human society, which 
are most in accord with nature's laws, must of 
necessity be broken. Suppose, by way of compari- 
son, that each one of our bodily members should con- 
ceive this idea and imagine that it could be strong 
and well if it should draw off to itself the health and 
strength of its neiglibouring member, the whole 
body would necessarily be enfeebled and die ; so, if 
eacli one of us should seize upon the property of his 
neighbours and take from each whatever he could 
appropriate to his own use, the bonds of human 
society must inevitably be annihilated. For, without 
any conflict with nature's laws, it is granted that 
everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather 
than for his neighbour what is essential for the con- 
duct of life; but nature's laws do forbid us to increasf^ 
u yb'o 

illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis nostras 
facultates, cbpias, opes augcamus. 

23 Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium, 
sed etiam legibus populorum, quibus in singulis civi- 
tatibus res publica continetur, eodem modo consti- 
tutum est, ut non liceat sui commodi causa nocere 
alteri ; hoc enim spectant leges, hoc volunt, incolu- 
mem esse civium coniunctionem ; quam qui diri- 
munt, eos morte, exsilio, vinclis, damno coercent. 

Atque hoc multo magis efficit ipsa naturae ratio, 
quae est lex divina et humana; cui parere qui veUt 
(omnes autem parebunt, qui secundum naturam vo- 
lent vivere), numquam committet, ut alienum appe- 
tat et id, quod altcri detraxerit, sibi adsumat. 

24 Etenim multo magis est secundum naturam excel- 
sitas animi et magnitudo itemque comitas, iustitia, 
liberalitas quam voluptas, quam vita, quam divitiae ; 
quae quidem contemnere et pro nihilo ducere com- 
parantem cum utilitate communi magni animi et 
excelsi est. [Detrahere autem de altero sui com- 
modi causa magis est contra naturam quam mors, 
quam dolor, quam cetera generis eiusdem.]^ 

25 Itemque magis est secundum naturam pro omni- 
bus gentibus, si fieri possit, conservandis aut iuvandis 
maximos labores molestiasque suscipere imitantem 
Herculem illum, quem hominum fama beneficiorum 
memor in concilio caelestium collocavit, quam vivere 

^ Detrahere . . . generis eiusdem MSS. bracketed by 
Baitcr, Edd. 


our means, wealth, and resources by despoilin^ 
3 But this principle is established not by nature's (2) of nations, 
laws alone (that is^ by the common rules of equity), 
but also by the statutes of particular communities, in 
accordance with which in individual states the public 
interests are maintained. In all these it is with one 
accord ordaiued that no man shall be allowed for the 
sake of his own advantage to injure his neighbour, 
For it is to this that the laws have regard ; this is 
their intent, that the bonds of union between citi- 
zens should not be impaired; and any attempt to 
destroy these bonds is repressed by the penalty of 
deathj exile, imprisonment, or fine. 

Again, this principle follows much more efFectually (3) of gods an 
directly from the Reason which is in Nature, which ™^°' 
is the law of gods and men. If anyone will hearken 
to that voice (and all will hearken to it who wisli to 
Uve in accord with nature's laws), he will never be 
guilty of coveting anything that is his neighbours 
or of appropriating to himself what he has taken 

24 from his neighbour. Then, too, loftiness and great- 
ness of spirit, and courtesy, justice, and generosity 
are much more in harmony with nature than are 
selfish pleasure, riches, and Hfe itself ; but it requires 
a great and lofty spirit to despise these latter and 
count them as naught, when one weighs them over 
against the common weal. [But for anyone to rob Seif-seeking 
his neighbour for his own profit is more contrary to self-sacriflce 
nature than death, pain, and the like.] 

25 In Hke manner it is more in accord with nature 
to emulate the great Hercules and undergo the 
greatest toil and trouble for the sake of aiding or 
saving the world, if possible, than to live in seclusion, 

u2 291 

in solitudine non modo sine ullis molestiis, sed etiam 
in maximis voluptatibus abundantem omnibus copiis, 
ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus. 

Quocirca optimo quisque et splendidissimo inge- 
nio longe illam vitam huic anteponit. Ex quo 
efficitur hominem naturae oboedientem homini 
nocere non posse. 

26 Deinde, qui alterum violat, ut ipse aliquid com- 
modi consequatur, aut nihil existimat se facere con- 
tra naturam aut magis fugiendam^ censet mortem, 
paupertatem, dolorem, amissionem etiam liberorum, 
propinquorum, amicorum quam facere cuiquam 
iniuriam. Si nihil existimat contra naturam fieri 
hominibus violandis, quid cum eo disseras, qui 
omnino hominem ex homine tollat? sin fugiendum 
id quidem censet, sed^ multo illa peiora, mortem, 
paupertatem, dolorem, errat in eo, quod ullum aut 
corporis aut fortunae vitium vitiis animi gravius 

VI. Ergo unum deoet esse omnibus propositum, 
ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum ; 
quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omnis 
humana consortio. 

27 Atque etiam, si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo 

^fugiendam b, Y.i\.\ fttgienda B H a c. 
*sed c, Edd. ; e/ B H a b. 

BOOK III. v-vi 

not only free from all care, but revelling in pleasures 
and abounding in wealth, while excelling others 
also in beauty and strength. Thus Hercules denied 
himself and underwent toil and tribulation for the 
world, and, out of gratitude for his services, popular 
behef has given him a place in the council of the 

The better and more noble, therefore, the charac- 
ter with which a man is endowed, the more does he 
prefer the life of service to the life of pleasure. 
Whence it follows that man, if he is obedient to 
nature, cannot do harm to his fellow-man. 

Finally, if a man wrongs his neighbour to gain 
some advantage for himself, he must either imagine 
that he is not acting in defiance of nature or he 
must believe that death, poverty, pain, or even the 
loss of children, kinsmen, or friends, is more to be 
shunned than an act of injustice against another. 
If he thinks he is not violating the laws of nature, 
when he wrongs his fellow-men, how is one to argue 
with the individual who takes away from man all 
that makes him man ? But if he believes that while 
such a course should be avoided, the other alterna- 
tives are much worse — namely, death, poverty, pain 
— he is mistaken in thinking that any ills afFecting 
either his person or his property are more serious 
than those afFecting his soul. 

VI. This, then, ought to be the chief end of all The interest oi 
men, to make the interest of each individual and of interest ol the 
the whole body politic identical. For if the individ- '«"iividuai. 
ual appropriates to selfish ends what should be 
devoted to the common good, all human fellowship 
will be destroyed. 

And furtlier, if nature ordains that one man shall 



homini, quicumque sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod 

is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est secundum 

eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse commu- 

nem. Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes et 

eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum si ita est, certe 

violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. Verum 

28 autemprimum; verum igitur extremum. Nam illud 

quidem absurdum est, quod quidam dicunt, parenti 

se aut fratri nihil detracturos sui commodi causa, 

aham rationem esse civium rehquorum. Hi sibi 

nihil iuris, nullam societatem communis utiHtatis 

causa statuunt esse cum civibus, quae sententia 

omnem societatem distrahit civitatis. 

Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, 

externorum negant, ii dirimunt communem humani 

generis societatem ; qua sublata beneficentia, Hbera- 

litaSj bonitaSj iustitia funditus tolHtur; quae qui 

tollunt, etiam adversus deos immortales impii iudi- 

candi sunt. Ab iis enim constitutam inter homines 

societatem evertunt, cuius societatis artissimum vin- 

culum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam homi- 

nem homini detrahere sui commodi causa quam om- 

nia incommoda subire vel externa vel corporis . . . 

vel etiam jpsius animi, quae vacent iustitia'"^; haec 

enim una virtus omnium est domina et regina vir- 


' ii Bt., Ed. ; A/ B a b ; hii H ; hij c. 

'^ quac vacent iustitia MSS. , Ed., Heine ; quae vacent 
iniustitia cod. Ubaldini, Bt.'; quae non v. iustitia O. 

«I.e. , there are no circumstances of loss or gain that cai» 
warrant a violation of justice. 



desire to promote the interests of a fellow-man, 
whoever he mny be, just because he is a fellow-man, 
then it follows, in aceordance with that same nature, 
that there are interests that all men have in com- 
mon. And if this is true, we are all subject to one 
and the same law of nature ; and if this also is true, 
we are certainly forbidden by nature's law to wrong 
our neighbour. Now the first assumption is true; 
therefore the conclusion is likewise true. For that 
is an absurd position which is taken by some people, 
who say that they will not rob a parent or a brother 
for their own gain, but that their relation to the 
rest of their fellow-citizens is quite another thing. 
Such people contend in essence that they are bound 
to their fellow-citizens by no mutual obligations, 
social ties, or common interests. This attitude 
demolishes the whole structure of civil society. 

Others again who say that regard should be had Betterendure 
for the rights of fellow-citizens, but not of foreigners, w^rong^afdtow 
would destroy the universal brotherhood of man- ^an^oi^g^'"- 
kind; and when this is annihilated, kindness, 
generosity, goodness, and justice must utterly 
perish; and those who work all this destruction 
must be considered as wickedly rebelling against 
the immortal gods. Por they uproot tlie fellowship 
which the gods have established bctween human 
beings, and tlie closest bond of this fellowship is 
the conviction that it is more repugnant to nature 
for man to rob a fellow-man for his own gain tlian 
to endure all possible loss, whetlier to his property 
or to his person . . . or even to liis very soul — so far 
as these losses are not concerned with justice^; for 
this virtue is the sovereign mistress and queen of 
all the virtues. 



29 Forsitan quispiam dixerit: Nonne igitur sapiens, 
si fame ipse conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri ho- 
mini ad nullam rem utili ? [Minime vero ; non enim 
mihi est vita mea utiHor quam animi tahs affectio, 
neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia.] ^ Quid ? si 
Phalarim, crudelem tyrannum et immanem, virbonus, 
ne ipse frigore conficiatur, vestitu spoliare possit, 
nonne faciat? 

30 Haec ad iudicandum sunt facillima. Nam, si 
quid ab homine ad nullam partem utili utilitatis 
tuae causa detraxeris, inhumane feceris contraque 
naturae legem; sin autem is tu sis, qui multam 
utilitatem rei pubhcae atque hominum societati, si in 
vita remaneas, afferre possis, si quid ob eam causam 
alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendum. Sin 
autem id non sit eius modi, suum cuique incommo- 
dum ferendum est potius quam de alterius commodis 
detrahendum. Non igitur magis est contra naturam 
morbus aut egestas aut quid eius modi quam detractio 
atque appetitio aUeni, sed communis utilitatis dere- 

31 lictio contra naturam est; est enim iniusta. Itaque 
lex ipsa naturae, quae utiUtatem hominum conservat 
et continet, decernet profecto, ut ab homine inerti 
atque inutiU ad sapientem, bonum, fortem virum 
transferantur res ad vivendum necessariae, qui si 
occiderit, muUum de communi utiUtate detraxerit, 
modo hoc ita faciat, ut ne ipse de se bene existimans 
seseque diUgens hanc causam habeat ad iniuriam. 

* Bracketed by Unger, Edd. 


But, perhaps, some one may say: Well, then, 
suppose a wise man were starving to death, might 
he not take the bread of some perfectly useless 
member of society?" [Not at all; for my hfe is not 
more precious to me than that temper of soul which 
would keep me from doing wrong to anybody for my 
own advantage.] "Oragain; supposing a righteous 
man were in a position to rob the cruel and inhuman 
tyrant Phalaris of clothing, might he not do it to 
keep himself from freezing to death ? " 

These cases are very easy to decide. For if merely 
for one's own benefit one were to take somethingaway 
from a man, though he were a perfectly worthless 
fellow, it would be an act of meanness and contrary 
to nature's law. But suppose one would be able, Theinterestsoj 
by remaining alive, to render signal service to the dedde^about 
state and to human society — if from that motive one exceptions. 
should take something from another, it would not 
be a matter for censure. But if such is not the case, 
each one must bear his own burden of distress rather 
than rob a neighbour of his rights. We are not to 
say, therefore, that sickness or want or any evil of 
that sort is more repugnant to nature than to covet 
and to appropriate what is one's neighbour's ; but we 
do maintain that disregard of the common interests 
is repugnant to nature ; for it is unjust. And there- 
fore nature's law itself, which protects and conserves 
human interests, will surely determine that a man 
who is wise, good, and brave, should in emergency 
have the neccssaries of life transferred to him from 
a person who is idle and worthless; for the good 
man's death would be a heavy loss to the common 
weal; only let him beware that self-esteem and 
self-love do not find in such a transfer of possessions 



Ita semper officio fungetur utilitati consulens homi- 
iium et ei, (juam saepe commemoro, humanae 

32 Nam quod ad Phalarim attinet, perfacile iudicium 
est. Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis, et 
potius summa distractio est, neque est contra naturam 
spoliare eum, si possis, quem est honestum necare, 
atque hoc omne genus pestiferum atque impium ex 
horainum communitate exterminandum est. Etenim, 
ut membra quaedam amputantur, si et ipsa sanguine 
et tamquam spiritu carere coeperunt et nocent 
reliquis partibus corporis, sic ista in figura hominis 
feritas et immanitas beluae a communi tamquara 
humanitatis corpore^ segreganda est. 

Huius generis quaestiones sunt oranes eae, in 
quibus ex tempore officium exquiritur. 

33 VII. Eius modi igitur credo res Panaetium perse- 
cuturum fuisse, nisi aliqui casus aut occupatio eius 
consilium pereraisset. Ad quas ipsas consultationes 
superioribus libris satis multa praecepta sunt, ex 
quibus^ perspici possit, quid sit propter turpitudinem 
fugiendum, quid sit, quod idcirco fugiendum non sit, 
quod omnino turpe non sit. 

Sed quoniam operi inchoato, prope tamen absoluto 
tamquara fastigiura imponinius, ut geometrae solent 
non orania docere, sed postulare, ut quaedara sibi 
concedantur, quo facihus, quae volunt, expUcent, sic 

' humanitatis corpore Murei, cod. Guelf., Ed., Bt., Heine ; 
humanitate corporis MSS., Miiller ; Unger strikes out 

'^ superioribus . . . ex quibus Walker, Bl.*, Ed. ; ex superi- 
oribiis. . . 9?</dwsMSS., Bi.^;superioribus . . . ywjAMS^Heine. 


BOOK III. vi-vii 

a pretext for wrong-doing. But thus guided in his 
decision, the good man will always perform his duty, 
promoting the general interests of human society on 
which I am so fond of dwelling. 

As for the case of Phalaris, a decision is quite No duty due lo 
simple : we have no ties of fellowship with a tyrant, * ^^^" ' 
but rather the bitterest feud ; and it is not opposed 
to nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally 
right to kill ; — nay, all that pestilent and abominable 
race sliould be exterminated from human society. 
And this may be done by proper measures; for as 
certain members are amputated, if they shoAV signs 
themselves of being bloodless and virtually hfeless 
and thus jeopardize the health of the other parts of 
the body, so those fierce and savage monsters in 
human form should be cut ofF from what may be 
called the common body of humanity. 

Of this sort are all those problems in wliich we 
have to determine what moral duty is, as it varies 
with varying circumstances. 

VII. It is subjects of this sort that I believe 
Panaetius would have followed up, had not some 
accident or business interfered with his design. For 
the elucidation of these very questions there are in 
his former books rules in plenty, from which one 
can learn what should be avoided because of its im- 
morality and what does not have to be avoided for 
the reason that it is not immoral at all. 

We are now putting the capstone, as it were, upon 
Dur structure, which is unfinished to be sure, but still 
almost completed; and as matheraaticians make a 
practice of not demonstrating every proposition but 
require that certain axioms be assumed as true, iii 
prder inore easily to explain their meanLng, so, my 



ego a te postulo, mi Cicero, ut mihi coneedas, si 
potes, nihil praeter id, quod honestum sit, propter 
se esse expetendum. Sin hoc non licet per Cratip- 
pum, at illud certe dabis, quod honestum sit, id esse 
maxime propter se expetendum. Mihi utrumvis 
satis est et tum hoc, tum illud probabilius videtur 
nec praeterea quicquam probabile. 
S4 Ac primum in hoc Panaetius defendendus est, 
quod non utilia cum honestis pugnare aliquando 
posse dixerit (neque enim ei fas erat), sed ea, quae 
viderentur utiHa. Nihil vero utile, quod non idem 
honestum, nihil honestum, quod non idem utile sit, 
saepe testatur negatque ullam pestem maiorem in 
vitam liominum invasisse quam eorum opinionem, 
qui ista distraxerint. Itaque, non ut aliquando 
anteponeremus utiha honestis, sed ut ea sine errore 
diiudicarenius, si quando incidissent,^ induxit eam, 
quae videretur esse, non quae esset,* repugnantiam. 
Hanc igitur partem rehctam explebimus nullis 
adminicuHs, sed, ut dicitur, Marte nostro. Neque 
enim quicquam est de hac parte post Panaetium 
expHcatum, quod quidem mihi probaretur, de iis, 
quae in manus meas venerunt. ^ 

^ ea . . . incidissent MSS., Bt.', Heine, Ed. ; eam [repugf- 
nantiam]. . . incidisset Unger, Bt.* 

"^ venerunt Manutius, Edd. ; venerint MSS. 

aAs a Peripatetic, Cratippus insisted that there was 
natural good as well as moral good ; thus health, honour, 
etc, were good and worth seeliing- for their own sake, 
though in less degree than virtue. But the Stoics (and 
Cicero is now spealting as a Stoic) called all those other 
blessings not"good" nor " worth seeking for their own 
sake," but "inditTerent." 

bWith this he waves aside, without even the honour of 
mentioning them, the Epicureans, Cyrenaics, etc, 

c Because he was a Stoic. 


BOOK III. vii 

dear Cicero, I ask you to assume with me, if you can, Morai Right 

that nothing is worth the seeking for its own sake or the chk^goi 

except what is morally right. But if Cratippus* does 

not permit this assumption, you will still grant this 

at least — that what is morally right is the object 

most worth the seeking for its own sake. Either 

alternative is sufficient for my purposes ; first the one 

and then the other seems to me the more probable; 

and besides these, there is no other alternative that 

seems probable at all.'' 

In the iirst place, I must undertake the defence Vindication of 
of Panaetius on this point ; for he has said not that nothlng «n b* 
the truly expedient could under certain circum- expedient that 

1111 11 i//'i 11 notmorally 

stances clash with the morally right {ior he could right. 
not have said that conscientiously *^), but only that 
what seemed expedient could do so. For he often 
bears witness to the fact that nothing is really ex- 
pedient that is not at the same time morally right, 
and nothing morally right that is not at the same 
time expedient ; and he says that no greater curse 
has ever assailed human Hfe than the doctrine of 
those who have separated these two conceptions. And 
so he introduced an apparent, not a real, conflict 
between them, not to the end that we should under 
certain circumstances give the expedient preference 
over the moral, but that, in case they ever should get 
in each other's way, we might decide between thera 
without uncertainty. This part, therefore, which 
was passed over by Panaetius, I will carry to com- 
pletion without any auxiharies, but fighting my own 
battle, as the saying is. For of all that has been 
worked out on this line since the time of Panaetius, 
notliing thdt has come into my hands is at all satis- 
factory to me. 



35 VIII. Cum igitur Jiliqua species utilitatis obiecta 
est, commoveri necesse est; sed si, cum animum 
attenderis, turpitudinem videas adiunctam ei rci, 
quae speciem utilitatis attulerit, tum non 
relinquenda est, sed intellegendum, ubi turpitudo 
sit, ibi utilitatem esse non posse. Quodsi nihil est 
tam contra naturam quam turpitudo (recta enim et 
convenientia et constantia natura desiderat asper- 
naturque contraria) nihilque tam secundum naturam 
quam utilitas, cerle in eadem re utilitas et turpi- 
tudo* esse non potest. 

Itemque, si ad honestatem nati sumus eaque aut 
sola expetcnda est, ut ^enoni visum est, aut certe 
omni pondere gravior habenda quam reliqua omnia, 
quod Aristoteli placet, necesse est, quod honestum 
sit, id esse aut solum aut summum bonum ; quod 
autem bonum, id certe utile ; ita, quicquid honestum, 
id utile. 

36 Quare error hominum non proborum, cum ahquid, 
quod utile visum est, arripuit, id continuo secernit 
ab honesto. Hinc sicae, hinc venena, hinc 
testamenta nascuntur, hinc furta, peculatus, expila- 
tiones direplionesque sociorum et civium, hinc opum 
nimiarum, potentiae non ferendae, postremo etiani 
jn Hberis civitatibus regnandi exsistunt cupiditates, 
quibus nihil ncc taetrius nec foedius excogitari potest. 

' re utilitas et turp. c, Edd • re ulili turpitudo B H a U 

BooK in. viii 

VIII. Now wlien we meet with expediency in fixpediency and 
some specious form or other, we cannot help being iJJlSmpatibie. 
influenced by it. But if upon closer inspection one 
sees that there is some immorahty connected with 
what presents the appearance of expediency, then 
one is not necessarily to sacrifice expediency but 
to recognize that there can be no expediency where 
there is immorality. But if there is nothing so 
repugnant to nature as immorahty (for nature 
demands right and harniony and consistency and 
abhors their opposites), and if nothing is so 
thoroughly in accord with nature as expediency, 
then surely expediency and immorahty cannot co- 
exist in one and the same object. 

Again: if we are born for moral rectitude and if Themorally 
that is either the only thing worth seeking, as Zeno expedknt!" 
thought, or at least to be esteemed as infinitely out- 
weighing everything else, as Aristotle holds, then it 
necessarily follows that the morally right is either 
the sole good or the supreme good. Now, that 
which is good is certainly expedient ; consequently, 
that which is morally right is also expedient. 

Thus it is the error of men who are not strictly i.heevilsresult- 
upright to seize upon something that seems to be *"? ^'^°'P '^°'^' 
expedient and straightway to dissociate that from ^^^^'^^^^' 
the question of moral right. To this error the 
assassin's dagger, the poisoned cup, the forged wills 
owe their origin ; this gives rise to theft, embezzle- 
ment of public funds, exploitation and plundering 
of provincials and citizens; this engenders also the 
lust for excessive wealth, for despotic power, and 
finally for making oneself king even in the midst of 
a free peopie; and anything more atrocious or repul- 
sive than Bueh a passion , cannot be conceived. For 
^ 303 


Emolumenta enim rerum fallacibus iudiciis vident, 
poenam non dico legum, quam saepe perrumpunt, 
sed ipsius turpitudinis, «quae acerbissima est, non 

37 Quam ob rem hoc quidem deliberantium genus 
pellatur e medio (est enim totum sceleratum et im- 
pium), qui deliberant, utrum id sequantur, quod 
honestum esse videant, an se scientes scelere con- 
taminent; in ipsa enim dubitatione facinus inest, 
etiamsi ad id non pervenerint. Ergo ea^eliberanda 
omnino non sunt, in quibus est turpis ipsa delibe- 

Atque etiam ex omni deliberatione celandi et oc- 
cultandi spes opinioque removenda est. Satis enim 
nobis, si modo in philosophia aUquid profecimus, 
persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque 
celare possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil iniuste, 
nihil Hbidinose, nihil incontinenter esse faciendum. 

38 IX. Hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone, qui, cum 
terra discessisset magnis quibusdam imbribus, de- 
scendit in illum hiatum aeneumque equum, ut ferunt 
fabulae, animadvertit, cuius in lateribus fores essent ; 
quibus apertis corpus horainis mortui vidit magnitu- 
dine invisitata^ anulumque aureum in digito ; quem 
ut detraxit, ipse induit (erat autem regius pastor), 
tum in conciUum se pastorum recepit. Ibi eum 
palam eius anuU ad palmam converterat, a nullo 
videbatur, ipse autem omnia vidcbat; idem rursus 

^invisitata B H', Edd. ; intisitata W a b c. 

BOOK III. viii-ix 

with a false perspective they see the material rewards 
but not the punishment — I do not mean the penalty 
of the law, which they often escape, but the heaviest 
penalty of all, their own demoralization. 

Away, then, with questioners of thi» sort (for 
their whole tribe is wicked and ungodly), who stop 
to consider whether to pursue the course which they 
see is morally right or to stain their hands with what 
they know is crime. For there is guilt in their very 
dehberation, even though they never reach the per- 
formance of the deed itself. Those actions, there- 
fore, should not be considered at all, the mere con- 
sideration of which is itself morally wrong. 

Furthermore, in any such consideration we must Moral rectitucu 
banish any vain liope and thought that our action ^*"'*®^"^*^'"' 
may be covered up and kept secret. For if we have 
only made some real progress in the study of philo- 
sophy, we ought to be quite convinced that, even 
though we may escape the eyes of gods and men, 
we must still do nothing that savours of greed 
or of injustice, of lust or of intemperance. 

IX. By way of illustrating this truth Plato intro- Thestoryof 
duces the famihar story of Gyges : Once upon a time ^^1.^* ^"'^ **** 
the earth opened in consequence of heavy rains; 
Gyges went down into the chasm and saw, so the story 
goes, a horse of bronze ; in its side was a door. On 
opening this door he saw the body of a dead man of 
enormous size with a gold ring upon his finger. He 
removed this and put it on his own hand and then 
repaired to an assembly of the shepherds, for he was 
a shepherd of the king. As often as he turned the 
bezel of the ring inwards toward the palm of his 
hand, he became invisible to every one, while he 
himself saw everything ; but as often as he turned 
X 305 


videbatur, cum iu locum anulum inverterat. Itaque 
hac opportunitate anuli usus reginae stuprum intulit 
eaque adiutrice regem dominum interemit, sustulit, 
quos obstare arbitrabatur, nec in his eum facinoribus 
quisquam potuit videre. Sic repente anuH beneficio 
rex exortus est Lydiae. 

Hunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, 
nihilo^ plus sibi licere putet peccare, quam si non 
haberet^; honesta enim bonis viris, non occulta 
39 Atque hoc loco philosophi quidam, minime mah 
illi quidem, sed non satis acuti, fictam et commenti- 
ciam fabulam prolatam dicunt a Platone ; quasi vero 
ille aut factum id esse aut fieri potuisse defendat! 
Haec est vis huius anuli et huius exempli : si nemo 
sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus quidem sit, cum 
aliquid divitiarum, potentiae, dominationis, libidinis 
causa feceris, si id dis hominibusque futurum sit 
semper ignotum, sisne facturus. Negant id fieri 
posse. Nequaquam^ potest id quidem ; sed quaero, 
quod negant posse, id si posset, quidnam facerent. 
Urguent rustice sane ; negant enim posse et in eo 
perstant ; hoc verbum quid valeat, non vident. Cum 
enim quaerimus, si celare possint, quid facturi sint, 
non quaerimus, possintne cclare, sed tamquam tor- 
menta quaedam adhibemus, ut, si respondcrint se 

* ni{c)hilo c, Edd. ; nihil B H a b. 
^peecare . . . haberet MSS. ; bracketcd by Madv., Bt. 
^nequaquam Manutius, Bt., Ed., W<i\ne; quamguarn (and 
yet it is possible) MSS., MGIUt. 



it back to its proper position, he became visible 
again. And so, with the advantage which the ring 
gave him, he debauched the queen, and with her 
assistance he murdered his royal master and removed 
all those who he thought stood in his way, without 
anyone's being able to detect him in his crimes. 
Thus, by virtue of the ring. he shortly rose to be 
king of Lydia. 

Now, suppose a wise man had just such a ring, he 
would not imagine that he was free to do wrong any 
more than if he did not have it ; for good men aim 
to secure not secrecy but the right. 

And yet on this point certain philosophers, who 
are not at all vicious but who are not very discern- 
ing, declare that the story related by Plato is ficti- 
tious and imaginary. As if he affirmed that it was 
actually true or even possible! But the force of the xhemoraiof 
illustration of the ring is this: if nobody were to *''^^*°'^^* 
know or even to suspect the truth, when you do any- 
thing to gain riches or power or sovereignty or 
sensual gratification — if your act should be hidden 
for ever from the knowledge of gods and men, would 
you do it? The condition, they say, is impossible. 
Of course it is. But my question is, if that were 
possible which they declare to be impossible, what, 
pray, would one do? They press their point 
with right boorish obstinacy : they assert that it is 
impossible and insist upon it; they refuse to see the 
meaning of my words, "if possible." For when 
we ask what they would do, if they could escape 
detection, we are not asking whether they can escape 
detection ; but we put them as it were upon the rack : 
should they answer that, if impunity were assured, 
they would do what was most to their selfish interest, 
x2 307 

impunitate proposita facturos, quod expediat, facino- 
rosos se esse fateantur, si negent^ omnia turpia per 
se ipsa fugienda esse concedant. 
Sed iam ad propositum revertamur. 

40 X, Incidunt multae saepe causae, quae conturbent 
animos utilitatis specie, non cum < hoc deliberetur, 
relinquendane sit honestas propter utilitatis magni- 
tudinem (nam id quidem improbum est), sed illud, 
possitne id, quod utile videatur, fieri non turpiter. 
Cum Collatino collegae Brutus imperium abrogabat, 
poterat videri facere id iniuste ; fuerat enim in regi- 
bus expellendis socius Bruti consiliorum et adiutor. 
Cum autem consilium hoc principes cepissent, co- 
gnationem Superbi nomenque Tarquiniorum et me- 
moriam regni esse tollendam, quod erat utile, patriae 
consulere, id erat ita honestum, ut etiam ipsi CoUa- 
tino pldcere deberet. Itaque utilitas valuit piopter 
honestatem, sine qua ne utihtas quidem esse potuisset. 

At in eo rege, qui urbem condidit, non item; 

41 species enim utilitatis animum pepulit eius; cui cum 
visum esset utihus solum quam cum altero regnare, 
fratrem interemit. Omisit hic et pietatem et huma- 
nitatem, ut id, quod utile videbatur neque erat. 



BOOK III. ix-x 

that would be a confesslon that they are criminally 
minded; should they say that they would not do 
so, they would be granting that all things in and of 
themselves immoi*al should be avoided. 

But let us now return to our theme. 

X. Many cases oftentimes arise to perplex our Conflicts 
minds with a specious appearanee of expediency : the [f)'apparent 
question raised in these cases is not whether moral Expediency and 
rectitude is to be sacrificed to some considerable ^ ' 
advantage (for that would of course be wrong), but 
whether the apparent advantage can be secured 
without moral wrong. When Brutus deposed his 
colleague Collatinus from the consular office, his 
treatment of him might have been thought unjust; 
for Collatinus had been his associate, and had helped 
him with word and deed in driving out the royal 
family. But when the leading men of the state had 
determined that all the kindred of Superbus and the 
very name of the Tarquins and every reminder of the 
monarchy should be obhterated, then the course that 
was expedient — namely, to serve the country's in- 
terests — was so pre-eminently right, that it was even 
Collatinus's own duty to acquiesce in its justice. And 
so expediency gained the day because of its moral 
rightness; for without moral rectitude there could 
have been no possible expediency. 

Not so in the case of the king* who founded the 
city : it was the specious appearance of expediency 
that actuated him; and when he decided that it 
was more expedient for him to reign alone than to 
share the throne with another, he slew his brother.'' 
He threw to the winds his brotherly affection and his 
human feelings, to secure what seemed to him— but 
was not — expedient ; and yet in defence of his deed 


assequi posset, et tamen muri causam^ opposuit, 
speciem honestatis nec probabilem nec sane idoneam. 
Peccavit igitur, pace vel Quirini vel Romuli dixerim. 

42 Nec tamen nostrae nobis utilitates omittendae 
sunt aliisque tradendae, cum iis' ipsi egeamus, sed 
suae cuique utilitati, quod sine alterius iniuria fiat, 
serviendum est. Scite Chrysippus, ut multa: "Qui 
stadium/' inquit, currit, eniti et contendere debet, 
quam maxime possit, ut vincat, supplantare eum, 
quicum^ certet, aut manu depellere nullo modo 
debet; sic in vita sibi quemque petere, quod perti- 
neat ad usum, non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius 
non est." 

43 Maxime autem perturbantur officia in amicitiis, 
quibus et non tribuere, quod recte possis, et tribuere, 
quod non sit aequum, contra officium est. Sed huius 
generis totius breve et non difficile praeceptum est. 
Quae enim videntur utilia, lionores, divitiae, volup- 
tates, cetera generis eiusdem, haec amicitiae num- 
quam anteponenda sunt. At neque contra rem pu- 
bhcam neque contra ius iurandum ac fidem amici 
causa vir bonus faciet, ne si iudex quidem erit de 
ipso amico; ponit enim personam amici, cum induit 
iudicis. Tantum dabit amicitiae, ut veram amici 

causam c, Edd. ; causa B H a b. 
*its Bt., Ed., Heine ; hh B H a b ; htjs c. 
^qtiiaim MSS., Bt., Heine ; quociim Ed. 

al.e., whether he be god or man. 


he offered the excuse about his wall — a specious show 
of moral rectitude, neither reasonable nor adequate 
at all. He committed a crime, therefore, with due 
respect to him let me say so, be he Quirinus or 

And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own (2)individuai 
iuterests and surrender to others what we need for fnterelts^*^^' 
ourselves, but each one should consider his own 
interests, as far as he may without injury to his 
neighbour's. When a man enters the foot-race," 
says Chrysippus with his usual aptness, it is his 
duty to put forth all his strength and strive with all 
his might to win ; but he ought never with his foot 
to trip, or with his hand to foul a competitor. Thus 
in the stadium of life, it is not unfair for anyone to 
seek to obtain what is needful for his own advantage, 
but he has no right to wrest it from his neighbour." 

It is in the case of friendships, however, that (3) obUgations to 
men's conceptions of duty are most confused; for it''''^"'!^^"'^'^"*^' 
is a breach of duty either to fail to do for a friend 
what one rightly can do, or to do for him what is 
not right. But for our guidance in all such cases we 
have a rule that is short and easy to master : appa- 
rent advantages — political preferment,riches, sensual 
pleasures, and the like — should never be preferred 
to the obligations of friendship. But an upright ' 

man will never for a friend's sake do anything in 
violation of his country's interests or his oath or his 
sacred honour, not even if he sits as judge in a 
friend's case; for he lays aside the role of friend 
when he assumes that of judge. Only so far will he 
make concessions to friendship, that he will prefer 
his friend's side to be the juster one and that he will 
set the time for presenting his case, as far as the 


causam esse malit, ut oraudae litis tempus, quoad 

44 per leges liceat, accommodet. Cum vero iurato 
sententia dicenda erit/ meminerit deum se adhibere ^ 
testem, id est, ut ego arbitror, mentem suam, qua 
nihil homini dedit deus ipse divinius. Itaque prae- 
clarum a maioribus accepimus morem rogandi iudicis, 
si eum teneremus, quae salva fide facere possit. 
Haec rogatio ad ea pertinet, quae paulo ante dixi 
honeste amico a iudice posse concedi ; nam si omnia 
facienda sint, quae amici velint, non amicitiae tales, 

45 sed coniurationes putandae sint. Loquor autem de 
communibus amicitiis; nam in sapientibus viris per 
fectisque nihil potest esse tale. 

Damonem et Phintiam Pythagoreos ferunt hoc 
animo inter se fuisse, ut, cum eorum alteri Dionysius 
tyrannus diem necis destinavisset et is, qui morti 
addictus esset, paucos sibi dies commendandorum 
suorum causa postulavisset, vas factus sit' alter eius 
sistendi, ut, si ille non revertisset, moriendum esset 
ipsi. Qui cum ad diem se recepisset, admiratus 
eorum fidem tyrannus petivit, ut se ad amicitiam 
tertium ascriberent. 

46 Cum igitur id, quod utile videtur in amicitia, cum 
eo, quod honestum est, comparatur, iaceat utilitatis 

'mV Ed., Bt.«, Heine ; sit MSS.; est Bt.' 
^adhibere B H a, Bt., Ed. ; habere b c, Lact., Miiiler. 
^sii Maiiubius, Edd.; est MSS., Nonius. 


laws will allow, to suit his friend's convenience. 

44 But when he comes to pronounce the verdict under 
oath, he should remember that he has God as his 
witness — that is, as I understand it, his own con- 
science, than which God himself has bestowed upon 
man nothing more divine. From this point of view 
it is a fine custom that we have inherited from our 
forefathers (if we were only true to it now) to appeal 
to the juror with this formula — to do what he can 
consistently with his sacred honour." This form of 
appeal is in keeping with what I said a moment ago 
would be morally right for a judge to concede to a 
friend. For supposing that we were bound to do 
everything that our friends desired, such relations 
would have to be accounted not friendships but 

45 conspiracies. But I am speaking here of ordinary 
friendships ; for among men who are ideally wise 
and perfect such situations cannot arise. 

They say that Damon and Phintias, of the Py tha- Damon and 
gorean schoolj enjoyed such ideally perfect friend- '^^' 
ship, that when the tyrant Dionysius had appointed a 
day for the execution of one of them, and the one 
who had been condemned to death requested a few 
days' respite for the purpose of putting his loved 
ones in the care of friends, the other became surety 
for his appearance, with the understanding that it 
his friend did not return, he himself should be put 
to death. And when the friend returned on the 
day appointed, the tyrant in admiration for their 
faithfulness begged that they would enrol him as a 
third partner in their friendship. 

46 Well then, when we are weighing what seems to Ruies of 
be expedient in friendship against what is morally precedence. 
right, let apparent expediency be disregarded and 


species, valeat honestas; cum autem in amicitia, 
quae honesta non sunt, postulabuntur, religio et fides 
anteponatur amicitiae. Sic habebitur is, quem ex- 
quirimus, dilectus officii. 

XI. Sed utilitatis specie in re publica saepissime 
peccatur, ut in Corinthi disturbatione nostri ; durius 
etiam Athenienses, qui sciverunt, ut Aeginetis, qui 
classe valebant, pollices praeciderentur. Hoc visum 
est utile ; nimis enim imminebat propter propinqui- 
tatem Aegina Piraeo. Sed nihil, quod crudele, utile ; 
est enim hominum naturae, quam sequi debemus, 
47 maxime inimica crudelitas. Male etiam, qui pere- 
grinos urbibus uti prohibent eosque exterminant, ut 
Pennus apud patres nostros, Papius nuper. Nam 
esse pro cive, qui civis non sit, rectum est non licere ; 
quam legem tulerunt sapientissimi consules Crassus 
et Scaevola; usu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos 
sane inhumanum est. 

Illa praeclara, in quibus publicae utilitatis species 
prae honestate contemnitur. Plena exemplorum est 

nostra res publica cum saepe, tum maxime bello 

BOOK III. x-xi 

moral rectitude prevail; and when in friendship 
requests are submitted that are not morally right, let 
conscience and scrupulous regard for the right take 
precedence of the obligations of friendship. In this 
way we shall arrive at a proper choice between con- 
flicting duties — the subject of this part of our inves- 

XI. Through a specious appearance of expediency (4) apparent 
wrong is very often committed in transactions be- P^pg^^^ielicy anrf 
tween state and state, as by our own country in the duty to 
destruction of Corinth. A more cruel wrong was "™*"' ^' 
perpetrated by the Athenians in decreeing that the 
Aeginetans, whose strength lay in their navy, should 
have their thumbs cut off. This seemed to be 
expedient ; for Aegina was too grave a menace, as it 
was close to the Piraeus. But no cruelty can be 
expedient; for cruelty is most abhorrent to human 
47 nature, whose leadings we ought to follow. They, 
too, do wrong who would debar foreigners from 
enjoying the advantages of their city and would 
exclude them from its borders, as was done by 
Pennus in the time of our fathers, and in recent 
times by Papius. It may not be right, of course, 
for one who is not a citizen to exercise the rights and 
privileges of citizenship ; and the law on this point 
was secured by two of our wisest consuls, Crassus and 
Scaevola. Still, to debar foreigners from enjoying 
the advantages of the city is altogether contrary to 
the laws of humanity. 

There are splendid examples in history where the Morairight 
apparent expediency of the state has been set at apparent'^''^'" 
naught out of regard for moral rectitude. Our own expediency 
country has many instances to offer throughout her 
history, and especially in the Second Punic War 



Punico secundo; quae Cannensi calamitate accepta 
maiores animos habuit quam umquam rebus secundis ; 
nulla timoris significatio, nulla mentio pacis. Tanta 
vis est honesti, ut speciem utilitatis obscuret. 

48 Athenienses cum Persarum impetum nullo modo 
possent sustinere statuerentque, ut urbe rehcta 
coniugibus et liberis Troezene depositis naves con- 
scenderent libertatemque Graeciae classe defende- 
rent, Cyrsilum quendam suadentem, ut in urbe 
manerent Xerxemque^ reciperent, lapidibus obrue- 
nmt. Atqui ^ ille utiUtatem sequi videbatur ; sed ea 
nulla erat repugnante honestate. 

49 Themistocles post victoriam eius belli, quod cum 
Persis fuit, dixit in contione se habere consiHum rei 
publicae salutare, sed id sciri non opus esse; postu- 
lavit, ut aUquem populus daret, quicum communi- 
caret; datus est Aristides; huic iUe, classem Lace- 
daemoniorum, <juae subducta esset ad Gytheum, 
clam incendi posse, quo facto frangi Lacedaemonio- 
rum opes necesse esset. Quod Aristides cum audis- 
set, in contionem magna exspectatione venit dixitque 
perutile esse consiUum, quod Themistocles afferret, 
sed minime honestum. Itaque Athenienses, quod 
honestum non esset, id ne utile quidem putaverunt 
totamque eam rem, quam ne audierant quidem, 

' Xerxemque BH a b, Bt., Heine ; Xersenque c ; Xersemque 
Nonius, Ed. 
"^Atqui Victorius, Fl., Bt.», Ed.; Atque MSS., Bt.' 



when news came of the disaster at Cannae, Rome dis- 
played a loftier courage than ever slie did in success ; 
never a trace of faint-heartedness, never a mention 
of making terms. The influence of moral right is so 
potentj that it eclipses the specious appearance of 

When the Athenians could in no way stem the 
tide of the Persian invasion and determined to 
abandon their city, bestow their wives and children 
in safety at Troezen, embark upon their ships, and 
fight on the sea for the freedom of Greece, a man 
named Cyrsilus proposed that they should stay at 
home and open the gates of their city to Xerxes. 
They stoned him to death for it. And yet he was 
working for what he thought was expediency ; but 
it was not — not at all, for it clashed with moral 

After the victorious close of that war with Persia, 
Themistocles announced in the Assembly that he 
had a plan for the welfare of the state, but that it 
was not politic to let it be generally known. He 
requested the people to appoint some one with whom 
he might discuss it. They appointed Aristides. 
Themistocles confided to him that the Spartan fleet, 
which had been hauled up on shore at Gytheum, 
could be secretly set on fire ; this done, the Spartan 
power would inevitably be crushed. When Aristides 
heard the plan, he came into the Assembly amid the 
eager expectation of all and reported that the plan 
proposed by Themistocles was in the highest degree 
expedient, but anything but morally right. The 
result was that the Athenians concluded that what 
was not morally right was likewise not expedient, 
and at the instance of Aristides they rejected the 



auctore Aristide repudiaverunt. Melius hi quam 
nos, qui piratas immunes, socios vectigales habemus. 
XII. Maneat ergo, quod turpe sit^ id numquam essc 
utile, ne tum quidem, cum id, quod esse utile putes, 
adipiscare ; hoc enim ipsum, utile putare, quod turpe 
§ 40 50 sit, calamitosum est. Sed incidunt, ut supra dixi, 
saepe causae, cum repugnare utilitas honestati videa- 
tur, ut animadvertendum sit, repugnetne plane an 
possit cum honestate coniungi. Eius generis hae 
sunt quaestiones: si exempli gratia vir bonus Ale- 
xandrea Rhodum magnum frumenti numerum ad- 
vexerit in Rhodiorum inopia et fame summaque 
annonae caritate, si idem sciat complures merca- 
tores Alexandrea solvisse navesque in cursu frumento 
onustas petentes Rhodum viderit, dicturusne sit id 
Rhodiis an silentio suum quam plurimo venditurus. 
Sapientem et bonum virum fingimus; de eius de- 
Uberatione et consultatione quaerimus, qui celaturus 
Rhodios non sit, si id turpe iudicet, sed dubitet, an 
turpe non sit. 
51 In huius modi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio 
videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, ahud Antipatro, 
discipulo eius, homini acutissimo. Antipatro omnia 
patefacienda, ut ne quid omnino, quod venditor 

a The Cilician pirates had been crushed by Pompey and 
settled at Soli (Pompeiopolis). They gathered strength 
again during the distractions of the civil wars, and Antony 
is even said to have sought their aid in the war against 
Brutus and Cassius. 

Marseilles and King Deiotarus of Armeniahad supported 
Pompey and in consequence were made tributary by 
Caesar's party. 

BOOK III. xi-xii 

whole proposition without even listening to it. Their 
attitude was better than ours ; for we let pirates go 
scot free, while we make our allies pay tribute.* V 

XII. Let it be set down as an established prin- 
ciple, then, that what is morally wrong can never be 
expedient — not even when one secures by means of 
it that which one thinks expedient; for the mere 
act of thinking a course expedient, when it is morally 

50 wrong, is demorahzing. But, as I said above, cases Expediency 
often arise in which expediency may seem to clash ^^^^^ rectitude 
with moral rectitude ; and so we should examine in business reia- 
carefully and see whether their conflict is inevitable *'°°*' 

or whether they may be reconciled. The following 
are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, a 
time of dearth and famine at Rhodes, with provisions 
at fabulous prices ; and suppose that an honest man 
has imported a large cargo of grain from Alexandria 
and that to his certain knowledge also several other 
importers have set sail from Alexandria, and that on 
the voyage he has sighted their vessels laden with 
grain and bound for Rhodes ; is he to report the fact 
to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel 
and sell his own stock at the highest market price ? 
I am assuming the case of a virtuous, upright man, 
and I am raising the question how a man would 
think and reason who would not conceal the facts 
from the Rhodians if he thought that it was immoral 
to do so, but who might be in doubt whether such 
silence would really be immoral. 

5 1 In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Baby- Diogenes 
lonia, a great and highly esteemed Stoic, consistently Antipater. 
holds one view ; his pupil Antipater, a most profound 
scholar, holds artother. According to Antipater all 

the facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may 



norit, emptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus 
iure civili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, 
cetera sine iiisidiis agere et, quoniam vendat, velle 
qnam optime vendere. 

Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris quam 
ceteri, fortasse etiam minoris, cum maior est copia. 
Cui fit iniuria?" 

52 Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte : Quid 
ais? tu cum hominibus consulere debeas et servire 
humanae societati eaque lege natus sis et ea habeas 
principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas, 
ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque com- 
munis utilitas tua sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit 
commoditatis et copiae?" 

Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: Aliud est 
celare, aliud tacere ; neque ego nunc te celo, si tibi 
non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui sit finis bono- 
rum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici 
viUtas^ ; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem^ 
mihi dicere necesse est." 

53 "immo vero," inquiet ille, * necesse est,' siqui- 

* vilitas a, Edd. ; utilitas, B H b c. 
« idem B H a b ; «V/ c, Bt. 

* immo . . . est c, Ed., Heine; immo vero necesse est p; 
immo vero [inquiet il/e] necesse est Bt. 


BOOK III. xii 

not be uninformed of any detail that the seller 
knows; according to Diogenes the seller shoukl 
declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a 
course is prescribed by tlie common law of the land ; 
but for the rest, since he has goods to sell, he may 
try to sell them to the best possible advantage, pro- 
vided he is guilty of no misrepresentation. 

I have imported my stock," Diogenes's mer- 
chant will say; I have offered it for sale; I sell 
at a price no higher than my competitors — perhaps 
even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who 
is wronged?" 

What say you ? " comes Antipater's argument on 
the other side ; it is your dutjt to consider the in- 
terests of your fellow-men and to serve society ; you 
were brought into the world under these conditions 
and have these inbornprincipleswhich you are in duty 
bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be 
the interest of the community and conversely that 
the interest of the community shall be your interest 
as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal is conceaiment 
from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous sup- i*mmorai ? 
plies is close at hand for them?" 

It is one thing to conceal/' Diogenes will ptr- 
haps reply ; not to reveal is quite a different thing. 
At this present moment I am not concealing from 
you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of 
the gods or the highest good ; and to know these 
secrets would be of more advantage to you than to 
know that the price of wheat was down. But I am 
under no obligation to tell you everything that it 
may be to your interest to be told." 

Yea," Antipater will say, but you are, as you 
must admit, if you will only bethink you of the 

Y 321 

dem meministi esse inter homines natura coniun- 
ctam societatem." 

Memini/' inquiet ille; ' sed num ista societas 
talis estj ut nihil suum cuiusque sit ? Quod si ita 
est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed do- 

XI 11. Vides in hac tota disceptatione non illud 
dici : Quamvis hoc turpe sit^ tamen, quoniam ex- 
pedit, faciam," sed ita expedire, ut turpe non sit, ex 
altera autem parte, ea re, quia turpe sit, non esse 

54 Vendat aedes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quae 
ipse norit, ceteri ignorent, pestilentes sint et habe- 
antur salubres, ignoretur in omnibus cubiculis appa- 
rere serpentes, male materiatae sint^ ruinosae, sed 
hoc praeter dominum nemo sciat; quaero, si liaec 
emptoribus venditor non dixerit aedesque vendiderit 
pluris multo, quam se venditurum putarit, num id 
iniuste aut improbe fecerit. 

55 Ille vero," inquit Antipater; "quid est enim 
aliud erranti viam non monstrare, quod Athenis ex- 
secrationibus publicis sanctum est, si hoc non est, 
cmptorem pati ruere et per errorem in maximam 
fraudem incurrere? Plus etiam est quam viam non 

' sint Bt.S Ed., Heine ; not in MSS., Bt». 

BOOK III. xii-xiii 

bonds of fellowship forged by nature and existing 
between man and man." 

I do not forget them/' the other will reply; 
but do you mean to say that those bonds of fellow- 
ship are such that tliere is no such thing as private 
property? If that is the case, we should not 
sell anything at all, but freely give everything 

XIII. In this whole discussion^ you see, no one 
says However wrong morally this or that may be, 
stillj since it is expedient, I will do it"; but the one 
side asserts that a given act is expedient, without 
being morally wrong, while the other insists that 
the act should not be done, because it is morally 

Suppose again that an honest man is ofFering a a vendor's duty 
house for sale on account of certain undesirable 
features of which he himself is aware but which 
nobody else knows; suppose it is unsanitary^ but 
has the reputation of being healthful ; suppose it is 
not generally known that vermin are to be found in 
all the bedrooms ; suppose, finally, that it is built of 
unsound timber and hkely to collapse, but that no 
one knows about it except the owner ; if the vendor 
does not tell the purchaser these facts but sells him 
the house for far more than he could reasonably 
have expected to get for it, I ask whether his trans- 
action is unjust or dishonourable. 

Yes," says Antipater, it is ; for to allow a pur- 
chaser to be hasty in closing a deal and through 
mistaken judgment to incur a very serious loss, if 
this is not refusing to set a man right when he has 
lost his way ' (a crime which at Athens is prohibited 
on pain of pui)lic execration), what is? It is even 
v2 323 


monstrare ; nam est scientem in errorem alterum 
(55) Diogenes contra : " Num te emere coegit, qui ne 
hortatus quidera est ? Ille, quod non placebat, pro- 
scripsit, tu, quod placebat, emisti. Quodsi, qui pro- 
scribunt villam bonam beneque aedificatam, non 
existimantur fefellisse, etiamsi illa nec bona est nec 
aedificata ratione, multo minus, qui domum non 
laudarunt. Ubi enim iudicium emptoris est, ibi 
fraus venditoris quae potest esse ? Sin autem di- 
ctum non omne praestandum est, quod dictum non 
est, id praestandum putas ? Quid vero est stultius 
quam venditorem eius rei, quam vendat, vitia nar- 
rare ? quid autem tam absurdum, quam si domini 
iussu ita praeco praedicet : * Domum pestilentem 
vendo ' ? " 

56 Sic ergo in quibusdam causis dubiis ex altera parte 
defenditur lionestas, ex altera ita de utilitate dicitur, 
ut id, quod utile videatur, non modo facere honestum 
sit, sed etiam non facere turpe. Haec est illa, quae 
videturutiliumfiericum honestis saepe dissensio. Quae 
diiudicanda sunt ^ ; non enim, ut quaereremus, ex- 

57 posuimus, sed ut expHcaremus. Non igitur videtui 
nec frumentarius ille Rhodios^ nec hic aedium 
venditor celare emptores debuisse. Neque enim id 
est celare, quicquid reticeas, sed cum, quod tu scias, 

* sunt MSS., Bt.^ Heine. Ed.; es/ [dissensio] Unger, Bt.« 

• Rhodios c, Edd. ; Rhodius B H a b. 


BOOK III. xiii 

worse than refusing to set a man on his way : it is 
dehberately leading a man astray." 

"Can you say," answers Diogenes,-'' that he com- 
pelled you to purchase, when he did not even advise 
it ? He advei*tised for sale what he did not Hke ; 
you bought what you did hke. If people are not 
considered guilty of swindhng when they place upon 
their placards For Sale : A Fine Villa, Well Built, 
even when it is neither good nor properly built, still 
less guilty are they who say nothing in praise of 
their house. For where the purchaser may exercise 
his own judgment, what fraud can there be on the 
part of the vendor.^ But if, again, not all that is 
expressly stated has to be made good, do you think 
a man is bound to make good what has not been 
said ? What, pray, would be more stupid than for a 
vendor to recount all the faults in the article he is 
ofFering for sale ? And what would be so absurd as 
for an auctioneer to cry, at the owner's bidding, 
' Here is an unsanitary house for sale ' ? " 

In this way, then, in certain doubtful cases moral 
rectitude is defended on the one side, while on the 
other side the case of expediency is so presented as 
to make it appear not only morally right to do what 
seems expedient, but even morally wrong not to do 
it. This is the contradiction that seems often to 
arise between the expedient and the morally right, 
But I must give my decision in these two cases ; for cicero's decisbn 
I did not propound them merely to raise the ques- '" '^* "^^^**- 
tions, but to offer a solution. I think, then, that it 
was the duty of that grain-dealer not to keep back 
the facts from the Rhodians, and of this vendor of 
the house to deal in the same way with his purchaser. 
The fact is that merely holding one's peace about a 

id ignorare emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum 
intersit id scire. Hoc autem celandi genus quale sit 
et cuius hominis, quis non videt? Certe non aperti, 
non simplicis, non ingenui, non iusti, non viri boni, 
versuti potius, obscuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, 
callidi, veteratoris, vafri. Haec tot et alia plura 
nonne inutile est vitiorum subire nomina ? 
58 XIV. Quodsi vituperandi, qui reticuerunt, quid de 
iis existimandum est, qui orationis vanitatem adhi- 
buerunt? C. Canius, eques Romanus, nec infacetus 
et satis litteratus, cum se Syracusas otiandi, ut ipse 
dicere solebat, non negotiandi causa contulisset, 
dictitabat^ se hortulos aliquos emere velle, quo invi- 
tare amicos et ubi se oblectare sine interpellatoribus 
posset. Quod cum percrebruisset, Pythius ei qui- 
dam, qui argentariam faceret Syracusis, venales 
quidem se hortos non habere, sed licere uti Canio, 
si vellet, ut suis, et simul ad cenam hominem in 
hortos invitavit in posterum diem. Cum ille pro- 
misisset, tum Pythius, qui esset ut argentarius apud 
omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se convocavit 
et ab iis petivit, ut ante suos hortulos postridie pi- 
scarentur, dixitque, quid eos facere vellet. Ad cenam 
tempori^ venit Canius; opipare a Pythio apparatum 
convivium, cumbarum ante oculos multitudo ; pro se 

^dictitabat c, Edd. ; dictabat B H a b. 
*tempori B H b, Bt.', Ed. ; tcmpore a c ; temperi Fl., Bt.', 

BOOK II I. xiii-xiv 

thing does not constitute concealment, but conceal- 
ment consists in trying for your own profit to keep 
others from finding out something that you know, 
when it is for their interest to know it. And who 
fails to discern what manner of concealment that is 
and what sort of person would be guilty of it ? At 
all events he would be no candid or sincere or 
straightforward or upright or honest man, but rather 
one who is shifty, sly, artful, shrewd, underhand, 
cunning, one grown old in fraud and subtlety. Is it 
not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms 
of reproach and many more besides? 

XIV. If, then, they are to be blamed who suppress Conceaiment oi 
the truth, what are we to think of those who actu- *^"'^ „, 
ally state what is false? Gaius Canius, a Roman misrepresenta- 

11-1. 11 ■. 1 t'on *"" 

knight, a man of considerable wit and literary cul- faisehood. 

ture, once went to Syracuse for a vacation, as he 
himself used to say, and not for business. He gave 
out that he had a mind to purchase a little country- 
seat, where he could invite his friends and enjoy 
himself, uninterrupted by troublesome visitors. 
When this fact was spread abroad, one Pythius, a 
banker of Syracuse, informed him that he had such 
an estate; that it was not for sale, however, but 
Canius might make himself at home there, if he 
pleased; and at the same time he invited him to the 
estate to dinner next day. Canius accepted. Then 
Pythius, who, as might be expected of a money- 
lender, could command favours of all classes, called 
the fishermen together and asked them to do their 
fishing the next day out in front of his villa, and 
told them what he wished them to do. Canius came 
to dinner at the appointed hour; Pythius had a 
sumptuous banquet prepared; there was a whole | 


quisque, quod ceperat, afFerebat, ante pedes Pythi 
pisces abiciebantur. 

59 Tum Canius: Quaeso/' inquit, "quid est hoc, 
Pythi? tantumne piscium? tantumne cumbarum?" 

Et ille: Quid mirum?" inquit, hoc loco est 
Syracusis quicquid est piscium, hic aquatio, hac villa 
isti carere non possunt." 

Incensus Canius cupiditate contendit a Pythio, ut 
venderet ; gravate ille primo ; quid multa ? impetrat. 
Emit homo cupidus et locuples tanti, quanti Pythius 
voluit, et emit instructos; nomina facit, negotium 
conficit. Invitat Canius postridie familiares suos, 
venit ipse mature; scalmum nullum videt, quaerit 
ex proximo vicino, num feriae quaedam piscatorum 
essentj quod eos nullos videret. 

Nullae, quod sciam," inquit; sed hic piscari 
nulli solent; itaque heri mirabar, quid accidisset." 

60 Stomachari Canius; sed quid faceret? nondum 
enim C. AquiHus, collega et familiaris meus, protu- 
lerat de dolo malo formulas ; in quibus ipsis, cum ex 
eo quaereretur,^ quid esset dolus malus, respondebat : 
cum esset aliud simulatum, aliud actum. Hoc quidem 
sane luculente ut ab liomine perito definiendi. Ergo 
et Pythius et omnes aliud agentes, aliud simulantes 

^quaereretur Edd., with authority ; guaererem MSS. 

BOOK III. xiv 

fleet ot boats before their eyes; each fisherman 
brduglit in in turn the cateh that he had made ; and 
the fishes were deposited at the feet of Pythius. 

Pray, Pythius," said Canius thereupon, what 
does this mean? — all these fish? — all these boats?" 
No wonder," answered Pythius; this is where 
all the fish in Syracuse are ; here is where the fresh 
water comes from ; the fishermen cannot get along 
without this estate." 

Inflamed with desire for it, Canius insisted upon 
Pythius's selling it to him. At first he demurred. 
To make a long story short, Canius gained his point. 
The man was rich, and, in his desire to own the 
country-seat, he paid for it all that Pythius asked ; 
and he bought the entire equipment, too, Pythius 
entered the amount upon his ledger and completed 
the transfer. The next day Canius invited his 
friends ; he came early himself. Not so much as a 
thole-pin was in sight. He asked his next-door 
neighbour whether it was a fisherman's holiday, for 
not a sign of them did he see. 

Not so far as I know," said he ; but none are in 
the habit of fishing here. And so I could not make 
out what was the matter yesterday." 

Canius was furious; but what could he do? For crfminalfraud 
not yet had my colleague and friend, Gaius Aquilius, 
introduced the established forms to apply to criminal 
fraud. When asked what he meant by "criminal 
fraud," as specified in these forms, he would reply: 
Pretending one thing and practising another" — a 
very felicitous definition, as one might expect from 
an expert in making them. Pythius, therefore, and 
all others who do one tliing while they pretend 
<inother are faithless, dishonest, and unprincipled 


perfidi, improbi, malitiosi. Nullum igitur eorum fa- 
ctum potest utile esse, cum sit tot vitiis inquinatum. 

61 XV. Quodsi Aquiliana definitio vera est, ex omni 
vita simulatio dissimulatioque tollenda est. Ita, nec 
ut emat melius nec ut vendat, quicquam simulabit 
aut dissimulabit vir bonus. Atque^ iste dolus malus 
et legibus erat vindicatus, ut tutela^ duodecim tabu- 
lis, circumscriptio adulescentium lege Plaetoria, et 
sine lege iudiciis, in quibus additur ex fide bona. 
Reliquorum autem iudiciorum haec verba maxime 
excellunt: in arbitrio rei uxoriae melius aequius, in 
fiducia UT INTER BONos BENE AGiER. Quid crgo ? aut 
in eo, QUOD melius aequius, potest uUa pars inesse 
fraudis? aut, cum dicitur inter bonos bene agier, 
quicquam agi dolose aut malitiose potest? Dolus 
autem malus in simulatione, ut ait Aquilius, con- 
tinetur. Tollendum est igitur ex rebus contrahendis 
omne mendacium; non illicitatorem^ venditor, non, 
qui contra se liceatur, emptor apponet; uterque, si 
ad eloquendum venerit, non plus quam semel f,lo- 

62 quetur. Q. quidem Scaevola P. f,, cum postulasset, 
ut sibi fundus, cuius emptor erat, semel indicaretur 

* AfgtieMSS., Bt.', Muller, Heine ; Atqui Manutius, Ed., 

* w/ tutela MSS., Bt., Muller ; ut in tutela Heine, Ed. 

^ no7i illicitatorem c (inl. ) p, Edd. ; non licitatorem B H a b. 

a See § 70 below, 

BOOK III. xiv-xv 

scoundrels. No act of theirs can be expedient, when 
what they do is tainted with so many vices. 

XV. But if Aquilius*s definition is correct, pre- 
tence and concealment should be done away with in 
all departments of our daily life. Then an honest 
man will not be guilty of either pretence or conceal- 
ment in order to buy or to sell to better advantage. 
Besides, your criminal fraud" had previously been Criminai fraud 
prohibited by the statutes : the penalty in the matter ^"^ ^^ '^^" 
of trusteeships, for example, is fixed by the Twelve 
Tables ; for the defrauding of minors, by the Plae- 
torian law. The same prohibition is effective, with- 
out statutory enactment, in equity cases, in which 
it is added that the decision shall be "as good 
faith requires."* In all other cases in equity, 
moreover, the following phrases are most note- 
worthy : in a case calling for arbitration in the matter 
of a wife's dowry : what is "the fairer is the better " ; 
in a suit for the restoration of a trust: "honest 
dealingj as between honest parties." Pray, then, 
can there be any element of fraud in what is adjusted 
for the better and fairer"? Or can anything 
fraudulent or unprincipled be done, when " honest 
dealing between honest parties " is stipulated ? But 
criminal fraud," as Aquilius says, consists in false 
pretence. We must, therefore, keep misrepresenta- criminaifraud 
tion entirely out of business transactions : the seller '° *^^ ''^^* °K 

.„ , , , .1, moral rectitud» 

will not engage a bogus bidder to run pnces up nor 
the buyer one to bid low against himself to keep 
them down; and each, it they come to naming a 
price, will state once for all what he will give or take. 
Why, when Quintus Scaevola, the son of Publius 
Scaevola, asked that the price of a farm that he 
desired to purchase be definitely named and the 


idque venditor ita fecisset, dixit se pluris aestimare ; 
addidit eentum milia. Nemo est, qui hoc viri boni 
fuisse negetj sapientis negant, ut si minoi-is, quani 
potuisset, vendidisset. Haec igitur est illa pemicies, 
quod alios bonos, alios sapientes existimant. Ex quo 
Medea,^ Ennius " nequiquam sapere sapientem, qui ipse sibi 
^'^ prodesse non quiret." Vere id quidem, si, quid 

esset "prodesse," mihi cumlEnnio conveniret. 

63 Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti- 
video in iis libris, quos de officio scripsit Q. Tuberoni , 
dicere " sapientis esse nihil contra mores, leges, in- 
stituta facientem habere rationem rei familiaris. 
Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed 
liberis, propinquis, amicis maximeque rei publicae, 
Singulorum enim facultates et copiae divitiae sunt 
civitatis." Huic^ Scaevolae [factum, de quo paulo 
ante dixi, placere nullo modo potest ; etenim om- 
nino tantum se negat facturum compendii sui causa, 
quod non liceat. Huic nec laus magna tribuenda 
nec gratia est. 

64 Sed, sive et simulatio et dissimulatio dolus malus 
est, perpaucae res sunt/^ in quibus non dolus malus 

* huic c, Edd.; huius B H a b- 


vendor namedit, he replied that he considered it 
worth more^ and paid him 100,000 sesterces over 
and above what he asked. No one could say that 
tliis was not the act of an honest man ; but people do 
say that it was not the act of a worldly-wise man, any 
more than if he had sold for a smaller amount than 
he could have commanded. Here, then, is that 
mischievous idea — the world accounting some men 
upright, others wise ; and it is this fact that gives 
Eimius'occasion to say : 

*' In vain is the wise man wise, who cannot 
benefit himself." 

And Ennius is quite right, if only he and I were agreed 
upon the meaning of "benefit." 

Now I observe that Hecaton of Rhodes, a pupil of 
Panaetius, says in his books on " Moral Duty " 
dedicated to Quintus Tubero that " it is a wise 
man's duty to take care of his private interests, at The standard 
the same time doing nothing contrary to the civil ofseifishness. 
customs, laws, and institutions. But that depends 
on our purpose in seeking prosperity ; for we do not 
aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our chil- 
dren, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country. 
For the private fortunes of individuals are the wealth 
of the state." Hecaton could not for a moment 
approve of Scaevola's act, which I cited a moment 
ago ; for he openly avows that he will abstain from 
doing for his own profit only what the law expressly 
forbids. Such a man deserves no great praise nor 

Be that as it may, if both pretence and conceal- 
ment constitute " criminal fraud/' there are very 
few transactions into which "criminal fraud " does 


iste versetur, sive vir bonus est is, qui prodest, qui- 
bus potest, nocet neminij certe^ istum^ virum bonuni 
non facile reperimus. 

Numquam igitur est utile peccare, quia semper 
est turpe, et, quia semper est honestum virum bonum 
esse, semper est utile. 

65 XVI. Ac de iure quidem praediorum sanctum apud 
nos est iure civili, ut in iis vendendis vitia diceren- 
tur, quae nota essent venditori. Nam, cum ex duo- 
decim tabulis satis esset ea praestari, quae essent 
lingua nuncupata, quae qui infitiatus esset, dupli 
poenam subiret, a iuris consultis etiam reticentiae 
poena est constituta ; quicquid enim esset^ in praedio 
vitii, id statuerunt, si venditor sciret, nisi nomina- 

66 tim dictum esset, praestari oportere. Ut, cum in 
arce augurium augures acturi essent iussissentque 
Ti.* Claudium Centumalum, qui aedes in Caelio 
monte habebat, demoliri ea, quorum altitudo office- 
ret auspiciis, Claudius proscripsit insulam [vendidit],^ 
emit P. Calpurnius Lanarius. Huic ab auguribus 
illud idem denuntiatum est. Itaque Calpurnius cum 
demolitus esset cognossetque Claudium aedes postea 
proscripsisse, quam esset ab auguribus demoliri 

' certe Lainb., Edd. ; recte MSS. 

* istum p c, Edd. ; iustum B H a b. 

* esset p c, Edd.; ^5/ B U a b. 

* Ti. Lang-e, Edd. ; tttum MSS. 

* vendidtt B H a b ; ^/ vendidit p c. ; Edd. omit. 


BOOK III. xv-xvi 

not enter ; or, if he only is a good man who helps 
all he can, and harms no one, it will certainly be no 
easy matter for us to find the good man as thus 

^o concludcj then, it is never expedient to do 
wrong, because wrong is always immoral ; and it is 
always expedient to be good, because goodness is 
always moral. 

XVI. In the laws pertaining to the sale of real conceaimentof 
property it is stipulated in our civil code that when estat^e^^pro"* '^^' 
a transfer of any real estate is made, all its defects hibited by lavK 
shall be declared as far as they are known to the 
vendor. According to the laws of the Twelve Tables 
it used to be sufficient that such faults as had been 
expressly declared should be made good and that for 
any flaws which the vendor expressly denied, when 
questioned, he should be assessed double damages. 
A like penalty for failure to make such declaration 
also has now been secured by our jurisconsults: 
they have decided that any defect in a piece of real 
estate, if known to the vendor but not expressly 
stated, must be made good by him. For example, 
the augurs were proposing to take observations from 
the citadel and they ordered Tiberius Claudius Cen- 
tumalus, who owned a house upon the Caelian Hill, 
to pull down such parts of the building as obstructed 
the augurs' view by reason of their height. Claudius 
at once advertised his block for sale, and Publius 
Calpurnius Lanarius bought it. The same notice 
was served also upon him. And so, when Calpurnius 
had pulled down those parts of the building and 
discovered that Claudius had advertised it for sale 
only after the augurs had ordered them to be pulled 
down, he summoned the former owner before a court 


iussus, arbitrum illum adegit, quicquid sibi dare 


tiam dixit, huius nostri Catonis pater (ut enim 
ceteri ex patribus, sic hic, qui illud lumen progenuit, 
ex filio est nominandus) — is igitur iudex ita pronun- 
tiavit: cum in vendendo rem eam scisset et non 
pronuntiasset, emptori damnum praestari oportere." 
67 Ergo ad fidem bonam statuit pertinere notum 
esse emptori vitium, quod nosset venditor. Quod si 
recte iudicavit, non recte frumentarius ille, non 
recte aedium pestilentium venditor tacuit. Sed 
huius modi reticentiae iure civili comprehendi^ non 
possunt; quae autem possunt, diligenter tenentur. 
M. Marius Gratidianus, propinquus noster, C. Sergio 
Oratae vendiderat aedes eas, quas ab eodem ipse 
paucis ante annis emerat. Eae serviebant,^ sed hoc 
in mancipio Marius non dixerat. Adducta res in 
iudicium est. Oratam Crassus, Gratidianum de- 
fendebat Antonius. lus Crassus urguebat, quod 
vitii venditor non dixisset sciens, id oportere prae- 
stari," aequitatem Antonius, * quoniam id vitium 

^ comprehendi MSS. ; ovines comprehendi Bt., Heine. 
* serviehant Hcus., Edd. ; sergio serviebant B H a b ; sergio 
alii serviebant c. 


BOOK III. xvi 

of equity to decide what indemnity tlie owner was 
under obligation in good faith ' to pay and deliver 
to him." The verdiot was pronounced by Marcus 
Cato^ the father of our Cato (for as other men receive 
a distinguishing name from their fathers, so he who 
bestowed upon the world so bright a luminary must 
have his distinguishing name from liis son); he^ as 
I was saying, was presiding judge and pronounced 
the verdict that since the augurs' mandate was 
known to the vendor at the time of making the 
transfer and since he had not made it known, he was 
bound to make good the purchasers loss." 

Withthis verdict he estabhshed the principle that Scope of Cato'o 
it was essential to good faith that any defect known ^*^*^ ^*"* 
to the vendor must be made known to the purchaser. 
If his decision was right, our grain dealer and the 
vendor of the unsanitary house did not do right to 
suppress the facts in those cases. But the civil code 
cannot be made to include all cases where facts are 
thus suppressed; but those cases which it does 
include are summarily dealt with. Marcus Marius 
Gratidianus, a kinsman of ours^ sold back to Gaius 
Sergius Orata the house which he himself had 
bought a few years before from that same Orata. It 
was subject to an encumbrance^ but Marius had said 
notliing about this fact in stating the terms of sale. 
The case was cai-ried to the courts. Crassus was 
counsel for Orata; Antonius was retained by Grati- 
dianus. Crassus pleaded the letter of the law that 

the vendor was bound to make good the defectj 
for he had not declared it, although he was aware ot 
it"; Antonius laid stress upon the equity of the case, 
pleading that, inasmuch as the defect in question 
had not been unknown to Sergius (for it was the 
z 337 

ignotum Sergio non fuisset, qui illas aedes vendi- 
dissetj nihil fuisse necesse dicij nec eum esse dece- 
ptum, qui, id, quod emerat, quo iure esset, teneret." 

^8 Quorsus haec? Ut ilhid intellegas, non placuisse 
maioribus nostris astutos. 

XVII. Sed ahter leges, ahter philosophi tollunt 
astutias, leges, quatenus manu tenere possunt, 
philosophi, quatenus ratione et intellegentia. Ratio 
ergo hoc postulat, ne quid insidiose, ne quid simulate, 
ne quid fallaciter. Suntne igitur insidiae tendere 
plagas, etiamsi excitaturus non sis nec agitaturus.^ 
ipsae enim ferae nullo insequente saepe incidunt. 
Sic tu aedes proscribas, tabulam tamquam plagam 
ponas, [domum propter vitia vendas,]^ in eam aliquis 
incurrat imprudens? 

69 Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem 
consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi neque aut 
lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege 
sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe 
dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius), latissime 
quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes, interior 
eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui 
eiusdem civitatis. Itaque maiores ahud ius gentium, 
ahud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civilc, uon 

^Bracketed by Unger, Edd. 

BOOK III. xvi-xvii 

same house that he had sold to Marius), i^o declara- 
tion of it was needed^ and in pui'ehasing it back he 
had not been imposed upon^ for he knew to what 
legal habihty his purchase was subject." 

What is the purpose of these illustrations ? To 
let you see that our forefathers did not countenance 
sharp practice. 

XVII. Now the law disposes of sharp practices in Law 
one way, philosophers in another : the law deals with phiiosophy in 
them as far as it can lay its strong arm upon them ; deaiing with 
philosophers, as far as they can be apprehended by "^^®'^^' 
reason and conscience. Now reason demands that 
nothing be done with unfairness, with false pretence, 
or with misrepresentation. Is it not deception, 
then, to set snares, even if one does not mean to 
start the game or to drive it into them ? Why, wild 
creatures often fall into snares undriven and unpur- 
sued. Could one in the same way advei'tise a house 
for sale^ post upa notice To be sold," Hke a snare, 
and liave somebody run into it unsuspecting ? 

Owing to the low ebb of pubhc sentiment, such Qyii \^^ 
a method of procedure^ I find^ is neither by custom Yi" 
accounted morally wrong nor forbidden either by 
statute or by civil law ; nevertheless it is forbidden 
by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellow- 
ship — although I have often made this statement, 
I must still repeat it again and again — which has the 
very widest apphcation^ uniting all men together 
and each to each. This bond of union is closer 
between those who belong to the same nation^ and 
more intimate still between those who are citizens 
of the same city-state. It is for this reason that 
our forefathers chose to understand one thing by the 
universal law and another by the civil law. The 
z2 339 

idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem 
civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque 
iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tene- 
mus^ umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam 
sequeremurl feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et 

70 veritatis exemplis. Nam quanti verba illa: uti ne 


sim! quam illa aurea: UT inter bonos bene agier 
OPORTET et sine fraudatione! Scd, qui sint 
boni," et quid sit bene agi," magna quaestio est. 
Q. quidem Scaevola, pontifex maximus, summam 
vim esse dicebat in omnibus iis arbitriis, in quibus 
adderetur ex fide bona, fideique bonae nomen existi- 
mabat manare latissime, idque versari in tutelis 
societatibus, fiduciis mandatis, rebus emptis ven- 
ditis, conductis locatis, quibus vitae societas contine- 
retur; in iis magni esse iudicis statuere, praesertim 
cum in plerisque essent iudicia contraria, quid quem- 
que cuique praestare oporteret. 

71 Quocirca astutiae tollendae sunt eaque malitia, 

quae volt illa quidem videri se esse prudentiam, sed 

abest ab ea distatque plurimimi. Prudentia est enim 

locata in dilectu bonorum et malorum, malitia, si 

BOOK III. xvii 
civil law is not necessarily also the universal law ; 
but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. 
But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true 
Law and genuine Justice ; a mere outhne sketch is 
all that we enjoy. I only wish that we were true 
even to this ; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the 
excellent models which Nature and Truth afford. 
) For how weighty are the woi-ds : That I be not " Good faith " 

- „in performance 

deceived and defrauded through you and my conh- of contracts. 
dence in 3'ou"! How precious are these: As 
between honest people there ought to be honest 
deahng, and no deception"! But who are honest 
people," and what is "honest deahng" — these are 
seiious questions. 

It "vvas Quintus Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, 
who used to attach the greatest importance to all 
questions of arbitration to which the formula was 
appended "as good faith requires;" and he held 
that the expression ' good faith " had a veiy exten- 
sive apphcation, for it was employed in trusteeships 
and partnerships, in trusts and commissions, in buy- 
ing and selhng, in hiring and letting — in a word, in 
all the transactions on which the social relations of 
daily life depend ; in these, he said, it required a 
judge of great abihty to decide the extent of each 
individuaVs obhgation to the other, especially when 
counter-claims were admissible in most cases. 
1 Away, then, with sharp practice and trickery, 
which desires, of course, to pass for wisdom, but is 
far from it and totally unlike it. For the function 
of wisdom is to discriminate between good and evil ; 


omniaj quae turpia sunt, mala sunt, mala bonis ponit 

Nec vero in praediis solum ius civile ductum a 
natura malitiam fraudemque vindicat, sed etiam in 
mancipiorum venditione venditoris fraus omnis ex- 
cluditur. Qui enim scire debuit de sanitate, de 
fuga, de furtis, praestat edicto aedilium. Heredum 
alia causa est. 

72 Ex quo intellegitur, quoniam iuris natura fons sit, 
hoc secundum naturam esse, neminem id agere, ut 
ex alterius praedetur inscitia. Nec uUa pernicies 
vitae maior inveniri potest quam in malitia simulatio 
intellegentiae ; ex quo ista innumerabilia nascuntur, 
ut utilia cum honestis pugnare videantur. Quotus 
enim quisque reperietur, qui impunitate et ignora- 
tione omnium proposita abstinere possit iniuria ? 

73 XVIII. Periclitemur, si placet, et in iis quidem 
exemplis, in quibus peccari volgus hominum fortasse 
non putet. Neque enim de sicariis, veneficis, testa- 
mentariis, furibus, peculatoribus hoc loco disseren- 
dum est, qui non verbis sunt et disputatione philoso- 
phorum, sed vincHs et carcere fatigandi, sed haec ^ 
consideremus, quae faciunt ii, qui habentur boni. 

L. Minuci Basili, locupletis hominis, falsum testa- 
mentum quidam e Graecia Romam attulerunt. Quod 

' haec c. Edd. ; hoc B H a b. 

BOOK III. xvii-xviii 

whereas, inasmuch as all things morally w^rong are 
evil, triekery prefers the evil to the good. 

It is not only in the case of real estate transfers 
that the civil law, based upon a natural feeling for 
the right, punishes trickery and deception, but also 
in the sale of slaves every form of deception on the 
vendors part is disallowed. For by the aediles' 
ruhng the vendor is answerable for any deficiency in 
the slave he sells, for he is supposed to know if his 
slave is souiid, or if he is a runaway, or a thief. The 
case of those who have just come into the possession 
of slaves by inheritance is different. 

From this we come to realize that since nature is cunning is not 
the source of right, it is not in accord with nature wisdom. 
that anyone should take advantage of his neigh- 
bour's ignorance. And no greater curse in life can 
be found than knavery that wears the mask of wis- 
dom. Thence come those countless cases in which 
the expedient seems to conflict with the right. For 
how few will be found who can refrain from wrong- 
doing, if assured of the power to keep it an absolute 
secret and to run no risk of punishment ! 

XVIII. Let us put our principle to the test, if 
you please, and see if it holds good in those instances 
in which, perhaps, the world in general finds no 
wrong; for in this connection we do not need to 
discuss cut-throats, poisoners, forgers of wills, thieves, 
and embezzlers of public moneys, who should be 
repressed not by lectures and discussions of philoso- 
phers, but by chains and prison walls; but let us 
study here the conduct of those who have the repu- 
tation of being honest men. 

Certain individuals brought from Greece to Rome 
a forged will, purporting to be that of the wealthy 



quo facilius optinerent, scripserunt heredes secum 
M. Crassum et Q. Hortensium, homines eiusdem 
aetatis potentissimos ; qui cum illud falsum esse 
suspicarentur, sibi autem nullius essent conscii 
culpae, alieni facinoris munusculum non repudiave- 
runt. Quid ergo? satin est hoc, ut non deliquisse 
videantur? Mihi quidem non videtur, quamquam 
alterum vivum amavi, alterum non odi mortuum ; 

74 sed, cum Basihis M. Satrium, sororis fihum, nomen 
suum ferre voluisset eumque fecisset heredem (hunc 
dico patronum agri Piceni et Sabini; o turpem 
notam temporum [nomen illorum] l),^ non erat aequum 
principes civis rem habere, ad Satrium nihil praeter 
nomen pervenire. Etenim, si is, qui non defendit 
iniuriam neque propulsat,^ cum potest, iniuste facit, 

§23 ut in primo libro disserui, quahs habendus est is, qui 
non modo non repellit, set etiam adiuvat iniuriam ? 
Mihi quidem etiam verae heredibites non honestae 
videntur, si sunt mahtiosis blanditiis, officiorum non 
veritate, sed simulatione quaesitae. 

Atqui in taHbus rebus ahud utile interdum, aliud 

75 honestum videri solet. Falso ; nam eadem utiHtatis, 
(75) quae honestatis, est regula. Qui hoc non pervidont, 

^turpetn notam temportim nomefi illorum H a {turpe) b, 
Bt. ; excl. nomcn illoruvt Victorius, Ed. ; tttrpe noiiien illo- 
rum temporum c. 

^ propulsat cod. Bern., O., Edd.; proputsat a suis Edd. 

aThe shame was that stales enjoying-the rigflitsof Roman 
citizenship should need a patron to protccl their interests in 
the Roman capital. 


BOOK III. xviii 

Lucius Minucius Basilus. The more easily to pro- 
cure validity for it, they made joint-heirs with them- 
selves two of the most influential men of the day, 
Marcus Crassus and Quintus Hortensius. Although 
these men suspected that the will was a forgeiy, 
still, as they were conscious of no personal guilt in 
the matter, they did not spurn the miserable boon 
procured through the crime of others. What shall we 
say, then? Is this excuse competent to acquit them 
of guilt? I cannot think so, although I loved the 
one while he lived, and do not hate the other now 
that he is dead. Be that as it may, Basilus had in fact 
desired that his nephew Marcus Satrius should bear 
his name and inherit his property. (I refer to the 
Satrius who is the present patron of Picenum and 
the Sabine country — and oh, what a shameful stigma 
it is upon the times ! ^) And therefore it was not 
right that two of the leading citizens of Rome 
should take the estate and Satrius succeed to nothing 
except his uncle's name. For if he does wrong who 
does not ward ofF and repel injury when he can — as 
I explained in the course of the FirstBook — what is to 
be thought of the man who not only does not try to 
prevent wrong, but actually aids and abets it? For 
my part, I do not believe that even genuine legacies 
are moral, if they are souglit after by designing 
flatteries and by attentions liypocritical rather than 

And j^et in such cases there are times when one Thesamestand- 
course is likely to appear expedient and another di^ncy asToV 
morally right. The appearance is deceptive; for morairectitude. 
our standard is the same for expediency and for 
moral rectitude. And the man who does not accept 
the truth of this will be capable of any sort of dis- 



ib hoc nulla fraus aberit, nullum facinus, Sic enim 
cogitans : ' Est istuc quidem honestum, verum hoc 
expedit/' res a natura copulatas audebit errore 
divellere^ qui fons est fraudium, maleficiorum, scele- 
Tum omnium. 

XIX. Itaque, si vir bonus habeat hanc vim, utj si 
digitis concrepuerit, possit in locupletium testamenta 
nomen eius inrepere, hac vi non utatur, ne si explo- 
ratum quidem habeat id omnino neminem umquam 
Guspicaturum. At dares hanc vim M. Crasso, ut 
digitorum percussione heres posset scriptus esse, qui 
re vera non esset heres, in forOj mihi crede, saltaret. 
Homo autem iustus isque, quem sentimus virum 
bonum, nihil cuiquam, quod in se transferat, detra- 
het. Hoc qui admiratur, is se, quid sit vir bonus, 
76 nescire fateatur. At vero, si qui voluerit animi sui 
compHcatam notionem evolvere, iam se ipse doceat 
cum virum bonum esse, qui prosit, quibus possit, 
noceat nemini nisi lacessitus iniuria. Quid ergo .'' 
hic non noceat, qui quodam quasi veneno perficiat, 
ut veros heredes moveat, in eorum locum ipse succe- 
dat? '*Non igitur faciat," dixerit quis, quod utile 
sit, quod expediat ? " Immo intellegat niliil nec 

«The Platonic doctrine of ideas known in a previous 
existence and gradiially developing- into renewed con- 
sciousness. Learning- is but a remembering of what the 
soul has known before. 

BOOK III. xviii-xix 

honesty, any sort of crime. For if he reasons 
"That is^ to be sure, the right course, but this 
course brings advantage," he will not hesitate in his 
mistaken judgment to divorce two conceptions that 
nature has made one; and that spirit opens the 
door to all sorts of dishonesty, wrong-doing, and 

XIX. Suppose^ then, that a good man had such Thegoodman 
power that at a snap of his fingers his name could unrighteous 
steal into rich men's wills^ he would not avail him- sam. 
self of that power — no^ not even though he could be 
perfectly sure that no one would ever suspect it. 
Suppose, on the other hand^ that one were to offer 
a Marcus Crassus the power, by the mere snapping 
of his fingers, to get himself named as heir, when he 
was not really an heir, he would, I warrant you, 
dance in the forum. But the righteous man, the 
one whom we feel to be a good man, would never 
rob anyone of anything to enrich himself. If any- 
body is astonished at this doctrine, let him confess 
76 that he does not know what a good man is. If, on whoisthegooi 
the other hand, anyone should desire to unfold the ™^°' 
idea of a good man which lies wrapped up in his OAvn 
mind/ he would then at once make it clear to him- 
self that a good man is one who helps all whom he 
can and harms nobody, unless provoked by wrong., 
What shall we say, then? Would he not be doing 
harm who by a kind of magic spell should succeed 
in displacing the real heirs to an estate and pushing 
himself into their place? Well/' some one may 
say, " is he not to do what is expedient, what is ad- 
vantageous to himself ? " Nay, verily ; he should rather 
be brought to reahze that nothing that is unjust is 
either advantageous or expedient; if he does not 


expedire nec utile esse, quod sit iniustum; hoc qui 
non didicerit, bonus vir esse non poterit. 
77 C} Fimbriara consularem audiebam de patre nostro 
puer iudicem M. Lutatio Pinthiae fuisse, equiti 
Romano sane honesto, cum is sponsionem fecisset, 
Ni viR BONUS ESSET. Itaque ei dixisse Fimbriam se 
illam rem numquam iudicaturum, ne aut spoliaret 
fama probatum hominem^ si contra iudicavisset, aut 
statuissc videretur virum bonum esse aliquem, cum 
ea res innumerabilibus officiis et laudibus contine- 

Huic igitur viro bono, quem Fimbria etiam, non 
modo Socrates noverat, nullo modo videri potest 
quicquam esse utile, quod non honestum sit. Itaque 
talis vir non modo facere, sed ne cogitare quidem 
quicquam audebit, quod non audeat praedicare. 
Haec non turpe est dubitare philosophos, quae ne 
rustici quidem dubitent? a quibus natum est id, 
quod iam contritum est vetustate, proverbium. Cum 
cnim fidem alicuius bonitatemque laudant, dignum 
esse dicunt, quicum in tenebris mices." Hoc quam 
habet vim nisi illam, nihil expedire, quod non 

'C. Bt., Ed., Heine; not in MSS. 

aLit. ' flash with the fingers'; shoot out some fing-ers 
the number of which had to be guessed. 


liOOK III. xix 
learn this lessoiij it will never be possible for him to 
be a good man." 

When I was a boy, I used to hear my father tell 
that Gaius Fimbriaj an ex-consul, was judge in a 
case of Marcus Lutatius Pinthia, a Roman knight of 
irreproachable character. On that occasion Pinthia 
had laid a wager to be forfeited if he did not prove 
in court that he was a good man." Fimbria de- 
clared that he would never render a decision in such 
a case, for fear that he might either rob a reputable 
man of his good name, if he decided against him, or 
be thought to have pronounced some one a good 
man, when such a character is, as he said, estabhshed 
by the performance of countless duties and the pos- 
session of praiseworthy quahties without number. 

To this type of good man, then, known not only to a good maD 
to a Socrates but even to a Fimbria, nothing can ITevTrex^pedjen 
possibly seem expedient that is not morally right. 
Such a man, therefore, will never venture to think 
— to say nothing of doing — anything that he would 
not dare openly to proclaim. Is it not a shame that 
philosophers should be in doubt about moral ques- 
tions on which even peasants have no doubts at all ? 
For it is with peasants that the proverb, already trite 
with age, originated: when they praise a man's 
honour and honesty, they say "He is a man with 
whom you can safely play at odd and even* in the 
dark." What is the point of the proverb but this — 
that what is not proper brings no advantage, even if 


deceat, etiamsi id possis nullo refellente optinere.'' 

78 Videsne hoc proverbio neque Gygi illi posse 
veniam dari neque huic, quem paulo ante fingebam 
digitorum percussione hereditates omnium posse 
converrere ? Ut enim^ quod turpe est, id, quamvis 
occultetur, tamen honestum fieri nullo modo potest, 
sic, quod honestum non est, id utile ut sit, effici non 
potest adversante et repugnante natura. 

79 XX. At enim, cum permagna praemia sunt, est 
causa peccandi. 

C. Marius cum a spe consulatus longe abesset et 
iam septimum annum post praeturam iaceret, neque 
petiturus umquam consulatum videretur, Q. Metel- 
lum, cuius legatus erat, summum virum et civem, 
cum ab eo, imperatore suo, Romam missus esset, 
apud populum Romanum criminatus est bellum illum 
ducere; si se consulem fecissent, brevi tempore aut 
vivum aut mortuum lugurtham se in potestatem 
populi Romani redactui-um. Itaque factus est ille 
quidem consul, sed a fide iustitiaque discessit, qui 
optimum et gravissimum civem, cuius legatus et a 
quo missus esset, in invidiam falso crimine adduxerit. 

80 Ne noster quidem Gratidianus officio viri boni 

' et tam Edd. ; etiam MSS. 

BOOK III. xix-xx 

you can gain your end without any one's being able 
to convict you of wrong ? 

Do you not see that in the hght of this proverb 
no excuse is available either for the Gyges of the 
story or for the man who I assumed a moment ago 
could with a snap of his fingers sweep together 
everybody's inheritance at once. For as the morally 
wrong cannot by any possibility be made morally 
rightj however successfully it may be covered up^ so 
what is not morally right cannot be made expedient, 
for nature refuses and resists. 

XX. "But stay," some one will object^ " when xhe morai loss 
the prize is very great^ there is excuse for doing wrong°^b^ ""^ 

Wrong." tions: 

Gaius Marius had been left in obscurity for more (i)Marius, 
than six whole years after his praetoi'ship and had 
scarcely the remotest hope of gaining the consul- 
ship. It looked as if he would never even be a 
candidate for that office. He was now a lieutenant ^|#v^ 

under Quintus Metelhis, who sent him on a furlough 
to Rome. There before the Roman People he 
accused his own general, an eminent man and one 
of our first citizens^ of purposely protracting the war 
and declared that if they would make him consul^ 
he would within a short time deUver Jugurtha alive 
or dead into the hands of the Roman People. And 
so he was elected consul, it is true, but he was a 
traitor to his own good faith and to justice; for by a 
false charge he subjected to popular disfavour an 
exemplary and highly respected citizen, and that 
too, although he was his heutenant and under leave 
of absence from him. 

Even our kinsman Gratidianus failed on one occa- (2) Gratidianus, 


functus est tum^ cum praetor esset collegiumque 
praetorium tribuni plebi adhibuissentj ut res num- 
maria de communi sententia constitueretur ; iacta- 
batur enim temporibus illis nummus sic, ut nemo 
posset scire, quid haberet. Conscripserunt commu- 
niter edictum cum poena atque iudicio constitue- 
runtque, ut omnes simul in rostra post meridiem 
escenderent. Et ceteri quidem alius alio, Marius 
ab subselliis in rostra recta idque, quod communiter 
compositum fuerat, solus edixit. Et ea res, si quaeris, 
ei magno honori fuit; omnibus vicis statuae, ad eas 
tus, cerei ; quid multa ? nemo umquam multitudini 
fuit carior, 
8 1 Haec sunt, quae conturbent in deliberatione non 
numquam, cum id, in quo violatur aequitas, non ita 
magnum, illud autem, quod ex eo paritur, perma- 
gnum videtur, ut Mario praeripere collegis et tribunis 
plebi popularem gratiam non ita turpe, consulem ob 
eam rem fieri, quod sibi tum proposuerat, valde utile 
videbatur. Sed omnium una regula est, quam tibi 
cupio esse notissimam, aut illud, quod utile videtur, 
turpe ne sit aut, si turpe est, ne videatur esse utile. 

a Gratidianiis's. 

bNever attained, however. For his conspicuous position 
as a popular leader made him an early mark for Sulla's 



sion to perform what would be a good man's duty : 
in his praetorship the tribunes of the people sum- 
moned the college of praetors to counsel, in order 
to adopt by joint resolution a standard of value for 
our currency; for at that time the value of money 
was so fluctuating that no one could tell how much 
he was worth. In joint session they drafted an 
ordinance^ defining the penalty and the methods of 
procedure in cases of violation of the ordinance^ and 
agreed that they should all appear together upon 
the rostra in the afternoon to pubhsh it. And while 
all the rest withdrew^ some in one direction, some 
in another^ Marius (Gratidianus) went straight from 
the council chamber to the rostra and published 
individually what had been drawn up by all together. 
And that coup, if you care to know, brought him 
vast honour; in every street statues of him were 
erected; before these incense and candles burned. 
In a word, no one ever enjoyed greater popularity 
with the masses. 

It is such cases as these that sometimes perplex Nomateriai 
us in our consideration, when the point in which pen^ate^for 
justice is violated does not seem so very significant, inoraiioss- 
but the consequences of such shght transgression 
seem exceedingly important. For example, it was not 
so very wrong morally, in the eyes of Marius,^ to over- 
reach his colleagues and the tribunes in turning to 
himself alone all the credit with the people ; but to 
secure by that means his election to the consulship, 
which was then the goal of his ambition,^ seemed 
very greatly to his interest. But for all cases we 
have one rule, with which I desire you to be per- 
fectly famihar: that which seems expedient mus^ 
not be morally wrong; or, if it is morally wrong, it 
AA 353 

Quod igitur? possumusne aut illum Marium virum 
bonum iudicai*e aut hunc^? Explica atque excnte 
intellegentiam tuam, ut videas, quae sit in ea [speciesj 
forma^ et notio viri boni. Cadit ergo in virum bonum 
mentiri emolumenti sui causa, criminari, praeripere, 
fallere? Nihil profecto minus. 
82 Est ergo ulla res tanti aut commodum ullum tam 
expetendum, ut viri boni et splendorem et nomen 
amittas ? Quid est, quod afFerre tantum utilitas 
ista, quae dicitur, possit, quantum auferre, si boni 
viri nomen eripuerit, fidem iustitiamque detraxerit ? 
Quid enim interest, utrum ex homine se convertat 
quis in beluam an hominis figura immanitatem gerat 
beluae ? 

XXI. Quid ? qui omnia recta et honesta negle- 
gunt, dum modo potentiam consequantur, nonne 
idem faciunt, quod is, qui etiam socerum habere 
voluit eum, cuius ipse audacia potens esset ? Utile 
ei videbatur plurimum posse alterius invidia ; id 
quam iniustum in patriam et quam turpe esset, non 
videbat. Ipse autem socer in ore semper Graecos 
versus de Phoenissis liabebat, quos dicam, ut potero, 
incondite fortasse, sed tamen, ut res possit intellegi : 

* aut hunc c, Edd. ; atque hunc B H a b. 
^ ea species forma B H a b ; ^a specie fonna c p ; eaforma, 
Klotz, Heine, Ed. ; ea species, Bt. 

«Pompey, who in sgmanied Caesar's daughter Julia, 
twenty-four years his junior, and already betrothed to 

BOOK III. xx-xxi 

must not seem expedient. What folloAvs ? Can we 
account either the great Marius or our Marius Grati- 
dianus a good man ? Work out your own ideas and 
sift your thoughts so as to see what conception and 
idea of a good man they contain. Pray^ tell me, 
does it coincide with the character of your good man 
to lie for his own profit, to slander, to overreachj to 
deceive? Nay, verily; anything but that! 

Is there, then, any object of such value or any 
advantage so worth the winning that, to gain it, one 
should sacrifice the name of a good man" and the 
lustre of his reputation? What is tliere that your 
so-called expediency can bring to you that will com- 
pensate for what it can take away, if it steals from 
you the name of a good man" and causes you to 
lose your sense of honour and justice ? For what 
difference does it make whether a man is actually 
transformed into a beast or whether, keeping the 
outward appearance of a man, he has the savage 
nature of a beast within ? 

XXI. Again, when people disregard everything 
that is morally right and true, if only they may 
secure power thereby, are they not pursuing the 
same course as he^ who wished to have as a father-in- (3)Pompcv, 
law the man by whose efFrontery he might gain 
power for himself ? He thought it advantageous to 
secure supreme power while the odium of it fell 
upon another; and he failed to see how unjust to 
his country this was, and how wrong morally. But (4)Caesax 
the father-in-law himself used to have continually 
upon his hps the Greek verses from the Phoenissae, 
whicl I will reproduce as well as I can — awkwardly, 
it may be, bijt still so that the meaning can be 
understood : 

A4? 355 


Eiir. Phoen- Nam si violandum est iiis, regnancL gnitia 


Violandum est ; aliis rebus pietatem colas. 
Capitalis [Eteocles vel potius Euripides],^ qui id 
unum, quod omnium sceleratissimum fuerit, exce- 

83 perit! Quid igitur minuta colligimus, hereditates, 
mercaturas, venditiones fraudulentas? ecce tibi, qui 
rex populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium 
esse concupiverit idque perfecerit I Hanc cupidita- 
tem si honestam quis esse dicit, amens cst; probat 
enim legum et libertatis interitum earumque oppres- 
sionem taetram et detestabilem gloriosam putat. 
Qui autem fatetur honestum non esse in ea civitate, 
quae libera fuerit quaeque^ esse debeat, regnare, sed 
ei, qui id facere possit, esse utile, qua hunc obiurga- 
tione aut quo potius convicio a tanto errore coner 
avellere? Potest enim, di immortales! cuiquam esse 
utile foedissimum et taeterrimum parrieidium patriae, 
quamvis is, qui se eo obstrinxerit, ab oppressis civi- 
bus parens nominetur? Honestate igitur dirigenda^ 
utilitas est, et quidem sic, ut haec duo verbo inter se 
discrepare, re unum sonare videantur. 

84 Non habeo, ad volgi opinionem quae maior utilitas 
quam regnandi esse possit; nihil contra inutihus ei, 
qui id iniuste consecutus sit, invenio, cum ad veritatem 

^Bracketed by Ed., Heine, et al. 

*fuerii quacque c, Edd. ; fitit B W a b. 

^ dirigenda MSS., Edd. plerique ; derigenda Ed. 

a From A. S. Way's translation. 

bThe title bestovved on Cicero for savingf the republic 
(in 63) and on Caesar for overthrowing- it (after the batile 
of Munda, in 45). 


BOOK III. xxi 

" If wrong may e'er be right^ for a throne's sake 
Were wrong most right:— be God in all else 
Our tjrant deserved his death for liaving made an 
exception of the one thing that was the blackest 

5 crime of all. VVhy do we gather instances of petty 
crime — legacies criminally obtained and fraudulent 
buying and selHng? Behold^ here you have a man 
who was ambitious to be king of the Roman People 
and master of the whole world ; and he achieved it ! 
The man who maintains that such an ambition is Even to gain a 
morally right is a madman; for he justifies the de- wrongisnot*'" 
struction of law and liberty and thinks their hideous expedient, 
and detestable suppression glorious. But if auyone 
agrees that it is not morally right to be king in a 
state that once was free and that ought to be free 
now, and yet imagines that it is advantageous for 
him who can reach that position, Avitli what remon- 
strance or rather with what appeal sliould I try to 
tear him away from so strange a delusion? For, oh 
ye immortal gods ! can the most horrible and hideous 
of all murders — that of fatherland — bring advantage 
to anybody, even though he who has committed 
such a crime receives from his enslaved fellow- 
citizens the title of " Father of his Counti-y " ^' ? identity of 
Expediency, tlierefore, must be measured by the morltr^eTtUud^ 
standard of moral rectitude, and in such a way, too, 
that these two words shall seem in sound only to be 
different but in real meaning to be one and the same. 

i AVhat greater advantage one could have, according 
to the standard of popular opinion, than to be a king, 
I do not know ; wlien, however, I begin to bring the 
question back to the standai*d of truth, then I find 
nothing more disadvantageous for one who has risen 



coepi revocare rationem. Possunt enim cuiquam esse 
utiles angores, sollicitudines, diurni et nocturni metus, 
vita insidiarum periculorumque plenissima? 
inc. Fab; Miilti iniqui atque infideles regno, pauci benivoli/ 

Ribbeck^, ^ -l o 7 1- j 

*5l inquit Accius. At cui regno? Quod a Tantalo et 

Pelope proditum iure optinebatur. Nam quanto plu- 
ris ei regi putas, qui exercitu populi Romani populum 
ipsum Romanum oppressisset civitatemque non modo 
liberam, sed etiam gentibus imperantem servire sibi 

85 coegisset? Hunc tu quas conscientiae labes in animo 
censes habuisse, quae vulnera? Cuius autem vita 
ipsi potest utilis esse, cum eius vitae ea condicio sit, 
ut, qui illam eripuerit, in maxima et gratia futurus sit 
et gloria ? Quodsi haec utilia non sunt, quae maxime 
videntur, quia plena simt dedecoris ac turpitudinis, 
satis persuasum esse debet nihil esse utile, quod non 
honestum sit. 

86 XXII. Quamquam id quidem cum saepe alias, tum 
Pyrrhi bello a C. Fabricio consule iterum et a senatu 
nostro iudicatum est. Cum enim rex Pyrrhus populo 
Romano bellum ultro intulisset, cumque de imperio 
certamen esset cum rege generoso ac potenti,^ per- 
fuga ab eo venit in castra Fabrici eique est pollicitus, 
si praemium sibi proposuisset, se, ut clam venisset, sic 
clam in Pyrrhi castra rediturum et eum veneno ne- 

^beni{e)voU Slurenbg'. ; benivoli suni c ; bonisunt B H a b. 
*^o/^M^» Nonius, Y.dd. ', potente MSS. 


BOOK 111. xxi-xxii 

to that height by injustice. For can occasions for 
worry, anxiety, fear by day and by nightj and a life all 
beset with plots and perils be of advantage to any- 
bodv ? ' 

Thrones have many foes and friends untrue, 
but few devoted friends," 
says Accius. But of what sort of throne was he 
speaking ? Why, one that was held by right, handed 
down from Tantalus and Pelops. Aye, but how many 
more foes, think you, had that king who with the 
Roman People's anny brought the Roman People 
themselves into subjection and compelled a state that 
not only had been free but had been mistress of the 
world to be his slave ? Wliat stains do you think he 
had upon his conscience, what scars upon his heart? 
But whose Hfe can be advantageous to himself, if that 
Hfe is his on the condition that the man who takes it 
shall be held in undying gratitude and glory ? But 
if these things which seem so very advantageous are 
not advantageous because they are full of shame and 
moral wrong, we ought to be quite convinced that 
nothing can be expedient that is not morally right. 

XXII. And yet this very question has been de- Apparent 
cided on many occasions before and since ; but in expediency aifd 
the war with Pyrrhus the decision rendered by Gaius morai rectitude 
Fabricius, in his second consulship, and by our senate the deserter, 
was particularly striking. Without provocation King 
Pyrrhus had declared war uponthe Roman People; the 
struggle was against a generous and powerful prince, 
and the supremacy of power was the prize ; a deserter 
came over from him to the camp of Fabricius and 
promised,if Fabricius would assure him of a reward,to 
return to the camp of Pyri-hus as secretly as he had 
come, administer poison to the king, and bring about 


raturum. Hunc Fabricius reducendum curavit ad 

Pyrrhum^ idque eius factum laudatum a senatu est. 

Atqui, si speciem utilitatis opinionemque quaerimus, 

magnum illud bellum perfuga unus et gravem adver- 

sarium imperii sustulisset, sed magnum dedecus et 

flagitium, quicum laudis certamen fuisset, eum non 

virtute, sed scelere superatum. 

87 Utrum igitur utilius vel Fabricio, qui talis in hac 

urbe, qualis Aristides Atlienis, fuit, vel senatui nostro, 

qui numquam utilitatem a dignitate seiunxit, armis 

cum hoste certare an venenis? Si gloriae causa 

imperium expetendum est^ scelus absit, in quo non 

potest esse gloria; sin ipsae opes expetuntur quoquo 

modo, non poterunt utiles esse cum infamia. 

Non igitur utilis illa L. Philippi Q. f. sententia, 

quas civitates L. Sulla pecunia accepta ex senatus 

consulto liberavisset, ut eae rursus vectigales essent 

neque iis pecuniam, quam pro libertate dederant, 

redderemus. Ei senatus est assensus. Turpe imperio ! 

piratarum enim melior fides quam senatus. At aucta 

vectigalia, utile igitur. Quousque audebunt dicere 

BOOK III. xxii 

his death. Fabricius saw to it that this fellow was 
taken back to Pyrrhus; and his action was com- 
mended by the senate. And yet, if the mere show 
of expediency and the popular conception of it are 
all we want, this one deserter would have put an 
end to that wasting war and to a formidable foe of 
our supremacy ; but it would have been a lasting 
shame and disgrace to us to have overcome not by 
valour but by crime the man with whom we had a 
contest for glory. 

Which course^ then, was more expedient for 
Fabricius, who was to our city what Aristides was to 
Athens, or for our senate, who never divorced expe- 
diency from honour — to contend against the enemy 
with the sword or with poison? If supremacy is to 
be sought for the sake of glory, crime should be ex- 
cluded, for there can be no glory in crime ; but if it 
is power for its own sake that is soughtj whatever 
the price, it cannot be expedient if it is linked with 

That well-known measure, therefore, introduced (2) the senate 
by Philippus, the son of Quintus, was not expedient. fary aiHes!*'"' 
With the authority of the senate, Lucius Sulla had 
exempted from taxation certain states upon receipt 
of a lump sum of money from them. Phihppus 
proposed that they should again be reduced to the 
condition of tributary states, without repaj^ment on 
our part of the money that they had paid for their 
exemption. And the senate accepted his proposal. 
Sharae upon our government! The pirates' sense of 
honour is higher than the senate's. But," some 
one will say, the revenues were increased, and 
therefore it was expedient." How long will people 
venture to say that a thing that is not morally right 


88 quicquam utile^ quod non honestum? potest autem 
ulli imperio, quod gloria debet fultum esse et beni- 
volentia sociorum, utile esse odium et infamia? 

Ego etiam cum Catone meo saepe dissensi; nimi» 
mihi praefracte videbatur aerarium vectigahaque de- 
fendei-e, omnia pubhcanis negare, multa sociis, cum 
in hos benefici esse deberemus, cum ihis sic agere, 
ut cum colonis nostris soleremus, eoque magis, quod* 
illa ordinum coniunctio ad salutem rei pubhcae per- 
tinebat. Male etiam Curio, cum causam Transpada- 
norum aequam esse dicebat, semper autem addebat : 

Vincat utilitasl" Fotius doceret non esse aequam, 
quia non esset utihs rei pubhcae, quam, cum utilem 
non esse diceret, esse aequam fateretur. 

89 XXIII. Plenus est sextus hber de officiis Hecatonis 
talium quaestionum: sitne boni viri in maxima 
caritate annonae famiham non alere." 

In utramque partem disputat, sed tamen ad ex- 
tremum utihtate, ut putat, officium dirigit^ magis 
quam humanitate. 

Quaerit, si in mari iactura facienda sit, equine prc- 

^ quod L c, Edd. ; quo B H a b. 

^ <fm^«^ MSS., Edd. plerique; derig^ii "EA. 

^Thepublicans, farmersof the revenue, werethe moneyed 
men of the times and belonged to the equestrian order. They 
purchased from the senate the farmins" of the revenues and 
then sublet their contract to the colledlors. Sometimes they 
found that Ihey had agreed to pay too high a rate and 
petitioned the senate to release them from their contract 
or reduce their obligations, as on this occasion (b.c. 6i). 
The opposition of Cato and others strained tlie relations 
between the senate, who had control of the business, and 
the equestrian order, driving many of the equites over to 
Caesar's side. Complete harmony between the senate and 
the knights, as Cicero says, was the only thing that could 
have saved Rome from the popular party and Caesar. 

BOOK III. xxii-xxiii 

can be expedient? Furthermore, can hatred and 
shame be expedient for any government? For 
government ought to be founded upon fair fame 
and the loyalty of allies ? 

On this point I often disagreed even witli my (3) Cato and the 

„ . , _, . , , ,1,1 , • publicans, 

friend Cato ; it seemed to me that lie was too rigor- 

ous in his watchful care over the claims of the 

treasury and the revenues; he refused everything 

that the farmers of the revenue asked for and much 

that the alHes desired; whereas, as I insisted, it was 

our duty to be generous to the alHes and to treat 

tlie pubHcans as we were accustomed individually to 

treat our tenants — and all the more, because harmony 

between the orders was essential to the welfare of 

tlie repubHc^ Curio, too, was wrong, when he (4) Cudo and 

pleaded that the demands of the people beyond the 

Po were just, but never failed to add Let expedi- 

ency prevail." He ought rather to have proved 

that the claims were not just, because they were 

not expedient for the repubHc, than to have admitted 

that they were just, when, as he maintained, they 

were not expedient. 

XXIII. The sixth book of Hecaton's Moral Hecaton debate 
Duties" is full of questions Hke the foHowing: "is expedien"r°^ 
it consistent with a good man's duty to let his slaves "«• 

, 1 .. , o • .«.jj moralrectitude, 

go hungry when provisions are at lamme prices? 

Hecaton gives the arguments on both sides of the 
question ; but still in the end it is by the standard of 
expediency, as he conceives it, rather than by one of 
human feeHng, that he decides the question of duty. 

Then lie raises this question : supposing a man 
had to throw part of his cargo overboard in a storm, 
should he prefer to sacrifice a high-priced horse or a 
cheap and worthless slave ? In this case regard for 


tiosi potius iacturam faciat an servoli vilis. Hic alio 
res familiaris, alio ducit Immanitas. 

Si tabulam de naufragio stultus arripuerit^ ex- 
torquebitne eam sapiens, si potuerit?" 
Negat, quia sit iniurium. 

Quid? dominus navis eripietne suum?" 

Minime, non plus quam navigantem^ in alto 
eicere de navi velit, quia sua sit. Quoad enim 
perventum est" eo, quo sumpta navis est, non domini 
est navis, sed navigantium." 
90 Quid? si una tabula sit, duo naufragi, eique 

sapientes, sibine utergMC^ rapiat, an alter cedat 

Cedat vero, sed ei, cuius magis intersit vel sua 
vcl rei publicae causa vivere." 

Quid, si haec paria in utroque?" 

Nullum erit certamen, sed quasi sorte aut mi- 
cando victus alteri cedet alter." 

Quid? si pater fana expilet, cuniculos agat ad 
aerarium, indicetne id magistratibus filius?" 

Nefas id quidem est, quin etiam defendat pa- 
trem, si arguatur." 

Non igitur patria praestat omnibus officiis?" 

^ quayn navigantem Heus., Edd. ; guam si naz^iifan/em 
'esi c, Nonius ; sif B H a b. 

^sibine uterque Victorius, Edd.; sihi ncuier MSS. 

BOOK 111. xxiii 

his property interest inclines him one way, human 
feeling the other. 

" Suppose that a foolish man has seized hold of a 
plank from a sinking ship, shall a wise man wrest it 
away from him if he can ?" 

'' No/' says Hecaton; for that Avould be un- 

"But how about the owner of the ship? Shall 
he take the plank away because it belongs to him?" 

"Notatall; no more than he would be willing 
when far out at sea to throw a passenger overboard 
on the ground tliat the ship was his. For until they 
reach the place for which the ship is chartered^ she 
belongs to the passengers, not to the OAvner." 

" Again; suppose there were two to be saved from 
the sinking ship— both of them Mdse men — and only 
one small plank, should both seize it to save them- 
selves? Or should one give place to the other?" 

"Why of course^ one should give place to the 
other, but that other must be the one whose life is 
more valuable either for his own sake or for that of 
liis country." 

"But what if these considerations are of equal 
weight in both?" 

'"Then there will be no contest, but one will give 
place to the other, as if the point were decided by 
lot or at a game of odd and even." 

" Again, suppose a father were robbing temples or 
making underground passages to the treasuiy, should 
a son inform the ofncers of it?" 

"Nay ; that were a crime ; rather should he defend 
his father, in case he were indicted." 

" Well, then, are not the claims of country para- 
mount to all other duties?" 



Immo vero, sed ipsi patriae conducit pios habere 
cives in parentes." 

Quid? si tyrannidem occupare, si patriam pro- 
dere conabitur pater, silebitne filius?" 

Immo vero obsecrabit patrem, ne id faciat. Si 
nihil proficiet, accusabit, minabitur etiam, ad extre- 
mum, si ad perniciem patriae res spectabit, patriae 
salutem anteponet saluti patris." 

91 Quaerit etiam, si sapiens adulterinos nummos 
acceperit imprudens pro bonis, cum id rescierit, 
soluturusne sit eos, si cui^ debeatj pro bonis. Dio- 
genes ait, Antipater negat, cui potitis assentior. 

Qui vinum^ fugiens vendat sciens, debeatne 
dicere. Non necesse putat DiogeneSj Antipater viri 
boni existimat. Haec sunt quasi controversa iura 
Stoicorum. In mancipio vendendo dicendane 

vitia, non ea, quae nisi dixeris, redhibeatur manci- 
pium iure civih, sed haec, mendacem esse, aleatorem, 
furacem, ebriosum?" Alteri dicenda videntur, 
alteri non videntur. 

92 Si quis aurum vendens orichalcum se putet 
vendere, indicetne ei vir bonus aurum illud esse an 
emat denario, quod sit mille denarium?" 

Perspicuum est iam, et quid mihi videatur, et 
quae sit inter eos philosophos, quos nominavi, con- 

^si cui c, Noniiis, Edd.; sicui B H a b. 
*vinum c, Nonius, Edd.; venenum B H a b p. 

» The denarius was worth at this time about ninepence. 

BOOK III. xxiii 

Aye, verily ; but it is to our country's interest to 
have citizens who are loyal to their parents." 

But once more — if the father attempts to make 
himself king, or to betray his country, shall the son 
hold his peace?" 

Nay, verily ; he will plead with his father not to 
do so. If that accomplishes nothing, he will take 
him to task ; he will even threaten ; and in the end, 
if things point to the destruction of the state^ he 
will sacrifice his father to the safety of his country." 

Again^ he raises the question : If a wise man a simiiar debate 
should inadvertently accept counterfeit money for ^^ Dwgenes 
good^ will he offer it as genuine in payment of a Antipater. 
debt after he discovers his mistake?" Diogenes 
says Yes"; Antipater, "No/' and I agree with 

If a man knowingly offers for sale wine that is 
spoiHng, ought he tell his customers? Diogenes 
thinks that it is not required ; Antipater holds that 
an honest man would do so. These are Uke so 
many points of the law disputed among the Stoics. 
' In selHng a slave, should his faults be declared — 
not those only which the seller is bound by the civil 
law to declare or liave the slave returned to him, but 
also the fact that he is untruthful, or disposed to 
gamble, or steal^ or get drunk?" The one thinks 
such facts should be declared, the other does not. 

If a man thinks that he is selHng brass, when he 
is actually selling gold, should an upright man inform 
him that his stuff is gold, or go on buying for one 
shilHng* what is worth a thousand? " 

It is clear enough by this time what my views are 
on these questions, and what are the grounds of 
dispute between the above-named philosophers. 


XXIV. Pacta et promissa semperne servanda sint, 
QUAE NEC VI NEC DOLo MALo, ut praetores solent, facta 


Si quis medicamentum cuipiam dederit ad aquam 
intercutem pepigeritque, si eo medicamento sanus 
factus esset, ne illo medicamento umquam postea 
uteretur, si eo medicamento sanus factus sit et 
annis aliquot post iiiciderit in eundem morbum nec 
ab eo, quicum pepigerat, impetret^ ut iterum eo ^ liceat 
uti, quid faciendum sit. Cum sit is inhumanus, qui 
non concedat, nec ei quicquam fiat iniuriae, vitae e*" 
saluti consulendum. 
93 Quid? si qui sapiens rogatus sit ab eo, qui eum 
heredem faciat, cum ei testaraento sestertium mihes 
relinquatur, ut, ante quam hereditatem adeat, luoe 
palam in foro saltet, idque se faoturum promiserit, 
quod aliter heredem eum scripturus ille noii esset, 
faciat, quod promiserit, necne? Promisisse nollem 
et id arbitror fuisse gravitatis ; quoniam promisit, si 
saltare in foro turpe ducet, honestius mentietur, si 
ex hereditate niliil ceperit, quam si ceperit, nisi forte 
' iterum eo Pearcc, Edd. ; item eoV> H a b; item tum c, 

• Approximately ^750,000. 

BOOK III. xxiv 

XXIV. The question arises also whether agree- i^omises not 
ments and promises must always be kept, "when/' ji" wheii life or 
in the language of the praetors' edicts, "they have heaithisat 
not been secured through force or criminal fraud." ' 

If one man gives another a remedy for the dropsy, 
with the stipulation that, if he is cured by it, he 
shall never make use of it again; suppose the 
patient's health is restored by the use of it but some 
years later he contracts the same disease once more ; 
and suppose he cannot secure from the man with 
whom he made the agreement permission to use the 
remedy again, what should he do? That is the 
question. Since the man is unfeeHng in refusing 
the request, and since no harm could be done to 
him by his friend's using the remedy, the sick man 
is justified in doing what he can for his own Ufe and 

Again : suppose that a millionaire is making some (2) when reputa 
wise man his heir and leaving him in his will a **°°'^^'^'^''*' 
hundred million sesterces^; and suppose that he has 
asked the wise man, before he enters upon his in- 
heritance, to dance publicly in broad dayhght in the 
forum ; and suppose that the wise man has given his 
promise to do so, because the rich man would not 
leave him his fortune on any other condition ; should 
he keep his promise or not? I wish he had made 
no such promise ; that, I think, would have been in 
keeping with his dignity. But seeing that he has 
made it, it will be morally better for him, if he 
believes it morally wrong to dance in the forum, to 
break his promise and refuse to accept his inheri- 
tance rather than to keep his promise and accept it 
— unless, perhaps, he contributes the money to the 
state to meet some grave crisis. In that case, to 
BB 369 


^am pecuniam in rei publicae magnum aliquod tem- 
pus contuleritj ut vel saltare, cum patriae consulturus 
sit, turpe non sit. 

94 XXV. Ac ne illa quidem promissa servanda sunt, 
quae non sunt iis ^ ipsis utilia^ quibus illa promiseris. 
Sol Phaethonti filio, ut redeamus ad fabulas, factu- 
rum se esse dixit, quicquid optasset; optavit, ut in 
currum patris tolleretur; sublatus est. Atque^ is^ 
ante quam constitit, ictu fulminis deflagravit. 
Quanto melius fuerat in hoc promissum patris non 
esse servatum ! Quid, quod Theseus exegit promis- 
sum a Neptuno? cui cum tres optationes Neptunus 
dedisset, optavit interitum Hippolyti filii, cum is 
patri suspectus esset de noverca; quo optato impe- 

95 trato Theseus in maximis fuit luctibus. Quid, 
quod^ Agamemnon cum devovisset Dianae, quod in 
suo regno pulcherrimum natum esset illo anno, im- 
molavit Iphigeniam, qua nihil erat eo quidem anno 
natum pulchrius? Promissum potius non faciendum 
quam tam taetrum facinus admittendum fuit. 

Ergo et promissa non facienda non numquam, 
neque semper deposita reddenda. Si gladium quis 
apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens, 
reddere peccatum sit, officium non reddere. Quid ? 
si is, qui apud te pecuniam deposuerit, bellum inferat 
patriae, reddasne depositum? Non credo; fecias* 

' iis Edd. ; his B H a b ; hi/s c. 

*Atgue MSS., Bt.\ Miiller, Heine; AiquiYL, Bt.«, Ed. 

• guod Ed. ; not in MSS. , Bt. , et al. 

*facias c, Bt., Ed., Heine ; facies A B H a b, Muller. 

BOOK III. xxiv-xxv 

promote thereby the interests of one's counlry, it 
would not be morally wrong even to dancej if you 
please, in the forum. 

XXV. No more binding are those promises which (3) when not 
are inexpedient for the persons themselves to whom hm^o^whom 
they have been given. To go back to the realm of j^^^™^'^^ 
story, the sungod promised his son Phaethon to do 
for him whatever he should wish. His wish was to 
be allowed to ride in his father's chariot. It was 
granted. And before he came back to the ground 
he was consumed by a stroke of lightning. How 
much better had it been, if in his case the father's 
promise had not been kept. And what of that 
promise, the fulfilment of which Theseus requix*ed 
from Neptune ? When Neptune ofFered him three 
wishes, he wished for the death of his son Hippoly- 
tus, because the father was suspicious of the son's 
relations with his step-mother. And when this wish 
was granted, Theseus was overwhelmed with grief. 
And once more; when Agamemnon had vowed to 
Diana the most beautiful creature born that year 
within his realm, he was brought to sacrifice Iphi- 
genia; for in that year nothing was born more 
beautiful than she. He ought to have broken his 
vow rather than commit so horrible a crime. 

Promises are, therefore, sometimes not to be kept ; Trusts not 
and trusts are not always to be restored. Suppose restored" ^ 
that a person leaves his sword with you when he is 
in his right mind, and demands it back in a fit of 
insanity ; it would be criminal to restore it to him ; 
it would be your duty not to do so. Again, suppose 
that a man who has entrusted money to you proposes 
to make war upon your common country, should you 
restore the trust? I believe you should not; for 
bb2 371 

enini contra rem publicamj qiiae debet esse carissima 
Sic multa, quae honesta natura videntur esse^ tem- 
poribus fiunt non honesta ; facere promissa, stare con- 
ventis, reddere deposita commutata utilitate fiunt 
non honesta. 

Ac de iis quidem, quae videntur esse utihtates 
contra iustitiam simulatione prudentiae, satis arbitror 

96 Sed quoniam a quattuor fontibus honestatis primo 
§§ 15 ff. libro officia duximus, in eisdem versemur, cum doce- 
II 71-95 ^i"^"S ea, quae videantur esse utilia neque sint, quam 

sint virtutis inimica. Ac de prudentia quidem, quam 
vult imitari malitia, itemque de iustitia, quae semper 
est utilis, disputatum est. ReHquae sunt duae partes 
honestatis, quarum altera in animi excellentis ma- 
gnitudine et praestantia cernitur, altera in conforma- 
tione et moderatione continentiae et temperantiae. 

97 XXVI. Utile videbatur Ulixi, ut quidem poetae 

tragici prodiderunt (nam apud Homerum, optimum 

auctorem, talis de Ulixe nulla suspicio est), sed in- 

simulant eum tragoediaesimulatione insaniae militiam 

subterfugere voluisse. Non honestura consilium, at 

utile, ut aliquis fortasse dixerit, regnare et Ithacae 

vivere otiose cum parentibus, cum uxore, cum filio. 

BOOK III. xxv-xxvi 

you would be acting against the state, which ought 
to be the dearest thing in the world to you. Thus 
there are many things which in and of themselves 
seem morally right, but which under certain circum- 
stances prove to be not morally right: to keep a 
promise, to abide by an agreement, to restore a 
trust^may^ with a change of expediency, cease to be 
morally right. 

With this I think I have said enough about those 
actions which masquerade as expedient under the 
guise of prudence, jwhile they are really contraryjto 

Since, however, in Book One we derived moral 
duties from the four sources of moral rectitude, let us 
continue the same fourfold division here in pointing 
out how hostile to virtue are those courses of con- 
duct which seem to be, but really are not, expedient. 
We have discussed wisdom, which cunning seeks to 
counterfeit, and Hkewise justice, which is always 
expedient. There remain for our discussion two 
divisions of moral rectitude, the one of which is 
discernible in the greatness and pre-eminence of a 
superior soul, the other, in the shaping and regula- 
tion of it by temperance and self-control. 

XXVI. Ulysses thought hts ruse expedient, as ApparentExpe 
the tragic poets, at least, have represented him. In ^'^^'^^vs. 
Homer, our most reliable authority, no such suspicion f, w'n"!^®", 
is cast upon him ; but the tragedies charge him with ruse, 
trying to escape a soldier's service by feigning mad- 
ness. The trick was not morally right, but, some 
one may perhaps say, " It was expedient for him to 
keep his throne and live at ease in Ithaca with 
parents, wife, and son. Dc you think that there 



Ullum tu decus in cotidianis laboi-ibus et pericuns 
cum hac tranquillitate conferendum putas ? 

Ego vero istam contemnendam et abiciendam, 
quoniam, quae honesta non sit, ne utilem quidem 

98 esse arbitror. Quid enim auditurum putas fuisse Uli- 
xem, si in illa simulatione perseveravisset ? qui cum ma- 
ximas res gesserit in bello,tamenhaec audiat ab Aiace: 

(Accius or Cuius ipse princeps iiiris iurandi fuit, 

judkTum' Quod (Smnes scitis, solus neglexit fidem; 

Armonim?) Furcre assimulare, n^ coiret, institit. 
Ribbecka ' Quodni Palamedi perspicax prudentia 
^^'^ Istius percepset^ malitiosam audaciam, 

Fid6 sacratae^ ius perpetuo falleret. 

99 Illi vero non modo cum hostibus, verum etiam cura 
fluctibus, id quod fecit, dimicare melius fuit quam 
deserere consentientem Graeciam ad bellum barbaris 

Sed omittamus et fabulas et externa; ad rem 
factam nostramque veniamus. / M. Atilius Regulus 
cum consul iterum in Africa ex insidiis captus esset 
duce Xanthippo Lacedaemonio, imperatore autem 
patre Hannibalis Hamilcare, iuratus missus est ad 
senatum, ut, nisi redditi essent Poenis captivi nobiles 
quidam, rediret ipse Carthaginem. Is cum Romam 

^ percepset Bt., Ed., Heine ; percepisset MSS. ; perspexet 
MuUer. • sacratae Edd. ; sacrata B H a b ; sacratum c. 

a Cicero is careless in his dates. Regulus was consul in 
267 and 256. He was defeated and taken prisoner in his 
second proconsulship at the battle of Tunes in 255. And the 
Hamilcar of 255 was not Hannibars father, for his career 
does not begin until 247, when he wasa mereyouth, and he 
was still in his prime when he feli in battle in Spain, in 229. 

bAt the battle of Panormus in 250 Lucius Caecilius 
Metellus took among the prisoners no less than thirteen 
Carthag^inian generals — all men of noble birth. 

/ BOOK III. xxvi 

is any glory in facing daily toil and danger that can 
b^ compared with a life of such tranquillity ? " 

Nay ; I think that tranquillity at such a price is to 
be despised and rejected; for if it is not morally 

98 right, neither is it expedient. For what do you 
think would have been said of Ulysses, if he hac . 
persisted in that pretended madness, seeing that, 
notwithstanding his deeds of heroism in the war, he 
was nevertheless upbraided by Ajax thus : 

" 'Twas he himself who first proposed the oath ; 

ye all 
Do know ; yet he alone of all his vow did break ; 
He feigned persistently that he was mad, that 

He might not have to join the host. And had not 

Palamedes, shrewd and wise, his tricky impu- 

Unmasked, he had evaded e'en for aye his vow." 

99 Nay, for him it had been better to battle not only 
with the enemy but also with the waves, as he did, 
than to desert Greece when she was united for 
waging the war against the barbai*ians. 

But let us leave illustrations both from story and 
from foreign lands and turn to real events in our own 
historyyfMarcus Atiiius Regulus in his second con- (2) the exampie 
sulship was taken prisoner in Africa by the stratagem 
of Xanthippus, a Spartan general serving under 
the command of HannibaVs father Hamilcar.* He 
was sent to the senate on parole, sworn to return 
to Carthage himself, if certain noble prisoners of 
war'' were not restored to the Carthaginians. When 
he came to Rome, he could not fail to see the 


venisset, utilitatis speeiem videbat, sed eam, ut rt^ 
declarat, falsam iudicavit ; quae erat talis : manere in 
patria, esse domui suae cum uxore, cum liberis, quam 
calamitatem accepisset in bello, communem fortunae 
bellicae iudicantem tenere consularis dignitatis gra- 
dum. Quis haec negat esse utilia? quem censes? 
100 Magnitudo animi et fortitudo negat. XXVII. Num' 
locupletiores quaeris auctores? Harum enim est 
virtutum proprium nihil extimescere, omnia humana 
despicere, nihil, quod homini accidere possit, intole- 
randum putarei Itaque quid fecit? In senatum 
venit, mandata exposuit, sententiam ne diceret re- 
cusavit, quam diu iure iurando hostium teneretur, 
non esse se senatorem. Atque illud etiam ( O stul- 
tum hominem," dixerit quispiam, et repugnantem 
utihtati suae!"), reddi captivos negavit esse utile; 
illos enim adulescentes esse et bonos duces, se iam 
confectum senectute. Cuius cum valuisset auctori- 
tas, captivi retenti sunt, ipse Carthaginem rediit, 
neque eum caritas patriae retinuit nec suorum. 
Neque vero tum ignorabat se ad crudehssimum 
hostem et ad exquisita supplicia proficisci, sed ius 
iurandum conservandum putabat. Itaque tum, cura 


' num A L c, Edd. ; nam B H a b. 

BOOK III. xxvi-xxvii 

specious appearance of expediency, but he decided 
that it was unreal, as the outcome proves. His ap- 
parent interest was to remain in his own country, to 
stay at home with his wife and childrenj and to 
retain his rank and dignity as an ex-consul, regarding 
the defeat which he had sufFered as a misfortune 
that might come to anyone in the game of war. 
Who says that this was not expedient ? Who, think 
you ? Greatness of soul and courage say that it was 
not. XXVII. Can you ask for more competent The violation 
authorities ? The denial comes from those virtues, l^J^ ^l\ jjave 
for it is characteristic of them to await nothing }'o^j''hirn^^'^'^°* 
with fear, to rise superior to all the vicissitudes of 
earthly life, and to count nothing intolerable that 
can befall a human being. W^hat, then, did he do ? 
He came into the senate and stated his mission; 
but he refused to give his own vote on the question; 
for, he held, hewas not a member of the senate so 
long as he was bound by the oath sworn to his 
enemies. And more than that, he said — What a 
fooHsh fellow," some one will say, to oppose his 
own best interests " — he said that it was not ex- 
pedient that the prisoners should be returned ; for 
they were young men and gallant officers, while he 
was already bowed with age. And when his counsel 
prevailed, the prisoners were retained and he him- 
self returned to Carthage ; affection for his country 
and his family failed to hold him back. And even 
then he was not ignorant of the fact that he was 
going to a most cruel enemy and to exquisite torture ; 
still, he thought his oath must be sacredly kept. 
And so even then, when he was being slowly put to 
death by enforced wakefulness, he enjoyed a happier 


vigilando necabatur, erat in meliore causa, quam si 
domi senex captivus, periurus consularis remansisset. 

101 At stulte, qui non modo non censuerit captivos 
remittendos, verum etiam dissuaserit. 

Quo modo stulte? etiamne, si rei publicae con- 
ducebat? potest autem, quod inutile rei publicae 
sit, id cuiquam civi utile esse? 

XXVIII. Pervertunt homines ea, quae sunt funda- 
menta naturae, cum utilitatem ab honestate seiun- 
gunt. Omnes enim expetimus utiUtatem ad eamque 
rapimur nec facere aUter ullo modo possumus. Nam 
quis est, qui utilia fugiat ? aut quis potius, qui ea non 
studiosissime persequatur? Sed quia nusquam pos- 
sumus nisi in laude, decore, honestate utilia reperire, 
propterea illa prima et summa habemus, utiUtatis 
nomen non tam splendidum quam necessarium duci- 

102 Quid est igitur, dixerit quis, in iure iurando? 
num iratum timemus lovem ? At hoc quidem com- 
mune est omnium philosophorum, non eorum modo, 
qui deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt, nihil 
exhibere alteri, sed eorum etiam, qui deum semper 
agere aliquid et moUri volunt, numquam nec irasci 
deum nec nocere. Quid autem iratus luppiter plus 

«The Epicureans. 


BOOK III. xxvii-xxviii 

lot than if he had remained at home an aged prisoner 
of war, a man of consular rank forsworn. 

101 But/' you will say, it was fooHsh of him not 

only not to advocate the exchange of prisoners but 
even to plead against such action." 

How was it foolish ? Was it so, even if his policy 
was for the good of the state ? Nay ; can what is 
inexpedient for the state be expedient for any indi- 
vidual citizen? 

XXVIII. People overturn the fundamental prin- Expediency 
ciples estabhshed by nature, when they divorce morafrtctUudr 
expediency from moral rectitude. For we all seek 
to obtain what is to us expedient ; we are irresistibly 
drawn toward it, and we cannot possibly be other- 
wise. For who is there that would turn his back 
upon what is to him expedient? Or rather^ who is 
there that does not exert himself to the utmost to 
secure it? But because we cannot discover it any- 
where except in good report, propriety, and moral 
rectitudCj we look upon these three for that reason 
as the first and the highest objects of endeavour, 
while what we term expediency we account not so 

f much an ornament to our dignity as a necessary 
incident to living. 

02 What significance, then," some one will say, Arguments 

"do we attach to an oath? It is not that we fear StyK"'*' 
the wrath of Jove, is it? Not at all; it is the uni- °^'^= 
versally accepted view of all philosophers that God need to fear 
is never angry, never hurtful. This is the doctrine '^°'^'^ wrath, 
not only of those* who teach that God is Himself 
free from troubhng cares and that He imposes no 
trouble upon others, but also of those'' who believe 
that God is ever working and ever directing His 
world. Furthermore, suppose Jupiter had been wroth, 


nocere potuisset, quam nocuit sibi ipse Regulus ? 
Nulla igitur vis fuit religionis, quae tantam utilita- 
tem perverteret. 

An ne turpiter faceret ? Primum minima de malis. 
Num^ igitur tantum mali turpitudo ista habebat,^ 
quantum ille cruciatus? Deinde illud etiam apud 
Accium : 

^2, ^ Fregistin^fidem? 

227-228 Neque dedi neque do infideli cuiquam 

quamquam ab impio rege dicitur, luculente tamen 

103 Addunt etiam, quem ad modum nos dicamus 
videri quaedam utilia, quae non sint, sic se dicere 
videri quaedam honesta, quae non sint, "ut hoc 
ipsum videtur honestum, conservandi iuris iurandi 
causa ad cruciatum revertisse ; sed fit non honestum, 
quia, quod per vim hostium esset actum, ratum esse 
non debuit." 

Addunt etiam, quicquid valde utile sit, id fieri 
honestum, etiamsi antea non videretur. 

Haec fere contra Regulum. Sed prima quaeque^ 

104 XXIX. Non fuit luppiter metuendus ne iratus 
noceret, qui neque irasci solet nec nocere." 

^l^um Edd.; non MSS. 
* habebat L c, Edd. ; habebit A B H a b. 
^ /reffistin Edd. ; fregistine A B H a b ; fregisti L c. 
*quaeque Forchhammer, Miiller, Heine: not in MSS., Bt.. 


BOOK III. xxviii-xxix 

what greater injury could He have inflicted upon 
ilegulus than Regulus brought upon himself ? Re- 
ligious scruple, therefore, had no such preponderance 
as to outweigh so great expediency." 

'^Or was he afraid that his act would be morally (2)"Oftwo 
wrong? As to that, first of all, the proverb says felf""^""'' ^^' 
* Of evils choose the least.' Did that moral wrong, 
then, really involve as great an evil as did that awful 
torture ? And secondly, there are the hnes of Accius : 

Thyestes. Hast thou broke thy faith ? ' 
Atreus. None have I giv'n; none give I ever to 
the faithless.' 

Although this sentiment is put into the mouth of a 
wicked king, still it is illuminating in its correct- 

Their third argument is this: just as we maintain (3)oaths 
that some things seem expedient but are not, so constrafnt not 
they maintain, some things seem morally right but binding. 
are not. For example/' they contend, in this 
very case it seems morally right for Regulus to have 
returned to torture for the sake of being true to his 
oath. But it proves not to be morally right, because 
what an enemy extorted by force ought not to have 
been binding." 

As their concluding argument, they add: what- (4)exceptionai 
ever is highly expedient may prove to be morally ma^kes dg^ht. 
right, even if it did not seem so in advance. 

These are in substance the arguments raised 
against the conduct of Regulus. Let us consider 
them each in turn. 

XXIX. He need not have been afraid that Rebuttai. 
Jupiter in anger would inflict injury upon him; he 
is not wont to be angry or hurtful." 


Haec quidem ratio non magis contra Reguli quam 
contra omne ius iurandum valet. Sed in iure iurando 
non qui metus, sed quae vis sit, debet intellegi; est 
enim ius iurandum affirmatio religiosa; quod autem 
affirmate quasi deo teste promiseris, id tenendum 
est. lam enim non ad iram deorum, quae nulla est, 
sed ad iustitiam et ad fidem pertinet. Nam prae- 
clare Ennius: 
(Thyestes?) 6 Fides alma apta pinnis 6t ius iurandiim lovis! 

Fab. inc,, 

Vahiens, Qui ius igitur iurandum violat, is Fidem violat, quam 
in Capitolio vicinam lovis optimi maximi/' ut in 
Unknown Catonis oratione est, maiores nostri esse voluerunt. 
105 At enim ne iratus quidem luppiter plus Rcgulo 
nocuisset, quam sibi nocuit ipse Regulus. 

Certe, si nihil malum esset nisi dolere. Id autem 
non modo [nonj summum malum, sed ne malum 
quidem esse maxima auctoritate philosophi affirmant. 
Quorum quidem testem non mediocrem, sed haud 
scio an gravissimum Regulum nolite, quaeso, vitu- 
perare. Quem enim locupletiorem quaerimus quam 
principem populi Romani, qui retinendi officii causa 
cruciatum subierit voluntarium? 

Nam quod aiunt: minima de malis," id est ut 

* non modo non B H a ; non modo nos c ; non modo L c p, 

* The Stoics. 

BOOK III. xxix 

This argument, at all eventSj has no more weight (i) An oath is s 
against Regulus's conduct than it has against the justke"an'd'''' 
keeping of any other oath. But in taking an oath Good Faith; 
it is our duty to consider not what one may have to 
fear in case of violation but wherein its obligation 
Ues: an oath is an assurance backed by rehgious 
sanctity ; and a solemn promise given^ as before God 
as one's witness^ is to be sacredly kept. For the 
question no longer concerns the wrath of the gods 
(for there is no such thing) but the obhgations of 
justice and good faith. For, as Ennius says so 
admirably : 

Gracious Good Faith, on wings upborne; 
thou oath in Jupiter's great name ! " 

Wlioever^ therefore, violates his oath violates Good 
Faith ; and, as we find it stated in Cato's speech, our 
forefathers chose that she should dwell upon the 
Cagitol neighbour to Jupiter Supreme and Best." 

But/' objection was further made, "even if 
Jupiter had been angry, he could not have inflicted 
greater injury upon Regulus than Regulus brought 
upon himself." 

Quite true, if there is no evil except pain. But whatisevii? 
philosophers* of the highest authority assure us that 
pain is not only not the supreme evil but no evil at 
all. And pray do not disparage Regulus, as no un- 
important witness — nay, I am rather inchned to 
think he was the very best witness — to the truth of 
their doctrine. For what more competent witness 
do we ask for than one of the foremost citizens of 
Rome, who voluntarily faced torture for the sake of 
being true to his moral duty? 

Again, they say "Of evils choose the least" — 



turpiter potius quam calamitose, an est ullum maius 
malum turpitudiue? quae si in deformitate corporis 
habet' aliquid ofFensionis, quanta illa depravatio et 

106 foeditas turpificati animi debet videril Itaque ner- 
vosius qui ista disserunt, solum audent malum dicere 
id, quod turpe sit, qui autem remissius, ii tamen non 
dubitant summum malum dicere. 

Nam illud quidem : 

N^que dedi neque do infideli cuiquam 
At^u*' i<icirco recte a poeta, quia, cum tractaretur Atreus, 
FUbbeckz personae serviendum fuit. Sed si hoc sibi sument, 
nuUam esse fidem, quae infideli data sit, videant, ne 
quaeratur latebra periurio. 

107 Est autem ius etiam bellicum fidesque iuris iurandi 
saepe cum hoste servanda.^ Quod enim ita iuratum 
est, ut mens conciperet fieri oportere, id servandum 
est; quod aliter, id si non fecerit, nullum est periu- 
rium. Ut, si praedonibus pactum pro capite pretium 
non attuleris, nulla fraus sit,^ ne si iuratus quidem 
id non feceris; nam pirata non est ex perdueUium 
numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium ; cum 
hoe nec fides debet nec ius iurandum esse commune. 

» habet L c, Edd. ; haheat A B H a b. 

^ Est . . . servanda brackeled by Unger, Bt.''', Ed. 

8«VEdd. plerique; est MSS., Bt.». 

«The Stoics. 
bThe Peripatetics. 


BOOK III. xxix 

that is, shall one " choose moral wrong rather than (2) no evii can 
misfortune/' or is there any evil greater than moral moral wrong^ 
wrong? For if physical deformity excites a certain 
amount of aversion, how ofFensive ought the defor- 
mity and hideousness of a demoralized soul to seem ! 

6 Therefore, those^ who discuss these problems with 
more rigour make bold to say that moral wrong is 
the only evii, while those'' who treat them with 
more laxity do not hesitate to call it the supreme 

Once more, they quote the sentiment: 

None have I given, none give I ever to the 

It was proper for the poet to say that, because, when 
he was working out his Atreus, he had to make the 
words fit the character. But if they mean to adopt 
it as a principlCj that a pledge given to the faithless 
is no pledge, let them look to it that it be not a mere 
loophole for perjury that they seek. 

7 FurthermorCj we have laws regulating warfare, What is per- 
and fideUty to an oath must often be observed in '""^^ 
deahngs with an enemy : for an oath sworn with the 

clear understanding in one's own mind that it should 
be performed must be kept ; but if there is no such 
understanding, it does not count as perjury if one 
does not perform the vow. For example, suppose 
that one does not deliver the amount agreed upon 
with pirates as the price of one's Hfe, that would be 
accounted no deception — not even if one should fail 
to deliver the ransom after having sworn to do so ; 
for a pirate is not included in the number of lawful 
enemies, but is the common foe of all the world; 
and with him there ought not to be any pledged 
cc 385 


1 08 Non enim falsum iurare periurare est, sed^ quod ex 
ANiMi Tui SENTENTiA iuraris, sicut verbis concipitur 
more nostro, id non facere periurium est. Scite 

Hippoiytus enim^ Euripides : 

luravi lingua, m^ntem iniuratam gero. 

Regulus vero non debuit condiciones pactionesque 
bellicas et hostiles perturbare periurio. Cum iusto 
enim et legitimo hoste res gerebatur, adversus quem 
et totum ius fetiale et multa sunt iura communia. 
Quod ni ita esset, numquam claros viros senatus 
vinctos^ hostibus dedidisset. 

109 XXX. At vero T. Veturius et Sp. Postumius cum 
iterum consules essent, quia, cum male pugnatum 
apud Caudium essetj legionibus nostris sub iugum 
missis pacem cum Samnitibus fecerant, dediti sunt 
iis ; iniussu enim populi senatusque fecerant. Eodem- 
que tempore Ti. Numicius, Q. Maelius, qui tum 
tribuni pl. erant, quod eorum auctoritate pax erat 
facta^ dediti sunt, ut pax Samnitium repudiaretur ; 
atque huius deditionis ipse Postumius, qui dedeba- 
tur, suasor et auctor fuit. 

Quod idem multis annis post C. Mancinus, qui, ut 
Numantinis, quibuscum sine senatus auctoritate foe- 
dus fecerat, dederetur, rogationem suasit eam, quam 

* Scite enim A L c, Edd. ; scit enim B H a b. 

* vinctos A L c, Edd. ; victos B H a b. 

"See Index, s.v. 
'>i84years, i.e., in B.c. 137, 


BOOK III. xxix-xxx 

8 word nor any oath mutually binding. For swearing 
to what is false is not necessarily perjury, but to 
take an oath upon your conscience," as it is ex- 
pressed in our legal formulas^ and then fail to per- 
form it, that is perjury. For Euripides aptly says: 

My tongue has sworn; the mind I have has 
sworn no oath." 
But Regulus had no right to confound by perjury Oathsmadeto 
the terms and covenants of war made with an enemy. bhiding as^^ 
For the war was being carried on with a legitimate, treaties. 
declared enemy ; and to regulate our dealings with 
such an enemy, we have our whole fetial ^ code as 
well as many other laws that are binding in common 
between nations. Were this not the case, the senate 
would never have delivered up illustrious men of 
ours in chains to the enemy. 

9 XXX. And yet that very thing happened. Titus Roman 
Veturius and Spurius Postumius in their second con- ^^"'='°^** 
sulship lost the battle at the Caudine Forks, and 

our legions were sent under tlie yoke. And because 
they made peace with the Samnites, those generals 
were delivered up to them, for they had made 
the peace without the approval of the people 
and senate. And Tiberius Numicius and Quintus 
MaeliuSj tribunes of the people, were delivered up 
at the same time, because it was with their sanction 
that the peace had been concluded. This was done 
in order that the peace with the Samnites might be 
annuUed. And Postumius, the very man whose de- 
livery was in question, was the proposer and advocate 
of the said delivery. 

Many years later,'' Gaius Mancinus had a similar 
experience: he advocated the bill, introduced in 
apcordance with a decree of the senate by Lucius 
cc2 387 

L. FuriuSj Sex. Atilius ex senatus consulto ferebant; 

qua accepta est hostibus deditus. Honestius hic 

quam Q. Pompeius, quo, cum in eadem causa esset, 

deprecante accepta lex non est. Hic ea, quae vide- 

batur utilitas, plus valuit quam honestas, apud supe- 

riores utilitatis species falsa ab honestatis auctoritate 

superata est. 

110 At non debuit ratum ( jse, quod erat actum per 

§103 vim. — Quasi vero forti viro vis possit adhiberi. 

Cur igitur ad senatum proficiscebatur, cum prae- 
sertim de captivis dissuasurus esset ? 

Quod maximum in eo est, id reprehenditis. Non 

enim suo iudicio stetit, sed suscepit causam, ut esset 

iudicium senatus ; cui nisi ipse auctor fiiisset, captivi 

profecto Poenis redditi essent ; ita incolumis in patria 

Regulus restitisset. Quod quia patriae non utile 

putavit, idcirco sibi honestum et sentire illa et pati 


§103 Nam quod aiunt, quod valde utile sit, id fieri ho- 



Furius and Sextus Atilius, that he should be delivered 
up to the Numantines, with whom he had made a 
treaty without authorization from the senate ; and 
when the bill was passed, he was dehvered up to the 
enemy. His action was more honourable than Quin- 
tus Pompey's ; Pompey's situation was identical with 
hiSj and yet at his own entreaty the bill was rejected. 
In this latter case, apparent expediency prevailed 
over moral rectitude ; in the former cases, the false 
semblance of expediency was overbalanced by the 
weight of moral rectitude. 

"But/' they argued against Regulus, an oath (.'})theinterests 
extorted by force ought not to have been binding." highe/than 
As if force could be brought to bear upon a brave p^reonaiadvan- 

Why, then, did he make the journey to the 
senate, especially when he intended to plead against 
the surrender of the prisoners of war?" 

Therein you are criticizing what is the noblest 
feature of his conduct. For he was not content to 
stand upon his own judgment but took up the case, 
in order that the judgment might be that of the 
senate ; and had it not been for the weight of his 
pleading, the prisoners would cei'tainly have been 
restored to the Carthaginians ; and in that case, 
Regulus would have remained safe at home in his 
country. But because he thought this not expedient 
for his country, he believed that it was therefore 
morally right for him to declare his conviction and 
to sufFer for it. 

When they argued also that what is highly expe- (4) nothins cx- 
dient may prove to be morally right, they ought ^''oraii* n" hf 
rather to say not that it may prove to be" but that 



nestum, immo vero esse, non fieri. Est enim nihil 
utile, quod idem non honestumj nec, quia utile, 
honestum, sed, quia honestum, utile. 

Quare ex multis mirabilibus exemplis haud facile 
quis dixerit hoc exemplo aut laudabilius aut prae- 

111 XXXI. Sed ex tota hac laude Reguli unum illud 
est admiratione dignum, quod captivos retinendos 
censuit. Nam quod rediit, nobis nunc mirabile 
videtur, illis quidem temporibus aliter facere non 
potuit ; itaque ista laus non est hominis, sed tempo- 
inim. Nullum enim vinculum ad astringendam fidem 
iure iurando maiores artius esse voluerunt. Id indi- 
cant leges in duodecim tabulis, indicant sacratae, 
indicant foedera, quibus etiam cum hoste devincitur 
fides, indicant notiones animadversionesque censo- 
rum, qui nulla de re diligentius quam de iure iurando 

112 L. Manlio A. f., cum dictator fuisset, M. Pompo- 
nius tr, pl. diem dixit, quod is paucos sibi dies ad 
dictaturam gerendam addidisset ; criminabatur etiam, 
quod Titum filium, qui postea est Torquatus appella- 
tus, ab hominibus relegasset et ruri habitare iussisset. 

» " Sacred " laws, according- to Festus (p. 318), were laws 
that placed their transgressor, together with his household 
and his property, under the ban of some divinity; other 
authorities hmit the fcrm to the laws enacted upon the 
Sacred Mount (b.c. 394). 

BOOK III. xxx-xxxi 

it actually is morally right. For nothing can be expe- 
dient which is not at the same time morally right; 
neither can a thing be morally right just because it 
is expedient, but it is expedient because it is morally 

From the many splendid examples in history, 
therefore, we could not easily point to one either 
more praiseworthy or more. heroic than the conduct 
of Regulus. 

XXXI. But of all that is thus praiseworthy in the ''^^fj^^°^,*ggg^^ j^ 
conduct of Regulus, this one feature above all others the story of 
calls for our admiration : it was he who ofFered the Reguius. 
motion that the prisoners of war be retained. For 
the fact of his returning may seem admirable to us 
nowadays, but in those times he could not have done 
otherwise. That merit, therefore, belongs to the 
age, not to the man. For our ancestors were of 
the opinion that no bond was more effective in 
guaranteeing good faith than an oath. That is 
clearly proved by the laws of the Twelve Tables, by 
the "sacred" laws,* by the treaties in which good 
faith is pledged even to the enemy, by the investi- 
gations made by the censors and the penalties 
imposed by them ; for there were no cases in which 
they used to render more rigorous decisions than 
in cases of violation of an oath. 

Marcus Pomponius, a tribune of the people, The sanctity oi 
brought an indictment against Lucius Manlius, oid°days." ^^^ 
Aulus's son, for having extended the term of his 
dictatorship a few days beyond its expiration. He 
further charged him with having banished his own 
son Titus (afterward surnamed Torquatus) from all 
companionship with his fellow-men, and with requir- 
ing him to live in the country. When the son, who 


Quod cum audivisset adulescens filius, negotium 
exhiberi patri, accurrisse Romam et cum primo 
luci ^ Pomponi domum venisse dicitur. Cui cum esset 
nuntiatum, qui illum iratum allaturum ad se aliquid 
contra patrem arbitraretur, surrexit e lectulo remo- 
tisque arbitris ad se adulescentem iussit venire. At 
ille, ut ingressus est, confestim gladium destrinxit 
iuravitque se illum statim interfecturum, nisi ius 
iurandum sibi dedisset se patrem missum esse factu- 
rum. luravit hoc terrore coactus Pomponius ; rem 
ad populum detuHt, docuit, cur sibi causa desistere 
necesse esset, Manlium missum fecit. Tantum 
temporibus illis ius iurandum valebat. 

Atque hic T. Manlius is est, qui ad Anienem GaUi, 
quem ab eo provocatus occiderat, torque detracto 
cognomen invenit, cuius tertio consulatu Latini ad 
Veserim fusi et fugati, magnus vir in primis et, qui 
perindulgens in patrem, idem acerbe severus in 
1 1 3 XXXII. Sed, ut laudandus Regulus in conservando 
iure iurando, sic decem illi, quos post Cannensem 
pugnam iuratos ad senatum misit Hannibal se in 
castra redituros ea, quorum erant potiti Poeni, nisi 
de redimendis captivis impetravissent, si non redie- 

^ />rimo luci Beier, Ilcine, Kd,;primo lucis c, prima luce 
A B H a b. 


BOOK III. xxxi-xxxii 

was then a young man, heard that his father was 
in trouble on his aeeountj he hastened to Rome — 
so the story goes — and at daybreak presented him- 
self at the house of Pomponius. The visitor was 
innounced to Pomponius. Inasmuch as he thought 
that the son in his anger meant to bring him some 
new evidence to use against the father, he arose 
from his bed, asked all who were present to leave 
the room, and sent word to the young man to come 
in. Upon entering, he at once drew a sword and 
swore that he would kill the tribune on the spot, if 
he did not swear an oath to withdraw the suit against 
his father. Constrained by the terror of the situa- 
tion, Pomponius gave his oath. He reported the 
matter to the people, explaining why he was obhged 
to drop the prosecution, and withdrew his suit against 
Manhus. Such was the regard for the sanctity of 
an oath in those days. 

And that lad was the Titus Manhus who in the 
battle on the Anio killed the Gaul by whom he had 
been challenged to single combat, pulled off his 
torque and thus won his surname. And in his third 
consulship he routed the Latins and put thera to 
flight in the battle on the Veseris. He was one of 
the greatest of the great, and one who, while more 
than generous toward his father, could yet be 
bitterly severe toward his son. 

XXXII. Now, as Regulus deserves praise for Contrastbetweei 
being true to his oath, so those ten whom Hannibal terfenvoy" from 
sent to the senate on parole after the battle of^^"°'^^'- 
Cannae deserve censure, if it is true that they did not 
return; for they were sworn to return to the camp 
which liad fallen into the hands of the Carthaginians, 
if they did not succeed in negotiating an exchange 


runt, vituperandi. De quibus non omnes uno modo ; 
nam PolybiuSj bonus auctor in primis, ex decem 
nobilissimiSj qui tum erant missi, novem revertisse 
dicit re a senatu non impetrata; unum ex decem, 
qui paulo post, quam erat^ egressus e castris^ redisset, 
quasi aliquid esset oblitus, Romae remansisse ; reditu 
enim in castra liberatum se esse iure iurando inter- 
pretabatur, non recte; fraus enim astringit,^ non 
dissolvit periurium. Fuit igitur stulta calliditas 
perverse imitata prudentiam. Itaque decrevit sena- 
tus, ut ille veterator et callidus vinctus ad Hanniba- 
lem duceretur. 

114^ Sed illud maximum : octo hominum milia tene- 
bat Hannibal, non quos in acie cepisset, aut qui 
periculo mortis diffugissent, sed qui relicti in castris 
fuissent a Paulo et a Varrone consulibus. Eos 
senatus non censuit redimendos, cum id parva 
pecunia fieri posset, ut esset insitum militibus nostris 
aut vincere aut emori. Qua quidem re audita fra- 
ctum animum Hannibalis scribit idem, quod senatus 
populusque Romanus rebus afflictis tam excelso 
animo fuisset. Sic honestatis comparatione ea, quae 
videntur utilia, vincuntur. 

115 C"* Acilius autemj qui Graece scripsit historiam, 
plures ait fuisse, qui in castra revertissent eadem 

^ Novem . . . quameratc, Bt.*, Ed.; om. A B H ab; unum 
qui Ung-er, Bt.'^ 

"^astringit c p, Ed., Heine; disiringit Pi. B H a b, Unger, 

*§ 114 bracketcd by Heus., Bt., as un-Ciceronian. 

« C. Heine, Ed.; not in MSS. 

BOOK III. xxxii 

of prisoners. Historians are not in agreement in 
regard to the facts. Polybius, one of the very best 
authorities, states that of the ten eminent nobles 
who were sent at that time^ nine returned when 
their mission failed at the hands of the senate. But 
one of the ten, who, a little while after leaving the 
camp, had gone back on the pretext that he had 
forgotten something or other, remained behind at 
Rome ; he explained that by his return to the camp 
he was released from the obligation of his oath. 
He was wrong; for deceit does not remove the guilt 
of perjury — it merely aggravates it. His cunning 
that impudently tried to masquerade as prudence The ancient 
was, therefore, only folly. And so the senate ^1°^!" 
ordered that the cunning sco"ndrel should be taken 
back to Hannibal in chains. 

But the most significant part of the story is this : 
the eight thousand prisoners in Hannibars hands 
were not men that he had taken in the battle or that 
had escaped in the peril of their Hves, but men that 
the consuls Paulus and Varro had left behind in 
camp. Though these might have been ransomed 
by a small sum of money, the senate voted not to 
redeem them^ in order that our soldiers might have 
the lesson planted in their hearts that they must 
either conquer or die. When Hannibal heard this 
newSj according to that same writer, he lost heart 
completely, because the senate and the people of 
Rome displayed courage so lofty in a time of disaster. 
Thus apparent expediency is outweighed when 
placed in the balance against moral rectitude. 

Gaius Acilius, on the other hand, the author of a 
history of Rome in Greek^ says that there were 
several who played the same trick of returning to 


fraude, ut iure iurando liberarentur, eosque a cen- 
soribus omnibus ignominiis notatos. 

Sit iam huius loci finis. Perspicuum est enim ea, 
quae timido animo, humili, demisso fractoque fiant, 
quale fuisset Reguli factum, si aut de captivis, quod 
ipsi opus esse videretur, non quod rei publicae, cen- 
suisset aut domi remanere voluisset, non esse utilia, 
quia sint flagitiosa, foeda, turpia. 

116 XXXIII. Restat quarta pars, quae decore, modera- 
tione, modestia, continentia, temperantia continetur. 

Potest igitur quicquam utile esse, quod sit huie 

talium virtutum choro contrarium? Atqui ab Ari- 
stippo Cyrenaici atque Annicerii philosophi nominati 
omne bonum in voluptate posuerunt virtutemque 
ciensuerunt ob eam rem esse laudandam, quod effi- 
ciens esset voluptatis. Quibus obsoletis floret 
Epicurus, eiusdem fere adiutor auctorque sententiae. 
Cum his viris^ equisque/' ut dicitur, si honestatem 
tueri ac retinere sententia est, decertandum est. 

117 Nam si non modo utiUtas, sed vita omnis beata 

corporis firma constitutione eiusque constitutionis 

spe explorata, ut a Metrodoro scriptum est, contine- 

tur, certe haec utilitas, et quidem summa (sic enim 

' viris c p, Edd. ; veris A B H b. 

BOOK III. xxxii-xxxiii 

the camp to release themselves thus from the obli- 
gation of their oath, and that they were branded by 
the censors with every mark of disgrace. 

Let this be the conclusion of this topic. For it Expediency an 
must be perfectly apparent that acts tliat are done ticai."^^ '^*'°* 
with a cowardly, craven, abject, broken spirit, as the 
act of Regulus would have been if he had supported 
in regard to the prisoners a measure that seemed to 
be advantageous for him personally, but disadvan- 
tageous for the state, or if he had consented to 
remain at home — that such acts are not expedient 
because they are shameful, dishonourable, and im- 

XXXIII. We have still left our fourth division, Apparent 
comprising propriety, moderation, temperance, self- ^^P^^J^^^^^y 

restraint, Self-COntrol. Temperance. 

Can anything be expedient, then, which is con- 
trary to such a chorus of virtues.^ And yet the 
Cyrenaics, adherents of the school of Aristippus, 
and the philosophers who bear the name of Anni- 
ceris find all good to consist in pleasure and consider 
virtue praiseworthy only because it is productive of 
pleasure. Now that these schools are out of date, 
Epicurus has come into vogue — an advocate and 
supporter of practically the same doctrine. Against 
such a philosophy we must fight it out "with horse 
and foot," as the saying is, if our purpose is to 
defend and maintain our standard of moral rectitude. 

For if, as we find it in the writings of Metrodorus, xhe faiiacy of 
not only expediency but happiness in life depends Epicureanism 
wholly upon a sound physical constitution and the 
reasonable expectation that it will always remain 
sound, then that expediency — and what is more, 
the highest expediency, as they estimate it — -will 



censent), cum honestate pugnabit. Nam ubi primum 

prudentiae locus dabitur? an ut conquirat undique 

suavitates ? Quam miser virtutis famulatus servientis 

voluptati! Quod autem munus prudentiae? an 

legere intellegenter voluptates? Fac nihil isto esse 

iucundius, quid cogitari potest turpius ? 

lam, qui dolorem summum malum dicat, apud 

eum quem habet locum fortitudoj quae est dolorum 

laborumque contemptio? Quamvis enim multis locis 

dicat Epicurus, sicuti^ dicit, satis fortiter de dolore, 

tamen non id spectandum est, quid dicat, sed quid 

consentaneum sit ei dicere, qui bona voluptate ter- 

minaverit, mala dolore. 

Et,^ si illum audiam, de continentia et temperantia 

dicit ille quidem multa multis locis, sed aqua haeret, 

ut aiunt; nam qui potest temperantiam laudare is, 

qui ponat summum bonum in voluptate ? est enim 

temperantia libidinum inimica, Ubidines autem 

consectatrices voluptatis. 

118 Atque in his tamen tribus generibus, quoquo modo 

possunt, non incalHde tergiversantur ; prudentiam 

introducunt scientiam suppeditantem voluptates, 

depellentem dolores; fortitudinem quoque aUquo 

modo expediunt, cum tradunt rationem neglegendae 

' sicuti L c, Edd. ; sicut «rf A B H a b. 
'^ dolore. Et Miiller, Heine; dolore: «^ MSS., Bt. ; dolore. 
Ut Ed. 

BOOK III. xxxiii 

assuredly clash with moral rectitude. For, first of all, 
what position will wisdom occupy in that system? 
The position of collector of pleasures from every 
possible source? What a sorry state of servitude 
for a virtue — to be pandering to sensual pleasure ! 
And what will be the function of wisdom ? To make 
skilful choice between sensual pleasures? Granted 
that there may be nothing more pleasant, what can 
be conceived more degrading for wisdom than such 
a role? 

Then again, if anyone hold that pain is the 
supreme evil^ what place in his philosophy has forti- 
tudcj which is but indifference to toil and pain? 
For however many passages there are in which 
Epicurus speaks right manfully of pain, we must 
nevertheless consider not what he says, but what it 
is consistent for a man to say who has defined the 
good in terms of pleasure and evil in terms of pain. 

And further, if I should hsten to him, I should 
find that in many passages he has a great deal to say 
about temperance and self-control ; but " the water 
will not run/' as they say. For how can he com- 
mend self-control and yet posit pleasure as the 
supreme good? For self-control is the foe of the 
passions, and the passions are the handmaids of 

And yet when it comes to these three cardinal Epicureanism 
virtues, those philosophers shift and turn as best dfnai Vi^tues. 
they can, and not without cleverness. They admit 
wisdom into their system as the knowledge that 
provides pleasures and banishes pain; they clear the 
way for fortitude also in some way to fit in with 
their doctrines, when they teach that it is a rational 
means for looking with indifFerence upon death and 



mortis, perpetiendi doloris; etiam temperantiam 
inducunt non faeillime illi quidem, sed tamen quo- 
quo modo possunt; dicunt enim voluptatis magnitu- 
dinem doloris detractione finiri. lustitia vacillat vel 
iacet potius omnesque eae virtutes^ quae in commu- 
nitate cernuntur et in societate generis humani. 
Neque enim bonitas nec liberalitas nec comitas esse 
potest, non plus quam amicitia, si haec non per se 
expetantur/ sed ad voluptatem utilitatemve refe- 

Conferamus igitur in pauca. 

119 Nam ut utilitatem nullam esse docuimus, quae 
honestati esset contraria, sic omnem voluptatem di- 
cimus honestati esse contrariam. Quo magis repre- 
hendendos Calliphontem et Dinomachum iudico, 
qui se dirempturos controversiam putaverunt, si cum 
honestate voluptatem tamquam cum homine pecu- 
dem copulavissent. Non recipit istam coniunctionem 
honestas, aspernatur, repellit. Nec vero finis bo- 
norum [et malorum],^ qui simplex esse debet, ex 

De dissimillimis rebus misceri et temperari potest. Sed 

II ' de hoc (magna enim res est) alio loco pluribus ; nunc 
ad propositum. 

120 Quem ad modum igitur, si quando ea, quae videtur ' 
utilitas, honestati repugnat, diiudicanda res sit, satis 
est supra disputatum. Sin autem speciem utiHtatis 
etiam voluptas habere dicetur, nulla potest esse ei 
cum honestate coniunctio. Nam, ut tribuamus ali- 

^ expetantur A, Edd. ; expectantut B a; exspectantur c. 
' Omitted by Muretus; brackcted by Heine, Ed., et al. 
^ videtur z^ Edd.; videretur B H a b; viderentur h, 


BOOK III. xxxiii 

for enduring pain. They bring even temperance in 
— not very easily, to be sure,i)ut still as best they can ; 
for they hold that the height of pleasure is found 
in the absence of pain. Justice totters or rather, I 
should say, Hes already prostrate; so also with all 
those virtues which are discernible in social life and 
the fellowship of human society. For neither good- 
ness nor generosity nor courtesy can exist, any more 
than friendship can, if they are not sought of and 
for themselves, but are cultivated only for the sake 
of sensual pleasure or personal advantage. 

Let us now recapitulate briefly. 

As I have shown that such expediency as is opposed Sensual pleasun 
to moral rectitude is no expediency, so I maintain r^cti^^de^" 
that any and all sensual pleasure is opposed to moral incompatible. 
rectitude. And therefore Calhphon and Dinomachus, 
in my judgment, deserve the greater condemnation ; 
they imagined that they should settle the contro- 
versy by coupling pleasure with moral rectitude ; as 
well yoke a man with a beast ! But moral rectitude 
does not accept such a union ; she abhors it, spurns 
it. Why, the supreme good, which ought to be 
simple, cannot be a compound and mixture of abso- 
lutely contradictory quaUties. But this theory I have 
discussed more fully in another connection ; for the 
subject is a large one. Now for the matter before 

We have, then, fully discussed the problem how a 
question is to be decided, if ever that which seems 
to be expediency clashes with moral rectitude. But 
if, on the other hand, the assertion is made that 
pleasure admits of a show of expediency also, there 
can still be no possible union between it and moral 
rectitude. For, to make the most generous admission 
no 40) 


quid voluptati, condimenti fortasse non nihil, utili- 
tatis eerte nihil habebit. 
121 Habes a patre munus, Marce fili, mea quidem 
sententia magnum, sed perinde erit, ut acceperis. 
Quamquam hi tibi tres Hbri inter Cratippi commen- 
tarios tamquam hospites erunt recipiendi ; sed, ut, si 
ipse venissem Athenas (quod quidem esset factum, 
nisi me e medio cursu clara voce patria revocasset), 
aliquando me quoque audires, sic, quoniam his 
voluminibus ad te pi-ofecta vox est mea, tribues iis^ 
temporis quantum poteris, poteris autem, quantum 
voles. Cum vero intellexero te hoc scientiae genere 
gaudere, tum et praesens tecum propediem, ut spero, 
et, dum aberis, absens loquar. 

Vale igitur, mi Cicero, tibique persuade esse te 
quidem mihi carissimum, sed multo fore cariorem, si 
talibus monitis^ praeceptisque laetabere. 

^ its Edd. ; his A B H a b ; ktjs c. 

■ monitis Lambinus, Edd. ; tnonumentis A B H a b ; tnoni- 
mentis c. 

a But Cicero never saw his son Marcus agaiii. 


BOOK III. xxxiii 

we can in favour of pleasure, we will grant tliat it 
may contribute something that possibly gives some 
spice to life, but certainly nothing that is really ex- 

Herewith, my son Marcus, you liave a present Conciusionf 
from your father — a generous one, in my humble 
opinion ; but its value will depend upon the spirit in 
which you receive it. And yet you must welcome 
these three books as fellow-guests, so to speak, along 
with your notes on Cratippus's lectures. But as you 
would sometimes give ear to me also, if I had come 
to Athens (and I should be there now, if my country 
had not called me back with accents unmistakable, 
when I was half-way there), so you will please devote 
as much time as you can to these volumes, for in 
them my voice will travel to you; and you can 
devote to them as much time as you will. And 
when I see that you take delight in this branch of 
philosophy, I shall then talk further with you — at 
an early date,* I hope, face to face — but as long as 
you are abroad, I shall converse with you thus at a 

Farewell, my dear Cicero, and be assured that, 
while you are the object of my deepest affection, you 
will be dearer to me still, if you find pleasure in 
such counsel and instruction. 

dd2 40S 


References are to Book and Section; all dates, given in parentheses 
(. . .), are b.c. 

Academicians, 1. adherents of the 
New Academy [q.v.) ; theirright to 
teach ethics, i, 6; attitude toward 
knowledge, ii, 7; Cicero's philo- 
sophy, II, 1-8. 2. adherents of 
the Old Academy, iii, 20. 

Academy, 1. the Older, a school 
of philosophy founded by Plato 
and so called from its home ; their 
doctrine of ideas, iii, 76, 81 ; the 
pre-existence and immortality of 
the soul; monotheism; the good- 
ness of God; striving after His 
perfection. 2. the New, a modi- 
fication of the Old, sceptical, 
anti-dogmatic, eclectic, lii, 20. 

Accius, Lucius, a tragic poet (born 
170). His tragedies were mostly 
imitations from the Greek. Cicero 
knew him personallv ; quotes from 
hira, iii, 84, 102, 106. 

Acilius; Gaius Acilius Glm^tio (tri- 
bune, 197); interpreter, when 
Carneades, Diogenes, and Crito- 
laus came to Rome; author of 
History of Rome, iii, 115. 

Admiration, how won with dignity, 
n, 31fg. 

.\eacidae, descendants of Aeacus 
(q.v.), the father of Peleus and 
Telamon and grandfather of 
Achilles and Ajax, i, 38. 

Aeacus, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and 
king of Aegina iq.v.); renowned 
for his justice and piety, i, 97; 
after his death he became with 
Minos and Rhadamanthus judge 
in Hades. 

Aedileship, cost of , ii, 57-60. 

Aegina, an island in the Saronic 
Gulf, a dangerous rival to Athens, 
directly in front of Piraeus and 
only twelve miles away, iii, 46; 
unjustly appropriated by Athens 
(429), 111,46. 

Aeginetans, the people of Aegina 

Aelius ; see Tubero. 

Aemilius ; sec Paulus and Scaurus. 

Aequians, a warlike mountain tribe 
on the upper Anio, warring 
against Rome (till 304), i, 35. 

Aesopus, Claudius, an intimate 
friend of Cicero, Rome's greatest 
tragic actor, i, 114. 

Africa, the province in whicb 
Carthage was, i, 112 (Thapsus); 

.\fricanus ; see Scipio. 

Agamemnon, leader of the war 
agaiust Troy; when detained at 
Aulis he sacrificed his daughter 
Iphigenia to save the expedition, 
III, 95. For this he was slain on 
his return from Troy by his wife 

A^esilaus, king of Sparta (398-360); 
waged war in Asia (396-394), 
victor at Coronea, saviour of 
Sparta after Mantinea (362); ii. 

Agis IV, king of Sparta (244-240); 
attempted to re-establish the 
institutions of Lycurgus and re- 
form property abuses; put to 
death through organized wealtji, 
II, 80. 

Agrarian Laws, a menace to the 
stability of the government, ii, 

Agriculture,impossible without man, 

II, 12; man's noblest calling, i, 

Agrigentum, a city on the south 
coast of Sicily, once " the most 
beautiful city of mortals," ruled 
by Phalaris (560), ii, 26. 

Ajax, son of Telamon; could brook 
no wrong, went mad, and com- 
mitted suicide when the arms of 
Achilles were awarded to Odys- 
seus, I, 113; rebuked Odysseus, 

III, 98. Subject of a tragedy by 
Ennius, i, 114. 

Albucius, Titus, an Epicurean; 
praetor in Sardinia (105) ; pro- 
secuted for extortion, ii, 50. 

Alexander, the Great (356-323), son 



of Philip of Macedon, ii, 16, 48; 
greater than his father in achieve- 
ment, inferior in courtliness, i, 
80; governor of Macedonia (340), 

II, 53; conquered Greece (338- 
335), subdued Asia (334-331), 
Egypt (331), invaded India (329- 
327), founded Alexandria and 
other citics, and died of a drunken 
debauch (i, 90). 

Alexander, tyrant of Pherae (369); 
brother, son-in-law, and successor 
of Jason {q.v.), defeated and slew 
Pelopidas of Thcbes at Cynoceph- 
alae (364); murdered by his 
wife and her three brothers, ii, 
25, 26. 

Alexandria, the metropolis of Egypt 
at the mouth of the Nile ; founded 
by Alexander (332); centre of 
wealth (ii, 82); grain market, ni, 

Alps, the mountains between Italy 
and further Gaul, ii, 28. 

Ambition, a cause of injustice, i, 
25-26, 46, 65; of moral wrong, 

III, 82; of treason, iii, 82-83; the 
foe of freedom, i, 68 ; li, 28. 

Amusements, wholesome, i, 103-104, 

Anger, never excusable, i, 89. 

Anio, the Sabine river, tributary to 
the Tiber; the battle on (340), 
which gave Rome supremacy 
over all Latium, iii, 112. 

Anniceris, of Cyrene (4th century), 
a successor of Aristippus; his 
■School a cross between the Epicu- 
rean and the Cyrenaic: he denied 
that pleasure was merely absence 
of pain; he held that every act 
had its own distinct purpose and 
that the virtues are good in them- 
selves; his teachings were not 
permanent, iii, 110. 

Antigonus, one of Alexander's 
generals, governor of Asia (323- 
301), king of Asia (306-301); 
father of Demetrius Poliorcetes 
and Philip, ii, 48. 

Antiope, mother of Amphion and 
Zethus, by whom she was saved 
from the persecutions of her 
former husband Lycus and his 
wife Dirce; her vengeance on 
Dirce drove her mad ; subject of 
a tragedy of Pacuvius, i, 114. 


Antipater, vice-regent of Macedon 
(334); father of Cassander, ii, 48. 

Antipater, of Tarsus (2nd century), 
pupil and successor of Diogenes of 
Babylonia ; teacher of Panaetius ; 
his ethical teachings, in, 51-55, 

Antipater, of Tyre (Ist century), 
friend of Cato the younger; a 
Stoic, II, 86. 

Antonius, Marcus, the famous 
orator (143-87), ii, 49; advocate, 
III, 67 ; f ather of Cicero's coUeague 
and grandfather o£ the triumvir. 

Apelles, of Cos (4th century), Ihe 
greatest painter of his age; court 
painter to Alexander the Great; 
his masterpiece was a Venus 
rising f rom the sea ; another Venus 
left unfinished, iii, 10. 

ApoIIo, god of the light of day ; giver 
of oracles at Pytho, ii, 77. 

Appetite, subject to Reason, i, 101- 

Appius Claudius Pulchcr, fathcr of 
Gaius, 11,57. 

Aquilius; Gaius Aquilius Gallus, 
famous jurist; Cicero's colleague 
in the praetorship; author of 
formulae on criminal fraud, iii, 

Aquilius, Manius, consul (101) with 
Marius; victorious in the Servile 
War in Sicily ; prosecuted (98) but 
acquitted, ii, 50. 

Aratus, of Sicyon, soldier and states- 
man (271-213), removed the ty- 
rant Nicocles (251) and averted 
financial ruin, ii, 81, 82; leader 
of the Achaean League; poisoned 
by order of Philip of Macedon. 

Areopagites, members of the Council 
of Areopagus. 

Areopagus, *' Mars Hill," a spur of 
the Acropolis, seat of the highest 
court of Athens; the court itself, 
with powers of senate and su- 
preme court, reorganized and 
enlargcd in function by Solon, i, 

Arginusae, a group of islands off the 
coast of Asia Minor, near Lesbos, 
scene of the victory of the 
Athenian fleet (406), i, 84. . 

Argos, the chief city of Argolis, ii, 


Axistides, " the Just," iii, [16], 49, 
87; fought at Marathon (490), 
Salamis (480), and commanded 
the Athenians at Plataea (479) ; 
exiled (483) because his policies 
clashed with those of Themis- 

Aristippus, of Cyrene (flourished 
370), founder of the Cyrenaic 
school, III, 116; disciple of 
Socrates, but taught that the 
chief end of man was to get 
enjoyment from everything (he- 
donism), to subject all things and 
circumstances to himself for 
pleasure; but pleasure must be 
the slave not the master; good 
and bad identical with pleas- 
ure and pain ; i, 148. 

Aristo, of Chios (3rd century), a 
Stoic philosopher, pupil of Zeno; 
he taught indifference to exter- 
nals, nothing good but virtue, 
nothing evil but vice ; his theories 
rejected, i, 6. 

Aristotle (385-322), disciple of Plato 
and teacher of Alexander the 

. Great; founderof the Peripatetic 
school; greatest of ptiilosophers, 
master of all knowledge — pby- 
sics, metaphysics, natural philc- 

: sophy, ethics, politics, poetics; 
sociology, logic, rhetoric, etc. ; 
II, 56; III, 35; might have been a 
great orator, i, 4. 

Arpinates, the people of Arpinum, 
owners of public lands, l, 21. 

Arpinum, a town in Latium, birth- 
place of Cicero and Gaius Marius, 

Athenians, the people of Athens, i, 
75, 84 ; their cruel sub jugation of 
Aegina, ni, 46; left theirhomes to 
fight at Salamis, iii, 48; political 
. strife, I, 86.; high moral principles 
of, III, 49, 55. 

Athens, ii,64,83; iii,55,87; thein- 
tellectual and artistic centre of the 
world; led Greece in the Persian 
• wars (490-479); humbled by 
Sparta (404); the university dty 
of tlie Roman world, i, 1 ; iii, 6, 

Atilius ; see Regulus. 

Atilius; Sextus Atilius Serranus, 
consul (136), in, 109. 

Atreus, son of Pelops and fathei' o 
Agamemnon and Menelaus, mut- 
derer of his half-brother Chrysip- 
pus and of his brother Thyestes's 
children ; murdered by his nephew 
Aegisthus; a fruitful theme for 
tragedy, 1,97; 111,106. 

Attic, belonging to Attica, theprov- 
ince in which Athens is situated ; 
Attic comedy, the comedy of 
Aristophanes, Eupolis, Menan- 
der, etc, i, 104. 

Avarice, the great temptation, ii, 
38, 77 ; the root of evil, iii, 73-75 ; 
due to delusion as to expediency, 
ni, 36 ; avoided by the statesman, 
II, 76-77 ; contrary to all law, iii, 
21-23; see also Covetousness. 

Babylonia, the district around 
Babylon at the head of the Per- 
sian Gulf, iii, 51. 

Bardulis, king of Illyria, conquered 
a large part of Macedonia from 
Perdiccas, the brother and pre- 
decessor of Philip; defeated and 

■ slain by Philip (358); called a 
" brigand," because his carfeer 
did not tend to promote civiliza» 
tion, II, 40. 

Basilus, Lucius Minucius, otherwise 
unknown; perhaps Sulla's lieu- 
tenant, m, 73-74. 

Beauty, physical, i, 98 126 ; types 
of, i, 130. 

Beneficence ; see Generosity. 

Bribery, in Rome, ii, 21-22, 75. 

Brutus,. Lucius Junius, led the 
Romans to expel the Tarauins; 
helped by CoUatinus, who snared 
with him the first consulship 
(509), III, 40. 

Brutus, Marcus Junius, an eminent 
jurist, one of the three founders 
of the civil law; father of " the 
Accuser," ii, 50. 

Brutus; Marcus Junius Brutus Ac- 
cusator, orator and vigorbus 
prosecutor, son of the preceding, 
11,50. . : . 

Caelian Hill, the south-cast hiU 61 
Rome, III, 66. 

Caesar, Gaius Julius, son of Lucius 
Caesar Strabo ; Vopiscus, candi- 
date fox. the consulship (88), 



slain by Marius (87); poet and 
orator, i, 108, 133. 

Caesar, Gaius Julius (100-44), con- 
sul (59), in Gaul (58-50), con- 
quered Pompey at Pharsahis 
(48), dictator (48-44), assassinated 
(44); orator, statesman, scholar, 
soldier; despot, ii, 2; tyrant, i, 
112; n, 23-28, 83; confiscator, i, 
43; 11, 84; enslaver o£ Rome, iii, 
85; treatment of Marseilles, n, 
28; a victim of depraved ambi- 
tion, I, 26; iii, 83; a conspirator 
with Catiline, his love of wrong, 
II, 84; deserved his death, in. 19 
32, 82. 

Caesar, Lucius Julius, father of the 
Dictator, i, 108. 

CalUcratidas, succeeded Lysander 
as admiral of the Spartan fleet, i, 
109; defeated Conon, took Les- 
bos, lost the battle and his life 
at Arginusae (406), i, 84. 

CaUiphon, a Greek philosopher, 
probably a disciple of Epicurus, 
taught that the supreme good 
was a union between moral recti- 
tude and pleasure, ni, 119. 

Calpurnius ; Lucius Calpurnius Piso 
Frugi ; see Piso. 

Calpurnius ; Publius Calpurnius La- 
narius ; see Lanarius. 

Calypso, the nymph of Ogygia, who 
kept Odysseus (Ulysses) with her 
seven years, i, 113. 

Campus (Martius), the open plain 
next to the Tiber outside the 
north wall of Rome; playground 
and drillground, i, 104. 

Canius, Gaius, a Roman knight, iii, 

Cannae, a town on the Aufidus in 
Apulia, scene of HannibaVs over- 
whelming defeat of the Romans 
(216), 1,40; III, 47, 113. 

Capitolium, the Capitoline Hill, 
between the forum and the Tiber, 
the citadel of Rome, with the 
temple of Jupiter and Good 
Faith, in, 104; place of augury, 

Cartbage, once a mighty city, on the 
north central coast of Africa, iii, 
M, 100; the most formidable 
commercial and miiitai:y rival of 
Rome ; conquerod by Rome ia the 


First Punic War (264-241), i, 39; 
Second Punic War (219-202), i, 
40 ; in, 47 ; destroyed in the Third 
(149-146), 1,35; 11,76. 

Carthaginians, the people of Car- 
thage, 1, 39, 108; in, 99, 110, 
113; treacherous, ni, 102; cruel, 
in, 100, 102; treaty-breaking, i, 

Cassander, son of Antipater, disin- 
herited by his father, gained the 
throne of Macedonia (306) by 
wars and murders (319-301), li, 48. 

Cato, Marcus Porciiis, the Censor 
(or Major, the Elder, i, 37) (234- 
149), author, i, 104 ; lil, 1 ; orator, 
in, 104; soldier, served in Second 
Punic War (217-202); statesman, 
responsible for the destruction o£ 
Carthage (146), i, 79; " the 
Wise," ni, 16; consul (195); cen- 
sor (184); stalwart champion of 
the simple life and stern morals, 
II, 89; bitterly opposed luxury 
and Greek culture ; yielded in old 

Cato, Marcus Porcius, son of the 
preceding; jurist; served under 
Paulus in Macedon (168), i, 87 
[under Marcus Popilius Laenas in 
Liguria(172), i, 36]. 

Cato, Marcus Porcius, grandson oi 
the Censor and father of Cato 
Uticensis, ill, 66. 

Cato; Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensls 
(95-46), son of the preceding 
and great-grandson of the Cen- 
sor; a Stoic philosopher; orator; 
soldier, i, 112; defeated at Thap- 
sus (46); judge, ni, 66; stern and 
unyielding as his great-grand- 
father, i, 112; in, 88; his suicide, 
I, 112; close friend of Cicero (ii, 
2); 111,88. 

Catulus, Quintus Lutatius, half- 
brother of Julius Caesar Strabo, 
I, 133; orator; scholar, i, 133; 
author; soldier; consul with 
Marius (102) in the war against 
the Cimbri (101); gentleraan, i, 
109; committed suicide to escape 
the proscriptions of Marius (87). 

Catulus, Quintus Lutatius, son of 
the preceding, defeated Lepidut 
at the Milvian bridge; (tatesman, 
I, 76 ; scholar, i,183. 


Caudlum, a little town in the moun- 
tains of Samnium ; near it are the 
Caudine Forks, the scene of the 
disastrous battle (321); iii, 109; 

Celtiberians, a powerful people of 
central Spain, opposed Rome in 
Second Punic War, were reduced 
in the Numantian War (134), sub- 
mitted on the death of Sertorius 
(72), I, 38. 

Centumalus, Tiberius Claudius; un- 
known, iii, 66. 

Chicanery, i, 33. 

Chremes, a character in Terence's 
Heauton Timorumenus, i, 30. 

Chrysippus, of Soli (250-207), stud- 
ied Stoic philosophy at Athens 
under Cleanthes, whom he suc- 
ceeded;volaminouswriter. " Had 
there been no Chrysippus, there 
had been no Stoa," iii, 42. 

Cicero, Marcus TuUius, the orator's 
father, III, 77;died(64). 

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, the orator 
(106-43), bom at Arpinum, cdu- 
cated at Rome under Archias, 
the Scaevolas, and the teachcrs 
of philosophy (see Introduction), 
at Atliens, in Asia, and at Rhodes ; 
his training was all for service, l, 
155; as consul (63) he crushed 
the conspiracy of Catiline, i, 84 ; 
banished (58), ii, 58 ; his enforced 
retirement from his profession, 
III, 2-4; as a philosopher and 
orator, i, 1-3 ; follower of Socrates 
and Plato, l, 2 ; of the New Acad- 
emy, ii, 7-8; why he wrote on 
philosophy, ii, 2-8; iii, 1-5; atti- 
tude on the downfall of the 
Republic, li, 2. 

Cicero, Marcus TuUius, the orator's 
only son, i, 1, 15, 78; ii, 1-8, 44; 
lii, 1, 5, 33; born in 65; served 
with credit under Pompey, ii, 
45, and Sextus Pompey ; a student 
of Peripatetic philosophy under 
Cratippus in Athens (44-43), i, 
1; admonished to read also his 
father's works, i, 3; iii, 121; 
served under Brutus (43-42) ; con- 
sul with Octavian (30). 

Cimbrians, a Celtic people, migrat- 
ing in a vast horde toward Italy, 
were cut to pieces by Marius and 

Catulus in the Raudian Plains 
near Verona (101), i,38. 

Cimon, of Athens, son of the great 
Miltiades; victorious admiral; 
statesman; genial and generous, 

Circe, nymph of Aeaea, a sorceress ; 
she kept Odysseus (Ulysses) in her 
halls a year, i, 113. 

Civic, compared with military ser- 
vice, i, 74 fg. 

Claudius ; see Appius and Centuma- 
lus and Pulcher. 

Cleombrotus, son of Pausanias, king 
of Sparta, fell at Leuctra (371), i, 

Cleomenes; see note to i, 33. 

Clodius; Publius Clodius Pulcher, 
Cicero's inveterate enemy, one 
of the most turbulent and corrupt 
characters of Rome, guilty of 
mutiny in the army, brihery in 
the courts, profiigacy in his 
public and private iife; securcd 
Cicero's banishment ; hired gladi- 
ators to force his own election to 
tbe praetorship, but was killed in 
a broil with MiIo's rival gang o£ 
ruffians, ii, 58. 

CloeUa, a Roman girl sent as a 
hostage to Porsena ; she made her 
escape by swimming the Tiber, 
was sent back, but restored by 
the king with rewards for her 
courage, (i, 61). 

Clytaemnestra, daughter of Tyn- 
dareus, wife of Agamemnon, 
paramour of Aegisthus, with 
whom she murdered her husband 
on his return from Troy ; she was 
in tum slain by her son Orestes. 
Subject of a tragedy by Accius, i, 

Cocles, Horatius, the hero who with 
two others kept tbe bridge against 
Porsena and Tarquin, i,61. 

CoUatinus, Lucius Tarquinius, hus- 
band of Lucretia, associate of 
Brutus in driving out the Tar- 
quins and bis colleague in the first 
consulship (509), iii, 40. 

Comedy ; see Old Comedy. 

Concealment, of guilt, iii, 37-39. 

Conon, famous Athcnian admiral, 
defeated by Lysander at Aegos- 
potami (405), victorious over 



Pisandcr of Sparta at Cnidus 
(394), restored the long walls, i, 

Considerateness, a subdivision of 
the virtue of Temperance, i, 99, 

Conversation, a division of speech, 
I, 132-133; II, 48; an art, i, 134- 

Co-operation, and civilization, ii, 
12-16; and the viitues, ii, 17-18; 
»s. Fortune, ii, 19; a universal 
need, ii, 39; how secured, ii, 21 

Corinth, a famous city at the Isth- 
mus of Corinth; wealthy; next 
to Athens, richest in treasures of 
art ; head of the Achaean League ; 
sacked and utterly destroyed by 
the Romans undcr Mummius 
(146), 1,35; 11,76; m, 46. 

Cornelius; see Scipio and Spinther 
and Sulla. 

Cos, chief city of the island of Cos, 

- one of the Sporadcs ; famed for its 
silks; the birthplace of Apelles, 
painter of the Coan Venus, iii, 

Cotta, Gaius Aurelius, distinguished 
. orator; one of the speakers in 
Cicero's de Oratore and de Natura 
Deorum; consul (75) ; ii, 59. 

Courage ; see Fortitude. ■ 

Covetousness, ij 68; iii, 30; see 

Crassus, Lucius Licinius, the famoiis 
orator, ii,.63; iii, 67; at 21 (119) 
he won renown by his prosecu- 
tioa of Carbo, the one-time friend 
of the Gracchi, II, 47, 49; his 
aedileship most splendid, ii, 57; 
as consul (95),' he seoured the 
expulsion from Rome of all who 
were not citizens, ni, 47; this^was 
a cause of the Social War. He 
was the greatest orator of Rome 
before Cicero, fluent, graceful, 
witty, I, 108, 183-; Cicero's 
mouthpiece in the de Oratore. 

Crassus; Marcus Licinius Crassus 
Dives, the triumvir; his wealth 
and ambition, i, 25; sided with 
SuIIa against Marius and grew 
enormously rich by the proscrip- 
tions; bis avarice did not shrtnk 
from any mca/in^ss or even crime, 


i, 109; III, 73-75. He defeareu 
Spartacus (71); slain in Parthia 

Crassus; Publius Licinius Crassus 
Dives, II, 57 ; father of the trium- 
vir, consul (97) ; ended his own life 
to escape the proscriptions of 
Marius (87); Cicero bought his 

Cratippus, of Mitylene, an eminent 
Peripatetic, came to Athens 
(about 50) to lecture; foremost of 
contemporary philosophers and 
teacher of young Cicero, i, 1, 2; ii, 
8; 111,5,6,33,121 

Cunning, not wisdom, ll, 10; in, 72, 

Curio, Gaius Scribonius, ii, 59; 
orator and statesman, iii, 88; 
consul, (76). 

Cynics, a school of philosophy so 
called from the Athenian gym- 
nasium, Cynosarges, whcre they 
met, later adapted to their snarl- 
ing manner and dirty habits; its 

■ leaders were Antisthenes of 
Athens, a disciple of Socrates, and 
Diogenes of Sinope ; they taught 
the virtue of poverty and want, 
indifference to all convention and 
decency; Cicero's contempt for 
them and their so-called philo- 
sophy, 1, 128, 148. 

Cyrenaics, the philosophic sect 
founded by Aristippus (q.v.), iii, 

Cyrsilus, a Medizing Athenian, iii, 

Cyrus, the Great, founder of the 

- Persian Empire ; wonderf ully gif t- 
ed in wianing the co-operation of 
men and nations, ii, 16. 

Damon, a Pythagorean and friend of 
Phintias, iii, 45. 

Debts, canccllation of, ii, 78-79, 
83-85; avoidance of, u, 84; pay- 
ment enforced, Hi 84. 

Decius; Publius Decius Mus, fatbcr 
and son, i, 61 ; iii, 16; the former, 
consul with. Maalius Torquatus 
(360), devoted himself to death 
in the battle on the Veseris. The 
son did the same at the battle ol 
Sentinuni (295) and brought tb* 
Samnite wats to an end-. j 


Demetrius of Phalerum (345-283), 
orator, statesman, ii, 60; philo- 
sopher, poet ; pupil of Theo- 
phrastus, i, 3; the only Greek 
who was both orator and philo- 
sopher, i, 3 ; he inspired the found- 
ing of the Alexandrine library. 

Demetrius Poliorcetes, ii, 26; son of 
Antigonus and king of Macedon 
(294-287). His life was occupied 
with continuous warfare against 
enemies in Egypt, Asia, Greece, 
Macedonia, Epirus. 

Demosthenes, tlie greatest orator of 
Athens (385-322); pupil of Isaeus 
and of Plato, l, 4; might have 
been a great philosopher, i, 4; 
at 18 he prosecuted his defaulting 
guardian with success, ii, 47 ; 
then turned to public speaking 
and statecraft as a profession. 

Diana, goddess of the light of the 
night, identified with Arterais, 
iii, 95. 

Dicaearchus, of Messana (4th cen- 
tury), a Peripatetic philosopher, 
geographer, and historian, ii, 16; 
pupil of Aristotle and friend of 

Dinomachus, a Greek philosopher^ 
always named with Calliphon 
-{q.v.), 111,119. 

Diogenes, of Babylonia, pupil and 
successor of Cbrysippus; best 
known for his part in the famous 
embassy with Carneades and 
Critolaus from Athens to Rome 
(156) where, on motion of Cato, 
they were not permitted to re- 
main; his ethics rather loose, iii, 

Dion, a kinsman of the elder Diony- 
sius and tyrant of Syracuse (356- 
353) ; a devoted disciple of Plato 
at Syracuse and Athens, l, 155. 

Dionysius, fhe elder (430-367), 
tyrant of Syracuse (405-367), a 
typically cruel tyrant, suspicious 
and fearful, ii, 25; m, 45 (?); de- 
voted to art and literature, him- 
self a poet crowned with a prize at 

Dionysius, the younger, son of the 
preceding and tyrant of Syracuse 
(367-356, 346-343); devoted to 
literature; Plato, Aristippus, Ar- 

chytas, and otbers were brought 
to his court. Whether the Da- 
mon and Phintias story is to be 
connected with him or bis fatber 
is uncertain, iii, 45 ( ?). 

Drusus, Marcus Livius, son of 
Gaius Gracchus's colleague in tbe 
tribuneship; an eloquent orator, 
i, 108; as tribune (91) he at- 
tempted to renew tbe social and 
agrarian legislation of Gracchus 
and was assassinated. 

Duty, the most important subject 
iii philosophy, i, 4; the most 
fruitful field, iii, 5; the philoso- 
phic sects and duty, i, 4-6; best 
presentation, iii, 7; classification, 
i, 7-9; order of importance, i, 58, 
152-160; III, 90; to those wbo 
have wronged us, i, 33; to an 
enemy, i, 35-40; iii, 98-115; to a 
slave, I, 41; iii, 89; toward the 
laws, 1, 148; of generosity, i, 42- 
60; of Temperance-Propriety, i, 
100-151; iii, 116-121; of Forti- 
tude, III, 97-115; to be prosper- 
ous, II, 87; duties of youth, i, 
122; II, 52; of age, i, 123; of mag- 
istrates, i, 124; of statesmen, i, 
-73-85 ; of private citizens, i, 124 ; 
of aliens, i, 125; vs. claims of 
friendship, in, 43-44; cbange of 
duty in change of circumstance, 
1, 31, 59; III, 32; "mean" and 
"absolute" duty, i, 8; iii, 14; 
doubts as to, i, 147. 

Eloquence, at the bar, ii, 66; its 
decline, ii, 67 ; see Oratory. 

Ennius, Quintus (239-169), a Greek 
by birth, tbe father of Roman 
poetry, wrote an epic (the Annals) 
I, 84; tragedies, i, 26, 51, 52; ii, 
23, 62 ; III, 62, 104 ; comedies and 
satires. ; 

Epaminondas, one of tbe.greatest 
men of Greece, a student of 
Pythagorean philosophy, i, 155; 
thc greatest general of Thebes, 
victorious at Leuctra (371), i, 84; 
humbled Sparta and made Thebes 
the leading city of Greece; fell at 

Epicurus (342-270), founded at 
Atbens the school that bears his 
aaine;-author of 300 books, 



natural and ethical philosophy; 
held happiness to be the highest 
good; Cicero confuses his teach- 
ing here vvith that of Axistippus 
and the Cyrenaics; with the 
latter, liappiness consists in indi- 
vidual pleasures; with Epicurus, 
it is permanent calm of soul and 
freedom from pain, with pure and 
lasting pleasures — the pleasures 
that come from a life of rigbteous- 
ness, iii, 12, 117; the gods existed 
but had nothing to do with human 
life, III, 102; adopted the atomic 

• theory. His own life was tem- 
perate even to abstinence; his 
foliowers went to excess. A very 
popular school, iii, 116; repre- 
sented by Cicero as illogical, 
iii, 39; their theory of society, 
1, 158. 

Epigoni, the sons of the Seven 
against Thebes ; under Aicmaeon, 
Diomedes, etc, they conquered 
and destroyed the city. Subject 
of a tragedy of Accius, i, 114. 

Erillus, of Carthage, pupil of Zeno 
the Stoic, held tliat knowledge 
is the only good, while everything 
else is neitber good nor evil; his 
ethical theories rejected, l, 6. 

Eteocles, son of Oedipus, drove out 
his brother Polynices, in order to 
reign alone, and brought on the 
war of the Seven against Thebes ; 
the brothers fell by each other's 
hands; iii, 82. 

Euripides (480-406), tragic poet of 
Athens; disciple of Anaxagoras 
and friend of Socrates; wrote 75 
to 90 plays; 17 are extant; Cicero 
quotes from the Hippolytus, iii, 
82 ; the Phoenissae, iii, 108. 

Evil, thesupreme, i, 5; iii, 119; not 
pain, i, 5; iii, 105, 117; but moral 
wrong, III, 105, 106; tbe only, iii, 

E.xpediency, definition, ii, 1, 11; 
i:idispensable, iii, 101; identical 
with Moral Rectitude, ii, 9-10; 
III, 20, 35, 49, 83, 85, 110; con- 
flict with Moral Rectitude im- 
possible, III, 9, 11, 18, 34, 40, 48, 
72; incompatible with immo- 
rality, iii, 35, 77, 81. 82, 87; ii, 
64; one staodard for botb, ui, 


75; relative, ii, 88 fg.; possible 
change of, iii, 95; occasion for 
doubt, III, 19; apparent conflict 
with justice, iii, 40, 86; apparent 
political expediency vs. humanity, 
III, 46-49; in business, iii, 50 fg. ; 
apparent conflict with Fortitude, 
III, 97-115; apparent conflict witb 
Temperance, iii, 116. 

Fabius ; see Maximus. 

Fabricius; Gaius Fabricius Lus- 
cinus, hero of old Rome, famed 
for integrity and moral dignity; 
called "the Just," iii, 16, 87; 
consul (282) ; served agaiiist Pyr- 
rhus (280); ambassador to Pyr- 
rhus to negotiate exchange of 
prisoners; Pyrrlms tried to gain 
his favour by appeals to his am- 
bition, avarice, and fears — in 
vain, i, 38; consul again (278), he 
sent back to Pyrrhus the traitor, 
i, 40; III, 86-87 ; a rigorous censor 
(275) ; lived and died in poverty. 

Fame ; see Glory. 

Fear, the wretchedness of, ii, 25-26 ; 
vs. love, II, 23-26; dangerous to 
the one who employs it, ii, 26. 

Fetial Law, the laws of the Fetiales, 
a college of four priests who 
served as guardians of the public 
faith; they conducted the cere- 
monies attendant upon demaods 
for redress, declarations of 
war, ratification of treaties, es- 
tablishment of peace; i, 36; ni, 

Fides; see Good Faith; the god- 
dess, III, 104 ; etymology of , i, 23. 

Fimbria, Gaius Flavius, colleague 
of Marius in his second consulship 
(104) ; orator and jurist, iii, 77. 

Finance, ii, 87; reform of currency, 

Fortitude, the third Cardinal Virtue, 
I, 15, 61-92; its characteristics, 
I, 66; in the light of justice, i, 
62, 157; dangers attending, i, 46, 
62-63; vs. expediency, iii, 97-115; 
in Epicurus's systcm, iii, 117. 

Fraud, criminal, iii, 60 fg. 

Friendship, motives to, «, 55-56 ; ac- 
quisition of friends, ii, 30; idcal 
i, 56; III, 45-46; vs. duty, iii, 


Fufius, Lucius, an orator of no great 

ability, ii, 50. 
Furius; Lucius Furius Philus, con- 

sul (136), proconsul in Spain, iii, 

109; a leamed interlocutor in 

Cicero's Republic. 

Galus, Gaius Sulpicius; see Sul- 

Gaul, an inhabitant of Gaul, the land 
north of the Apennines, iii, 112. 

Generosity, divisions of, ii, 52; 
close to nature, iii, 24; must not 
barm its object, i, 42-43 ; in pro- 
portion to one's means, i, 42-44; 

II, 55; to the recipienfs merits, 
i, 45-60 ; motives to, i, 47-49 ; iii, 
118; means to winning popu- 
larity, ii, 32; gifts of money, ii, 
52-60; personal service, ii, 52, 
53; to individuals, ii, 65-71; to 
the state, ii, 72 fg. ; when most 
appreciated, ii, 63. 

Glory, a means to popularity, ii, 31, 
43 ; preferred to wealth, li, 88. 

Gods, favourof, won by piety, ii, 11 ; 
do no hann, ii, 12; iii, 102; free 
from care, iii, 102; slow to anger, 

III, 102, 104, 105. 

Golden Mean, i, 89; in generosity, 
II, 58, 59, 60; in personal adorn- 
ment, i, 130. 

Good, the supreme, i, 5, 7; iii, 52, 
119; not pleasure, i, 5; iii, 116, 
117, 118; but moral goodness, iii, 
11, 35; living in harmony with 
nature, iii, 13; the only, moral 
goodness, i, 67 ; iii, 12. 

Good faith, iii, 104; even to an 
enemy, iii, 86 fg., 111, 113. 

Good man, what constitutes a, ni, 
63, 75-77. 

Gracchus, Gajus Sempronius, bro- 
ther of the younger Tiberius; a 
more radical reformer; tribune 
(123 and 122); fell (121) a martyr 
to his reforms for the restoration 
of the public lands and the re- 
duction of the cost of living, ii, 
72, 80; his death applauded by 
Cicero, li, 43. 

Gracchus,Publius Sempronius,father 
of the elder Tiberius, ii, 43. 

Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius, fa- 
ther of the tribunes, ii, 43; in 
his own tribuneship he defended 

Scipio (187); a great soldier, ii, 
80; twice consul, triurophed 
twice ; a just ruler in Spyain ; son- 
in-Iaw of the elder, father-in-law 
of the younger Africanus, an 
ardent aristocrat; hence Cicero's 
praise, ii, 43. 

Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius, son 
of the foregoing; a persuasive 
orator; friend of the people and 
helper of the poor and op- 
pressed; murdered for attempting 
as tribune (133) to reform agrarian 
abuses and build up a class of 
small farmers, i, 76, 109 ; li, 80 ; 
his death applauded by Cicero, ii, 

Gratidianus, Marcus Marius; see 

Gratitude, how won, ii, 63. 

Greece, the land of liberty, letters, 
art, and civilization, ii, 60; iii, 
48, 73, 99 ; cause of fall, ii, 80. 

Greek, belonging to or a native of 
Greece, i, 108, 111 ; ii, 83 ; in, 82 ; 
leaders in literature, i, 3; masters 
of philosophy, i, 8, 51, 142, 153; 
II, 18; Greek and Latin studies, 

Gyges, the shepherd who dethroned 
Candaules and became king of 
Lydia (716-678), III, 38, 78. 

Gytheum, the harbour-town and 
arsenal of Sparta, iii, 49. 

Hamilcar, a successful Carthaginian 
general in the First Punic War, 
deftated by Regulus at Ecnomus ; 
opposed Regulus in Africa, iii, 
99; confused with Hamilcar 
Barca {q.v.), iii, 99. 

Hamilcar Barca, famous command- 
er of the Carthaginian forces in 
Sicily (247-241); in Spain (238- 
229); father of Hannibal, iii, 99. 

Hannibal (247-183), one of the 
worId's greatest generals, i, 108 ; 
son of Hamilcar Barca, iii, 99; 
sacked Saguntum (219), crossed 
the Alps and defeated the Romans 
on the Trebia and Ticinus (218), 
at Trasimenus (217), Cannae 
(216), l, 40; iii, 113-114; defeated 
at Zama (202); maligned by the 
Romans as treacherous and crue , 



Harm, ffom gods to men, ii, 12; iii, 
102; men to men, ii, 16 fg. 

Health, impossible without man's 
co-operation, ii, 12, 15 ; care of, 

Hecaton, of Rhodes, a Stoic, pupil 
of Panaetius, iii, 63,89. 

Hercuies, the greatest of heroes, son 
of Zeus (Jupiter) and Alcmena, 
i, 118; his choice of his path in 

. life, 1, 118 ; performer of the twelve 
labours; benefactor of humanity, 
III, 25 ; his attainment of heaven, 

Hernicians, a tribe in the Sabine 
mountains, subdued by Rome 
(306), I, 35. 

Herodotus, of Halicarnassus (5th 
century), lived also at Athens and 
Thurii; the father of history; 
travelled widely and wrote the 
history of Persia and Greece, ii, 

Hesiod, the Boeotian didactlc poet 
(8th century) ; author of the The- 
ogony, the Works and Days, etc, 
I, 48. 

Hippoly tus, son of Theseus ; his step- 
mother Phaedra fell in love with 
bim; he rejected her advances 
but promised not to tell, iii, 108; 
she accused him falsely; his 
innocence proved, Phaedra hang- 
ed herself and Theseus suffered 
lifelong remorse, i, 32; iii, 94. 

Home, of raan of rank; see House. 

Homer, the poet, author of Iliad 
and Odyssey, iii, 97. 

Honesty, the bond of human society, 
III, 21 fg.; the corner-stone of 
government, ii, 78 fg. 

House, suitablc for a man of rank, i, 

Hortensius, Quintus (114-50), Ci- 
cero's famous rival as orator and 
advocate; his close friend (after 
63), III, 73; enormously wealthy; 
lavish in his aedileship (75), ii, 
57; not always scrupulous, iii, 

Hospitallty, the duty of, ii, 64. 

Humility, in prosperity, i, 90-91. 

IUyria, the country between Mace- 

donia and the Adriatic, ii, 40. 
Ingratitude, abhorred, ii, 63. 

Injustice, active and passive, i, 23, 
28; never expedient, ni, 84; of 
hypocrisy, i, 41. 

Instinct and Reason, difference be- 
t\\'een man and beast, i, 11. 

Iiitegrity, official, ii, 75, 76, 77. 

Iphigenia, daughter of Agaraemnon 

^ and Clytaemnestra {q.v.) ; sacri- 
ficed at Aulis, ni, 95. 

Isocrates (436-338), one of the ten 
Attic orators, pupil of Gorgias 
anc^ Socrates ; a polished speaker ; 
greater as a teacher than as an 
orator; might have been a great 
philosopher, i, 4. 

Italian War (90-88), caused by 
Rome's injustice to the allies, pro- 
voked by the fear of prosecution 
on the part of the corrupt aristo- 
crats, II, 75; resulted in Rome's 
granting the contentions of the 

Italy, in government identified with 
Rome, II, 76. 

Ithaca, the home of Odysseus 
(Ulysses), an island of the lonian 
group west of Greece, probably 

, the historical Leucas, iii, 97. 

Janus, an old Italian sun-god; a 

. covered passage (commonly called 
his temple) adjoining the forum 
accommodated thebanking houses 
of Rome, ii, 87. 

Jason, tyrant of Pherae (395-370), 
generalissimo of Thessaly (374- 
370), an able soldier and diplo- 
mat, i, 108. 


Jove; s<e Jupiter 

Jugurtha, king of Numidia (118- 
106), campaigned with Scipio 
against Numantia; war with 
Rome (112-106) protracted by his 
bribes as much as by his arms, lll, 
79 ; executed in Rome (104). 

J ulius ; see Caesar. 

Junius; see Brutus and Pennus acd 

Jupiter, the greatest of the gods of 
Italy, III, 102, 105; " Supreme 
and Best," iii, 104; father of 
Hercules, i, 118. 

Justice, thesecond Cardinal Virtue, 
I, 15, 17, 20-41; In what con- 
«isting, I, 20; not fully comprc- 


hended,. m, 69 ; queen of all the 
virtues,, iii, 28; most important, 
I, 153; close to nature, i, 163; 
III, 24; rule of duty, i, 29-30; in 
war, 1, 38-40; aad generosity, i, 

, 42; vs. Wisdom, i, 152-157; vs. 

^. Fortitude, i, 157 ; vs. Temperance, 
I, 159-160; indispensable in busi- 
ness, II, 40; iuspires most confi- 
dence, ii, 34 ; the best means to 
popularity, ii, 39; to glory, ii, 43; 
always expedient, iii, 96; in con- 
iiict with apparent expediency, 

Labeo, Qulntus Fabius, grandson 
of Fabius Maximus, Consul (183); 
injustice of, i, .33. 

Lacedaemon ; see Sparta. 

Laciads, citizens of the deme of 
Lacia, west of Athens, the home 
of Miltiades, u, 64. 

Laelius, Gaius, surnamed " the 
Wise," III, 16; statesman; soldier 
under Scipio at Carthage, success- 
ful against Viriathus, ii, 40; a 
Stoic, pupil of Diogenes and 
Panaetius ; a man of endless charm 
and wit, i, 90, 108 ; his friendship 
for Af ricanus inunortalized, ii, 31 ; 
a man of letters, centre of the 
literary group comprising also 
Scipio, Panaetius, Polybius, Te- 
rence, Lucilius. 

Lanarius, Gaius Calpurnius, iii, 66. 

Latin, study of combined with 
Greek, i, 1-2. 

Latins, the people of Latium, the 
province in which Rome is 
situated, the first territory added 
to Rome, i, 38 ; decisive battle on 
the Anio, iii, 112. 

Law, the origin of, ii, 41-42; the 
majesty of, i, 148; as a profes- 
sion, II, 65; its decline with the 
end of the Republic, ii, 67; iii, 

Lentulus ; Publius Comelius Lentu- 
lus Spinther, the splendour of his 
aedileship (63), ii, 57; as consul 
(57) he was largely instrumental 
in securing Cicero's recall from 

Leuctra, a town of Boeotia, where 
the Spartans undrr Cleombrotus 
were disastrously defeated by 

Epaminondas and the Thebans 
(371), 1,61; II, 26. 

Love, hmv won, ii, 32; vs. fear, ii, 

LucuUus, Lucius Licinius (110-56), 
surnamed Ponticus for his vic- 
tories over Mithradates (84-66); 
famed for his wealth and mag- 
nificence, i, 140; for the splen- 
dour of his aedileship with his 
brother Marcus (79), ii, 57; with 
him prosecuted Servilius to 
avenge their father whom he had 

, accused of bribery and corrup- 
tion, 11, 50; patron of letters, 
especially of the poet Archias. 

Lucullus, Marcus Licinius, asso- 
ciated with his brother Lucius 
{q.v.}, II, 60, 57; soldier and 

■ orator. 

Lusitania, western Spain, practically 
modern Portugal, ii, 40. 

Lutatius ; See Catulus. 

Luxury, a vice, i, 92, 106, 123. 

Lycurgus (9th century), the famous 
lawgiver of Sparta, author ( ?) of 
the Spartan constitution, i, 76. 

Lydia, the central country of wes» 
tern Asia Minor, iii, 38. 

Lysander, the Spartan admiralwho 
defeated the Athenians at Aegos- 
potami (405), received the capitu- 
lation of Athens (404), established 

, ' the Thirty Tyrants (403), and 
gave Sparta her leadership, i, 76, 

Lysander, the ephor (241), a de- 
scendant of the admiral, a friend 
of King Agis (q.v.), sought to bring 
about agrarian reforms based up- 
on the constitution of Lycurgus; 
for this he was banished, ii 80. 

Lysis, of Tarentum, a Pythagorean; 
expelled from Italy, he came to 
Thebes and taught Epaminondas, 
1, 155. 

Macedonia, until the time of Philip 
a small coimtry north of Thessaly. 
i, 37. 

Macedonians.the people of Macedon, 

I, 90 ; II, 53 ; deserted to Pyrrhus, 

II, 26; Paulus and their wealth, 
II, 76. 

Maelius, Quintus, tribune (321), 
more probably tribune-elect, as 



tribunes could not leave the city, 
III, 109. 

Magnificence, in the home, i, 140. 

Mamercus; Aemilius Lepidus Ma- 
mercus Livianus, a ktnsman of 
Caesar; though defeated once, ii, 
58, he was later (77) consul. 

Mancia, Quintus Mucius, unknown, 
I, 109. 

Mancinus, Gaius Hostilius; in his 
consulship (137) he was defeated 
by the Numantines; his delivery 
to the enemy, iii, 109. 

Minlius ; Aulus Manlius Capitolinus, 
father of Lucius {g.v.), iii, 112. 

M inUus; Lucius Manlius Capitolinus 
Imperiosus; named dictator to 
mark the year (363), he used his 
office to engage in a war ; that he 
transgressed but a " few days " 
was due to the intervention of the 
tribunes, iii, 112. 

M mUus ; Titus Manlius Imperiosus 
Torquatus, his son, a famous hero 
of Roman story ; as consul at the 
time of the battle on the Veseris 
he executed his own son for dis- 
obeying orders, though the dis- 
obedience won the spolia opima, 
iii, 112. 

Marathon, a plain about twenty 
miles north of Athens where (490) 
Miltiades and his ten thousand 
deleated the hosts of Darius, i, 

MarceUus, Marcus Claudius, cam- 
paigned against Hannibal in Italy, 
took Syracuse (212), five times 
consul, a brave but cruel soldier, 
over-praised by the Romans, i, 

Marcus ; iee Cicero — Marcus TuUius, 
the son. 

Marcius; s« Philippus. 

Marius, Gaius (157-87), seven times 
consul ; gained his first consulship 
dishonourably, iii, 79, 81; con- 
quered Jugurtha (107); saved 
Rome from the invading Clmbri 
(102) and Teutons (101); a miU- 
tary genius, i, 76; cruel and 
selnsh, he flooded the streets of 
Rome with her best blood in the 
civil war with Sulla. 

Marius ; Marcus Marius Gratidianus, 
the son (or grandson) of Marcus 


Gratidius whose sister married 
Cicero's grandfather; adopted by 
a kinsman of the great Marius; 
hence his name; twice praetor; 
murdered by CatiUne during 
SuUa's proscriptions, iii, 67; his 
unbounded popularity in his first 
praetorship (86), lu, 80-81. 

Mars, the god of war, iii, 34. 

Marseilles (MassiUa), a Greek city 
on the southern coast of Gaul, 
independent of the province; it 
sided with Pompey; Caesar cap- 
tured the city after a protracted 
siege and exacted cruel vengeance, 

Maximus; Quintus Fabius Maxi- 
mus Cunctator, consul four 
times; in his second dictatorship 
(217) he won his sumame by 
harassing Hannibal, watching his 
plans and working on the defen- 
sive, I, 84, 108. 

Medes, the people of Media, a great 
kingdom in central Asia Minor 
added to Persia by Cyrus, ii, 41. 

Medus, a son of Medea and Aegeus ; 
wandering in search of his mother 
he came to Colchis, where Medea 
saved his Ufe;the subject of a 
tragedy of Pacuvius, i, 114. 

Melanippa, mother of Boeotiis and 
Aeolus by Posidon (Neptune) ; 
blinded and imprisoned by her 
father, she was at last rescued by 
her sons and her sight was re- 
stored by Posidon; subject of a 
tragedy of Ennius, l, 114. 

Metellus ; Quintus Caecilius MeteUus 
Macedonicus, won his sumamc by 
his victories over Andriscus (148) ; 
a political rival and yet a good 
friend of the younger Scipio, i, 87. 

Metellus; Quintus Caecilius Metellus 
Numidicus, nephew of the pre- 
ceding, statesman and soldier; 
as consul (109), carried on the war 
with Jugurtha with distingrished 
success, III, 79. 

Metrodorus, of Lampsacus (330- 
277), the most distinguished of the 
disciples of Epicurus; his Epi- 
cureanism was of the grossly sen- 
sual sort ; his conception of bappi- 
ness misunderstood by Cicero, 
ni, 117. 


Milo, ntus Annius, an unscrupu- 
lous and turbulent fellow; as tri- 
bune (57) he did much for Cicero's 
recal! and made a sworn enemy of 
Clodius {q.v.); hired gladiators to 
force his own election, ii, 58; 
defended without success by 
Cicero for liilling Clodius. 

Minerva, goddess of tbought, tem- 
perament, wit, i, 97. 

Minos, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and 
liing of Crete; because of his 
upright life he was made judge 
with Aeacus (q.v.) in Hades, i, 

Moderation, defined, i, 142. 

Modesty, 1,126-129. 

Mucius ; see Scaevola. 

Mummius ; Lucius Mummius Achai- 
cus, as consul (146) broke up the 
Achaean League, razed Corinth 
to the ground, i, 35 ; ii, 46 ; carried 
to Italy untold treasuresof wealth 
and art, ii, 76. 

Naples, the beautiful Greek city of 

Campania, i, 33. 
Nasica ; see Scipio. 
Neptune, god of the sea, i, 32; ii, 

New Academy ; see Academy. 
Nicocles, tyrant of Sicyon, ii, 81. 
Nola, a city in Campania. loyal to 

Rome, I, 33. 
Norbanus, Gaius, tribune (95), 

impeached (94) for treason, ii, 

49;consul (83). 
Numantia, the capital of Celtiberla, 

razed to the ground after a long 

siege by the younger Scipio, i, 

35, 76; treacherously treated bv 

Rome, iii, 109. 
Numicius, Tiberius, colleague of 

Quintus Maelius {q.v.), iii, 109. 

Oath, significance of, i, 39, 40; iii, 
102 fg.; fidelity to, i, 39, 40; 
iii, 99-112; violation of, iii, 113 
fg. ; see Perjury. 

Octavius, Gnaeus, as praetor com- 
manded the fleet against Perseus 
<168)andgained a tnumph ; consul 
(165), 1, 138. 

Octavius, Marcus, tribune (120); 
had the com law of Gaius Grac- 
chus repealed and secured the 


passage of a new and more con« 

servative one, ii, 72. 
Old Age, duties pecidiar to, i, 123; 

worst vices of, i, 123. 
Old Comedy, that of Aristophanes, 

Cratinus, Eupolis, etc, the come- 

dy of personal abuse, i, 104. 
Orata, Gaius Sergius Silus, praetor 

(97), III, 67. 
Oratory, a division of speech, i, 

132; divisions of, ii, 49; a means 

f or winning favour, ii, 48 ; a means 

for service, ii, 65-71; a power 

to save, II, 51. 
Orderliness, defined, i, 142; of 

action, i, 142-145. 
Orestes; Gnaeus Aufidius Orestes 

Aurelianus, consul (71), ii, 58. 

Palamedes, the inventor; exposed 
UIysses's trick, iii, 98; treacher- 
ously done to death in revenge. 

Palatine, the hill above the forum 
on the south; east of the capital, 
1, 138. 

Panaetius, of Rhodes (180-111 ca.), 
Stoic philosopher, disciple of 
Diogenes and Antipater {q.v.) at 
Athens, close friend of Laelius 
{g.v.) and Scipio, i, 90; ii, 76; 
popularized philosophy, ii, 36; 
wrote a book on moral duty, 
m, 7; failed to define duty, i, 7; 
classification of duty, i, 9 ; omits 
third division, i, 152, 161; ii, 88; 
reason.j for omission, iii, 7-18, 34 ; 
how it would have been met, iii, 
33 ; other omissions, h, 86 ; on co- 
operation, ii, 16 ; defends Iawyer's 
efforts in a bad case, ii, 51; on 
expensive public buildings, ii, 
60; Cicero's model, ii, 60; iii, 7; 
Hecaton's teacher, iii, 63. 

Papius, Gaius, as tribune (66), re- 
vived the law of Pennus {q.v.), 
Ui, 47. 

Patriotism, i, 83; duty to country, 
1, 160; in, 90, 95 ; to die for coun- 
try, I, 57; sacrifice for, i, 84; 
III, 100; right to do wrong for 
one's country, i, 159; iii, 93, 95. 

Paulus, Lucius Aemilius, consul 
(216), defeated and slain at 
Cannae, i, 114. 

Paulus; Lucius Aemilius Paulus 
Macedonicus, son of the preceding; 



in his second consulship he con- 
quered Perseus of Macedon at 
Pydna (168) and enriched Rome 
witli spoils, II, 76 ; the father of the 
younger Africanus, i, 116, 121. 

Pausanias, king of Sparta, com- 
mander-in-chief of the forces of 
Greece at Plataea (479) to the 
glory of Sparta, i, 76. 

Peloponnesian War, the death- 
struggle of Athens with Sparta 
(431-404), 1,84. 

Peloponnesus, the lower peninsula 
of Greece, in which Sparta was 
the chief city, i, 84. 

Pelops, son of Tantalus and king of 
Mycenae, father of Atreus and 
Thyestes, iii, 84. 

Pennus, Marcus Junius; as tribune 
(126) he secured a law expelling 
all foreigners from Rome, iii, 47. 

Pericles, the peerless statesman of 
Athens, ii, 16 ; philosopher, frien;! 
of Anaxagoras and Socrates ; 
orator of mighty power, serious 
and deep, i, 108; general, i, 144; 
his administration made Athens 
unequalled in the splendour of 
her public buildings, ii, 60. 

Peripatetics, foUowers of Aristotle 
tq.v.), empiricists, ii, 16; students 
of exact science; lack the poetry 
and eloquence of Plato but not 
very different from the New 
Acaderay, i, 2; iii, 20; foUowers 
of Socrates and Plato, i, 2; their 
right to teach ethics, i, 6 ; seek the 
golden mean, 1, 89 ; moral rectitude 
the supreme good, iii, 11; moral 
wrong the supreme evil, iii, 106; 
young Cicero their foUower, i, 1 ; 

Perjury, iii, 106-108, 113. 

Perseus, the last king of Macedon, 
conquered by Paulus (?.».), i, 37. 

Persians, the people of Persia, the 
great empire of western Asia; un- 
der Darius they invaded Greece 
and were beaten back at Marathon 
(490), I, 61 ; under Xerxes were 
overwhehningly dcfeated at Sala- 
mis (480), I, 61; iii, 48, 49; and 
at Plataea (479), i, 61. 

Phaedra, daughter of Minos, wife 
of Theseus and stepraother of 
Hippolytus [q.v.), iii, 94. 


Phaethon, his story, iii, 94. 
Phalaris, tyrant of Agrigentum (6th 

century), type of inhuman cru- 

elty, II, 26; iii, 29, 32; slain in an 

uprising of his people, ii, 26 ; typi- 

cal of Caesar. 
Phalerum, a deme of Attica on the 

bay of Phalerum, i, 3; ii, 60. 
Pherae, a town of south-eastern 

Thessaly, the home of Admetus; 

of Jason, I, 108; of Alexander, 

II, 25. 

Philip, conqueror, klng of Mace- 
don (359-336),educated at Thebes, 
cultured, i, 90; wise, ii, 48; elo- 
quent, tactful and firm in disci- 
pline, II, 53. 

Philip, the younger, son of Anti- 
gonus iq.v.), II, 48. 

Philippus, Lucius Marcius, orator 
second only to Crassus and 
Antonius, i, 108; statesman, ii, 
59; as tribune (104), proposed 
agrarian reforms, ii, 73; dis- 
honest policy toward the Asiatic 
states, 111,87. 

Philippus, Quintus Marcius, father 
of preceding, consul (186 and 169), 
11,59; 111,87. 

Philosophers, why righteous, i, 28; 
attitude toward civic duty, i, 28 ; 
as teachers, i, 155. 

Philosophy, the study of, i, 1-4; 
theoretical speculation, i, 153; 
meaning, ii, 5; spirit of, ii, 7; as 
a discipline, ii, 4; worth while, ii, 
5 fg. ; why Cicero turned to it, ii, 
2-8; 111,1-6. 

Phintias, the friend of Damon (q.v.), 

III, 45. 

Phoenissae, the Phoenician Women, 

a tragedy of Euripides dealing 

with the war of the Seven against 

Thebes, iii, 82. 
1'icenum, state of north-east Italy, 

on the Adriatic, iii, 74. 
['inthia, Marcus Lutatius, un- 

known, iii, 77. 
Piraeus, the great, landlocked har- 

bour of Athens, about five miles 

from the city, iii, 46. 
Piso; Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi, 

so surnamed for his integrity; 

author and statosraan; tribune 

(149); law against extortion, ii, 



Plaetorian Law, enacted{192),iii,61. 

Plataea, the heroic little city at the 
foot of Mount Cithaeron in 
Boeotia; alone with Athens at 
Marathon (490); the scene of the 
final defeat of the Persians in 
Hellas (479), i, 61. 

Plato (429-347), pupil and friend 
of Socrates, profound philoso- 
pher and brilhant author, i, 22, 
63; ideal statesman, i, 85, 87; 
might have been a great orator, 

I, 4; founder of the Academy 
(^.tr.); a great teacher, i, 155; 
often quoted by Cicero, i, 15 
22, 28, 63, 64, 85, 87; iii, 38, 39. 

Plautus, Titus Maccius (254-184), 
the greatest of Rome's comic 
poets ; rich in wit, i, 104. 

Po, the great river of Cisalpine 
Gaul, III, 88. 

Poeni; see Carthaginians. 

Polybius, of Megalopolis (204-122), 
president of the Achaean League, 
detained at Rome in the house 
of Aemilius Paulus; friend of 
Scipio Aemilianus and Laelius; 
author of a history of Rome.iii, 

Pompey; Gnaeus Pompeius Mag- 
nus (106-48), warrior, i, 76; 
(ii, 20;) poUtician, the enemy of 
Caesar, the idol of Cicero, ii, 2; 
conquered the pirates, Sertorians, 
Mithradates, J udaea, i, 78 ; trium- 
vir; married Julia, iii, 82; 
adorned Rome with great build- 
ings, 11, 60; magnificent shows, 

II, 57; defeated at Pharsalus 
(48), 11,45. 

Pompey; Quintus Pompeius Rufus, 
consul (141) ; as commander in the 
war with Numantia (140) made 
the unfortunate peace, iii, 109. 

Pompey, Sextus, cousin of Pompey 
the Great, Stoic, scholar, geo- 
metrician, i, 19. 

Pomponius, Marcus, tribune (363); 
accuser of Lucius Manlius, iii,112. 

Pontius, Gaius, the Samnite general, 
victor at the Caudine Forks (321), 
II, 75; faithlessly treated, de- 
feated (292), and executed in 

Poor, services to the, ii, 61 fg. ; their 
gratitude, ii, 63, 69-71. 

PopiHus [Marcus Popilius Laenas, 
as consul (172) campaigning in 
Liguria, i, 36]. 

Popular esteem, a means to glory, 
II, 31 ; how gained, n, 44 fg. 

Posidonius, of Apamea (135-51), a 
Stoic, disciple of Panaetius at 
Athens, iii, 8 ; established a school 
at Rhodes where Cicero studied 
under him; later he Uved with 
Cicero in Rome ; author of many 
works, 1, 159; iii, 10. 

Postumius; Spurius Postumius Al- 
binus, defeated in his second con- 
sulship (821) at the Caudine 
Forks, III, 109. 

Prodicus, of Ceos (fifth century), a 
respected sophist; his " Choice 
of Hercules," i, 118. 

Profession ; see Vocation. 

Promises, non-fulfilment sometimes 
a duty, I, 32 ; iii, 92-95 ; sacred 
though given to an enemy, i, 39- 

Property, private, how obtained, 
I, 92; rights of, i, 21; ii, 73-79, 
85 ; III, 53 ; public, rights of, i, 21, 

Propriety, defined, i, 96; its rela- 
tions to the Cardinal Virtues, i, 
93-100; poetic, i, 97; moral, i, 
98-99; conduct in accord with 
personal endowment, i, 110-117; 
in choosing a career, i, 115-121; 
in outward appearance, i, 130; 
in inward self-control, i, 131-132; 
in speech, i, 132 fg. ; in the home, 
1, 138-140. 

Propylaea, the magnificent gateway 
to the AcropoUs of Athens, built 
(437-431) by Pericles and Mnesi- 
cles at a cost of i(;500,000, ii, 60. 

Prosecution, ii, 49; to be rarely 
undertaken, ii, 50; a public ser- 
vice, 11, 50. 

Prudence ; see Wisdom. 

Ptolemy, Philadelphus (309-247), 
king of Egypt, patron of art and 
letters, had the Bible translated; 
vastly rich, ii, 82. 

Public Lands, private occupation to 
be maintained, i, 21. 

Public Service, as a career, i, 70 fg. ; 
as a duty, i, 72 ; as an honour, i, 
73; free from partisanship, i, 85- 
86 ; self-seeking, i, 87 ; vindictlve- 



ness, I, 88; anger, i, 89; guided 
by wisdoin, i, 155-156. 

Public shows, extravagant expendi- 
tures, II, 55-60; expected of an 
aedile, ii, 57-60. 

Pulcher, Gaius Claudius, son of 
Appius, aedile (99), ii, 57; consul 

Public Wars ; see Carthage. 

Pyrrho, of Elis (fourth century), 
founder of the school of the Scep- 
tics; held that virtue is the only 
good, that truth and Ijnowledge 
are unattainable; his ethical 
theories rejected, i, 6. 

Pyrrhus (318-272), king of Epirus, 
descended from Achilles and 
Aeacus, i, 38 ; a daring soldier and 
a gallant enemy, i, 38; a career 
of adventure and conquest, i, 
38; in, 86; invaded Italy (280- 
275); the story of the poisoner, 
1, 40; III, 86; (see also Fabricius); 
invaded Macedonia (273) and the 
enemy's troops joined him, ll, 26 ; 
killed in Argos (272). 

Pythagorean, a follower of Pythag- 
oras or member of his secret 
fraternity, i, 155 ; iii, 45. 

Pythagoras, of Samos (sixth cen- 
tury), studied in the Orient, 
great mathematician ; moral and 
religious teacher; serious, ascetic, 
I, 108; taught transmigration of 
souls; founded a secret brother- 
hood of ideal friendship, i, 56; 
asceticism was the rule of prac- 
tice, with deep meditation and 
lofty aspiration. 

Pythian, epithet of Apollo, from 
Pytho, another name for Delphi, 
n, 77. 

Pythius, of Syracuse, his dis- 
honesty, iii, 58. 

Quirinus, the Sabine name for thc 
deified Romulus, iii, 41. 

Recklessness, to be avoided, i, 81, 

Regulus, Marcus Atilius, a favourite 
hero of old Rome ; consul (267 
and 256), annihilated the Car- 
thaginian fleet, took many towns, 
was finally (256) defeated and 
taken prisoner, i, 39; iii, 99; 


his famous emoassy and tne ethics 
of his conduct, iii, 99-115. 

Remus, twin brother of Romulus, 
slain for leaping in derision over 
the new walls of Rome, in, 41. 

Reproof, how administered, i, 136. 

Republic, the Roman; its glory, ii, 
2; the protectorate of the world, 

II, 27; its downfall, i, 35; ii, 2-5, 
29, 65; III, 2, 4, 83; the tyraufs 
sway, II, 23-29; iii, 81-85; en- 
slaved, iii, 84-85. 

Retirement, the life of, i, 69-70. 
Rhodes, a large island off the coast 

of Caria, iii,50. 
Rhodian, a native of Rhodcs, iii, 

50, 57; 111,63. 
Riches, the object of acquiring, i, 

25 ; proper use of , i, 68 ; compared 

with virtue, iii, 24 (s<<WeaIth). 
Roman, of or belonging to Rome, 

III, 58; people, i, 33; iii, 79, 
83-86, 105, 109, 114; the peoplc 
of Rome, ii, 75; celebrated for 
courage, i, 61; champion of jus- 
tice, I, 36; ii, 26; hatred of 
tyranny and injustice, iii, 19; 
atonement for tyranny and injus- 
tice, II, 27-29; their enslavement, 

Rome, the capital of the Empire 
and mistress of the world, i, 39, 
40;iii, 73, 79, 99, 112, 113. 

Romulus, the mythical king, founder 
of Rome, iii, 40; builder of its 
walls ; not justified in slaying his 
brother, iii, 41. 

Roscius, Sextus, of Ameria, ac- 
cused by Chrysogonus, a freed- 
man of Sulla's, of murdering his 
father; bravely and successfully 
defended by Cicero at the age of 
twenty-six, ii, 51. 

Rupilius, an actor otherwise un- 
known, i, 114. 

Rutilius; Publius Rutilius Rufus, a 
disciple of Publius Scaevola, ii, 
47; of Panaetius, lii, 10; with 
Quintus Scaevola in Asia he re- 
pressed the extortion of the pub- 
licans, was banished, and de- 
voted his life to philosophy and 
literature, iii, 10. 

Sabine, belonging to the province 
ol central Italy, iii, 74; the Sa- 


bines, unfriendly to Rome till 
subdued and added to the empire 
(290), I, 35, 38. 

Sacred Laws; the Leges Sacratae, 
laws for the violation of wbich 
the oflfender was nominally con- 
secrated to some god — i.e., laden 
with acurse, iii, 111. 

Salamis, the island and straits 
directly in front of the Piraeus 
{q.v.), where (480) Themistocles 
and the allied Greeks virtually 
annihilated the fleets of Persia, 

Sale, fraud in sale of real estate, 
III, 54-64; laws concerning, iii, 
65-71 ;ofslaves, iii, 71-72. 

Salmacis, a fountain (and nymph) 
at Halicamassus, whose waters 
made men who drank them weak 
and eflfeminate, i, 61. 

Samnites, the brave, liberty-loving 
people of Samnium, a province 
of south-central Italy; after 
seventy-one years (343-272) of 
war with Rome admitted to citi- 
zenship, i, 38; famous for their 
victory at the Caudine Forks, iii, 
109; Gaius Pontius, ii, 75. 

Sanitation ; see Health. 

Sardinia, the large island north of 
Sicily, made a province (238), 
misgoverned, ii, 50. 

Satrius; Marcus Minucius Basilus 
Satrianus, adopted by Lucius 
Minucius Basilus, his inherit- 
ance, iii, 74. 

Scaevola, Publius Mucius, father of 
the pontifex maximus, consul 
(133) and friend of Tiberius 
Gracchus, an expert in the ponti- 
fical law, II, 47. 

Scaevola, Quintus Mucius, the 
Augur, son of the preceding, son- 
in-Iaw of Laelius, friend of Afri- 
canus, consul (117), preceptor 
to Cicero ; simple in his greatness, 
I, 109. 

Scaevola, Quintus Mucius, the 
Pontifex Maximus, son of Pub- 
lius, preceptor of Cicero; orator, 
jurist ; authority on the civil law, 
his business honour, iii, 62, 70; 
followed his father's calling, i, 
116; magnificent aedileship, ii, 
57 ; consul (96), m, 47. 

Scaurus, Marcus Aemilius, consul 
(115) ; partisan rather than states- 
man, i, 76; ambassador to Jugur- 
tha (112), notorious corruptionist, 
but loyal aristocrat; hence Cice- 
ro's praise, i, 108. 

Scaurus, Marcus Aemilius, son of 
the preceding, step-son of SuIIa, 
aedile (68) with extraordinary 
magnificence, ii, 57; governor of 
Sardinia (56), which he plundered 
outrageously ; successfully de- 
fended by Cicero and Horten- 
sius; later (52) condemned and 
banished, i, 138; palace on the 
Palatine, i, 138. 

Scipio, Gnaeus Cornelius, brother 
of Publius {see foUowing) ; consul 
(222) with Marcus Marcellus; 
with Publius in Spain (217-211); 
a gallant soldier, i, 61 ; iii, 16. 

Scipio, Publius Cornelius, brother 
of Gnaeus and father of the eldcr 
Africanus, l, 121 ; consul (218), 
defeated by Hannibal at the 
Ticinus; waged war in Spain 
(217-211); a gallant soldier, i, 
61 ; iii, 16. 

Scipio; Publius Cornelius Scipio 
Africanus Major (234-183), the 
son of Publius, i, 121 ; grandfather 
of the Gracchi, ii, 80; defeatcd 
Hannibal at Zama (202) and 
closed the war; never idle in his 
zeal for Rome, iii, 1-4. 

Scipio, Publius Cornelius, son of 
Africanus Major, adoptive father 
of Africanus Minor; gifted men- 
tally but physically disqualified 
for an active career, i, 121. 

Scipio; Publius Cornelius Scipio 
Aemilianus Africanus Minor, son 
of Aemilius Paulus Macedonicus, 

I, 116, 121; adopted son of Pub- 
lius Africanus's son, i, 121 ; friend 
and pupil of Panaetius, i, 90 ; in- 
timate friend of Laelius {g.v.) and 
devoted to literature; serious, 
earnest, i, 108; self-control, ii, 
76; a great soldier, i, 76, 116; 
at Pydna (168) with his father; 
captured and destroyed Carthage 
(136) and Numantia (133), i, 35; 

II, 76; statesman of high ideals, 
a bitter rival and yet a friend o 
Quintus Metellus, i, 87. 



Scipio; Publius Comelius Scipio 
Nasica Serapio, known cLiefly as 
the man who led the riot and mur- 
dered Tiberius Gracchiis, i, 76, 

Scipio; Publius Cornelius Scipio 
Nasica, son of the preceding; 
died in his consulship (111); a 
charming gentleman and a bril- 
liant speaker, i, 109. 

Secret sin, ii, 37 fg. 

Seius, Marcus, reduced the price of 
corn and rc^;ained his lost popu- 
larity, ii, 58. 

Self-control; s«« Temperance. 

Self-sacrifice, rii, 25 ; of Regulus, iii, 

Sergius, Gaius ; see Orata. 

Sicily, the great island south-west 
of Italy, fertile and rich, occupied 
along the coasts by prosperous 
Greek colonies, a Roman province 
(212 on), an easy prey for rapa- 
cious governors, as Verres whom 
Cicero prosecuted (70), ii, 50. 

Sicyon, a city near Corinth, famous 
as a centre of art ; Aratus and the 
tyranny, ii, 81-82. 

Silanus, Decimus Junius, stepfather 
of Marcus Brutus, consul (62), 
aedile, ii, 57. 

Slaves, duty toward, i, 41; iii, 89. 

Social Instinct, man and beast, i, 
12, 50; bees, i, 157; leads to jus- 
tice, I, 157; weighed against jus- 
tice, 1, 159 fg. 

Society, principles of, i, 50-57; iii, 
53 ; rights of, i, 21 ; service to, i, 

Socrates (469-399), the great philo- 
sopher and teacher, ii, 43; his 
ethics, III, 11, 77; his perfect 
poise, I, 90 ; brilliant dialectician, 
with a profound meaning in every 
word, I, 108; personal eccen- 
tricities, i, 148. "The noblest, 
ay, and the wisest and most 
righteous man that we have 
ever known." 

Socratic, following Socrates, i, 104, 
134 ; II, 87 ; most schools of philo- 
sophy are based on the teaching 
of Socrates — the Academy, i, 2; 
the Peripatetic, i, 2; iii, 20; the 
Cynic, i, 128; the Cyrenaic, iii, 
116 ; the Stoic, i, 6 ; etc, 


Sol, the sun-god, father of Phaeth<.in, 
iii, 94. 

Solon, the great lawgiver of Athens 
(638-558 ca.), poet, soldier, states- 
man ; his feigned madness and the 
acquisition of Salamis, i, 108 ; his 
constitution and the reorganized 
Areopagus, i, 75. 

Sophocles, the great tragic poet 
(495-406), supreme on the Athe- 
nian stage (468-441); general in 
the war against Samos (440), i, 

Sparta, capital of Lacedaemon in 
the south-eastern part of the 
Peloponnesus, iii, 99; constitu- 
tion of Lycurgus, i, 76; national 
character, i, 64; position at end 
of Persian wars, i, 76; at end of 
Peloponnesian war, i, 76; her 
arsenal, m, 49; disasters, i, 84; 
despotic, II, 26 ; cause of her fall, 
II, 77, 80. 

Stoics, adherents of the school 
founded by Zeno, an offshoot 
from Cynicism, i, 128; refounded 
by Chrysippus; philosophy with 
them is practical, making life 
accord with Nature's laws, iii, 
13; virtue and philosophy are 
identical; virtue the only good, i, 
6; III, 11, 12; moral wrong the 
only evil, iii, 106; pain no 
evil, III, 105 ; no degrees of right 
or viTong, I, 10; etymologists, 
I, 23; define fortitude, i, 62; 
temperance, i, 142; duties, iii, 
14; controversies, iii, 91; their 
right to teach ethics, i, 6; 
Cicero adopts their, 
I, 6; III, 20; common interests, 
I, 22 ; their theology a pantheistic 
materialism, God working in his 
providence, iii, 102; repre- 
sentative Stoics, ii, 61, 80; iii, 

Sulla; Lucius Comelius SuIIa Felix 
(138-78), noble, profligate, bril- 
liant genius; would stoop to 
anything, i, 109; soldier against 
Jugurtha, Mithradates, Marius, 
Rome; statesman; reformed the 
constitution ; absolute monarch of 
Rome (81-79) ; treatment of trib- 
utary allies, ni, 87; confiscator, 
i, 43; ir, 29; ovcrturned the old 


morals, ii, 27; Cicero opposed 

him, II, 51. 
SuUa, Publius Cornelius, nephew of 

the dictator, ii, 29; defended by 

Cicero on charge of complicity 

in Catiline's conspiracy. 
Sulla, Cornelius, a freedman of the 

dictator, ii, 29. 
Sulpicius; Gaius Sulpicius Galus, 

consul (166) ; famous astronomer, 

I, 19; predicted an eclipse of the 

Sulpicius; Publius Sulpicius Rufus 

(124-88), an eminent orator of 

little character, ii, 49. 
Sungod ; see SoL 
Superbus ; see Tarquin. 
Syracuse, a great Greek city in 

south-eastern Sicily, rich in art 

and in goods; ruled by Dioii, i, 

155; Dionysius, ii, 25; iii, 45; a 

popular resort, iii, 58. 

Tantalus, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and 
father of Pelops {q.v.), iii, 84. 

Tarquin; Lucius Tarquinius Super- 
bus, the last king of Rome (535- 
510), a cruel tyrant, expelled by 
Brutus and CoUatinus, iii, 40. 

Tarquins, the kinsmen of Tar- 
quinius Superbus, all expelled 
(510), III, 40. 

Taxation, levying of, ii, 74. 

Ternperance, the fourth Cardinal 
Virtue, I, 93-151; definition, i, 
93; the passions, i, 102; speech, 
I, 103; vs. Justice, i, 159-160; es- 
sential to success; ii, 77; vs. 
apparent Expedioncy, iii, 116 fg. 

Terence; Publius Terentius Afer 
(195-159), a comic poet, friend 
of Laelius and Scipio; six plays 
are left; quotation from the 
Heauton Timorumenus, i, 30; the 
Eunuchus, i, 150. 

Tliebe, daughter of Jason and wife 
of Alexander of Pherae, ii, 25. 

Thebes, the capital of Boeotia, 
home of Pindar and Epaminon- 
das, 1, 155. 

Themistocles, brilliant statesman 
of Athens, n, 16; gave Athens 
her fleet and saved Greece at 
Salamis (480), i, 75; consummate 
general, i, 108; not always scru- 
pulous in his metbods, iii, 49; 

his valuation of character, ii, 

Theophrastus, of Lesbos, favourite 
pupil and successor of Aristotle, 
a marvellous teacher, master of 
Demetrius of Phalerum, i, 3; a 
prolific author; cited, ii, 56, 64. 

Theopompus, of Chios (fourth cen- 
tury), pupil of Isocrates, orator 
and historian, ii, 40. 

Thermopylae, a narrow pass on the 
seashore between Thessaly and 
Locris, held by Leonidas and his 
three hundred against the hosts of 
Xerxes (480), i, 61. 

Theseus, the great legendary hero of 
Athens, benefactor of the world; 
uniter of Athens and Attica; 
father of Hippolytus {q.v.) by 
Antiope; husband of Phaedra; 
his son's death, i, 32 ; iii, 94. 

Thrace, the vast country north of 
the Aegean; though the home of 
Orpheus, Linus, etc, it was gener- 
ally considered barbarous, ii, 25. 

Thyestes, son of Pelops and brother 
of Atreus {q.v.), (iii, 102). 

Timotheus, admiral of the Athenian 
fleet (378-356), compared with his 
father Conon, i, 116. 

Torquatus ; see Manlius. 

Trades; see Vocation. 

Troezen, a city of Argolis, near the 
shore opposite Aegina ; the asylura 
of the Athenians at the approach 
of Xerxes, iii, 48. 

Trusts, when not to be restored, iii, 

Truth, the search af ter, i, 13. 

Tubero, Quintus Aelius, the Stoic, 
a pupil of Panaetius, praetor 
(123); a talented jurist, iii, 63. 

Tusculum, a town in the Alban hills, 
the oldest municipium in Italy, 
admitted (381), i, 35 ; public lands 
of, 1, 21 ; Cicero's favourite coun- 
try home. 

Twelve Tables.the laws of, drawn up 
(450) ; quoted, i, 37 ; iii, 111. 

Tyranny, ii, 23-29 ; inspired by false 
perspective, iii, 36 ; right and duty 
toward the tyrant, iii, 19, 85. 

Tyre, the great commercial city on 
the coast of Phoenice, ii, 86. 

Ulysses (Odysseus), son of Laerte» 


of Ithaca, the shrewdest of the 
Greek heroes at Troy, iii, 97 • the 
hero of the Odyssey, i, 113 ' 

Varro, Gaius Terentius, consul (216) 
with Paulus, responsible for the 
disaster at Cannae, iii, 114. 

Venus (Aphrodite), the goddess of 
beauty and love; of Cos, iii 10 

Vesens, a little stream near Mount 
Vesuvius; scene of the battle of 
Manlius Torquatus and the elder 
Decius, III, li2. 

Veturius; Titus Vcturius Calvinus, 
consul with Spurius Postumius 
(321) at the Caudine Forlcs, m, 

Vice, luxurious living, i, 123; sen- 
sual pleasure, i, 102, 104-106 
122-123; II, 37; avarice, 11 77- 
extravagance, i, 140; mlsrepre- 
seatation, i, 150; untruth, i, 150; 
corrected by obsorving others i' 
146; by the criticisra of the wise. 
1, 147. 

Viriathus, 11, 40. 

Vi tue, defined, 11, ig; chief 
function of, 11, 17; the four Car- 
dinal Virtues described, i, 15-17; 
the sources of moral rectitude, i' 
152; III, 96; Nature's leadings to, 
I, 100; endangered by sensual 
pleasure, 11, 37; rulers chosen for 
n, 41. ' 

V)cation, choice of, i, 115-120- 
change of, i, 120-121; vulgar and 
liberal, i, 150-152. 

Volscians, a people of lower Latium 
subdued (303), given full citizeii- 
ship (188), I, 35. 

War, rights of, to be enforced, 1, 34 ; 

Cato's son, i, 36-37; excuse foi 
war, I, 35, 80; justice in war, i 
38; war for supremacy, i, 38; foi 
glory, I, 38; needless cruelty, i 

Wealth, Theophrastus on, 11, 56 ; in- 
satiable thirst for, i, 25- why 
sought, I, 25-27; the real good o) 
wealth, II, 56 ; see Riches. 

Wisdom, the first of the Cardinal 
Virtues, 1, 15-19; most important, 
I, 153; 11, 6; absolute, iii, 16; and 
propriety, i, 94, 100; vs. Justice, 
I, 152-157, 160; confounded with 
cunning, 11, 10; iii, 72, 96; in 
Epicurus'ssystem, iii, 117. 

Wit, kinds of, i, 103-104 ; representa- 
tives of, 1, 108. 

Xanthippus, a Spartan soldier 01 
fortune, whose generalship de- 
feated Regulus, iii, 99. 

Xenocrates, of Chalcedon (396-314), 
a pupil of Plato, president of the 
Academy, industrious and severe. 
1, 109. 

Xenophon, soldier, historian, dis- 
ciple of Socrates, 11, 87 ; the story 
of Hercules's choice, i, 118. 

Xerxes, king of Persia (485-46:-)), 
son of Darius, invaded Gretre 
(480), came to grief at Salamis 
and Plataea, iii, 48. 

Youth, duties peculiar to, i, 123; 
II, 52; time for choosing pro- 
fession, i, 117. 

Zeno, of Cytium (fourth century), 
pupil of Crates the Cynic and 
founder of the Stoic school (see 
Stoics), III, 35. 



^o^z Cicero, Marcus Tullius 

o296 De officiis